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1935:(Strategy is still a possibility, but it can only work by making an option get a median higher or lower than you think it deserves, in order to beat/lose to an option whose median you think is even further out of line. Thus, in general, the only people able to use strategy - those who rated the winner above the winning median, or a loser below the winning median - are the ones with the weakest motives to do so.)
336:
with overlapping support. In particular, when there are two roughly-equal partisan "sides" to an issue, it is likely to be the nuanced votes in the middle, not the extreme ones, which will ultimately determine the result. You should therefore feel free to use whichever grades you feel are appropriate, without the need to either exaggerate or minimize your support or opposition.
263:(MJ) meets criteria 1-4 and 6; and Graduated Majority Judgment (GMJ), a small adjustment which gives the same result in all but exceptional circumstances, meets criteria 1-5. So if the actual system used is MJ, but the results are reported based on GMJ, then all 6 criteria will be met — except in the rare cases where these two systems disagree.
63:
99:
1877:
option is that it adds a "free parameter" which could be argued about in and of itself. Therefore, if this option is used, I think it should be decided by some arbitrary authority/ benevolent dictator (ie, ArbCom). If I were such a dictator, I'd use 20%; but if there is no such dictator to be had, I wouldn't use this option.
1541:
The CMJ tiebreaker effectively looks a little further out than that. Instead of focusing on the closest transition to the center, it effectively takes a weighted average of a balanced central region which includes all of the median votes (that is, extending out as far as the second-closest transition
686:
Suppose voters assigned their ratings to the four cities by giving their own city the rating "Strongly support", the farthest city the rating "Strongly oppose" and the other cities "Support", "Neutral", or "Oppose" depending on whether they are less than a hundred, less than two hundred, or over two
350:
Each type of !vote for each option will be tallied. Say that option A has (1,2,4,3,5) !votes (ordered from opposition to support), and option B has (2,1,2,6,4). These tallies are enough to find the medians for each option - in this case, "support" for both. If one option has the highest median, that
246:
A wikipedia !vote should tend to discourage sockpuppets and meatpuppets, and to take account of strength of arguments and not just sheer numbers. However, it is impossible for any voting system to inherently accomplish this; this is dependent on the judgment of the closing administrator(s). The term
376:
So the verdict in this case would be that B wins, because of MJ. The CMJ scores would be posted, to give an easily-understandable measure of how much B had !won by. It would also be reasonable to multiply by 25 in order to map the 0—4 range of the CMJ scores onto a 0—100 range, and say that in this
2031:
Score voting and MJ are actually quite similar on the whole; as similar as the mean and the median. Thus, even though there is not a huge difference on the desirable characteristics, what difference there is is directly comparable. This allows us to see that MJ is detectably better on 1 and 3, and
1872:
After tallying the !votes, but before finding the !result, a number of "strongly negative" !votes could be added to all the options. This has the effect of moving the median point to a supermajority requirement; and thus encouraging consensus and compromise (desirable characteristic #3 above). For
2045:
This is the system (with some modifications) that was used in the initial round of the abortion article naming debate, and it was a total failure. As the person who did the count, I can personally attest that without a doubt it badly failed 1 and 4, and in my opinion it also badly failed 2 and 3.
1876:
I believe using a number around 20% would give a better, "more wikepedian" result. If there were two roughly equal factions, they would both be forced to seek a compromise, instead of everyone knowing that whichever faction was larger would be able to steamroll the other. The disadvantage of this
335:
Note that all votes have equal power to raise or lower an option's median result toward the desired grade. Thus, exaggerating your grades (from "support" to "strong support", or from "oppose" to "strong oppose") will not change the result, unless it is necessary to distinguish between two options
1545:
In the table below, votes changed by this assumption are shown in their actually-cast versions as well as the virtual within-1-step-of-the-median versions used for the average. Three of the four cities have such "virtual" votes, because their ratings jump discontinuously over some rating that no
269:
Please note that this is not a one-size-fits-all solution. While
Majority Judgment is a good system overall, there are situations where I'd recommend others even more highly. For US president, I'd recommend Approval; for US Senate, SODA Voting; for most congressional and parliamentary systems, a
346:
Any !voters who didn't explicitly assign the options to categories would have their votes interpreted as if they had (unless they specifically ask not). Interpretations will attempt to preserve any distinctions and groupings that the voter made, and to assign at least one option each the two
358:
tiebreaker, drop 1 median !vote at a time from all tied candidates at once until they differ. In the example, after dropping 1 "support" from A and B, they have (1,2,4,2,5) and (2,1,2,5,4) respectively, leaving A with a rounded-down median of "neutral" and B still with "support". B !wins.
1546:
voters gave them. That's an effect of this artificial example, where all the voters live in the cities. In a more realistic example, where voters varied more in where they lived and/or their threshold between levels of support, the necessity for "virtual votes" would be far less common.
1143:
breaks this tie by removing "Fair" ratings from all three, until their medians become different. This is essentially the same as looking for each candidate's rating transition closest to the middle, and breaking median ties by choosing the candidate where that's furthest to the right.
1873:
instance, if 20% of the real !votes were added as "strongly negative" virtual !votes, the effective median point would be moved from 50% to 60% (since 40+20=60). That is, each option would be given the grade that 60% of the !voters could agree it at least deserved.
327:
Please grade all the options into no more than 5 groups: those you "strongly support", those you "support", those you find "neutral", those you "oppose", and those you "strongly oppose". Each of these groups may include zero, one, or more options. As in any
124:
However, there are still some cases in which voting is the only answer. When two or more sides each have a strong interest and a reasonable argument from policy, at some point the slow-motion (hopefully) edit war has to stop. That's what happened with the
347:"strongly" categories. Any options not mentioned in a !vote would be counted as the non-strong option as far from the explicitly-given options as possible (so a vote that only mentions "support" will have unmentioned items classed as "oppose")
1962:
GMJ assigns a single number to each option, and the highest number wins. That's pretty easy to follow. There could be rare cases when the MJ winner did not agree with the GMJ winner, but even then, GMJ would show that the MJ winner had been
2056:
This is unacceptable, as it completely fails criterion 4 by not giving a usable answer after a single round of voting. It's hard enough for the admins to handle one round; stretching the process to two rounds of voting is unacceptable.
126:
270:
biproportional system such as PAL voting; in Robert's Rules situations, approval with runoffs; and in loose internet voting, Score Voting. Such flexibility is the spirit of the
Declaration of Election Method Reform Advocates.
302:
option. If that option has a significant number of !votes in its own right, then that-much-or-more will have a majority against less-than-that, while that-much-or-less also has a majority against more-than-that.
2083:
Felsenthal, D. S., and M. Machover. “Who Ought to Be
Elected and Who Is Actually Elected? An Empirical Investigation of 92 Elections Under Three Procedures.” Electoral Studies 14, no. 2 (1995): 143–169.
188:
It should be monotonic, so there is never a case where one more !vote for the current winning option could cause it to lose. (Such a situation could cause crazy strategies and/or recriminations.)
306:(This subsection, unlike the rest of this essay, is only given as guidance in finding consensus, as it is unlikely that a disagreement of this sort would fail to be resolved eventually by
2035:
Specifically, in Score voting, strategic exaggeration is always a viable strategy for any voter whose honest vote isn't already fully exaggerated; in MJ, it almost never is.
1139:
The median ratings for
Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville are all "Fair"; and for Memphis, "Poor". Since there is a tie between Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville,
2067:
Though this can be an excellent voting system in some cases, for
Knowledge (XXG) it would simply be a bureaucratic nightmare which overtly encourages vote-stuffing.
259:
There is no single !voting system which meets all of these desiderata. However, by combining two closely-related systems, you can (almost always) satisfy them all.
156:
The election system used by wikipedia should have the following general characteristics (many of which are associated with one or more formal voting criteria in
516:
107:
Voting should not be used on wikipedia except as a truly final resort. If it does come to voting, though, it's important to use an appropriate system such as
266:
After explaining how and why this would work, this essay will consider other voting system options, and show why none meet these criteria nearly as well.
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No voter or minority subset of voters who agree on the rating an option deserves can do anything strategically to bring the median closer to that rating.
1931:
it would NOT help a minority of voters to either exaggerate a vote (by adding "strong"), or to vote a less-preferred option above a more-preferred one.
144:. Furthermore, many voting systems have obvious strategy problems. For instance, Felsenthal and Machover found, using real-world election data, that
1946:
By allowing "all options good" and "neutral" votes, this system does pretty well. With the optional supermajority threshold, it does even better.
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That is, it should be easy to interpret a comment like "I strongly favor options B and D. I don't like E, and I hate A and G" as a valid ballot.
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Strongly support 4; violets are blue. Support 1, per
Novelist. Neutral on 2. Oppose 3; grey poupon. Strongly oppose 5, again per Novelist.
78:
It contains the advice or opinions of one or more
Knowledge (XXG) contributors. This page is not an encyclopedia article, nor is it one of
79:
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A "+" or "-" is added depending on whether the median would rise or fall if median ratings were removed, as in the tiebreaking procedure.
509:
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Majority judgment, a "scored" system which uses verbal grades by preference, passes with flying colors, as the example above shows.
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to the center). To take this average, all votes in this region are treated as if they were within one category of the median.
1968:
The system should be well-understood by voting theorists, so that its coherence with the above criteria is agreed-on by all.
232:
The system should be well-understood by voting theorists, so that its coherence with the above criteria is agreed-on by all.
170:
There should be no arbitrary restrictions on the form of the ballot (say, to be a full preference ordering of the options).
449:
These !votes would be interpreted as: (using SO, O, N, S, SS for grades, and giving the grades of the 5 options in order)
141:
502:
413:
Strongly support 1; grass is green. Support 3; fifty shades of grey. Strongly oppose 5; oranges are not the only fruit.
148:, the most commonly-used voting system, was also the most likely to elect the candidate who would have lost a runoff.
140:) used is important. It is well-known that, depending on the voting method, there is always some possibility that
235:(This is true of all systems in the criteria table. Systems not in the table may or may not meet this criterion.)
1923:
It should not encourage any obvious strategy by which a partisan minority could easily try to sway the result
182:
It should not encourage any obvious strategy by which a partisan minority could easily try to sway the result
1880:
If this option were used at 20% with the example above, the tallies and CMJ scores for each option would be:
164:
It should be easy, even "foolproof", for !voters; and compatible with existing !voting behavior on wikipedia
542:
191:(This generally corresponds to the colums "Later-no-harmÂ/Later-no-help" and "FBC:No favorite betrayal" in
561:
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The results should be as comprehensible as possible for editors unversed in the details of voting theory
224:
The results should be as comprehensible as possible for editors unversed in the details of voting theory
83:
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In as many cases as possible, naive !voters should have as much power as sophisticated, strategic ones.
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It should be as easy to count as possible for volunteer administrators, and give a clear answer.
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It should be as easy to count as possible for volunteer administrators, and give a clear answer.
177:. If skipped ranks must also be allowed, it corresponds to "scores" in the "ballot type" column)
373:
A's CMJ score is 3+((5-7)/(2*3)) or 2.67. B's is 3+((4-5)/(2*6)) or 2.92. As with MJ, B !wins.
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343:(A shorthand format for votes would be easy to work out and include in the instructions.)
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As much as possible, it should encourage, or at least allow for, compromise and consensus
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As much as possible, it should encourage, or at least allow for, compromise and consensus
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86:. Some essays represent widespread norms; others only represent minority viewpoints.
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251:" (read as "not-vote") is used in this essay to remind readers of this fact.
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Median + ((Votes_above_median - Votes_below_median) / (2 * Votes_at_median))
362:
To calculate the
Continuous Majority Judgment score, you use the formula:
173:(This generally corresponds to the colums ">2 ranks" and "= ranks" in
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This does well on 4, 5, and 6, but is barely acceptable on 1, 2, and 3.
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This badly fails 1, 2, and 4, and doesn't do as well as MJ on 3.
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How does this system do on the desirable criteria listed above?
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All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible.
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This badly fails almost all the desirable criteria except #5.
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These don't do as well as MJ on 2, and clearly fail 4 and 5.
195:. The "monotone" and "cloneproof" columns are also desirable)
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Say the options are 1-5, and the following !votes are cast:
219:, it is in the "Summable" and "Polytime/Resolvable" columns)
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This is true of MJ, but there has been little study of GMJ.
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541:. The population is concentrated around four major cities.
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This system is polytime, resolvable, and summable at O(N).
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So the tallies and CMJ scores for each option would be:
49:
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Process characteristics independent of voting system
1900:Option 4 is still the winner with both MJ and CMJ.
2150:"Democracy Chronicles Interviews Election Experts"
2095:"Declaration of Election-Method Reform Advocates"
558:, near the center of the state (26% of voters)
537:is holding an election on the location of its
806:Then the sorted scores would be as follows:
574:The preferences of each region's voters are:
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489:Option 4 is the winner with both MJ and CMJ.
121:. Consensus is preferred, whenever possible.
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129:; and it will surely happen again some day.
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318:!Voters would be instructed as follows:
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80:Knowledge (XXG)'s policies or guidelines
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1978:Inferior alternatives for this use case
142:voting strategy could change the result
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294:, these should be considered as an
84:thoroughly vetted by the community
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2148:Tawfik, Adrian (April 22, 2012).
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443:) 17:40, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
432:) 16:47, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
421:) 14:07, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
410:) 13:37, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
399:) 12:42, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
377:case A got 66.7 and B got 72.9.
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435:Strongly support 5; support 3.
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479:O3: (0, 2, 0, 3, 0) CMJ 2.67
473:O1: (0, 2, 0, 2, 1) CMJ 2.75
207:, it is in the "MMC" column)
2032:considerably better on 2.
1896:O5: (3, 1, 0, 2, 0) CMJ 0.5
1893:O4: (1, 1, 1, 1, 2) CMJ 2.5
1887:O2: (2, 1, 1, 0, 2) CMJ 1.5
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24:Knowledge (XXG):NOTNOTVOTE
2157:. Retrieved April 22 2012
2098:. Retrieved April 22 2012
1996:/ Alternative Vote / Hare
1890:O3: (1, 2, 0, 3, 0) CMJ 2
1884:O1: (1, 2, 0, 2, 1) CMJ 2
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482:O4: (0, 1, 1, 1, 2) CMJ 3
476:O2: (1, 1, 1, 0, 2) CMJ 2
274:If options are on a scale
152:Desirable characteristics
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105:This page in a nutshell:
1471:closest transition—>
1382:closest transition—>
1268:<-closest transition
1186:<—closest transition
2172:Check date values in:
2113:Check date values in:
1555:City
1153:City
812:City
1994:Instant runoff voting
687:hundred miles away:
82:, as it has not been
2154:Democracy Chronicles
1528: SO
1504: SS
1123: SO
1099: SS
284:a small slice of pie
1522: O
1516: N
1510: S
1117: O
1111: N
1105: S
323:Voting instructions
117:Knowledge (XXG) is
2184:Unknown parameter
2125:Unknown parameter
1984:Plurality (voting)
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132:In this case, the
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2156:
2147:
2146:
2142:
2124:
2112:
2102:
2097:
2092:
2091:
2087:
2082:
2078:
2073:
2065:
2054:
2043:
2029:
2018:
2015:Approval voting
2008:
1998:
1987:
1980:
1911:
1906:
1870:
1549:
1538:
1470:
1444:
1439:
1381:
1366:
1361:
1292:
1287:
1241:
1236:
1185:
1147:
1136:
1133:
719:
714:
709:
704:
699:
694:
693:
685:
602:
595:
588:
581:
524:
523:
495:
462:S, N, O, SS, SO
459:SS, N, S, N, SO
453:O, SS, O, SS, O
383:
337:
334:
330:wikipedia !vote
316:
292:nothing but pie
276:
257:
244:
154:
127:Ireland article
98:
88:
87:
76:
62:
56:
55:
48:
41:
37:
29:
28:
21:
20:
12:
11:
5:
2236:
2234:
2226:
2225:
2215:
2214:
2209:
2208:
2199:
2140:
2085:
2075:
2074:
2072:
2069:
2064:
2059:
2053:
2048:
2042:
2037:
2028:
2027:/ Score voting
2022:
2017:
2012:
2007:
2002:
1997:
1991:
1986:
1981:
1979:
1976:
1975:
1974:
1973:
1972:
1966:
1965:
1964:
1957:
1956:
1955:
1949:
1948:
1947:
1941:
1940:
1939:
1936:
1933:
1929:Specifically,
1927:
1921:
1920:
1919:
1905:
1902:
1898:
1897:
1894:
1891:
1888:
1885:
1869:
1866:
1863:
1862:
1859:
1858:
1856:
1853:
1845:
1844:
1842:
1840:
1837:
1829:
1828:
1826:
1824:
1821:
1813:
1812:
1810:
1808:
1800:
1799:
1797:
1790:
1786:
1785:
1782:
1781:
1779:
1777:
1769:
1768:
1766:
1764:
1761:
1753:
1752:
1750:
1748:
1745:
1737:
1736:
1734:
1732:
1724:
1723:
1721:
1714:
1710:
1709:
1706:
1705:
1703:
1701:
1699:
1695:
1694:
1692:
1690:
1688:
1684:
1683:
1681:
1679:
1677:
1673:
1672:
1669:
1667:
1665:
1661:
1660:
1657:
1655:
1653:
1646:
1642:
1641:
1638:
1637:
1635:
1627:
1626:
1623:
1615:
1614:
1612:
1610:
1602:
1601:
1599:
1597:
1589:
1588:
1585:
1578:
1574:
1573:
1570:
1569:
1566:
1563:
1556:
1534:
1533:
1530:
1529:
1526:
1523:
1520:
1517:
1514:
1511:
1508:
1505:
1502:
1499:
1492:
1488:
1487:
1484:
1480:
1479:
1476:
1475:
1473:
1463:
1462:
1460:
1452:
1451:
1449:
1447:
1442:
1437:
1429:
1428:
1426:
1424:
1416:
1415:
1413:
1406:
1402:
1401:
1398:
1397:
1395:
1387:
1386:
1384:
1374:
1373:
1371:
1369:
1364:
1359:
1351:
1350:
1348:
1346:
1338:
1337:
1335:
1328:
1324:
1323:
1320:
1319:
1317:
1315:
1313:
1309:
1308:
1306:
1304:
1302:
1298:
1297:
1295:
1290:
1285:
1281:
1280:
1278:
1276:
1274:
1270:
1269:
1266:
1264:
1262:
1255:
1251:
1250:
1247:
1246:
1244:
1239:
1234:
1226:
1225:
1223:
1215:
1214:
1212:
1210:
1202:
1201:
1199:
1197:
1189:
1188:
1183:
1176:
1172:
1171:
1168:
1167:
1164:
1161:
1154:
1129:
1128:
1125:
1124:
1121:
1118:
1115:
1112:
1109:
1106:
1103:
1100:
1097:
1094:
1087:
1083:
1082:
1079:
1075:
1074:
1071:
1070:
1068:
1060:
1059:
1057:
1049:
1048:
1046:
1044:
1036:
1035:
1033:
1031:
1023:
1022:
1020:
1013:
1009:
1008:
1005:
1004:
1002:
994:
993:
991:
983:
982:
980:
978:
970:
969:
967:
965:
957:
956:
954:
947:
943:
942:
939:
938:
936:
932:
931:
929:
925:
924:
922:
918:
917:
915:
911:
910:
908:
901:
897:
896:
893:
892:
890:
882:
881:
879:
871:
870:
868:
866:
858:
857:
855:
853:
845:
844:
842:
835:
831:
830:
827:
826:
823:
820:
813:
802:
801:
798:
795:
792:
789:
786:
782:
781:
778:
775:
772:
769:
766:
762:
761:
758:
755:
752:
749:
746:
742:
741:
738:
735:
732:
729:
726:
722:
721:
716:
711:
706:
701:
696:
681:
680:
679:
678:
675:
672:
669:
662:
661:
660:
657:
654:
651:
644:
643:
642:
639:
636:
633:
626:
625:
624:
621:
618:
615:
607:
606:
599:
592:
585:
572:
571:
565:
559:
553:
522:
521:
514:
507:
499:
498:
494:
491:
487:
486:
483:
480:
477:
474:
467:
466:
465:O, O, S, O, SS
463:
460:
457:
456:S, SO, S, S, S
454:
447:
446:
445:
444:
433:
422:
411:
400:
382:
379:
368:
367:
351:option !wins.
341:
340:
320:
315:
312:
275:
272:
256:
253:
243:
240:
239:
238:
237:
236:
230:
229:
228:
222:
221:
220:
210:
209:
208:
198:
197:
196:
189:
186:
180:
179:
178:
171:
168:
153:
150:
138:!voting system
136:(or at least,
113:
112:
102:
90:
89:
77:
68:
66:
54:
53:
46:
38:
33:
30:
15:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2235:
2224:
2221:
2220:
2218:
2203:
2200:
2195:
2190:|author=
2179:
2166:
2155:
2151:
2144:
2141:
2136:
2131:|author=
2120:
2107:
2096:
2089:
2086:
2080:
2077:
2070:
2068:
2063:
2060:
2058:
2052:
2051:Runoff voting
2049:
2047:
2041:
2038:
2036:
2033:
2026:
2023:
2021:
2016:
2013:
2011:
2006:
2003:
2001:
1995:
1992:
1990:
1985:
1982:
1977:
1970:
1969:
1967:
1961:
1960:
1958:
1953:
1952:
1950:
1945:
1944:
1942:
1937:
1934:
1932:
1928:
1925:
1924:
1922:
1917:
1916:
1914:
1913:
1912:
1909:
1903:
1901:
1895:
1892:
1889:
1886:
1883:
1882:
1881:
1878:
1874:
1867:
1850:
1834:
1818:
1805:
1794:
1791:
1787:
1774:
1758:
1742:
1729:
1718:
1715:
1711:
1696:
1685:
1674:
1671:virtual votes
1662:
1650:
1647:
1643:
1632:
1625:virtual votes
1620:
1607:
1594:
1582:
1579:
1575:
1560:
1557:
1553:
1550:
1547:
1543:
1539:
1527:
1521:
1515:
1509:
1503:
1497:
1496:
1493:
1490:
1489:
1485:
1482:
1481:
1468:
1457:
1434:
1421:
1410:
1407:
1403:
1392:
1379:
1356:
1343:
1332:
1329:
1325:
1310:
1299:
1282:
1271:
1259:
1256:
1252:
1231:
1220:
1207:
1194:
1180:
1177:
1173:
1158:
1155:
1151:
1148:
1145:
1142:
1137:
1134:
1122:
1116:
1110:
1104:
1098:
1092:
1091:
1088:
1085:
1084:
1080:
1077:
1076:
1065:
1054:
1041:
1028:
1017:
1014:
1010:
999:
988:
975:
962:
951:
948:
944:
933:
926:
919:
912:
905:
902:
898:
887:
876:
863:
850:
839:
836:
832:
817:
814:
810:
807:
784:
783:
764:
763:
744:
743:
724:
723:
717:
712:
707:
702:
697:
692:
691:
688:
676:
673:
670:
668:
665:
664:
663:
658:
655:
652:
650:
647:
646:
645:
640:
637:
634:
632:
629:
628:
627:
622:
619:
616:
614:
611:
610:
609:
608:
601:17% of voters
594:15% of voters
587:26% of voters
580:42% of voters
578:
575:
569:
566:
563:
560:
557:
554:
551:
548:
547:
546:
544:
540:
536:
533:Suppose that
531:
529:
520:
515:
513:
508:
506:
501:
500:
497:
492:
490:
484:
481:
478:
475:
472:
471:
470:
464:
461:
458:
455:
452:
451:
450:
442:
438:
434:
431:
427:
423:
420:
416:
412:
409:
405:
401:
398:
394:
390:
389:
388:
387:
386:
380:
378:
374:
371:
365:
364:
363:
360:
357:
352:
348:
344:
339:
338:
333:
331:
324:
319:
313:
311:
309:
304:
301:
297:
296:ordinal scale
293:
289:
285:
281:
273:
271:
267:
264:
262:
254:
252:
250:
241:
234:
233:
231:
226:
225:
223:
218:
214:
213:
211:
206:
202:
201:
199:
194:
190:
187:
184:
183:
181:
176:
172:
169:
166:
165:
163:
162:
161:
159:
151:
149:
147:
143:
139:
135:
134:voting system
130:
128:
122:
120:
110:
106:
103:
96:
95:
85:
81:
75:
73:
67:
60:
59:
51:
47:
44:
43:WP:NOTNOTVOTE
40:
39:
36:
25:
19:
2202:
2192:suggested) (
2153:
2143:
2133:suggested) (
2088:
2079:
2066:
2062:Proxy voting
2055:
2044:
2034:
2030:
2025:Range voting
2019:
2009:
1999:
1988:
1930:
1910:
1907:
1899:
1879:
1875:
1871:
1659:actual votes
1587:actual votes
1568:Median point
1548:
1544:
1540:
1537:
1166:Median point
1146:
1138:
1135:
1132:
825:Median point
805:
684:
671:Chattanooga
666:
648:
635:Chattanooga
630:
620:Chattanooga
612:
573:
532:
525:
496:
488:
468:
448:
384:
381:Full Example
375:
372:
369:
361:
353:
349:
345:
342:
326:
322:
317:
305:
291:
287:
283:
279:
277:
268:
265:
258:
245:
155:
131:
123:
116:
104:
69:
2223:User essays
2040:Borda count
1713:Chattanooga
1327:Chattanooga
946:Chattanooga
765:Chattanooga
708:Chattanooga
695:City Choice
649:Chattanooga
597:Center-East
562:Chattanooga
288:a whole pie
70:This is an
18:User:Homunq
2071:References
1904:Compliance
674:Nashville
656:Nashville
653:Knoxville
638:Knoxville
623:Knoxville
617:Nashville
158:this table
2188:ignored (
2129:ignored (
1789:Knoxville
1645:Nashville
1405:Knoxville
1254:Nashville
1012:Knoxville
900:Nashville
785:Knoxville
745:Nashville
713:Knoxville
703:Nashville
667:Knoxville
631:Nashville
568:Knoxville
556:Nashville
535:Tennessee
314:Mechanics
217:the table
205:the table
193:the table
175:the table
35:Shortcuts
2217:Category
2165:cite web
2106:cite web
677:Memphis
659:Memphis
641:Memphis
604:Far-East
583:Far-West
415:Novelist
393:Romantic
255:Solution
1839:virtual
1577:Memphis
1293:———>
1288:>———
1175:Memphis
834:Memphis
725:Memphis
720:rating
698:Memphis
613:Memphis
550:Memphis
539:capital
437:Laconic
404:Realist
1963:close.
1868:Option
1855:actual
1852:
1836:
1823:
1820:
1807:
1796:
1776:
1763:actual
1760:
1747:
1744:
1731:
1720:
1698:
1687:
1676:
1664:
1652:
1634:
1622:
1609:
1596:
1584:
1562:
1525:
1519:
1513:
1507:
1501:
1491:
1486:
1483:
1459:
1436:
1423:
1412:
1394:
1358:
1345:
1334:
1312:
1301:
1284:
1273:
1261:
1233:
1222:
1209:
1196:
1182:
1160:
1120:
1114:
1108:
1102:
1096:
1086:
1081:
1078:
1067:
1056:
1043:
1030:
1019:
1001:
990:
977:
964:
953:
935:
928:
921:
914:
907:
889:
878:
865:
852:
841:
819:
718:Median
715:voters
710:voters
705:voters
700:voters
590:Center
300:median
290:, and
280:no pie
50:WP:NNV
1445:-<
1440:<-
1367:-<
1362:<-
1242:->
1237:>-
249:!vote
72:essay
16:<
2194:help
2178:help
2135:help
2119:help
740:SO+
441:talk
430:talk
426:Me22
419:talk
408:talk
397:talk
800:N-
780:N-
760:N+
310:.)
160:):
2219::
2182:;
2169::
2167:}}
2163:{{
2152:.
2123:;
2110::
2108:}}
2104:{{
797:SS
788:SO
774:SS
751:SS
737:SO
734:SO
731:SO
728:SS
286:,
282:,
2196:)
2180:)
2176:(
2159:.
2137:)
2121:)
2117:(
2100:.
1565:↓
1163:↓
822:↓
794:S
791:N
777:S
771:N
768:O
757:N
754:N
748:N
518:e
511:t
504:v
439:(
428:(
417:(
406:(
395:(
247:"
111:.
74:.
26:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.