Knowledge (XXG)

1939 German ultimatum to Poland

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257:) and also a four-track railway line. The construction of the motor road and of the railway shall be carried out in such a manner that Polish lines of communication are not affected thereby, i.e., they are to be overbridged or underbridged. This zone shall be one kilometer in width and shall be German territory.Should the result of the plebiscite be in favor of Germany, Poland shall have the same rights as Germany would have had, to build an extraterritorial road and railway connection in order to secure her free and unrestricted access to her port of Gdynia. 279:
compatible with their national convictions, Germany and Poland mutually agree to safeguard the rights of their respective minorities by most comprehensive and binding agreements for the purpose of warranting these minorities the preservation, free development and cultivation of their national customs, habits and traditions, to grant them in particular and for that purpose the form of organization considered necessary by them. Both parties undertake not to draft the members of the minority into military service.
209:, etc., who were domiciled in this area on that day or who were born there on or before the above-mentioned date, shall be entitled to vote. Germans who have been expelled from this territory shall return for the purpose of registering their votes.In order to ensure an impartial plebiscite and to guarantee that the necessary and extensive preparations for the plebiscite shall be carried out correctly, an International Commission like the one formed in connection with the 20: 489: 275:
acts of terrorism.Germany and Poland bind themselves to indemnify the minorities on either side for any economic damages and other wrongs inflicted upon them since 1918; and/or to revoke all expropriations or otherwise to completely indemnify the respective person or persons for these and other encroachments upon economic life.
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The German Government, having most serious complaints to make about the treatment of the minority by the Poles, and the Polish Government, considering themselves entitled to raise complaints against Germany, agree to investigate into all complaints about economic and personal damage, as well as other
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In order that during that period, Germany's lines of communication with East Prussia and Poland's access to the sea may be unrestrict-edly ensured, certain roads and railway lines shall be determined, in order to facilitate unobstructed transit. In this connection only such taxes may be levied as are
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As intended by Ribbentrop, the narrow time limit for acceptance of the ultimatum made it impossible for the British government to contact the Polish government in time about the German offer, let alone for the Poles to arrange for a Polish plenipotentiary envoy to arrive in Berlin that night, thereby
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and Great Britain, shall be formed immediately, and placed in charge of this territory. This commission shall exercise sovereign rights throughout the territory. To that end, the territory shall be evacuated by the Polish military forces, by the Polish police and by the Polish authorities within the
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When Joachim von Ribbentrop refused to give a copy of the German demands to the British Ambassador at midnight of 30–31 August 1939, the two almost came to blows. Ambassador Henderson, who had long advocated concessions to Germany, recognized that here was a deliberately conceived alibi the German
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In order to free the Germans remaining in Poland, as well as the Poles remaining in Germany, from the feeling of being deprived of the benefits of international law, and above all to afford them the certainty of their not being made to take part in actions and in furnishing services of a kind not
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In order to secure, after the plebiscite (irrespective of the result thereof), Germany's unrestricted communication with the province of Danzig-East Prussia, and Poland's access to the sea, Germany shall, in case the territory be returned to Poland as a result of the plebiscite, be given an
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to the extent of the Polish settlement is not included in this area, but, as a matter of principle, is recognized as Polish territory.The details of the boundaries of this Polish port shall be decided on by Germany and Poland, and if necessary established by an International Court of
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appeared at the Foreign Office and sought an audience with Ribbentrop. Five hours later he was shown in, and since he did not have the negotiating authority demanded by Hitler, Ribbentrop briefly dismissed him with the information that he would inform the
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In the event of the Polish Corridor being returned to the Reich, the latter declares herself prepared to arrange with Poland for an exchange of population, insofar as conditions in the Corridor lend themselves to such an
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In order to avoid any sense of menace or danger on either side, Danzig and Gdynia shall henceforth have a purely commercial character; i.e., neither of these places shall be provided with means of military defense or
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also emphasizes the "purely propagandistic character" of the 16-point memorandum, since the Germans gave neither the Polish nor the British side the opportunity to comment on it before they began their invasion.
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attached to German demands to negotiate on August 29, 1939. It was announced on German radio that these points had been rejected on September 1, 1939, even though they were never presented to Poland. Like the
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In case of an agreement being reached on the basis of these proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves prepared immediately to order and carry out the demobilization of their respective armed forces.
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In order to allow for ample time for the necessary and extensive preparations for the carrying out of an impartial plesbiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place before a period of twelve months has
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read the 16 points to Henderson but, against all diplomatic custom, refused to hand him the relevant document. Since no Polish representative had appeared, the proposal had become void anyway.
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government had prepared for a war it was determined to start. No wonder Henderson was angry; von Ribbentrop on the other hand could see war ahead and went home beaming.
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Any special rights claimed by Poland within the port of Danzig shall be negotiated on a parity basis in exchange for equal rights for Germany at the Port of Gdynia.
309:". In doing so, it had weakened its own "moral position" in the face of German "impositions against Polish integrity and independence." In contrast, the historian 271:
The Peninsula of Hela, which according to the result of the plebiscite would be allocated either to Poland or to Germany, shall also be demilitarized in any case.
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points out that the German offer of negotiations was only made as an alibi to its own population. Its decision to go to war had been made long ago. According to
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expressed the view that Poland had refused "to show any objective accommodation in the questions that had to be settled since the unfortunate provisions of the
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shall be held in this territory. All Germans who were domiciled in this area on January 1, 1918, or who were born there on or before that day, and also all
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Because of its purely German character and the unanimous will of its population, the Free City of Danzig shall be returned forthwith to the German Reich.
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Any additional measures required to hasten the carrying through of the above agreement shall be mutually agreed upon between Germany and Poland.
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By the time of the radio broadcast on the same day, Hitler had already given the order to attack on September 1, 1939.
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The allocation of this territory shall be decided on by the absolute majority of the votes cast.
324:, the 16 points were not intended as a basis for negotiations at all, but to let them "burst." 625: 569: 407: 57: 238:
necessary for the upkeep of the lines of communication and for the carrying out of transport.
194:, shall itself decide whether it shall become part of the German Reich or remain with Poland. 442: 333: 310: 99: 325: 167: 107: 88:
in a secret additional protocol. This was the basis for the German attack on September 1.
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on the same day, Polish "rejection" of the ultimatum served as a pretext for the German
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until after the set deadline had expired. It was not until the following noon that the
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allowing Ribbentrop to claim that the Poles had rejected the German demands".
19: 136: 250: 187: 179: 406:(1st American ed.). New York: Crown Publishers. pp. 257–258. 431:
How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939
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Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche AuĂźenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler.
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Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche AuĂźenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler.
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Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche AuĂźenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler.
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Hitlers erster „Blitzkrieg“ und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa
190:, (including these towns), and then in a westerly direction towards 568:(2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 43. 463:
Eine Welt in Waffen. Die globale Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges
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described the Henderson–Ribbentrop meeting regarding the ultimatum:
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This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the
213:, and consisting of members appointed by the four Great Powers, 389:. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1979, pp. 79–158, p. 90. 64:, which had already been planned and withheld several times. 387:
Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent
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were severed. On the night of August 31, Foreign Minister
253:, for the purpose of building a German motor highway ( 500:
Documents Of Events Preceding The Outbreak Of The War
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Europas Weg in den Krieg. Hitler und die Mächte 1939
566:A world at arms: a global history of World War II 245:extraterritorial traffic zone running from, say, 534:Bd. 29). Oldenbourg, MĂĽnchen 1998, p.301. 102:that he was ready to resume negotiations with 532:Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte. 433:. Pantheon Books, New York 1989, pp. 518–526. 8: 382:Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 170:, that is to say, the territory bounded by 371: 369: 367: 114:within 24 hours. In principle, Poland and 222:shortest possible time to be agreed upon. 379:. In: derselbe, Klaus A. Maier et al.: 363: 95:On August 29, 1939, Adolf Hitler told 90:The Soviet invasion of eastern Poland 7: 596:Germany–Poland relations (1918–1939) 397: 395: 118:were ready to negotiate. Because of 58:raid on the Gleiwitz radio station 39:refers to a list of 16 demands by 14: 641:Foreign relations of Nazi Germany 517:Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, p. 697. 487: 478:Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, p. 696. 449:Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, p. 696. 621:1939 in international relations 37:1939 German ultimatum to Poland 132:Polish Ambassador JĂłzef Lipski 1: 564:Weinberg, Gerhard L. (2005). 465:. DVA, Stuttgart 1995, p. 58. 126:decided not to forward it to 106:. For this purpose, a Polish 84:into a German and a Soviet 657: 92:followed on September 17. 174:and a line running from 122:'s ultimate demand, the 110:was required to come to 47:, largely regarding the 402:Bloch, Michael (1992). 332:The American historian 294:In 1959, the historian 166:The territory known as 141:German-Polish relations 74:Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact 16:Demands by Nazi Germany 547:Siedler, Munich 2015, 352:Joachim von Ribbentrop 343: 145:Joachim von Ribbentrop 32: 338: 296:Karl Dietrich Erdmann 76:was reached with the 22: 631:Diplomatic incidents 307:Treaty of Versailles 197:For that purpose, a 139:" of this. Thus the 545:Hitler. Biographie. 459:Gerhard L. Weinberg 427:Donald Cameron Watt 225:The Polish port of 168:the Polish Corridor 86:Sphere of influence 82:East-Central Europe 53:Free City of Danzig 616:August 1939 events 601:Invasion of Poland 513:Klaus Hildebrand: 474:Klaus Hildebrand: 158:The sixteen points 124:British government 97:British Ambassador 72:On August 23, the 62:invasion of Poland 51:and status of the 33: 575:978-0-521-85316-3 543:Peter Longerich: 413:978-0-517-59310-3 648: 580: 579: 561: 555: 541: 535: 524: 518: 511: 505: 504: 491: 490: 485: 479: 472: 466: 456: 450: 443:Klaus Hildebrand 440: 434: 424: 418: 417: 399: 390: 373: 334:Gerhard Weinberg 323: 311:Klaus Hildebrand 304: 217:, the U.S.S.R., 100:Nevile Henderson 656: 655: 651: 650: 649: 647: 646: 645: 611:1939 in Germany 586: 585: 584: 583: 576: 563: 562: 558: 542: 538: 526:Hermann Graml: 525: 521: 512: 508: 497: 488: 486: 482: 473: 469: 457: 453: 441: 437: 425: 421: 414: 401: 400: 393: 374: 365: 360: 348: 326:Peter Longerich 317: 298: 292: 268:fortifications. 211:Saar plebiscite 160: 108:plenipotentiary 70: 49:Polish Corridor 25:Polish Corridor 17: 12: 11: 5: 654: 652: 644: 643: 638: 636:1939 documents 633: 628: 623: 618: 613: 608: 606:1939 in Poland 603: 598: 588: 587: 582: 581: 574: 556: 549:available here 536: 519: 506: 480: 467: 451: 435: 419: 412: 391: 385:, Bd. 2: 362: 361: 359: 356: 355: 354: 347: 344: 291: 288: 287: 286: 283: 280: 276: 272: 269: 265: 262: 258: 255:Reichsautobahn 242: 239: 235: 231: 223: 195: 172:the Baltic Sea 164: 159: 156: 69: 66: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 653: 642: 639: 637: 634: 632: 629: 627: 624: 622: 619: 617: 614: 612: 609: 607: 604: 602: 599: 597: 594: 593: 591: 577: 571: 567: 560: 557: 553: 550: 546: 540: 537: 533: 529: 523: 520: 516: 510: 507: 502: 501: 495: 494:public domain 484: 481: 477: 471: 468: 464: 460: 455: 452: 448: 444: 439: 436: 432: 428: 423: 420: 415: 409: 405: 398: 396: 392: 388: 384: 383: 378: 375:Horst Rohde: 372: 370: 368: 364: 357: 353: 350: 349: 345: 342: 337: 335: 330: 327: 321: 316: 315:Hermann Graml 312: 308: 302: 297: 289: 284: 281: 277: 273: 270: 266: 263: 259: 256: 252: 249:to Danzig or 248: 243: 240: 236: 232: 228: 224: 220: 216: 212: 208: 204: 200: 196: 193: 189: 185: 181: 177: 173: 169: 165: 162: 161: 157: 155: 152: 148: 146: 142: 138: 133: 129: 125: 121: 117: 116:Great Britain 113: 109: 105: 101: 98: 93: 91: 87: 83: 79: 75: 67: 65: 63: 59: 54: 50: 46: 42: 38: 30: 26: 21: 565: 559: 552:Google Books 544: 539: 531: 527: 522: 514: 509: 499: 483: 475: 470: 462: 454: 446: 438: 430: 422: 403: 386: 380: 376: 339: 331: 293: 230:Arbitration. 176:Marienwerder 153: 149: 94: 78:Soviet Union 71: 41:Nazi Germany 36: 34: 318: [ 299: [ 80:, dividing 590:Categories 404:Ribbentrop 358:References 290:Commentary 207:Cassubians 199:plebiscite 192:Schönlanke 68:Background 261:exchange. 31:1923–1939 626:Ultimata 346:See also 251:Dirschau 234:elapsed. 188:Bromberg 180:Graudenz 572:  496:: 410:  227:Gdynia 219:France 137:FĂĽhrer 128:Warsaw 120:Hitler 112:Berlin 104:Poland 45:Poland 29:Danzig 322:] 303:] 247:BĂĽtow 215:Italy 203:Poles 570:ISBN 408:ISBN 184:Kulm 35:The 27:and 23:The 530:(= 178:to 43:to 592:: 461:: 445:: 429:: 394:^ 366:^ 320:de 301:de 205:, 186:, 182:, 578:. 554:. 416:. 135:"

Index


Polish Corridor
Danzig
Nazi Germany
Poland
Polish Corridor
Free City of Danzig
raid on the Gleiwitz radio station
invasion of Poland
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
Soviet Union
East-Central Europe
Sphere of influence
The Soviet invasion of eastern Poland
British Ambassador
Nevile Henderson
Poland
plenipotentiary
Berlin
Great Britain
Hitler
British government
Warsaw
Polish Ambassador JĂłzef Lipski
FĂĽhrer
German-Polish relations
Joachim von Ribbentrop
the Polish Corridor
the Baltic Sea
Marienwerder

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