641:, recommended providing Afghan fighters in "forward positions" just inside the Pakistan border with "surface to air missiles to defend themselves against air attack". The CIA had tied their hands by striking a deal with Pakistan's ISI under which the Americans were not able to conduct unilateral operations against the Soviets inside Afghanistan. This also meant that they were only able to supply to Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami. As a result, they had to rely heavily on MI6 using it as a proxy to carry out operations that were deemed too secret to involve the Pakistanis. The difference being – the CIA was restricted to extreme secrecy whereas MI6 were not. The
467:. As it was considered too dangerous for serving British soldiers to travel in the country they were 'de-badged' and then seconded to SIS under false identification. There were also contract labourers who had to be trained in intelligence techniques and were provided military instructions by MI6 personnel so that these men had to handle the dangerous cross-border operations from Pakistan. Altogether these men were known colloquially as the 'increment' or the Revolutionary Warfare Wing (RWW). The first of these arrived in the summer of 1981, having made the difficult two-week journey walking North of the Pakistan border into
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horseman) along with a miniature satellite dish, a transmitter and a computerised keyboard. Also recovered was a
British passport which belonged to a 'Stuart Bodman' purporting to be a journalist working for Gulf Features Service. The equipment and the body were identified and paraded at a Kabul Press conference to the world; the Russians accused the British of meddling with terrorists. The Foreign office denied any knowledge of who he was and remained tight-lipped. Over the next few days after the broadcast, the British press sought to find details about Stuart Bodman, but was then tracked down by journalists from the
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escaped when an Afghan officer lured the helicopter away sacrificing his life so they could escape. If the
British were identified by the Soviets in a clash, a cover story was in place in case such an incident occurred. MI6 operations soon began to attract Soviet attention; on 1 July 1983 British operatives in the Panjshir had been warned by Massoud himself, that the Russians were about to descend on their position. All the operatives immediately attempted to head back to Pakistan in a convoy which included a number of French medical doctors. Eventually, this led to a clash not far from
960:. MI6's overall contribution is not known as much remains classified. The support from Britain as well as the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China all assisted in forcing a Soviet withdrawal. The help the British gave Massoud was critical to his fight which led to the Soviet failure to capture and consolidate the Panjshir and even Massoud himself. His men were still using the British-supplied radios well into the nineties. One British official claimed that the intelligence and communications that Massoud was given were 'worth over a hundred planeloads of
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short on delivering vital supplies. Avrakotos also concluded that funding MI6 independently had to be done secretly under the noses of other CIA officials, as well as the
Pakistanis. From him money was poured into MI6, increasing their expenditure tenfold and allowing them to carry out further operations. Through Avrakotos the CIA used MI6 operatives to set up listening devices near Russian bases such as at Bagram. These teams were sent throughout the war to track the movements of Soviet tanks and aircraft.
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that the
Mujahideen had won. MI6 then recruited journalists who were then trained for the role of Britain's psychological operations in Afghanistan. These were more experimental, having to find suitable cameramen among the mujahideen groups in Peshawar or sometimes crossing the border with them to reinforce their journalistic cover as freelance foreign correspondents. Footage that came out of Afghanistan initially were of poor quality, and MI6 sought to improve this, so therefore the camera of choice was a
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758:). The Stingers however were not able to intercept the high-flying Soviet jets. ISI however made sure that Massoud's forces received none of the Stingers, even though eight (a fraction of 1% of the total) were smuggled in. The impact of the Stinger on the outcome of the war is contested, particularly in the translation between the impact on the tactical battlefield to the strategic level withdrawal, and the influence the first had on the second.
791:, a KMS subsidiary. They would end up training the leaders of seven large brigades. Some of this training took place before the Soviet invasion was launched – the support going to the Mahz-i-Milli Islam led by Rahmatullah Safi who lived in England after the Soviet invasion. He and his officers were trained by MI6 and would return a year later based in
532:. From the intercepted Soviet intelligence MI6 was able to adjust mujahid training accordingly. During the Soviet Panjshir VII offensive, which would be one of the largest of the war, the radios and British intelligence combined had warned Massoud. This gave him details of the 11,000 Soviet and 2,600 Afghan soldiers, under Marshal of the Soviet Union
536:, supported by 200 aircraft and 190 helicopters assaulting the valley. These details saved Massoud and his men's lives, and despite the losses during the offensive they survived the huge onslaught. Through the following offensives (Panjshir VIII and IX) as well, MI6 was providing him with more than just secure communications.
585:. It was assumed that the passport was a stolen identity and led to speculation that there was a cover-up. It was not realised at the time that Gulf Features Service was a front organisation that provided a journalistic cover and that Bodman's false name allowed the British government to deny any knowledge of his existence.
307:. Thatcher, on the other hand, wanted to wage a covert war even if it meant putting British troops on the ground. However any overt military action to counter the USSR was out of the question, not just because of the risks of escalation, but the severe limitations on the UK's military capabilities. The
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The UK's role in the conflict entailed direct military involvement not only in
Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. From 1984 in conjunction with the CIA and ISI, MI6 helped organize and execute "scores" of guerrilla-style attacks. These included rocket attacks on villages
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was chosen which was also sent clandestinely. The CIA eventually supplied nearly 500 Stingers (some sources claim 1,500–2,000) to the
Mujahideen in Afghanistan and 250 launchers. American personnel however were not able to train the Mujahideen, so instead, they were trained by the Pakistani ISI and a
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With
Pakistan and the US working together, British intelligence believed that "the CIA was being too alarmist about the Soviet threat to Pakistan." Some British officers thought that backing militant Islamic groups such as that of Hekmatyar was dangerous, particularly in the wake of the death of Andy
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who coordinated the assistance of training and supplies to Abdul Haq. The latter would become an intermediary for the CIA, MI6 and the Kabul front. Haq's office in
Peshawar became the organizing centre of resistance with MI6 and CIA operatives assisting – most of the time they supplied him with maps
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met with some MI6 agents in London, one of whom had just returned from three months inside the warzone. Avrakotos questioned
Massoud's truce with the Soviets but he got a better understanding of the situation with British intelligence and reports from the field. He realized MI6's budget cuts led them
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MI6 sought to find the faction that they could support – after approval for operations the first move was in
February 1980 just two months after the Soviet invasion, MI6 officers led by the Far East's Controller Gerry Warner met tribal leaders in the Pakistan border area within a school to offer help
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After the Soviet withdrawal, CIA and MI6 officers in Pakistan prepared for what happened next. MI6 was still supportive of Massoud, while the CIA still hoped Heketmayer would be the ideal choice to lead an anti-communist government. The British also wanted the United Nations to push for a compromise
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KMS even organised the commanders to be sent to Britain – the training camps there were set up in late 1983. Disguised as tourists, the selected Mujahideen commanders were trained in three-week cycles in Scotland, northern and southern England on SAS training grounds, living in old barns. One of the
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The operatives always saw front-line action assisting Massoud's men mostly using silencer rifles. They witnessed the interrogation of Russian prisoners and assisted in directing mortar fire. At one point three operatives and their Afghan escorts were lured into a Soviet helicopter ambush – they only
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the rebels. Thatcher did neither, and denied any British involvement, and only in Parliament did she state that diplomatic solutions were the answer to the end of the war. She was still however vocally supporting the Mujahideen in the same year and even met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Haq in
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came to power in 1985, he was looking for a way to disengage from Afghanistan. Newspaper reports linking Britain with the supply and training of weapons to the Mujahideen led to Soviet anger. Gorbachev put to Margaret Thatcher that there would be a solution if Britain stopped supplying and training
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For Massoud's men, it was different, due to Pakistan's hostility they had to take them out of Pakistan and be trained elsewhere. Massoud stated that his men needed battlefield organisation skills and so picked out the best of his junior commanders to be trained by the British. Here KMS was involved
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which was the CIA's program to arm and finance the Afghan mujahideen began in 1981 – the first US aid package worth $ 3.2 billion. Britain would play a vital role in the program in many ways. MI6 reactivated their long-established networks of contacts in Pakistan which they relayed to the CIA.
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who had been recruited by MI6 for this reason, and went into Afghanistan in 1982. He built up a good friendship with Massoud and his aides. Later that year Gall and his team managed to send back footage successfully during the Soviet Panjshir IV offensive. This was transmitted on 23 November for an
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hotel. They then set off crossing the border into Afghanistan where they came under fire from the Soviets or their Afghan allies before they eventually met Massoud. The meeting was a success – the British gave a large sum of money to Massoud and asked what he needed. He said he had enough weapons,
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touring the border and assuring them of support. A further meeting with West German, French and US representatives took place in London the following month. All looked to support the Mujahideen in some ways but not to provide direct aid – the French proposed channeling military aid via the Iraqis,
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In line with Carrington's wish for a 'televised war' MI6's training and operational efforts doubled as a sideshow providing the international coverage of Massoud's fight against the Soviets in the Panjshir. In an untried method MI6 intended to film any atrocities they came across or any victories
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There would be nine Soviet directed offensives in the Panjshir valley in total. The last, 'Panjshir IX' ended in 1985, and the Soviets withdrew from the area the following year. The offensives were a failure overall - with each one either repelled, or after a Soviet withdrawal, Massoud's forces
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as punishment for 'bringing war footage of Massoud's military victories to the West'. Skrzypkowiak's killers were not found and Hekmatyar even rewarded them, such was the interfactional rivalry at the time. Britain's response was muted over the death of Skrzypkowiak even though they had concerns
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by Soviet and Afghan DPRA troops supported by helicopter gunships. All six of the Britons just about managed to escape alive – one suffering from severe exhaustion and having to be carried back. The Russians who had been tipped off failed to capture them but recovered a body (in fact Mujahideen
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Since its establishment of the 'increment' during the war MI6 continued to use this in the 1990s with both SAS and SBS providing small detachments. Coordination and tasking would be routed through a fourth ministry of defense adviser typically an SAS officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel
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operated by the RAF 'S&D' flight, a small cadre of RAF special forces pilots that support MI6 and the SAS. Once back in Afghanistan the commanders passed on the training to the insurgents themselves. Some KMS personnel even performed scouting parties and backup roles for the front-line
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as well as the CIA, due mostly to his truce with the Soviets and their Afghan counterparts which took place in 1983. With Pakistan unwilling to assist Massoud as he was a Tajik the US had to follow suit. The British role was particularly resented by the Pakistanis, who accused Massoud of an
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much of it captured from the Russians and their allies but what he needed was expert military training, radios and other high-tech supplies. The British agreed to support Massoud despite the challenges of the Pakistanis, and to set up an operation to fund, supply and train Massoud's forces.
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refugee camp, where 12,000 people were staying close to the Afghan border. Thatcher toured the refugee camp and then told a gathering of Afghan elders that her Government would continue to press Moscow to withdraw its troops from their homeland. She then gave a speech telling them that the
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to buy back the Stinger missiles from the Mujahideen but this failed. Most of the British trained Mujahideen however were loyal to Massoud and continued to fight with the Northern alliance against the Taliban. Most of the blame lay on the US after they had given Hekmatyar's group (who
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and was only fifty miles North East of Kabul. Here Massoud's men ambushed Soviet and Afghan communist convoys travelling through the pass, causing fuel shortages in Kabul. There was the issue that Massoud's faction were mostly Tajiks and Pakistan only supported the hardline Islamic
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and Saudi Arabia to train. There the Afghan commanders were trained in sabotage, reconnaissance, attack planning, arson, and how to use explosive devices and heavy artillery, such as mortars. The next stage was how to attack aircraft and lay anti-aircraft and anti-armour ambushes.
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and were mostly given to Haq's Hezb-e-Islami as they were easy to get through from Pakistan to Afghanistan between 1985 and 1986. British personnel then trained the Mujahideen on the missile, but the system nevertheless proved ineffective; thirteen missiles were fired for no hits.
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Skrzypkowiak. The Americans on the other hand still had suspicions about Britain's role in Afghanistan – they had assumed that they were trying to do as much as 'stay in the game' and that the 'Brits' had an agenda that America was trying to take the lead in their 'old back yard'.
543:. The operatives were able to take the most important parts of the helicopter, carrying them out on mules. From there they were successfully brought across the border into Pakistan, where they were field-tested or boxed up to be sent back to the UK for study.
80:, Massoud and his fighters with British support and intelligence, overcame nine Soviet offensives and held out up to the Soviet withdrawal from the vital valley in 1986. Massoud became the most successful and feared out of any of the Mujahideen commanders.
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stocks. MI6 also sent nearly half a million rounds for rifles even though they from the army reserve supplies. These weapons proved highly popular amongst the Afghan resistance groups, they were accurate and could penetrate Soviet flak jackets that a
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Britain's biggest contribution to the war by far was training the Mujahideen fighters. From Islamabad MI6 coordinated a multitude of private security and mercenary firms much of which was contracted out to the British Army. These were monitored by
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and also helped shelter Bin Laden. There was also the issue of the many hundreds of Blowpipe launchers and missiles being found in Taliban hands, some being unearthed as late as 2005. The US had launched an even bigger $ 10 million campaign
87:, from which the latter provided far more in financial and material terms. Unlike the US which had to funnel its program through Pakistan, the UK played a more direct combat role in Afghanistan itself – in particular, using retired or seconded
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cameraman with Massoud's men. Known as 'the Pole' (due to his Polish background) and brought out rare images of Massoud's guerrilla attacks against the Soviets. In October 1987 on his way back from the Panjshir he was killed by the CIA backed
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in which Afghanistan attempted to invade India. Although they were repelled, Afghanistan did secure independence but a new diplomatic mission was secured so that it could act as a buffer state between the British empire in India and the new
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who had close links with Hekmatyar & Massoud. MI6's aim was for Ahmad to spread radical and anti-Soviet Islamic literature in the Soviet republics in the hope of rebellions against their Communist governments. These went as far as
246:. British officials were concerned about the possibility that Moscow might subsequently exploit opportunities to destabilize fragile South Asian states to expand its influence within them. British concern was not with neighboring
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unwillingness to fight, but the truce was a tactical move so that he was able to regroup his forces, as his supplies were running critically low. Despite the CIA's doubts on Massoud, MI6 pursued an act to support him regardless.
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goggles. Lethal arms were also procured which included silenced sniper rifles and mortars. This would carry on over the next few years, all being done under the noses of the Pakistanis, who were unaware of the operations.
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The UK's role in the conflict entailed direct military involvement not only in Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. By the war's end, Britain's support to the Afghan resistance turned out to be
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intercepted and translated Soviet battle plan communications. This was then relayed to the MI6 teams, who had with them equipment such as the American-made AN/URS11 remote controlled signals intelligence transceiver and
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commandos. They would then guide guerrilla operations in Afghanistan in the hope officers could impart their learned expertise directly to the Afghans. They taught the Mujahideen how to shoot down Russian helicopters.
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Obtaining supplies in the first year proved difficult however, as the Soviets and their allies began to mine the route between them and Pakistan. Finding Afghans willing to drive supplies to them proved difficult but
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he and his factions not only controlled the Panjshir valley but several provinces in North East Afghanistan. Infighting between rival Mujahideen groups began in April 1992 which led to the 'War over Kabul'. Massoud
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In the subsequent aftermath of 9/11 there was controversy with the fact that Britain had been involved in training and arming the Mujahideen, and from which some officers went on to command senior positions in the
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network and computers, which not only intended to prevent Soviet eavesdropping, but were also exceptionally useful for Massoud to coordinate his forces. The team taught English to Massoud's aides (one of which was
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Through MI6, Massoud accepted an annual mission of two of their officers as well as military instructors (a total of five to eight men) for him and his fighters. These men were composed of special forces – SAS and
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Support for the Afghan resistance was approved by the British government who then authorized MI6 to conduct operations within the first year of the Soviet occupation. This was to be coordinated by MI6 officers in
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and private military corporations to support the resistance groups in practical manners. One of Britain's greatest contributions was training the Mujahideen; not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in the
981:. After the latter had lost control, American interest in Afghanistan waned and they withdrew all support, shutting down Operation Cyclone later that year. Infighting continued however and the next stage was
1058:– the Iraqis using mostly bought Soviet equipment. The British were able to pass on the knowledge to their allies and both were able to know what they were up against in terms of firepower and equipment.
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Scottish journalist and author John Fullerton who was a 'contract labourer' for MI6, in the role of head agent on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier during the war – used his experience which formed the novel
857:, to stitch together more effective alliances. The training delivered great dividends for Massoud and his fighters which lead to the destruction of hundreds of Soviet vehicles and tanks.
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were brought in, which eased the situation. By the end of the following year they were then able to move supplies to Massoud, which now included high tech equipment; laser binoculars and
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399:-style Afghan commander. Examinations from reports in the field and intercepted Soviet communications were filtered through – at first it was thought that helping the Mujahideen in the
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The war itself had had the bonus for the British getting their hands on or the ability to study and acquire knowledge of a large range of Soviet equipment – this being from the latest
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These were the first direct Western attacks on the Soviet Union since the 1950s and they reached their peak in 1986. MI6 directly remitted money into an account of Pakistani leader of
904:. MI6 facilitated the attacks which included the Limpets. In this they were successful in destroying a number of barges as well as damaging the bridge pylons spanning the river near
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MI6 team's most important contribution to Massoud and his fighters was helping with organization and communications via radio. Several of these tactical radios made by British firm
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became the British Prime Minister, and had a reputation for being firmly anti-Soviet. The nickname 'The Iron Lady' was first coined in an article in the Soviet military newspaper
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There were however some differences between America and the UK during the war. There was also a focus on Massoud who would be the subject of criticism from China, Pakistan,
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served under) $ 600 million during the conflict. Hekmatyar himself would occasionally give support to Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the US subsequently put him on its
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Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1981 – nicknamed the 'Iron Lady' by the Soviet press for her anti-Soviet stance. She pushed for more direct involvement in Afghanistan.
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but the West Germans were concerned about American intentions and the danger of a third world war. France agreed to provide some support, but only with the medical group
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was a feasible option. However, attention was soon turned to one of the factions that, in the view of the British, were the ones giving the Soviets a bloody nose – the
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on NATO troops. Although Britain had provided little support to Hekmatyar during the war, Whitehall officials had met with him twice in the 1980s, including Thatcher.
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and both agreed to give as much assistance to the Afghan rebels. She also enthusiastically backed Carter's tough stance towards the Soviets, but did not go as far as
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as a sham which enabled the Soviet bloc to wage the Cold War by other means, and professed in her memoirs that their intervention in Afghanistan came as no surprise.
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the head of MI6) arguing the case for military aid to "encourage and support resistance". Carrington then visited Pakistan on 17 January meeting with President
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in June 1980 and welcomed Zia-ul-Haq in a state visit four months later. Following this Thatcher then visited Pakistan in October 1981 and met Haq again, on a
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of new targets they wanted Haq to hit. Intelligence from GCHQ was also relayed to the CIA and ISI who were helping with their respective Mujahideen groups.
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peace between the factions but the CIA wanted to push on. However, after the Soviet withdrawal Massoud would soon become the biggest winner; after the
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Towards the end of the war, Britain was virtually running its own version of Operation Cyclone. On 20 July 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the
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mountains and finally into the valley itself at a secret location. They went so far as much as to look and dress like the mujahideen wearing the
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The operatives also helped to retrieve abandoned or destroyed Soviet equipment including crashed Soviet helicopters, one of which was a downed
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tribes. Despite this however the British sent out a team to meet Massoud – posing as journalists, they met Massoud's British-educated brother
787:(KMS Ltd) which was led by former SAS officers. The training was done in a pyramid structure with the SAS, KMS and MI6. This was done through
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The Secret History of the Five Eyes The Untold Story of the Shadowy International Spy Network, Through Its Targets, Traitors and Spies
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by the British army, but were available on the international arms market. Around fifty launchers and 300 Missiles were sent from the
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and stayed for three weeks or more in the Panjshir mountains using caves for shelter and cover, where a small base was established.
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on the other hand responded to the whole visit by critiquing Thatcher's "provocation aimed at stirring up anti-Soviet hysteria."
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The Special Air Service themselves were sent to Pakistan in 1983 and worked alongside US special forces in training Pakistan's
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where the majority of the population was Muslim. On Christmas Day 1979, the USSR began its military occupation of Afghanistan.
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to some units of the Mujahideen, and made sure their origins were open to speculation. The most notable of these was the
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Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity (chapter II, Historical background)
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Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
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Charlie Wilson's War The Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History: The Arming of the Mujahideen by the CIA
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took place after the revolution had ended. The Soviets were keen to get in and stabilise the country citing the
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insurgents. Members of KMS and MI6 operatives also brought together rival Mujahideen groups that had previous
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Britain's role in the war was the most extensive covert operation their government had implemented since the
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Fighting in the Panjshir valley became the Soviet Union's major focus for offensives in Afghanistan.
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The Real Special Relationship The True Story of How the British and US Secret Services Work Together
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refused any meeting on the matter. Armstrong then sent a note to Thatcher, Carrington and "C" (Sir
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off Western Scotland. The Mujahideen soldiers were shuttled between the UK and Pakistan by an RAF
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to withdraw his troops from Afghanistan, but this proved fruitless when Soviet foreign minister
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Manufacturing Terrorism: When Governments Use Fear to Justify Foreign Wars and Control Society
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Behind the Enigma The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency
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which took Moscow by surprise, who preferred that the pro-Soviet Daoud Khan stay in power.
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1127:"The Second 'Great Game': Britain and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, 1979 – 1980"
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Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy
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inspected some captured Soviet weapons, briefly crossed the border shaking hands with an
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from Britain in the hope of attacking Soviet transport barges on the South bank of the
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Map of the Panjsher Valley where MI6 operatives stayed in support of Ahmad Shah Massoud
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3332:. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation in association with Har-Anand Publications.
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MI6 and the Machinery of Spying Structure and Process in Britain's Secret Intelligence
1279:
588:
Another incident involved an ex-SAS operative; Andy Skrzypkowiak who was working as a
3543:
3020:
2749:
1043:
designated MODA/SO who joined other Ministry of Defense Advisers in the Secretariat.
768:
755:
730:
513:
492:
295:
162:
125:
3279:
Britain, America, and the Special Relationship Since 1941 Seminar studies in history
311:
wanted to focus Britain's armed forces on Europe, and the risks of conflict between
203:
Discontent fermented amongst the people of Afghanistan, and anti-government revolts
3549:
1840:
897:
677:
578:
496:
323:
220:
219:
as a basis for their intervention. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders believed that
173:
149:
57:
1836:"UK discussed plans to help mujahideen weeks after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan"
1367:"UK discussed plans to help mujahideen weeks after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan"
1217:
1974:
710:
706:
646:
620:
424:
375:
362:
316:
153:
2032:
60:, including secretly arming, funding and supplying various factions. Britain's
3518:
3424:
3239:
3149:
3120:
3091:
3062:
3010:
2743:
2739:
2731:
2408:"United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan – Background"
871:
867:
854:
619:(National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) led by a former senior officer in the
552:
520:
472:
366:
358:
299:
259:
129:
37:
3453:
3318:
3268:
3189:
St. Petersburg and Moscow : Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814-1974
3178:
2981:
2933:
2904:
2796:
2702:
2670:
507:
were supplied in early 1982 to the Panjshir. The radio system was the Jaguar
132:
brought Afghanistan into the fray. Britain intended to gain control over the
3489:
3376:
3347:
2854:
2825:
2767:
661:
548:
339:
286:
attempted to visit Moscow to try to persuade the leader of the Soviet Union
3498:
3404:
3277:
3219:
3129:
3100:
3071:
3042:
2990:
2711:
917:
would then retake it. Massoud thus became known as the 'Lion of Panjshir'.
874:
which flowed through these areas, some 25 kilometers in these territories.
560:
bulletin. Gall however was always kept away from the other MI6 operatives.
184:
political party was founded and supported by the Soviets. The PDPA, led by
3471:
The silent conspiracy : inside the intelligence services in the 1990s
3433:
3298:
3248:
3207:
3158:
2961:
2913:
2884:
2776:
2682:
2650:
3469:
3356:
3327:
3022:
MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service
2834:
2805:
1152:"Declassified files reveal Britain's secret support to Afghan Mujahideen"
1055:
1051:
1018:
886:
833:
819:
and they organized flights to be sent out to secret MI6 and CIA bases in
792:
734:
557:
468:
441:
396:
357:
Thatcher discussed British military aid with Pakistan's foreign minister
247:
224:
73:
1225:
936:
from Afghanistan. This was pursuant to the negotiations that led to the
3187:
2836:
The Base In Search of Al-Qaeda, the Terror Network that Shook the World
2145:
1014:
986:
829:
783:. These firms would directly train Afghan forces; the main company was
742:
722:
433:
383:
83:
The British also played a vital role in support of the US government's
1204:
Ingram, Edward (1980). "Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction".
905:
890:
796:
582:
416:
2137:
395:
and support if necessary. Warner then briefed an officer to find a
3500:
Understanding Afghanistan : history, politics and the economy
3102:
The Panjshir Valley 1980–86 The Lion Tames the Bear in Afghanistan
1047:
947:
849:
562:
504:
481:
278:
Within three weeks of the Soviet invasion, the cabinet secretary,
269:
255:
228:
28:
2943:
The Art of Betrayal Life and Death in the British Secret Service
820:
524:
312:
251:
52:, the British provided both indirect and direct support for the
223:
were behind the uprisings in Afghanistan in the context of the
997:
fighting a defensive war against the Taliban. Massoud however
776:
589:
343:
254:
and the potential hijack by the Iranian Communist Party – the
3329:
The Jihad Factory Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making
2622:"how-mi6-backed-right-wing-religious-fanatics-in-afghanistan"
1509:
van Voorst, Bruce; Iyer, Pico; Aftab, Mohammad (7 May 1984).
870:
and raids on Soviet airfields, troop supplies and convoys in
627:'s Mahz-i-Milli Islam group, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group
3435:
Guerrilla Warfare Irregular Warfare in the Twentieth Century
2778:
Unholy Wars Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism
2512:"Pakistan Arrests Alleged Killer of Afghan Leader Abdul Haq"
374:
were with them, and promised aid. Thatcher then went to the
3192:. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 200–201.
2184:
2182:
382:, before flying back to Islamabad for a state banquet. The
196:. However Daoud Khan was overthrown six years later in the
136:, and as a result, three major wars were fought there; the
2119:"The Stinger missile and U.S. intervention in Afghanistan"
652:
In late 1983 the head of the CIA's Afghanistan operation,
649:
were able to keep away any facts from the British public.
1884:
1882:
1101:
1099:
1097:
1095:
3386:
Killer Elite: America's Most Secret Soldiers Front Cover
3358:
The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage
3300:
What We Won America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-89
2451:
2449:
2252:
2250:
2248:
1653:
1651:
1570:
1568:
1413:
1411:
2342:
2340:
1638:
1636:
1634:
1609:
1607:
1175:
1173:
1054:
in helicopters. These would prove useful in the coming
749:
With the failure of the Blowpipe missile, the American
2915:
Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam
2293:
2291:
2289:
2199:
2197:
1716:
1714:
2652:
Afghanistan The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation
1745:
1743:
1741:
1243:"The end game: Britain's role in Afghanistan 1947–50"
844:. Amongst the training involved was heavy weapons on
2963:
Shadow Wars: The Secret Struggle for the Middle East
72:
who, having received little support from the US and
2572:"À Kaboul et à Kandahar, loin des caméras (French)"
2546:"Designation of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a Terrorist"
322:Thatcher had a long conversation with US President
3019:
2085:The Campaign for the Caves: The battles for Zhawar
803:provinces. They would later take part in the 1986
448:
3303:. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
952:Abandoned Soviet artillery in the Panjshir Valley
754:few SAS (some of whom had used the weapon in the
2533:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
3655:Cold War military history of the United Kingdom
3131:Afghan Napoleon: The Life of Ahmad Shah Massoud
2684:Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–1989
1976:Endgame in Afghanistan: For Whom the Dice Rolls
631:– both introduced to the CIA in the same year.
167:independence of both Pakistan and India in 1947
64:(MI6) primarily supported the Mujahideen group
44:Though not officially a belligerent during the
721:In the Spring of 1986, Whitehall sent weapons
709:rifles, some of which were purchased from old
602:about how brutal and extremist Hekmatyar was.
3665:Cold War military history of the Soviet Union
989:taking over in 1996. After this followed yet
140:which ended in a humiliating withdrawal. The
108:'s most extensive covert operation since the
76:, became Britain's key ally in the conflict.
8:
3250:The Afghan Way of War How and Why They Fight
3073:Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964–91
2868:. Oxford University Press. pp. 235–36.
2716:. West Hoathly, W. Sussex: Clairview Books.
1511:"Afghanistan: The bear descends on the lion"
1360:
1358:
1356:
1316:
1304:
828:camps was in the mountains surrounding the
3531:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
2807:Ghost Force The Secret History of the SAS
2311:"SIS Paramilitary/Covert Action Sections"
1429:
2382:
2331:
1900:
1732:
1681:
1191:
1105:
729:which had proved to be a failure in the
692:
551:film camera. One of the journalists was
449:MI6's battleground – the Panjshir Valley
178:People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
2995:. Portland, Or.: Taylor & Francis.
2011:
1343:"PAKISTANIS ASSURED BY LORD CARRINGTON"
1266:
1091:
455:Panjshir offensives (Soviet–Afghan War)
18:United Kingdom in the Soviet-Afghan War
3650:Cold War history of the United Kingdom
3524:
3076:. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
2607:
2595:
2498:
2467:
2455:
2440:
2394:
2370:
2358:
2280:
2268:
2256:
2239:
2227:
2215:
2188:
2071:
1999:
1979:. SAGE Publishing India. p. 133.
1960:
1948:
1912:
1861:
1821:
1797:
1785:
1705:
1657:
1642:
1598:
1586:
1574:
1547:
1496:
1484:
1441:
1417:
1179:
176:'s involvement. In the 1960s the new
3675:Soviet Union–United Kingdom relations
3253:. New York: Oxford University Press.
2781:(3rd ed.). London: Pluto Press.
2687:. New York: Oxford University Press.
2346:
2297:
2203:
2173:
2087:, Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali
1924:
1873:
1773:
1749:
1720:
1669:
1625:
1613:
1535:
1390:
1120:
1118:
1116:
1114:
365:. She was flown by helicopter to the
7:
3660:Cold War history of the Soviet Union
3625:Anti-communism in the United Kingdom
3620:Afghanistan–United Kingdom relations
2428:
2155:from the original on 21 October 2014
2104:
1936:
1888:
1809:
1761:
1693:
1559:
1472:
1402:
1341:Borders, William (17 January 1980).
1328:
1280:"Afghanistan: 20 years of bloodshed"
1237:
1235:
999:was assassinated on 9 September 2001
985:which resulted in a new faction the
836:, while the other was in the remote
3570:Afghanistan conflict (1978–present)
2514:. Voice of America. 28 October 2009
920:By the time the new Soviet Premier
3438:. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books.
1365:Bowcott, Owen (30 December 2010).
25:
3605:Wars involving the United Kingdom
2620:Miller, Phil (4 September 2001).
519:Added to this was intelligence –
3615:20th-century military operations
3409:. London: Simon & Schuster.
1456:"Secret Affairs, By Mark Curtis"
1206:The International History Review
1081:United Kingdom in the Korean War
779:, and given the go-ahead by the
615:The two most prominent were the
250:, but the ongoing revolution in
192:by overthrowing the monarchy of
3610:Military history of Afghanistan
3600:Wars involving the Soviet Union
2535:, "SIPRI Yearbook 2007", p. 636
660:MI6's base of operation was in
156:being established by 1893. The
78:Fighting in the Panjshir valley
2966:. London: Simon and Schuster.
2960:Davidson, Christopher (2016).
2839:. London: Simon and Schuster.
2550:US Department of State Archive
1454:Sengupta, Kim (30 July 2010).
1035:in 2003. Hekmatyar would even
1007:NATO's twenty-year involvement
567:Panjshir valley as it is today
1:
3590:British intelligence agencies
3047:. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
1218:10.1080/07075332.1980.9640210
40:were trained by Britain's SAS
3635:Private military contractors
3224:. London: Blink Publishing.
2810:. London: Cassell Military.
2655:. Diane Publishing Company.
2480:Sifton, John (6 July 2005).
970:Communists had been defeated
697:An Afghan mujahid carries a
645:with their state censorship
639:US national security adviser
606:Supporting Operation Cyclone
144:which ended in British ally
3497:Qayyum Kahn, Abdul (2021).
3276:McKercher, B. J. C (2017).
3163:. New York: Pegasus Books.
2126:Political Science Quarterly
1973:Karlekar, Hiranmay (2012).
1001:, just two days before the
934:withdrawal of Soviet troops
427:, the supply route for the
265:
62:Secret Intelligence Service
56:in their fight against the
3691:
3670:Commandos (United Kingdom)
3595:Wars involving Afghanistan
3186:Jelavich, Barbara (1974).
2918:. London: Serpent's Tail.
2570:Mielcarek, Romain (2021).
2029:, Mark Curtis, Chronology"
977:out of Kabul which led to
727:Blowpipe missile launchers
452:
407:. Led by political leader
2889:. New York: Grove Press.
2649:Amstutz, J Bruce (1994).
2117:Alan J. Kuperman (1999).
1033:designated terrorist list
896:Pakistan's ISI requested
861:Into the Soviet Republics
142:second was fought in 1879
36:in Scotland where Afghan
3468:Dorril, Stephen (1993).
3326:Sareen, Sushant (2005).
3282:. Taylor & Francis.
3247:Johnson, Robert (2011).
3018:Dorril, Stephen (2002).
2132:(Summer 1999): 219–263.
2092:13 November 2005 at the
1005:which ultimately led to
581:to be alive and well in
372:hearts of the free world
305:Médecins Sans Frontières
158:third was fought in 1919
3403:Smith, Michael (2022).
3384:Smith, Michael (2011).
3355:Smith, Michael (2003).
3157:Geraghty, Tony (2009).
3099:Galeotti, Mark (2021).
3070:Hyman, Anthony (2016).
2989:Davies, Philip (2004).
2941:Corera, Gordon (2011).
2775:Cooley, John K (2002).
1050:rifle series, tanks to
334:which the US had done.
309:Conservative government
190:1973 Afghan coup d'état
188:had taken power in the
3432:Weir, William (2008).
3361:. London: Politico's.
3297:Riedel, Bruce (2014).
3026:. Simon and Schuster.
2883:Crile, George (2003).
953:
938:Geneva Accords of 1988
785:Keenie Meenie Services
702:
568:
509:high frequency hopping
487:
275:
134:Emirate of Afghanistan
41:
3474:. London: Heinemann.
3041:Ferris, John (2021).
2912:Curtis, Mark (2010).
2862:Cormac, Rory (2018).
2833:Corbin, Jane (2002).
2576:Le Monde diplomatique
2385:, p. Back cover.
1131:King's College London
951:
696:
566:
485:
453:Further information:
273:
266:Britain's involvement
32:
3580:1980s in Afghanistan
3128:Gall, Sandy (2021).
2804:Connor, Ken (2002).
2710:Coles, T. J (2018).
1812:, pp. 167, 275.
1003:September 11 attacks
838:Applecross peninsula
623:, Brigadier General
342:in liaison with the
332:Moscow Olympic Games
34:Applecross Peninsula
3640:Special Air Service
3630:British mercenaries
3575:1979 in Afghanistan
3160:Soldiers of Fortune
3134:. Haus Publishing.
2679:Braithwaite, Rodric
2431:, pp. 184–185.
2059:armstrade.sipri.org
1788:, pp. 302–303.
1776:, pp. 199–200.
1194:, pp. 200–201.
643:Ministry of Defence
635:Zbigniew Brzezinski
599:Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
409:Burhanuddin Rabbani
233:Soviet Central Asia
186:Mohammed Daoud Khan
148:being installed as
100:and the UK itself.
93:Special Air Service
3555:Cold War conflicts
3105:. Oxford: Osprey.
2610:, pp. 291–93.
2486:Human Rights Watch
2361:, pp. 146–47.
2283:, pp. 419–20.
2218:, pp. 143–44.
2191:, pp. 235–36.
2002:, pp. 295–96.
1963:, pp. 231–32.
1939:, pp. 123–24.
1696:, pp. 131–32.
1499:, pp. 144–45.
1347:The New York Times
1156:Times of Islamabad
954:
882:Qazi Hussain Ahmad
795:, and operated in
703:
617:Mahz-i-Milli Islam
569:
488:
438:Ahmad Wali Massoud
413:Ahmad Shah Massoud
390:Ahmad Shah Massoud
276:
124:'s threat against
70:Ahmad Shah Massoud
42:
3585:Conflicts in 1979
3565:Soviet–Afghan War
3510:978-1-000-42646-5
3445:978-1-4617-5109-0
3416:978-1-4711-8680-6
3310:978-0-8157-2585-5
3260:978-0-19-979856-8
3231:978-1-78946-556-3
3170:978-1-60598-048-5
3083:978-1-349-21948-3
3033:978-0-7432-1778-1
3002:978-0-203-50372-0
2973:978-1-78607-001-2
2925:978-1-84668-763-1
2896:978-0-8021-6508-4
2875:978-0-19-878459-3
2788:978-1-84964-177-7
2694:978-0-19-983265-1
2443:, pp. 48–49.
2176:, pp. 49–50.
2055:"Trade Registers"
1891:, p. 209-10.
1735:, pp. 68–69.
1628:, p. 199-20.
1307:, pp. 41–42.
1269:, pp. 17–21.
1158:. 30 January 2018
1125:Hughes, Geraint.
995:Northern Alliance
991:another civil war
983:another civil war
922:Mikhail Gorbachev
716:Kalashnikov rifle
699:Lee–Enfield No. 4
689:Arms and supplies
621:Royal Afghan army
612:Operation Cyclone
419:commander in the
240:Margaret Thatcher
217:Brezhnev Doctrine
146:Abdur Rahman Khan
85:Operation Cyclone
54:Afghan mujahideen
50:Second Great Game
46:Soviet–Afghan War
16:(Redirected from
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2419:
2417:
2415:
2410:. United Nations
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2096:
2081:
2075:
2069:
2063:
2062:
2051:
2045:
2044:
2042:
2040:
2031:. Archived from
2021:
2015:
2009:
2003:
1997:
1991:
1990:
1970:
1964:
1958:
1952:
1946:
1940:
1934:
1928:
1927:, pp. 48–49
1922:
1916:
1910:
1904:
1898:
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1877:
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1865:
1859:
1853:
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1813:
1807:
1801:
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1783:
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1771:
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1747:
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1611:
1602:
1596:
1590:
1584:
1578:
1572:
1563:
1557:
1551:
1545:
1539:
1538:, p. 198-9.
1533:
1527:
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1522:
1506:
1500:
1494:
1488:
1482:
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1382:
1381:
1379:
1377:
1362:
1351:
1350:
1338:
1332:
1326:
1320:
1317:Braithwaite 2011
1314:
1308:
1305:Braithwaite 2011
1302:
1296:
1295:
1293:
1291:
1276:
1270:
1264:
1258:
1257:
1255:
1253:
1239:
1230:
1229:
1201:
1195:
1189:
1183:
1177:
1168:
1167:
1165:
1163:
1148:
1142:
1141:
1139:
1137:
1122:
1109:
1103:
1037:organise attacks
975:forced Hekmatyar
958:Second World War
789:Saladin Security
625:Rahmatullah Safi
597:fighters led by
530:Satellite phones
429:Soviet 40th Army
401:Helmand Province
352:war like Vietnam
284:Peter Carrington
280:Robert Armstrong
182:Marxist–Leninist
128:– the so-called
110:Second World War
21:
3690:
3689:
3685:
3684:
3683:
3681:
3680:
3679:
3540:
3539:
3523:
3511:
3496:
3482:
3467:
3464:
3462:Further reading
3446:
3431:
3417:
3402:
3396:
3388:. Hachette UK.
3383:
3369:
3354:
3340:
3325:
3311:
3296:
3290:
3275:
3261:
3246:
3232:
3216:Kerbaj, Richard
3214:
3200:
3185:
3171:
3156:
3142:
3127:
3113:
3098:
3084:
3069:
3055:
3040:
3034:
3017:
3003:
2988:
2974:
2959:
2953:
2940:
2926:
2911:
2897:
2882:
2876:
2861:
2847:
2832:
2818:
2803:
2789:
2774:
2760:
2738:
2724:
2709:
2695:
2677:
2663:
2648:
2645:
2640:
2630:
2628:
2619:
2618:
2614:
2606:
2602:
2594:
2590:
2580:
2578:
2569:
2568:
2564:
2554:
2552:
2544:
2543:
2539:
2531:
2527:
2517:
2515:
2510:
2509:
2505:
2497:
2493:
2479:
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2138:10.2307/2657738
2121:
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2111:
2103:
2099:
2094:Wayback Machine
2082:
2078:
2070:
2066:
2053:
2052:
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2023:
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2018:
2010:
2006:
1998:
1994:
1987:
1972:
1971:
1967:
1959:
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1947:
1943:
1935:
1931:
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1911:
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1834:Bowcott, Owen.
1833:
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1471:
1467:
1460:The Independent
1453:
1452:
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1440:
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1340:
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1286:. 26 April 1998
1278:
1277:
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1251:
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1203:
1202:
1198:
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1149:
1145:
1135:
1133:
1124:
1123:
1112:
1104:
1093:
1089:
1077:
1064:
1029:Osama bin Laden
979:Peshawar Accord
946:
914:
902:Amu Darya River
879:Jamaat-e-Islami
863:
805:Zhawar fighting
764:
691:
670:Alastair Crooke
608:
457:
451:
421:Panjshir Valley
405:Jamiat-e Islami
392:
346:and Pakistan's
288:Leonid Brezhnev
268:
258:. Thatcher saw
198:Saur revolution
194:King Zahir Shah
118:
68:, commanded by
66:Jamiat-e Islami
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3688:
3686:
3678:
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3672:
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3662:
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3617:
3612:
3607:
3602:
3597:
3592:
3587:
3582:
3577:
3572:
3567:
3562:
3560:Guerrilla wars
3557:
3552:
3542:
3541:
3538:
3537:
3509:
3494:
3480:
3463:
3460:
3459:
3458:
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3429:
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3323:
3309:
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3259:
3244:
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3212:
3198:
3183:
3169:
3154:
3140:
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3111:
3096:
3082:
3067:
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3038:
3032:
3015:
3001:
2986:
2972:
2957:
2951:
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2909:
2895:
2880:
2874:
2859:
2845:
2830:
2816:
2801:
2787:
2772:
2758:
2736:
2722:
2707:
2693:
2675:
2661:
2644:
2641:
2639:
2638:
2626:Daily Maverick
2612:
2600:
2598:, p. 335.
2588:
2562:
2537:
2525:
2503:
2501:, p. 310.
2491:
2472:
2470:, p. 301.
2460:
2458:, p. 146.
2445:
2433:
2421:
2399:
2397:, p. 145.
2387:
2375:
2363:
2351:
2349:, p. 416.
2336:
2334:, p. 291.
2324:
2302:
2285:
2273:
2271:, p. 143.
2261:
2259:, p. 299.
2244:
2232:
2230:, p. 142.
2220:
2208:
2193:
2178:
2166:
2109:
2097:
2076:
2074:, p. 305.
2064:
2046:
2035:on 15 May 2011
2016:
2014:, p. 220.
2004:
1992:
1985:
1965:
1953:
1951:, p. 309.
1941:
1929:
1917:
1915:, p. 144.
1905:
1903:, p. 134.
1893:
1878:
1876:, p. 200.
1866:
1854:
1826:
1824:, p. 141.
1814:
1802:
1790:
1778:
1766:
1754:
1737:
1725:
1710:
1708:, p. 547.
1698:
1686:
1674:
1672:, p. 194.
1662:
1660:, p. 752.
1647:
1630:
1618:
1616:, p. 197.
1603:
1601:, p. 291.
1591:
1589:, p. 298.
1579:
1577:, p. 249.
1564:
1552:
1550:, p. 297.
1540:
1528:
1501:
1489:
1487:, p. 296.
1477:
1475:, p. 7-8.
1465:
1446:
1444:, p. 292.
1434:
1430:McKercher 2017
1422:
1420:, p. 293.
1407:
1395:
1393:, p. 198.
1383:
1352:
1333:
1321:
1309:
1297:
1271:
1259:
1231:
1212:(2): 160–171.
1196:
1184:
1182:, p. 131.
1169:
1143:
1110:
1108:, p. 290.
1090:
1088:
1085:
1084:
1083:
1076:
1073:
1063:
1060:
1056:First Gulf War
1024:Operation MIAS
964:or Stingers'.
945:
942:
927:Downing Street
913:
912:End of support
910:
862:
859:
842:West Highlands
781:Foreign Office
773:Special Branch
763:
760:
751:FIM-92 Stinger
701:in August 1985
690:
687:
666:Anthony Hawkes
654:Gust Avrakotos
607:
604:
574:Bagram airbase
541:Mil Mi-24 Hind
534:Sergei Sokolov
493:mine detectors
477:Shalwar kameez
450:
447:
391:
388:
380:Afghan Soldier
292:Andrei Gromyko
267:
264:
122:Tsarist Russia
117:
114:
89:Special forces
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3687:
3676:
3673:
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3528:
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3512:
3506:
3502:
3501:
3495:
3491:
3487:
3483:
3481:0-434-20162-6
3477:
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3441:
3437:
3436:
3430:
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3412:
3408:
3407:
3401:
3397:
3395:9781908059062
3391:
3387:
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3374:
3370:
3368:9781842750049
3364:
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3339:9788124110751
3335:
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3289:9781351776325
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3199:0-253-35050-6
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3141:9781913368647
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3112:9781472844736
3108:
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3054:9781526605481
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2952:9780297861010
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2846:9780743230735
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2817:9780304363674
2813:
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2790:
2784:
2780:
2779:
2773:
2769:
2765:
2761:
2759:9781594200076
2755:
2751:
2750:Penguin Group
2747:
2746:
2741:
2737:
2733:
2729:
2725:
2723:9781905570973
2719:
2715:
2714:
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2662:9780788111112
2658:
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2613:
2609:
2604:
2601:
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2500:
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2434:
2430:
2425:
2422:
2409:
2403:
2400:
2396:
2391:
2388:
2384:
2383:Galeotti 2021
2379:
2376:
2373:, p. 74.
2372:
2367:
2364:
2360:
2355:
2352:
2348:
2343:
2341:
2337:
2333:
2332:Davidson 2016
2328:
2325:
2313:. 1 June 2004
2312:
2306:
2303:
2300:, p. 48.
2299:
2294:
2292:
2290:
2286:
2282:
2277:
2274:
2270:
2265:
2262:
2258:
2253:
2251:
2249:
2245:
2242:, p. 24.
2241:
2236:
2233:
2229:
2224:
2221:
2217:
2212:
2209:
2206:, p. 50.
2205:
2200:
2198:
2194:
2190:
2185:
2183:
2179:
2175:
2170:
2167:
2151:
2147:
2143:
2139:
2135:
2131:
2127:
2120:
2113:
2110:
2107:, p. 12.
2106:
2101:
2098:
2095:
2091:
2088:
2086:
2080:
2077:
2073:
2068:
2065:
2060:
2056:
2050:
2047:
2034:
2030:
2028:
2027:Web of Deceit
2020:
2017:
2013:
2008:
2005:
2001:
1996:
1993:
1988:
1986:9788132117131
1982:
1978:
1977:
1969:
1966:
1962:
1957:
1954:
1950:
1945:
1942:
1938:
1933:
1930:
1926:
1921:
1918:
1914:
1909:
1906:
1902:
1901:Geraghty 2009
1897:
1894:
1890:
1885:
1883:
1879:
1875:
1870:
1867:
1864:, p. 77.
1863:
1858:
1855:
1843:
1842:
1837:
1830:
1827:
1823:
1818:
1815:
1811:
1806:
1803:
1800:, p. 79.
1799:
1794:
1791:
1787:
1782:
1779:
1775:
1770:
1767:
1764:, p. 60.
1763:
1758:
1755:
1751:
1746:
1744:
1742:
1738:
1734:
1733:Galeotti 2021
1729:
1726:
1723:, p. 49.
1722:
1717:
1715:
1711:
1707:
1702:
1699:
1695:
1690:
1687:
1684:, p. 32.
1683:
1682:Galeotti 2021
1678:
1675:
1671:
1666:
1663:
1659:
1654:
1652:
1648:
1645:, p. 48.
1644:
1639:
1637:
1635:
1631:
1627:
1622:
1619:
1615:
1610:
1608:
1604:
1600:
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1541:
1537:
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1502:
1498:
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1481:
1478:
1474:
1469:
1466:
1461:
1457:
1450:
1447:
1443:
1438:
1435:
1432:, p. 94.
1431:
1426:
1423:
1419:
1414:
1412:
1408:
1405:, pp. 5.
1404:
1399:
1396:
1392:
1387:
1384:
1372:
1368:
1361:
1359:
1357:
1353:
1348:
1344:
1337:
1334:
1331:, p. 32.
1330:
1325:
1322:
1319:, p. 80.
1318:
1313:
1310:
1306:
1301:
1298:
1285:
1281:
1275:
1272:
1268:
1263:
1260:
1248:
1247:History Extra
1244:
1238:
1236:
1232:
1227:
1223:
1219:
1215:
1211:
1207:
1200:
1197:
1193:
1192:Jelavich 1974
1188:
1185:
1181:
1176:
1174:
1170:
1157:
1153:
1147:
1144:
1132:
1128:
1121:
1119:
1117:
1115:
1111:
1107:
1106:Davidson 2016
1102:
1100:
1098:
1096:
1092:
1086:
1082:
1079:
1078:
1074:
1072:
1070:
1061:
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790:
786:
782:
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774:
770:
769:Scotland Yard
761:
759:
757:
756:Falklands War
752:
747:
744:
740:
736:
733:and had been
732:
731:Falklands War
728:
724:
723:clandestinely
719:
717:
712:
708:
700:
695:
688:
686:
682:
679:
674:
671:
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663:
658:
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648:
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640:
636:
632:
630:
629:Hezb-e-Islami
626:
622:
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613:
605:
603:
600:
596:
595:Hezb-e-Islami
591:
586:
584:
580:
575:
565:
561:
559:
554:
550:
544:
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537:
535:
531:
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522:
517:
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514:Abdullah Anas
510:
506:
501:
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494:
484:
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478:
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306:
301:
297:
296:Colin Figures
293:
289:
285:
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272:
263:
261:
257:
253:
249:
245:
241:
238:In May 1979,
236:
234:
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206:
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195:
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187:
183:
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163:Soviet empire
159:
155:
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147:
143:
139:
138:first in 1842
135:
131:
127:
126:British India
123:
115:
113:
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107:
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99:
94:
90:
86:
81:
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51:
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39:
35:
31:
27:
19:
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3072:
3043:
3021:
2991:
2962:
2942:
2914:
2885:
2864:
2835:
2806:
2777:
2748:. New York:
2744:
2712:
2683:
2651:
2643:Bibliography
2629:. Retrieved
2625:
2615:
2603:
2591:
2579:. Retrieved
2575:
2565:
2553:. Retrieved
2549:
2540:
2528:
2516:. Retrieved
2506:
2494:
2475:
2463:
2436:
2424:
2412:. Retrieved
2402:
2390:
2378:
2366:
2354:
2327:
2315:. Retrieved
2305:
2276:
2264:
2235:
2223:
2211:
2169:
2157:. Retrieved
2129:
2125:
2112:
2100:
2084:
2079:
2067:
2058:
2049:
2037:. Retrieved
2033:the original
2026:
2019:
2012:Johnson 2011
2007:
1995:
1975:
1968:
1956:
1944:
1932:
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1374:. Retrieved
1371:The Guardian
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1267:Amstutz 1994
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2631:8 September
2608:Davies 2004
2596:Curtis 2010
2499:Corera 2011
2468:Corera 2011
2456:Curtis 2010
2441:Riedel 2014
2414:21 November
2395:Curtis 2010
2371:Sareen 2005
2359:Curtis 2010
2281:Connor 2002
2269:Curtis 2010
2257:Corera 2011
2240:Corbin 2002
2228:Curtis 2010
2216:Curtis 2010
2189:Cormac 2018
2072:Corera 2011
2000:Corera 2011
1961:Corera 2011
1949:Corera 2011
1913:Curtis 2010
1862:Cooley 2002
1822:Curtis 2010
1798:Cooley 2002
1786:Corera 2011
1706:Ferris 2021
1658:Dorril 2002
1643:Riedel 2014
1599:Davies 2004
1587:Corera 2011
1575:Kerbaj 2022
1548:Corera 2011
1497:Curtis 2010
1485:Corera 2011
1442:Corera 2011
1418:Corera 2011
1180:Curtis 2010
855:blood feuds
741:factory in
718:could not.
711:Indian Army
707:Lee Enfield
647:DSMA-Notice
471:, over the
425:Salang Pass
376:Khyber Pass
363:state visit
317:Warsaw Pact
154:Durand Line
98:Gulf states
3645:Proxy wars
3544:Categories
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3503:. London.
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3121:1125989301
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3063:1193114956
3011:1086490160
2732:1076248472
2484:(Report).
2347:Smith 2022
2317:8 December
2298:Coles 2018
2204:Coles 2018
2174:Coles 2018
2159:21 October
1925:Coles 2018
1874:Crile 2003
1774:Crile 2003
1750:Smith 2003
1721:Coles 2018
1670:Coles 2018
1626:Crile 2003
1614:Smith 2011
1536:Crile 2003
1517:. New York
1391:Hyman 2016
1087:References
872:Uzbekistan
868:Tajikistan
735:mothballed
610:America's
553:Sandy Gall
521:Cheltenham
473:Hindu Kush
415:, a young
367:Nasir Bagh
359:Agha Shahi
328:boycotting
300:Zia-ul-Haq
180:(PDPA), a
130:Great Game
116:Background
38:Mujahideen
3527:cite book
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3319:881029965
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3179:286439437
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2945:. Orion.
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2703:751995302
2671:948347893
2581:1 October
2555:1 October
2518:21 August
2429:Coll 2004
2105:Coll 2004
1937:Coll 2004
1889:Weir 2008
1810:Gall 2021
1762:Gall 2021
1694:Gall 2021
1560:Gall 2021
1521:16 August
1473:Gall 2021
1462:. London.
1403:Gall 2021
1329:Gall 2021
962:armalites
662:Islamabad
549:Super 8mm
340:Islamabad
152:with the
106:Whitehall
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3218:(2022).
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2826:48571620
2768:52814066
2742:(2004).
2681:(2011).
2150:Archived
2090:Archived
1847:12 March
1290:12 March
1284:BBC News
1226:40105749
1162:12 March
1136:6 August
1075:See also
1069:Spy Game
1052:avionics
1019:Al Qaeda
887:Chechnya
834:Dumfries
793:Peshawar
762:Training
558:ITN News
556:evening
469:Nuristan
442:Peshawar
434:Pushtuns
397:Napoleon
315:and the
248:Pakistan
244:Red Star
225:Cold War
221:the West
205:in March
74:Pakistan
2146:2657738
2039:27 July
1015:Taliban
987:Taliban
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840:in the
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440:in a
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231:' in
229:Jihad
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