489:, and Hadas Yafe (2004) tested these results in a field experiment. Groups of six diners faced different billing arrangements. In one arrangement the diners pay individually, in the second they split the bill evenly between themselves and in the third the meal is paid entirely by the experimenter. As predicted, the consumption is the smallest when the payment is individually made, the largest when the meal is free and in-between for the even split. In a fourth arrangement, each participant pays only one sixth of their individual meal and the experimenter pay the rest, to account for possible unselfishness and social considerations. There was no difference between the amount consumed by these groups and those splitting the total cost of the meal equally. As the private cost of increased consumption is the same for both treatments but splitting the cost imposes a burden on other group members, this indicates that participants did not take the welfare of others into account when making their choices. This contrasts to a large number of laboratory experiments where subjects face analytically similar choices but the context is more abstract.
41:. The situation imagined is that several people go out to eat, and before ordering, they agree to split the cost equally between them. Each diner must now choose whether to order the costly or cheap dish. It is presupposed that the costlier dish is better than the cheaper, but not by enough to warrant paying the difference when eating alone. Each diner reasons that, by ordering the costlier dish, the extra cost to their own bill will be small, and thus the better dinner is worth the money. However, all diners having reasoned thus, they each end up paying for the costlier dish, which by assumption, is worse than had they each ordered the cheaper.
477:, everyone would be better off. This demonstrates the similarity between the diner's dilemma and the prisoner's dilemma. Like the prisoner's dilemma, everyone is worse off by playing the unique equilibrium than they would have been if they collectively pursued another strategy.
371:
for the cheaper meal. By assumption, the utility of ordering the expensive meal is higher. Remember that the choice of opponents' strategies was arbitrary and that the situation is symmetric. This proves that the expensive meal is
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Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yafe (2004). The inefficiency of splitting the bill. The
Economic Journal, 114(495), 265-280.
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413:. On the other hand, if all the individuals had ordered the cheap meal, the utility of every player would have been
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Consider an arbitrary set of strategies by a player's opponent. Let the total cost of the other players' meals be
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we presume that one would prefer to order the expensive meal given others will help defray the cost,
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the number of players. From the description above we have the following ordering
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107:. Also, in order to make the game sufficiently similar to the
383:
If everyone orders the expensive meal all of the diners pay
528:
Glance, Natalie S.; Huberman, Bernardo A. (March 1994).
558:
Gneezy, Uri; Haruvy, Ernan; Yafe, Hadas (April 2004).
162:{\displaystyle a-{\frac {1}{n}}k>b-{\frac {1}{n}}l}
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364:{\displaystyle b-{\frac {1}{n}}x-{\frac {1}{n}}l}
312:{\displaystyle a-{\frac {1}{n}}x-{\frac {1}{n}}k}
53:represent the joy of eating the expensive meal,
260:{\displaystyle {\frac {1}{n}}x+{\frac {1}{n}}k}
221:and the cost of ordering the expensive meal is
214:{\displaystyle {\frac {1}{n}}x+{\frac {1}{n}}l}
638:
8:
645:
631:
623:
175:. The cost of ordering the cheap meal is
45:Formal definition and equilibrium analysis
16:Game theory: n-player "prisoner's dilemma"
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560:"The inefficiency of splitting the bill"
614:If You're Paying, I'll Have Top Sirloin
520:
267:. So the utilities for each meal are
7:
387:and the utility of every player is
61:is the cost of the expensive meal,
694:First-player and second-player win
57:the joy of eating the cheap meal,
14:
530:"The dynamics of social dilemmas"
801:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
582:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00209.x
65:the cost of the cheap meal, and
592:from the original on 2016-02-05
811:Evolutionarily stable strategy
1:
739:Simultaneous action selection
1671:List of games in game theory
851:Quantal response equilibrium
841:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
776:Bayes correlated equilibrium
25:unscrupulous diner's dilemma
1140:Optional prisoner's dilemma
871:Self-confirming equilibrium
319:for the expensive meal and
1728:
1605:Principal variation search
1321:Aumann's agreement theorem
984:Strategy-stealing argument
896:Trembling hand equilibrium
826:Markov perfect equilibrium
821:Mertens-stable equilibrium
470:{\displaystyle b-l>a-k}
100:{\displaystyle k-l>a-b}
1641:Combinatorial game theory
1300:Princess and monster game
856:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
781:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
1656:Evolutionary game theory
1389:Antoine Augustin Cournot
1275:Guess 2/3 of the average
1072:Strictly determined game
866:Satisfaction equilibrium
684:Escalation of commitment
1661:Glossary of game theory
1260:Stackelberg competition
886:Strong Nash equilibrium
1686:Tragedy of the commons
1666:List of game theorists
1646:Confrontation analysis
1356:Sprague–Grundy theorem
876:Sequential equilibrium
796:Correlated equilibrium
499:Tragedy of the commons
471:
439:. Since by assumption
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1707:Non-cooperative games
1459:Jean-François Mertens
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1588:Search optimizations
1464:Jennifer Tour Chayes
1351:Revelation principle
1346:Purification theorem
1285:Nash bargaining game
1250:Bertrand competition
1235:El Farol Bar problem
1200:Electronic mail game
1165:Lewis signaling game
709:Hierarchy of beliefs
568:The Economic Journal
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417:
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376:and thus the unique
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271:
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179:
115:
73:
1636:Bounded rationality
1255:Cournot competition
1205:Rock paper scissors
1180:Battle of the sexes
1170:Volunteer's dilemma
1042:Perfect information
969:Dominant strategies
806:Epsilon-equilibrium
689:Extensive-form game
535:Scientific American
432:{\displaystyle b-l}
406:{\displaystyle a-k}
1615:Paranoid algorithm
1595:Alpha–beta pruning
1474:John Maynard Smith
1305:Rendezvous problem
1145:Traveler's dilemma
1135:Gift-exchange game
1130:Prisoner's dilemma
1047:Large Poisson game
1014:Bargaining problem
919:Backward induction
891:Subgame perfection
846:Proper equilibrium
504:Free-rider problem
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109:Prisoner's dilemma
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39:prisoner's dilemma
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1600:Aspiration window
1569:Suzanne Scotchmer
1524:Oskar Morgenstern
1419:Donald B. Gillies
1361:Zermelo's theorem
1290:Induction puzzles
1245:Fair cake-cutting
1220:Public goods game
1150:Coordination game
1024:Intransitive game
954:Forward induction
836:Pareto efficiency
816:Gibbs equilibrium
786:Berge equilibrium
734:Simultaneous game
374:strictly dominant
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1681:Topological game
1676:No-win situation
1574:Thomas Schelling
1554:Robert B. Wilson
1514:Merrill M. Flood
1484:John von Neumann
1394:Ariel Rubinstein
1379:Albert W. Tucker
1230:War of attrition
1190:Matching pennies
831:Nash equilibrium
754:Mechanism design
719:Normal-form game
674:Cooperative game
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575:(495): 265–280.
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378:Nash equilibrium
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1610:max^n algorithm
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1579:William Vickrey
1539:Reinhard Selten
1494:Kenneth Binmore
1409:David K. Levine
1404:Daniel Kahneman
1371:
1365:
1341:Negamax theorem
1331:Minimax theorem
1309:
1270:Diner's dilemma
1125:All-pay auction
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1077:Stochastic game
1029:Mean-field game
1000:
993:
964:Markov strategy
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729:Sequential game
714:Information set
699:Game complexity
669:Congestion game
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618:Russell Roberts
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509:Abilene paradox
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29:diner's dilemma
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1519:Olga Bondareva
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1509:Melvin Dresher
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1499:Leonid Hurwicz
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1434:Harold W. Kuhn
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1424:Drew Fudenberg
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1414:David M. Kreps
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1399:Claude Shannon
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1336:Nash's theorem
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1195:Ultimatum game
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1175:Dollar auction
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1160:Centipede game
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1115:Infinite chess
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1082:Symmetric game
1079:
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1067:Signaling game
1064:
1062:Screening game
1059:
1054:
1052:Potential game
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1021:
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986:
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979:Mixed strategy
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868:
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861:Risk dominance
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823:
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704:Graphical game
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608:External links
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1629:Miscellaneous
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1564:Samuel Bowles
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1559:Roger Myerson
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1549:Robert Aumann
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1504:Lloyd Shapley
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1500:
1497:
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1492:
1490:
1489:Kenneth Arrow
1487:
1485:
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1472:
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1469:John Harsanyi
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1439:Herbert Simon
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1240:Fair division
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1215:Dictator game
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1087:Zero-sum game
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1057:Repeated game
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987:
985:
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977:
975:
974:Pure strategy
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962:
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947:
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942:
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939:De-escalation
937:
935:
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917:
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903:
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881:Shapley value
879:
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869:
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769:
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755:
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749:Succinct game
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1534:Peyton Young
1529:Paul Milgrom
1444:Hervé Moulin
1384:Amos Tversky
1326:Folk theorem
1269:
1037:-player game
1034:
959:Grim trigger
594:. Retrieved
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487:Ernan Haruvy
485:Uri Gneezy,
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1651:Coopetition
1454:Jean Tirole
1449:John Conway
1429:Eric Maskin
1225:Blotto game
1210:Pirate game
1019:Global game
989:Tit for tat
924:Bid shading
914:Appeasement
764:Equilibrium
744:Solved game
679:Determinacy
662:Definitions
655:game theory
21:game theory
1701:Categories
1295:Trust game
1280:Kuhn poker
949:Escalation
944:Deterrence
934:Cheap talk
906:Strategies
724:Preference
653:Topics of
596:2015-06-08
515:References
1479:John Nash
1185:Stag hunt
929:Collusion
462:−
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144:−
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80:−
27:(or just
1712:Dilemmas
1620:Lazy SMP
1314:Theorems
1265:Deadlock
1120:Checkers
1001:of games
768:concepts
587:Archived
493:See also
31:) is an
1372:figures
1155:Chicken
1009:Auction
999:Classes
36:-player
23:, the
1110:Chess
1097:Games
590:(PDF)
563:(PDF)
791:Core
456:>
138:>
86:>
49:Let
1370:Key
616:by
577:doi
573:114
19:In
1703::
1105:Go
585:.
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1035:n
646:e
639:t
632:v
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127:1
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95:b
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83:l
77:k
67:n
63:l
59:k
55:b
51:a
34:n
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