420:, and ADC's concerns became more urgent. The Air Force Council issued proposals to industry for a new design to work alongside the F-102 that would help fill the gap between the F-89 and F-106. After short consideration of alternatives—an updated F-89 and an interceptor version of F-100—the two-seat modification of F-101 was finally selected for development. Known as F-101B, it would be equipped with the MG-3/Falcon suite from the F-102, but operated by a weapons officer instead of the pilot. It would greatly simplify the complexity of the system as a whole.
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known to all of the participants in advance, and one of the companies would be considered "prime" on ensuring all the parts would fit when they were delivered. The 1954 interceptor was the first fighter aircraft ordered under the Weapon System concept, and became "WS-201A". Contracts for the various parts making up 201A were sent out as soon as they completed documenting them, starting with the electronics suite, then the missile, and finally airframe and engine.
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ADC also became interested in the Voodoo in
October 1952, but funding from higher headquarters was difficult to obtain. They rejected modifying the F-101, mainly due to its high cost, and suggested solving the problem by increasing the numbers of F-86Ds and speeding up work on the F-102. In April ADC
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The Air Force realized that the complexity of these newer systems would make integration difficult. In the past, aircraft airframes, engines and weapons were fairly common in size and general layout, allowing existing designs to be modified to change any one component with relative ease. For the 1954
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known as the J67, would not be ready for a 1954 service entry. Additionally, the MX-1179 fire-control system seemed to be a risky proposition, and was a source of delay. In
December the Air Force decided to reduce the risk by splitting the program in two, producing a reduced-performance version with
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To deal with this problem the Air Force introduced the "Weapons
Systems" concept, where an entire aircraft (or other system) would be ordered as a complete working assembly. Although the parts going into it would be ordered under separate contracts, the requirements of the system as a whole would be
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The delays seriously upset the original timetable, and it was clear by 1952 that even the "low tech" F-102 would not be able to meet the 1954 deadline. Although it was expected that the F-102B would be an excellent long-term solution, something was needed quickly to fill the performance gap between
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to combat this problem. Convair did not immediately put these recommendations into effect, and the initial two flying prototypes, of an order of 42 aircraft, continued with the original design. When these flew starting in
October 1953, NACA's estimates were proven correct, and the F-102 had only a
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was more than capable of holding its own, it was not clear that would be the case in a war situation in Europe against "front line" Soviet pilots. A plane of considerably greater performance was needed to guarantee leadership in this role, so the
Lockheed entry was redirected toward a day fighter
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Work on the airframes continued through 1952 and into 1953. NACA wind tunnel tests in early 1953 showed that the maximum altitude of 57,000 feet and combat radius of 350 miles predicted by
Convair were too optimistic. Drag turned out to be higher than expected, but NACA was able to suggest the
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interceptor, new equipment such as missiles and radar systems would be radically different between designs. There was little expectation that one missile could be swapped for another, for instance, due to different electronic requirements as well as different mechanical layout.
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on 18 June 1950, with a
January 1951 deadline for submissions. MX-1554 also stated that the winner of the airframe contract would also be named the lead "integrator" of the overall Weapon System. When the deadline was reached, nine different proposals were submitted;
401:(SAC) as a long-range "penetration fighter" to escort their heavy bombers. When newer bomber designs offered performance so great that the F-88 could not hope to keep up with them, TAC then took over the work and started modifying it as a low-level nuclear-armed
186:(RFP) for an advanced interceptor capable of attacking Soviet bombers that were expected to enter service in the early 1950s. Several jet-powered interceptors were already under development at that point, typically adaptations of existing fighters like the
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the existing subsonic designs and the continuing delays in the existing F-102 design. ADC argued that having a second design would also guarantee that problems in either program would be less likely to effect defense as a whole.
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speeds. For reasons that are not clear, they also demanded that the entire system be flown and operated by a single pilot. Given the complexity of the radar systems and the aircraft themselves, this would require an advanced
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each submitted a single design. On 2 July 1951 the Air Force announced that
Convair, Lockheed, and Republic had been selected to continue development through the mockup stage, and a winner would be selected at that point.
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responded. Hughes was announced as the winner in July 1950, with what would become the MA-1. The original contract specified that MX-1179 would "direct some type of air-to-air guided missile." Hughes had already won the
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Although the F-102 had been selected as the "low tech" solution to meet the 1954 deadline, practically every part of the 201A system encountered delays. It was clear that the engine, a Wright-modified version of the
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175:. TAC was primarily tasked with offensive duties, but required capable fighters to protect their offensive capability. ADC was tasked solely with the defense of the US from enemy attack, in particular long-range
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It became clear that the
Republic design was far too advanced for the 1954 operational deadline, and on 11 September 1951 the Convair design was selected as the MX-1554 airframe and was designated
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battle control computers to directly control the interceptors for much of their flight. Although greatly delayed, the resulting systems operated for approximately 20 years, into the 1980s.
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interim engines and fire control as an "Interim
Interceptor", and continuing with the original design over a longer period as the "Ultimate Interceptor". The Interim design would use the
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once again asked for the F-101, this time justifying it as a longer-range counterpart for use in areas not widely covered by radar. It appears this suggestion was also rejected.
206:. These were all subsonic aircraft, and it was felt they would have insufficient performance to effectively intercept high-speed jet bombers known to be under development in the
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to endure the high heat load of extended Mach 3+ operation. This proved more difficult to fabricate than expected. The engine, a combination of a Wright-modified version of the
385:, also encountered extensive problems and the J67 eventually ended in failure. Nevertheless, the expected performance was so high that the program was allowed to continue.
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system that was integrated with the fire control system to reduce pilot workload. Given the perceived threat, the new designs were expected to enter service in 1954.
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Studies of the electronics suite had started in February 1949, prior to the 201A specification, and were folded into the project. In January 1950 they sent out the
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engine, already available (although low power), and the Hughes E-9 fire-control system, a slightly updated version of the system being used in the F-86D.
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Meanwhile, practically every part of the F-103 program was going wrong. Construction of the airframe required extensive use of
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To counter these threats, ADC prepared a request for an entirely new aircraft expected to perform "hot war" interceptions at
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The only design with the needed performance at that time was the McDonnell F-88. This design had originally been ordered by
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Jenkins, Dennis R. (January 2004). "The Titanium Titan: The Story of the XF-103 – Republic’s Elusive Mach 3 Fighter".
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275:. This was selected for 201A mainly because it seemed to be the only one that could meet the 1954 operational date.
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era. With the re-arrangement of command, several new organizations within the Air Force were created, including
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The "1954 interceptor" concept first appeared shortly after the creation of the Air Force from the former
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that would enter service in 1954. Several aircraft were developed as part of the project, leading to the
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A, originally slated as an interim interceptor, ended in October 1951 in favor of the new designs.
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A Genesis Workshop: Five Generations of Engineering Enterprise from the Birthplace of Aviation
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marginal performance improvement over the F-86D it was supposed to replace.
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systems. The project also led, eventually, to the upgrading of the
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contract tender to eighteen electronics contractors, but only
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Military aircraft procurement programs of the United States
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Shortly after, the Air Force decided that it also needed a
349:. With the introduction of these programs, work on the
327:were outperformed by the MiG, and while the newer
416:In August 1953 the Soviets detonated their first
478:(5th printing ed.). Air University Press.
287:entered three designs, North American two, and
278:The airframe and engine contract was issued as
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80:Learn how and when to remove this message
202:), with the exception being the all-new
43:This article includes a list of general
429:application of the recently developed
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503:1950s United States fighter aircraft
446:—British interceptor program of 1955
49:it lacks sufficient corresponding
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315:that were being encountered over
171:(ADC), who shared an interest in
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103:project to develop a dedicated
472:Futrell, Robert Frank (1989).
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468:, Chapter 7, "A New Paradigm"
444:Operational Requirement F.155
319:. Existing designs like the
182:In early 1949 ADC started a
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271:contract for the missile
131:missile and a variety of
332:role, evolving into the
377:and a "combined cycle"
256:North American Aviation
101:United States Air Force
64:more precise citations.
95:, informally known as
409:on 26 November 1951.
405:, renaming it as the
399:Strategic Air Command
184:Request for Proposals
119:and, indirectly, the
165:Tactical Air Command
105:interceptor aircraft
97:the 1954 Interceptor
192:the F-86D Sabre Dog
169:Air Defense Command
424:Continued problems
321:P-80 Shooting Star
311:to combat the new
200:P-80 Shooting Star
198:(adapted from the
109:F-102 Delta Dagger
334:F-104 Starfighter
285:Republic Aircraft
157:US Army Air Force
125:F-104 Starfighter
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16:(Redirected from
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389:Interim measures
364:Westinghouse J40
248:General Electric
173:fighter aircraft
113:F-106 Delta Dart
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159:in the post-
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129:AIM-4 Falcon
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309:day fighter
70:August 2014
62:introducing
497:Categories
451:References
329:F-86 Sabre
215:supersonic
188:F-86 Sabre
167:(TAC) and
151:Background
135:–supplied
45:references
431:area rule
383:Marquardt
220:autopilot
458:Airpower
438:See also
371:titanium
301:Lockheed
99:, was a
313:MiG-15s
297:Douglas
293:Convair
280:MX-1554
240:MX-1179
226:WS-201A
194:), the
177:bombers
93:WS-201A
58:improve
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379:ramjet
299:, and
269:MX-904
262:, and
260:Sperry
244:Bendix
47:, but
460:34/1.
381:from
346:F-103
341:F-102
317:Korea
137:radar
480:ISBN
323:and
145:SAGE
139:and
123:and
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