Knowledge (XXG)

United Kingdom in the Soviet–Afghan War

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641:, recommended providing Afghan fighters in "forward positions" just inside the Pakistan border with "surface to air missiles to defend themselves against air attack". The CIA had tied their hands by striking a deal with Pakistan's ISI under which the Americans were not able to conduct unilateral operations against the Soviets inside Afghanistan. This also meant that they were only able to supply to Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami. As a result, they had to rely heavily on MI6 using it as a proxy to carry out operations that were deemed too secret to involve the Pakistanis. The difference being – the CIA was restricted to extreme secrecy whereas MI6 were not. The 467:. As it was considered too dangerous for serving British soldiers to travel in the country they were 'de-badged' and then seconded to SIS under false identification. There were also contract labourers who had to be trained in intelligence techniques and were provided military instructions by MI6 personnel so that these men had to handle the dangerous cross-border operations from Pakistan. Altogether these men were known colloquially as the 'increment' or the Revolutionary Warfare Wing (RWW). The first of these arrived in the summer of 1981, having made the difficult two-week journey walking North of the Pakistan border into 577:
horseman) along with a miniature satellite dish, a transmitter and a computerised keyboard. Also recovered was a British passport which belonged to a 'Stuart Bodman' purporting to be a journalist working for Gulf Features Service. The equipment and the body were identified and paraded at a Kabul Press conference to the world; the Russians accused the British of meddling with terrorists. The Foreign office denied any knowledge of who he was and remained tight-lipped. Over the next few days after the broadcast, the British press sought to find details about Stuart Bodman, but was then tracked down by journalists from the
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escaped when an Afghan officer lured the helicopter away sacrificing his life so they could escape. If the British were identified by the Soviets in a clash, a cover story was in place in case such an incident occurred. MI6 operations soon began to attract Soviet attention; on 1 July 1983 British operatives in the Panjshir had been warned by Massoud himself, that the Russians were about to descend on their position. All the operatives immediately attempted to head back to Pakistan in a convoy which included a number of French medical doctors. Eventually, this led to a clash not far from
960:. MI6's overall contribution is not known as much remains classified. The support from Britain as well as the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China all assisted in forcing a Soviet withdrawal. The help the British gave Massoud was critical to his fight which led to the Soviet failure to capture and consolidate the Panjshir and even Massoud himself. His men were still using the British-supplied radios well into the nineties. One British official claimed that the intelligence and communications that Massoud was given were 'worth over a hundred planeloads of 949: 271: 657:
short on delivering vital supplies. Avrakotos also concluded that funding MI6 independently had to be done secretly under the noses of other CIA officials, as well as the Pakistanis. From him money was poured into MI6, increasing their expenditure tenfold and allowing them to carry out further operations. Through Avrakotos the CIA used MI6 operatives to set up listening devices near Russian bases such as at Bagram. These teams were sent throughout the war to track the movements of Soviet tanks and aircraft.
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that the Mujahideen had won. MI6 then recruited journalists who were then trained for the role of Britain's psychological operations in Afghanistan. These were more experimental, having to find suitable cameramen among the mujahideen groups in Peshawar or sometimes crossing the border with them to reinforce their journalistic cover as freelance foreign correspondents. Footage that came out of Afghanistan initially were of poor quality, and MI6 sought to improve this, so therefore the camera of choice was a
564: 30: 694: 758:). The Stingers however were not able to intercept the high-flying Soviet jets. ISI however made sure that Massoud's forces received none of the Stingers, even though eight (a fraction of 1% of the total) were smuggled in. The impact of the Stinger on the outcome of the war is contested, particularly in the translation between the impact on the tactical battlefield to the strategic level withdrawal, and the influence the first had on the second. 791:, a KMS subsidiary. They would end up training the leaders of seven large brigades. Some of this training took place before the Soviet invasion was launched – the support going to the Mahz-i-Milli Islam led by Rahmatullah Safi who lived in England after the Soviet invasion. He and his officers were trained by MI6 and would return a year later based in 532:. From the intercepted Soviet intelligence MI6 was able to adjust mujahid training accordingly. During the Soviet Panjshir VII offensive, which would be one of the largest of the war, the radios and British intelligence combined had warned Massoud. This gave him details of the 11,000 Soviet and 2,600 Afghan soldiers, under Marshal of the Soviet Union 536:, supported by 200 aircraft and 190 helicopters assaulting the valley. These details saved Massoud and his men's lives, and despite the losses during the offensive they survived the huge onslaught. Through the following offensives (Panjshir VIII and IX) as well, MI6 was providing him with more than just secure communications. 585:. It was assumed that the passport was a stolen identity and led to speculation that there was a cover-up. It was not realised at the time that Gulf Features Service was a front organisation that provided a journalistic cover and that Bodman's false name allowed the British government to deny any knowledge of his existence. 307:. Thatcher, on the other hand, wanted to wage a covert war even if it meant putting British troops on the ground. However any overt military action to counter the USSR was out of the question, not just because of the risks of escalation, but the severe limitations on the UK's military capabilities. The 865:
The UK's role in the conflict entailed direct military involvement not only in Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. From 1984 in conjunction with the CIA and ISI, MI6 helped organize and execute "scores" of guerrilla-style attacks. These included rocket attacks on villages
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was chosen which was also sent clandestinely. The CIA eventually supplied nearly 500 Stingers (some sources claim 1,500–2,000) to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and 250 launchers. American personnel however were not able to train the Mujahideen, so instead, they were trained by the Pakistani ISI and a
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With Pakistan and the US working together, British intelligence believed that "the CIA was being too alarmist about the Soviet threat to Pakistan." Some British officers thought that backing militant Islamic groups such as that of Hekmatyar was dangerous, particularly in the wake of the death of Andy
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who coordinated the assistance of training and supplies to Abdul Haq. The latter would become an intermediary for the CIA, MI6 and the Kabul front. Haq's office in Peshawar became the organizing centre of resistance with MI6 and CIA operatives assisting – most of the time they supplied him with maps
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met with some MI6 agents in London, one of whom had just returned from three months inside the warzone. Avrakotos questioned Massoud's truce with the Soviets but he got a better understanding of the situation with British intelligence and reports from the field. He realized MI6's budget cuts led them
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MI6 sought to find the faction that they could support – after approval for operations the first move was in February 1980 just two months after the Soviet invasion, MI6 officers led by the Far East's Controller Gerry Warner met tribal leaders in the Pakistan border area within a school to offer help
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After the Soviet withdrawal, CIA and MI6 officers in Pakistan prepared for what happened next. MI6 was still supportive of Massoud, while the CIA still hoped Heketmayer would be the ideal choice to lead an anti-communist government. The British also wanted the United Nations to push for a compromise
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KMS even organised the commanders to be sent to Britain – the training camps there were set up in late 1983. Disguised as tourists, the selected Mujahideen commanders were trained in three-week cycles in Scotland, northern and southern England on SAS training grounds, living in old barns. One of the
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The operatives always saw front-line action assisting Massoud's men mostly using silencer rifles. They witnessed the interrogation of Russian prisoners and assisted in directing mortar fire. At one point three operatives and their Afghan escorts were lured into a Soviet helicopter ambush – they only
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the rebels. Thatcher did neither, and denied any British involvement, and only in Parliament did she state that diplomatic solutions were the answer to the end of the war. She was still however vocally supporting the Mujahideen in the same year and even met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Haq in
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came to power in 1985, he was looking for a way to disengage from Afghanistan. Newspaper reports linking Britain with the supply and training of weapons to the Mujahideen led to Soviet anger. Gorbachev put to Margaret Thatcher that there would be a solution if Britain stopped supplying and training
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For Massoud's men, it was different, due to Pakistan's hostility they had to take them out of Pakistan and be trained elsewhere. Massoud stated that his men needed battlefield organisation skills and so picked out the best of his junior commanders to be trained by the British. Here KMS was involved
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which was the CIA's program to arm and finance the Afghan mujahideen began in 1981 – the first US aid package worth $ 3.2 billion. Britain would play a vital role in the program in many ways. MI6 reactivated their long-established networks of contacts in Pakistan which they relayed to the CIA.
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who had been recruited by MI6 for this reason, and went into Afghanistan in 1982. He built up a good friendship with Massoud and his aides. Later that year Gall and his team managed to send back footage successfully during the Soviet Panjshir IV offensive. This was transmitted on 23 November for an
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hotel. They then set off crossing the border into Afghanistan where they came under fire from the Soviets or their Afghan allies before they eventually met Massoud. The meeting was a success – the British gave a large sum of money to Massoud and asked what he needed. He said he had enough weapons,
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touring the border and assuring them of support. A further meeting with West German, French and US representatives took place in London the following month. All looked to support the Mujahideen in some ways but not to provide direct aid – the French proposed channeling military aid via the Iraqis,
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In line with Carrington's wish for a 'televised war' MI6's training and operational efforts doubled as a sideshow providing the international coverage of Massoud's fight against the Soviets in the Panjshir. In an untried method MI6 intended to film any atrocities they came across or any victories
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There would be nine Soviet directed offensives in the Panjshir valley in total. The last, 'Panjshir IX' ended in 1985, and the Soviets withdrew from the area the following year. The offensives were a failure overall - with each one either repelled, or after a Soviet withdrawal, Massoud's forces
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as punishment for 'bringing war footage of Massoud's military victories to the West'. Skrzypkowiak's killers were not found and Hekmatyar even rewarded them, such was the interfactional rivalry at the time. Britain's response was muted over the death of Skrzypkowiak even though they had concerns
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by Soviet and Afghan DPRA troops supported by helicopter gunships. All six of the Britons just about managed to escape alive – one suffering from severe exhaustion and having to be carried back. The Russians who had been tipped off failed to capture them but recovered a body (in fact Mujahideen
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Since its establishment of the 'increment' during the war MI6 continued to use this in the 1990s with both SAS and SBS providing small detachments. Coordination and tasking would be routed through a fourth ministry of defense adviser typically an SAS officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel
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operated by the RAF 'S&D' flight, a small cadre of RAF special forces pilots that support MI6 and the SAS. Once back in Afghanistan the commanders passed on the training to the insurgents themselves. Some KMS personnel even performed scouting parties and backup roles for the front-line
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as well as the CIA, due mostly to his truce with the Soviets and their Afghan counterparts which took place in 1983. With Pakistan unwilling to assist Massoud as he was a Tajik the US had to follow suit. The British role was particularly resented by the Pakistanis, who accused Massoud of an
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much of it captured from the Russians and their allies but what he needed was expert military training, radios and other high-tech supplies. The British agreed to support Massoud despite the challenges of the Pakistanis, and to set up an operation to fund, supply and train Massoud's forces.
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refugee camp, where 12,000 people were staying close to the Afghan border. Thatcher toured the refugee camp and then told a gathering of Afghan elders that her Government would continue to press Moscow to withdraw its troops from their homeland. She then gave a speech telling them that the
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to buy back the Stinger missiles from the Mujahideen but this failed. Most of the British trained Mujahideen however were loyal to Massoud and continued to fight with the Northern alliance against the Taliban. Most of the blame lay on the US after they had given Hekmatyar's group (who
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and was only fifty miles North East of Kabul. Here Massoud's men ambushed Soviet and Afghan communist convoys travelling through the pass, causing fuel shortages in Kabul. There was the issue that Massoud's faction were mostly Tajiks and Pakistan only supported the hardline Islamic
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and Saudi Arabia to train. There the Afghan commanders were trained in sabotage, reconnaissance, attack planning, arson, and how to use explosive devices and heavy artillery, such as mortars. The next stage was how to attack aircraft and lay anti-aircraft and anti-armour ambushes.
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and were mostly given to Haq's Hezb-e-Islami as they were easy to get through from Pakistan to Afghanistan between 1985 and 1986. British personnel then trained the Mujahideen on the missile, but the system nevertheless proved ineffective; thirteen missiles were fired for no hits.
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Skrzypkowiak. The Americans on the other hand still had suspicions about Britain's role in Afghanistan – they had assumed that they were trying to do as much as 'stay in the game' and that the 'Brits' had an agenda that America was trying to take the lead in their 'old back yard'.
543:. The operatives were able to take the most important parts of the helicopter, carrying them out on mules. From there they were successfully brought across the border into Pakistan, where they were field-tested or boxed up to be sent back to the UK for study. 80:, Massoud and his fighters with British support and intelligence, overcame nine Soviet offensives and held out up to the Soviet withdrawal from the vital valley in 1986. Massoud became the most successful and feared out of any of the Mujahideen commanders. 713:
stocks. MI6 also sent nearly half a million rounds for rifles even though they from the army reserve supplies. These weapons proved highly popular amongst the Afghan resistance groups, they were accurate and could penetrate Soviet flak jackets that a
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Britain's biggest contribution to the war by far was training the Mujahideen fighters. From Islamabad MI6 coordinated a multitude of private security and mercenary firms much of which was contracted out to the British Army. These were monitored by
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and also helped shelter Bin Laden. There was also the issue of the many hundreds of Blowpipe launchers and missiles being found in Taliban hands, some being unearthed as late as 2005. The US had launched an even bigger $ 10 million campaign
87:, from which the latter provided far more in financial and material terms. Unlike the US which had to funnel its program through Pakistan, the UK played a more direct combat role in Afghanistan itself – in particular, using retired or seconded 592:
cameraman with Massoud's men. Known as 'the Pole' (due to his Polish background) and brought out rare images of Massoud's guerrilla attacks against the Soviets. In October 1987 on his way back from the Panjshir he was killed by the CIA backed
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in which Afghanistan attempted to invade India. Although they were repelled, Afghanistan did secure independence but a new diplomatic mission was secured so that it could act as a buffer state between the British empire in India and the new
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who had close links with Hekmatyar & Massoud. MI6's aim was for Ahmad to spread radical and anti-Soviet Islamic literature in the Soviet republics in the hope of rebellions against their Communist governments. These went as far as
246:. British officials were concerned about the possibility that Moscow might subsequently exploit opportunities to destabilize fragile South Asian states to expand its influence within them. British concern was not with neighboring 681:
unwillingness to fight, but the truce was a tactical move so that he was able to regroup his forces, as his supplies were running critically low. Despite the CIA's doubts on Massoud, MI6 pursued an act to support him regardless.
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goggles. Lethal arms were also procured which included silenced sniper rifles and mortars. This would carry on over the next few years, all being done under the noses of the Pakistanis, who were unaware of the operations.
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The UK's role in the conflict entailed direct military involvement not only in Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. By the war's end, Britain's support to the Afghan resistance turned out to be
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intercepted and translated Soviet battle plan communications. This was then relayed to the MI6 teams, who had with them equipment such as the American-made AN/URS11 remote controlled signals intelligence transceiver and
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commandos. They would then guide guerrilla operations in Afghanistan in the hope officers could impart their learned expertise directly to the Afghans. They taught the Mujahideen how to shoot down Russian helicopters.
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Obtaining supplies in the first year proved difficult however, as the Soviets and their allies began to mine the route between them and Pakistan. Finding Afghans willing to drive supplies to them proved difficult but
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he and his factions not only controlled the Panjshir valley but several provinces in North East Afghanistan. Infighting between rival Mujahideen groups began in April 1992 which led to the 'War over Kabul'. Massoud
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In the subsequent aftermath of 9/11 there was controversy with the fact that Britain had been involved in training and arming the Mujahideen, and from which some officers went on to command senior positions in the
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network and computers, which not only intended to prevent Soviet eavesdropping, but were also exceptionally useful for Massoud to coordinate his forces. The team taught English to Massoud's aides (one of which was
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Through MI6, Massoud accepted an annual mission of two of their officers as well as military instructors (a total of five to eight men) for him and his fighters. These men were composed of special forces – SAS and
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Support for the Afghan resistance was approved by the British government who then authorized MI6 to conduct operations within the first year of the Soviet occupation. This was to be coordinated by MI6 officers in
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and private military corporations to support the resistance groups in practical manners. One of Britain's greatest contributions was training the Mujahideen; not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in the
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Scottish journalist and author John Fullerton who was a 'contract labourer' for MI6, in the role of head agent on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier during the war – used his experience which formed the novel
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were brought in, which eased the situation. By the end of the following year they were then able to move supplies to Massoud, which now included high tech equipment; laser binoculars and
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The war itself had had the bonus for the British getting their hands on or the ability to study and acquire knowledge of a large range of Soviet equipment – this being from the latest
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These were the first direct Western attacks on the Soviet Union since the 1950s and they reached their peak in 1986. MI6 directly remitted money into an account of Pakistani leader of
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MI6 team's most important contribution to Massoud and his fighters was helping with organization and communications via radio. Several of these tactical radios made by British firm
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became the British Prime Minister, and had a reputation for being firmly anti-Soviet. The nickname 'The Iron Lady' was first coined in an article in the Soviet military newspaper
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There were however some differences between America and the UK during the war. There was also a focus on Massoud who would be the subject of criticism from China, Pakistan,
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served under) $ 600 million during the conflict. Hekmatyar himself would occasionally give support to Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the US subsequently put him on its
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Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1981 – nicknamed the 'Iron Lady' by the Soviet press for her anti-Soviet stance. She pushed for more direct involvement in Afghanistan.
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but the West Germans were concerned about American intentions and the danger of a third world war. France agreed to provide some support, but only with the medical group
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was a feasible option. However, attention was soon turned to one of the factions that, in the view of the British, were the ones giving the Soviets a bloody nose – the
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on NATO troops. Although Britain had provided little support to Hekmatyar during the war, Whitehall officials had met with him twice in the 1980s, including Thatcher.
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and both agreed to give as much assistance to the Afghan rebels. She also enthusiastically backed Carter's tough stance towards the Soviets, but did not go as far as
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as a sham which enabled the Soviet bloc to wage the Cold War by other means, and professed in her memoirs that their intervention in Afghanistan came as no surprise.
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the head of MI6) arguing the case for military aid to "encourage and support resistance". Carrington then visited Pakistan on 17 January meeting with President
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in June 1980 and welcomed Zia-ul-Haq in a state visit four months later. Following this Thatcher then visited Pakistan in October 1981 and met Haq again, on a
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of new targets they wanted Haq to hit. Intelligence from GCHQ was also relayed to the CIA and ISI who were helping with their respective Mujahideen groups.
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peace between the factions but the CIA wanted to push on. However, after the Soviet withdrawal Massoud would soon become the biggest winner; after the
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Towards the end of the war, Britain was virtually running its own version of Operation Cyclone. On 20 July 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the
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mountains and finally into the valley itself at a secret location. They went so far as much as to look and dress like the mujahideen wearing the
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The operatives also helped to retrieve abandoned or destroyed Soviet equipment including crashed Soviet helicopters, one of which was a downed
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tribes. Despite this however the British sent out a team to meet Massoud – posing as journalists, they met Massoud's British-educated brother
787:(KMS Ltd) which was led by former SAS officers. The training was done in a pyramid structure with the SAS, KMS and MI6. This was done through 3634: 3508: 3443: 3414: 3308: 3258: 3229: 3168: 3081: 3031: 3000: 2971: 2923: 2894: 2873: 2786: 2692: 1032: 616: 283: 1455: 1126: 642: 2089: 3669: 3594: 1006: 3221:
The Secret History of the Five Eyes The Untold Story of the Shadowy International Spy Network, Through Its Targets, Traitors and Spies
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by the British army, but were available on the international arms market. Around fifty launchers and 300 Missiles were sent from the
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and stayed for three weeks or more in the Panjshir mountains using caves for shelter and cover, where a small base was established.
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on the other hand responded to the whole visit by critiquing Thatcher's "provocation aimed at stirring up anti-Soviet hysteria."
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The Special Air Service themselves were sent to Pakistan in 1983 and worked alongside US special forces in training Pakistan's
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where the majority of the population was Muslim. On Christmas Day 1979, the USSR began its military occupation of Afghanistan.
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to some units of the Mujahideen, and made sure their origins were open to speculation. The most notable of these was the
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Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity (chapter II, Historical background)
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Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
516:) so they could better use the radios. By 1986 a full system had been established after training had been completed. 1009:. Abdul Haq was killed a month later on 26 October after he was captured by the Taliban along with nineteen others. 3584: 227:, and the rebellions were seen in Moscow as the first stage of an alleged Western plot to instigate rebellions or ' 2886:
Charlie Wilson's War The Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History: The Arming of the Mujahideen by the CIA
423:. This area had within it 150,000 people, in a fertile river valley but it also had strategic areas, such as the 948: 705:
From the start of the war the mujahideen were sent hundreds of thousands of old British army small arms, mostly
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took place after the revolution had ended. The Soviets were keen to get in and stabilise the country citing the
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insurgents. Members of KMS and MI6 operatives also brought together rival Mujahideen groups that had previous
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Britain's role in the war was the most extensive covert operation their government had implemented since the
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After the 1940s, Britain played a very little role in Afghan politics, and this opened the door for the
48:, the United Kingdom was heavily involved, playing a key covert role in the conflict. Also known as the 181: 17: 788: 563: 1002: 837: 464: 459:
Fighting in the Panjshir valley became the Soviet Union's major focus for offensives in Afghanistan.
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The Real Special Relationship The True Story of How the British and US Secret Services Work Together
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refused any meeting on the matter. Armstrong then sent a note to Thatcher, Carrington and "C" (Sir
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off Western Scotland. The Mujahideen soldiers were shuttled between the UK and Pakistan by an RAF
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Britain had fought in Afghanistan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. British paranoia of
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to withdraw his troops from Afghanistan, but this proved fruitless when Soviet foreign minister
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Manufacturing Terrorism: When Governments Use Fear to Justify Foreign Wars and Control Society
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Behind the Enigma The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency
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which took Moscow by surprise, who preferred that the pro-Soviet Daoud Khan stay in power.
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Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy
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inspected some captured Soviet weapons, briefly crossed the border shaking hands with an
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from Britain in the hope of attacking Soviet transport barges on the South bank of the
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Map of the Panjsher Valley where MI6 operatives stayed in support of Ahmad Shah Massoud
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MI6 and the Machinery of Spying Structure and Process in Britain's Secret Intelligence
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Another incident involved an ex-SAS operative; Andy Skrzypkowiak who was working as a
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designated MODA/SO who joined other Ministry of Defense Advisers in the Secretariat.
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Britain, America, and the Special Relationship Since 1941 Seminar studies in history
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wanted to focus Britain's armed forces on Europe, and the risks of conflict between
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Discontent fermented amongst the people of Afghanistan, and anti-government revolts
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as a basis for their intervention. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders believed that
173: 149: 57: 1836:"UK discussed plans to help mujahideen weeks after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan" 1367:"UK discussed plans to help mujahideen weeks after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan" 1217: 1974: 710: 706: 646: 620: 424: 375: 362: 316: 153: 2032: 60:, including secretly arming, funding and supplying various factions. Britain's 3518: 3424: 3239: 3149: 3120: 3091: 3062: 3010: 2743: 2739: 2731: 2408:"United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan – Background" 871: 867: 854: 619:(National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) led by a former senior officer in the 552: 520: 472: 366: 358: 299: 259: 129: 37: 3453: 3318: 3268: 3189:
St. Petersburg and Moscow : Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814-1974
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were supplied in early 1982 to the Panjshir. The radio system was the Jaguar
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brought Afghanistan into the fray. Britain intended to gain control over the
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attempted to visit Moscow to try to persuade the leader of the Soviet Union
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would then retake it. Massoud thus became known as the 'Lion of Panjshir'.
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which flowed through these areas, some 25 kilometers in these territories.
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bulletin. Gall however was always kept away from the other MI6 operatives.
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political party was founded and supported by the Soviets. The PDPA, led by
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The silent conspiracy : inside the intelligence services in the 1990s
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MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service
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and they organized flights to be sent out to secret MI6 and CIA bases in
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Thatcher discussed British military aid with Pakistan's foreign minister
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from Afghanistan. This was pursuant to the negotiations that led to the
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The Base In Search of Al-Qaeda, the Terror Network that Shook the World
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The British also played a vital role in support of the US government's
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Ingram, Edward (1980). "Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction".
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and support if necessary. Warner then briefed an officer to find a
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Understanding Afghanistan : history, politics and the economy
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The Panjshir Valley 1980–86 The Lion Tames the Bear in Afghanistan
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Within three weeks of the Soviet invasion, the cabinet secretary,
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The Art of Betrayal Life and Death in the British Secret Service
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were behind the uprisings in Afghanistan in the context of the
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fighting a defensive war against the Taliban. Massoud however
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and the potential hijack by the Iranian Communist Party – the
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The Jihad Factory Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making
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van Voorst, Bruce; Iyer, Pico; Aftab, Mohammad (7 May 1984).
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and raids on Soviet airfields, troop supplies and convoys in
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Guerrilla Warfare Irregular Warfare in the Twentieth Century
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Unholy Wars Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism
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were with them, and promised aid. Thatcher then went to the
3192:. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 200–201. 2184: 2182: 382:, before flying back to Islamabad for a state banquet. The 196:. However Daoud Khan was overthrown six years later in the 136:, and as a result, three major wars were fought there; the 2119:"The Stinger missile and U.S. intervention in Afghanistan" 652:
In late 1983 the head of the CIA's Afghanistan operation,
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were able to keep away any facts from the British public.
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Killer Elite: America's Most Secret Soldiers Front Cover
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The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage
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What We Won America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-89
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in helicopters. These would prove useful in the coming
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With the failure of the Blowpipe missile, the American
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Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam
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Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation
1745: 1743: 1741: 1243:"The end game: Britain's role in Afghanistan 1947–50" 844:. Amongst the training involved was heavy weapons on 2963:
Shadow Wars: The Secret Struggle for the Middle East
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who, having received little support from the US and
2572:"À Kaboul et à Kandahar, loin des caméras (French)" 2546:"Designation of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a Terrorist" 322:Thatcher had a long conversation with US President 3019: 2085:The Campaign for the Caves: The battles for Zhawar 803:provinces. They would later take part in the 1986 448: 3303:. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 952:Abandoned Soviet artillery in the Panjshir Valley 754:few SAS (some of whom had used the weapon in the 2533:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 3655:Cold War military history of the United Kingdom 3131:Afghan Napoleon: The Life of Ahmad Shah Massoud 2684:Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–1989 1976:Endgame in Afghanistan: For Whom the Dice Rolls 631:– both introduced to the CIA in the same year. 167:independence of both Pakistan and India in 1947 64:(MI6) primarily supported the Mujahideen group 44:Though not officially a belligerent during the 721:In the Spring of 1986, Whitehall sent weapons 709:rifles, some of which were purchased from old 602:about how brutal and extremist Hekmatyar was. 3665:Cold War military history of the Soviet Union 989:taking over in 1996. After this followed yet 140:which ended in a humiliating withdrawal. The 108:'s most extensive covert operation since the 76:, became Britain's key ally in the conflict. 8: 3250:The Afghan Way of War How and Why They Fight 3073:Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964–91 2868:. Oxford University Press. pp. 235–36. 2716:. West Hoathly, W. Sussex: Clairview Books. 1511:"Afghanistan: The bear descends on the lion" 1360: 1358: 1356: 1316: 1304: 828:camps was in the mountains surrounding the 3531:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher ( 2807:Ghost Force The Secret History of the SAS 2311:"SIS Paramilitary/Covert Action Sections" 1429: 2382: 2331: 1900: 1732: 1681: 1191: 1105: 729:which had proved to be a failure in the 692: 551:film camera. One of the journalists was 449:MI6's battleground – the Panjshir Valley 178:People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan 2995:. Portland, Or.: Taylor & Francis. 2011: 1343:"PAKISTANIS ASSURED BY LORD CARRINGTON" 1266: 1091: 455:Panjshir offensives (Soviet–Afghan War) 18:United Kingdom in the Soviet-Afghan War 3650:Cold War history of the United Kingdom 3524: 3076:. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 2607: 2595: 2498: 2467: 2455: 2440: 2394: 2370: 2358: 2280: 2268: 2256: 2239: 2227: 2215: 2188: 2071: 1999: 1979:. SAGE Publishing India. p. 133. 1960: 1948: 1912: 1861: 1821: 1797: 1785: 1705: 1657: 1642: 1598: 1586: 1574: 1547: 1496: 1484: 1441: 1417: 1179: 176:'s involvement. In the 1960s the new 3675:Soviet Union–United Kingdom relations 3253:. New York: Oxford University Press. 2781:(3rd ed.). London: Pluto Press. 2687:. New York: Oxford University Press. 2346: 2297: 2203: 2173: 2087:, Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali 1924: 1873: 1773: 1749: 1720: 1669: 1625: 1613: 1535: 1390: 1120: 1118: 1116: 1114: 365:. She was flown by helicopter to the 7: 3660:Cold War history of the Soviet Union 3625:Anti-communism in the United Kingdom 3620:Afghanistan–United Kingdom relations 2428: 2155:from the original on 21 October 2014 2104: 1936: 1888: 1809: 1761: 1693: 1559: 1472: 1402: 1341:Borders, William (17 January 1980). 1328: 1280:"Afghanistan: 20 years of bloodshed" 1237: 1235: 999:was assassinated on 9 September 2001 985:which resulted in a new faction the 836:, while the other was in the remote 3570:Afghanistan conflict (1978–present) 2514:. Voice of America. 28 October 2009 920:By the time the new Soviet Premier 3438:. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books. 1365:Bowcott, Owen (30 December 2010). 25: 3605:Wars involving the United Kingdom 2620:Miller, Phil (4 September 2001). 519:Added to this was intelligence – 3615:20th-century military operations 3409:. London: Simon & Schuster. 1456:"Secret Affairs, By Mark Curtis" 1206:The International History Review 1081:United Kingdom in the Korean War 779:, and given the go-ahead by the 615:The two most prominent were the 250:, but the ongoing revolution in 192:by overthrowing the monarchy of 3610:Military history of Afghanistan 3600:Wars involving the Soviet Union 2535:, "SIPRI Yearbook 2007", p. 636 660:MI6's base of operation was in 156:being established by 1893. The 78:Fighting in the Panjshir valley 2966:. London: Simon and Schuster. 2960:Davidson, Christopher (2016). 2839:. London: Simon and Schuster. 2550:US Department of State Archive 1454:Sengupta, Kim (30 July 2010). 1035:in 2003. Hekmatyar would even 1007:NATO's twenty-year involvement 567:Panjshir valley as it is today 1: 3590:British intelligence agencies 3047:. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 1218:10.1080/07075332.1980.9640210 40:were trained by Britain's SAS 3635:Private military contractors 3224:. London: Blink Publishing. 2810:. London: Cassell Military. 2655:. Diane Publishing Company. 2480:Sifton, John (6 July 2005). 970:Communists had been defeated 697:An Afghan mujahid carries a 645:with their state censorship 639:US national security adviser 606:Supporting Operation Cyclone 144:which ended in British ally 3497:Qayyum Kahn, Abdul (2021). 3276:McKercher, B. J. C (2017). 3163:. New York: Pegasus Books. 2126:Political Science Quarterly 1973:Karlekar, Hiranmay (2012). 1001:, just two days before the 934:withdrawal of Soviet troops 427:, the supply route for the 265: 62:Secret Intelligence Service 56:in their fight against the 3691: 3670:Commandos (United Kingdom) 3595:Wars involving Afghanistan 3186:Jelavich, Barbara (1974). 2918:. London: Serpent's Tail. 2570:Mielcarek, Romain (2021). 2029:, Mark Curtis, Chronology" 977:out of Kabul which led to 727:Blowpipe missile launchers 452: 407:. Led by political leader 2889:. New York: Grove Press. 2649:Amstutz, J Bruce (1994). 2117:Alan J. Kuperman (1999). 1033:designated terrorist list 896:Pakistan's ISI requested 861:Into the Soviet Republics 142:second was fought in 1879 36:in Scotland where Afghan 3468:Dorril, Stephen (1993). 3326:Sareen, Sushant (2005). 3282:. Taylor & Francis. 3247:Johnson, Robert (2011). 3018:Dorril, Stephen (2002). 2132:(Summer 1999): 219–263. 2092:13 November 2005 at the 1005:which ultimately led to 581:to be alive and well in 372:hearts of the free world 305:Médecins Sans Frontières 158:third was fought in 1919 3403:Smith, Michael (2022). 3384:Smith, Michael (2011). 3355:Smith, Michael (2003). 3157:Geraghty, Tony (2009). 3099:Galeotti, Mark (2021). 3070:Hyman, Anthony (2016). 2989:Davies, Philip (2004). 2941:Corera, Gordon (2011). 2775:Cooley, John K (2002). 1050:rifle series, tanks to 334:which the US had done. 309:Conservative government 190:1973 Afghan coup d'état 188:had taken power in the 3432:Weir, William (2008). 3361:. London: Politico's. 3297:Riedel, Bruce (2014). 3026:. Simon and Schuster. 2883:Crile, George (2003). 953: 938:Geneva Accords of 1988 785:Keenie Meenie Services 702: 568: 509:high frequency hopping 487: 275: 134:Emirate of Afghanistan 41: 3474:. London: Heinemann. 3041:Ferris, John (2021). 2912:Curtis, Mark (2010). 2862:Cormac, Rory (2018). 2833:Corbin, Jane (2002). 2576:Le Monde diplomatique 2385:, p. Back cover. 1131:King's College London 951: 696: 566: 485: 453:Further information: 273: 266:Britain's involvement 32: 3580:1980s in Afghanistan 3128:Gall, Sandy (2021). 2804:Connor, Ken (2002). 2710:Coles, T. J (2018). 1812:, pp. 167, 275. 1003:September 11 attacks 838:Applecross peninsula 623:, Brigadier General 342:in liaison with the 332:Moscow Olympic Games 34:Applecross Peninsula 3640:Special Air Service 3630:British mercenaries 3575:1979 in Afghanistan 3160:Soldiers of Fortune 3134:. Haus Publishing. 2679:Braithwaite, Rodric 2431:, pp. 184–185. 2059:armstrade.sipri.org 1788:, pp. 302–303. 1776:, pp. 199–200. 1194:, pp. 200–201. 643:Ministry of Defence 635:Zbigniew Brzezinski 599:Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 409:Burhanuddin Rabbani 233:Soviet Central Asia 186:Mohammed Daoud Khan 148:being installed as 100:and the UK itself. 93:Special Air Service 3555:Cold War conflicts 3105:. Oxford: Osprey. 2610:, pp. 291–93. 2486:Human Rights Watch 2361:, pp. 146–47. 2283:, pp. 419–20. 2218:, pp. 143–44. 2191:, pp. 235–36. 2002:, pp. 295–96. 1963:, pp. 231–32. 1939:, pp. 123–24. 1696:, pp. 131–32. 1499:, pp. 144–45. 1347:The New York Times 1156:Times of Islamabad 954: 882:Qazi Hussain Ahmad 795:, and operated in 703: 617:Mahz-i-Milli Islam 569: 488: 438:Ahmad Wali Massoud 413:Ahmad Shah Massoud 390:Ahmad Shah Massoud 276: 124:'s threat against 70:Ahmad Shah Massoud 42: 3585:Conflicts in 1979 3565:Soviet–Afghan War 3510:978-1-000-42646-5 3445:978-1-4617-5109-0 3416:978-1-4711-8680-6 3310:978-0-8157-2585-5 3260:978-0-19-979856-8 3231:978-1-78946-556-3 3170:978-1-60598-048-5 3083:978-1-349-21948-3 3033:978-0-7432-1778-1 3002:978-0-203-50372-0 2973:978-1-78607-001-2 2925:978-1-84668-763-1 2896:978-0-8021-6508-4 2875:978-0-19-878459-3 2788:978-1-84964-177-7 2694:978-0-19-983265-1 2443:, pp. 48–49. 2176:, pp. 49–50. 2055:"Trade Registers" 1891:, p. 209-10. 1735:, pp. 68–69. 1628:, p. 199-20. 1307:, pp. 41–42. 1269:, pp. 17–21. 1158:. 30 January 2018 1125:Hughes, Geraint. 995:Northern Alliance 991:another civil war 983:another civil war 922:Mikhail Gorbachev 716:Kalashnikov rifle 699:Lee–Enfield No. 4 689:Arms and supplies 621:Royal Afghan army 612:Operation Cyclone 419:commander in the 240:Margaret Thatcher 217:Brezhnev Doctrine 146:Abdur Rahman Khan 85:Operation Cyclone 54:Afghan mujahideen 50:Second Great Game 46:Soviet–Afghan War 16:(Redirected from 3682: 3536: 3530: 3522: 3493: 3457: 3428: 3399: 3380: 3351: 3322: 3293: 3272: 3243: 3211: 3182: 3153: 3124: 3095: 3066: 3037: 3025: 3014: 2985: 2956: 2937: 2908: 2879: 2858: 2829: 2800: 2771: 2735: 2706: 2674: 2637: 2636: 2634: 2632: 2617: 2611: 2605: 2599: 2593: 2587: 2586: 2584: 2582: 2567: 2561: 2560: 2558: 2556: 2542: 2536: 2530: 2524: 2523: 2521: 2519: 2508: 2502: 2496: 2490: 2489: 2477: 2471: 2465: 2459: 2453: 2444: 2438: 2432: 2426: 2420: 2419: 2417: 2415: 2410:. 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Thatcher saw 198:Saur revolution 194:King Zahir Shah 118: 68:, commanded by 66:Jamiat-e Islami 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 3688: 3686: 3678: 3677: 3672: 3667: 3662: 3657: 3652: 3647: 3642: 3637: 3632: 3627: 3622: 3617: 3612: 3607: 3602: 3597: 3592: 3587: 3582: 3577: 3572: 3567: 3562: 3560:Guerrilla wars 3557: 3552: 3542: 3541: 3538: 3537: 3509: 3494: 3480: 3463: 3460: 3459: 3458: 3444: 3429: 3415: 3400: 3394: 3381: 3367: 3352: 3338: 3323: 3309: 3294: 3288: 3273: 3259: 3244: 3230: 3212: 3198: 3183: 3169: 3154: 3140: 3125: 3111: 3096: 3082: 3067: 3053: 3038: 3032: 3015: 3001: 2986: 2972: 2957: 2951: 2938: 2924: 2909: 2895: 2880: 2874: 2859: 2845: 2830: 2816: 2801: 2787: 2772: 2758: 2736: 2722: 2707: 2693: 2675: 2661: 2644: 2641: 2639: 2638: 2626:Daily Maverick 2612: 2600: 2598:, p. 335. 2588: 2562: 2537: 2525: 2503: 2501:, p. 310. 2491: 2472: 2470:, p. 301. 2460: 2458:, p. 146. 2445: 2433: 2421: 2399: 2397:, p. 145. 2387: 2375: 2363: 2351: 2349:, p. 416. 2336: 2334:, p. 291. 2324: 2302: 2285: 2273: 2271:, p. 143. 2261: 2259:, p. 299. 2244: 2232: 2230:, p. 142. 2220: 2208: 2193: 2178: 2166: 2109: 2097: 2076: 2074:, p. 305. 2064: 2046: 2035:on 15 May 2011 2016: 2014:, p. 220. 2004: 1992: 1985: 1965: 1953: 1951:, p. 309. 1941: 1929: 1917: 1915:, p. 144. 1905: 1903:, p. 134. 1893: 1878: 1876:, p. 200. 1866: 1854: 1826: 1824:, p. 141. 1814: 1802: 1790: 1778: 1766: 1754: 1737: 1725: 1710: 1708:, p. 547. 1698: 1686: 1674: 1672:, p. 194. 1662: 1660:, p. 752. 1647: 1630: 1618: 1616:, p. 197. 1603: 1601:, p. 291. 1591: 1589:, p. 298. 1579: 1577:, p. 249. 1564: 1552: 1550:, p. 297. 1540: 1528: 1501: 1489: 1487:, p. 296. 1477: 1475:, p. 7-8. 1465: 1446: 1444:, p. 292. 1434: 1430:McKercher 2017 1422: 1420:, p. 293. 1407: 1395: 1393:, p. 198. 1383: 1352: 1333: 1321: 1309: 1297: 1271: 1259: 1231: 1212:(2): 160–171. 1196: 1184: 1182:, p. 131. 1169: 1143: 1110: 1108:, p. 290. 1090: 1088: 1085: 1084: 1083: 1076: 1073: 1063: 1060: 1056:First Gulf War 1024:Operation MIAS 964:or Stingers'. 945: 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p. 24. 2241: 2236: 2233: 2229: 2224: 2221: 2217: 2212: 2209: 2206:, p. 50. 2205: 2200: 2198: 2194: 2190: 2185: 2183: 2179: 2175: 2170: 2167: 2151: 2147: 2143: 2139: 2135: 2131: 2127: 2120: 2113: 2110: 2107:, p. 12. 2106: 2101: 2098: 2095: 2091: 2088: 2086: 2080: 2077: 2073: 2068: 2065: 2060: 2056: 2050: 2047: 2034: 2030: 2028: 2027:Web of Deceit 2020: 2017: 2013: 2008: 2005: 2001: 1996: 1993: 1988: 1986:9788132117131 1982: 1978: 1977: 1969: 1966: 1962: 1957: 1954: 1950: 1945: 1942: 1938: 1933: 1930: 1926: 1921: 1918: 1914: 1909: 1906: 1902: 1901:Geraghty 2009 1897: 1894: 1890: 1885: 1883: 1879: 1875: 1870: 1867: 1864:, p. 77. 1863: 1858: 1855: 1843: 1842: 1837: 1830: 1827: 1823: 1818: 1815: 1811: 1806: 1803: 1800:, p. 79. 1799: 1794: 1791: 1787: 1782: 1779: 1775: 1770: 1767: 1764:, p. 60. 1763: 1758: 1755: 1751: 1746: 1744: 1742: 1738: 1734: 1733:Galeotti 2021 1729: 1726: 1723:, p. 49. 1722: 1717: 1715: 1711: 1707: 1702: 1699: 1695: 1690: 1687: 1684:, p. 32. 1683: 1682:Galeotti 2021 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London. 3425:1336402588 3240:1343210299 3150:1309960914 3121:1125989301 3092:1256689628 3063:1193114956 3011:1086490160 2732:1076248472 2484:(Report). 2347:Smith 2022 2317:8 December 2298:Coles 2018 2204:Coles 2018 2174:Coles 2018 2159:21 October 1925:Coles 2018 1874:Crile 2003 1774:Crile 2003 1750:Smith 2003 1721:Coles 2018 1670:Coles 2018 1626:Crile 2003 1614:Smith 2011 1536:Crile 2003 1517:. New York 1391:Hyman 2016 1087:References 872:Uzbekistan 868:Tajikistan 735:mothballed 610:America's 553:Sandy Gall 521:Cheltenham 473:Hindu Kush 415:, a young 367:Nasir Bagh 359:Agha Shahi 328:boycotting 300:Zia-ul-Haq 180:(PDPA), a 130:Great Game 116:Background 38:Mujahideen 3527:cite book 3454:958548235 3319:881029965 3269:713186739 3179:286439437 2982:959909516 2945:. Orion. 2934:655641314 2905:298484907 2797:656249884 2703:751995302 2671:948347893 2581:1 October 2555:1 October 2518:21 August 2429:Coll 2004 2105:Coll 2004 1937:Coll 2004 1889:Weir 2008 1810:Gall 2021 1762:Gall 2021 1694:Gall 2021 1560:Gall 2021 1521:16 August 1473:Gall 2021 1462:. London. 1403:Gall 2021 1329:Gall 2021 962:armalites 662:Islamabad 549:Super 8mm 340:Islamabad 152:with the 106:Whitehall 3490:28375863 3377:59390846 3348:62517115 3218:(2022). 2855:59497864 2826:48571620 2768:52814066 2742:(2004). 2681:(2011). 2150:Archived 2090:Archived 1847:12 March 1290:12 March 1284:BBC News 1226:40105749 1162:12 March 1136:6 August 1075:See also 1069:Spy Game 1052:avionics 1019:Al Qaeda 887:Chechnya 834:Dumfries 793:Peshawar 762:Training 558:ITN News 556:evening 469:Nuristan 442:Peshawar 434:Pushtuns 397:Napoleon 315:and the 248:Pakistan 244:Red Star 225:Cold War 221:the West 205:in March 74:Pakistan 2146:2657738 2039:27 July 1015:Taliban 987:Taliban 846:islands 840:in the 830:Criffel 743:Belfast 523:-based 384:Kremlin 260:détente 3517:  3507:  3488:  3478:  3452:  3442:  3423:  3413:  3392:  3375:  3365:  3346:  3336:  3317:  3307:  3286:  3267:  3257:  3238:  3228:  3208:796911 3206:  3196:  3177:  3167:  3148:  3138:  3119:  3109:  3090:  3080:  3061:  3051:  3030:  3009:  2999:  2980:  2970:  2949:  2932:  2922:  2903:  2893:  2872:  2853:  2843:  2824:  2814:  2795:  2785:  2766:  2756:  2730:  2720:  2701:  2691:  2669:  2659:  2144:  1983:  1224:  1062:Legacy 906:Termez 891:Bosnia 797:Paktia 637:, the 583:Surrey 213:August 150:puppet 2153:(PDF) 2142:JSTOR 2122:(PDF) 1222:JSTOR 1048:AK-74 850:C-130 801:Kunar 739:Short 505:Racal 440:in a 417:Tajik 256:Tudeh 231:' in 229:Jihad 3533:link 3515:OCLC 3505:ISBN 3486:OCLC 3476:ISBN 3450:OCLC 3440:ISBN 3421:OCLC 3411:ISBN 3390:ISBN 3373:OCLC 3363:ISBN 3344:OCLC 3334:ISBN 3315:OCLC 3305:ISBN 3284:ISBN 3265:OCLC 3255:ISBN 3236:OCLC 3226:ISBN 3204:OCLC 3194:ISBN 3175:OCLC 3165:ISBN 3146:OCLC 3136:ISBN 3117:OCLC 3107:ISBN 3088:OCLC 3078:ISBN 3059:OCLC 3049:ISBN 3028:ISBN 3007:OCLC 2997:ISBN 2978:OCLC 2968:ISBN 2947:ISBN 2930:OCLC 2920:ISBN 2901:OCLC 2891:ISBN 2870:ISBN 2851:OCLC 2841:ISBN 2822:OCLC 2812:ISBN 2793:OCLC 2783:ISBN 2764:OCLC 2754:ISBN 2728:OCLC 2718:ISBN 2699:OCLC 2689:ISBN 2667:OCLC 2657:ISBN 2633:2022 2583:2022 2557:2022 2520:2021 2416:2008 2319:2007 2161:2014 2041:2005 1981:ISBN 1849:2020 1523:2007 1515:Time 1378:2022 1292:2018 1254:2022 1164:2020 1138:2022 1017:and 889:and 821:Oman 799:and 775:and 525:GCHQ 330:the 313:NATO 252:Iran 211:and 209:June 3550:MI6 2134:doi 2130:114 1214:doi 866:in 832:in 812:SSG 777:MI5 771:'s 590:BBC 465:SBS 348:ISI 344:CIA 3546:: 3529:}} 3525:{{ 3513:. 3484:. 3448:. 3419:. 3371:. 3342:. 3313:. 3263:. 3234:. 3202:. 3173:. 3144:. 3115:. 3086:. 3057:. 3005:. 2976:. 2928:. 2899:. 2849:. 2820:. 2791:. 2762:. 2752:. 2726:. 2697:. 2665:. 2624:. 2574:. 2548:. 2448:^ 2339:^ 2288:^ 2247:^ 2196:^ 2181:^ 2148:. 2140:. 2128:. 2124:. 2057:. 1881:^ 1838:. 1740:^ 1713:^ 1650:^ 1633:^ 1606:^ 1567:^ 1513:. 1458:. 1410:^ 1369:. 1355:^ 1345:. 1282:. 1245:. 1234:^ 1220:. 1208:. 1172:^ 1154:. 1129:. 1113:^ 1094:^ 1071:. 929:. 908:. 807:. 354:. 319:. 207:, 169:. 112:. 3535:) 3521:. 3492:. 3456:. 3427:. 3398:. 3379:. 3350:. 3321:. 3292:. 3271:. 3242:. 3210:. 3181:. 3152:. 3123:. 3094:. 3065:. 3036:. 3013:. 2984:. 2955:. 2936:. 2907:. 2878:. 2857:. 2828:. 2799:. 2770:. 2734:. 2705:. 2673:. 2635:. 2585:. 2559:. 2522:. 2488:. 2418:. 2321:. 2163:. 2136:: 2061:. 2043:. 2025:" 1989:. 1851:. 1525:. 1380:. 1349:. 1294:. 1256:. 1228:. 1216:: 1210:2 1166:. 1140:. 20:)

Index

United Kingdom in the Soviet-Afghan War

Applecross Peninsula
Mujahideen
Soviet–Afghan War
Afghan mujahideen
Soviet Union
Secret Intelligence Service
Jamiat-e Islami
Ahmad Shah Massoud
Pakistan
Fighting in the Panjshir valley
Operation Cyclone
Special forces
Special Air Service
Gulf states
Whitehall
Second World War
Tsarist Russia
British India
Great Game
Emirate of Afghanistan
first in 1842
second was fought in 1879
Abdur Rahman Khan
puppet
Durand Line
third was fought in 1919
Soviet empire
independence of both Pakistan and India in 1947

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