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closely with Ian Hacker, then a Lloyd's underwriter, and Ted
Doolittle and Kinsey Carpenter, then brokers with Kinsey Carpenter, a San Francisco, CA insurance broker, the policy provided third-party coverage along with business interruption coverage. In those early days, it was thought that a big risk would be for a company to negligently transmit a virus that could infect other companies' systems who would then bring suit against the original company as well as business interruption. The policy was one of the first, as well, to include first-party and third-party coverages in the same form. While such errors & omissions have likely happened, suits against organizations on this basis have proven to be rare. The focus of forms that have developed since 2000 has been on business interruption, payment of fines and penalties, credit monitoring costs, public relations costs, and the cost of restoring or rebuilding private data, and they continue to expand and evolve today. Also, technology errors & omissions policies are now sold with third-party coverage to organizations, such as programmers and technology installers who could get sued if their advice or product fails to be satisfactory to their clients. Other early entrants to the cyber market included American International Group (AIG) and Chubb. Today, more than 80 companies are competing in the cyber market.
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cyber-insurance believe that cyber-insurance would lead to the design of insurance contracts that would shift appropriate amounts of self-defense liability to the clients, thereby making the cyberspace more robust. Here the term ‘self-defense' implies the efforts by a network user to secure their system through technical solutions such as anti-virus and anti-spam software, firewalls, using secure operating systems, etc. Cyber-insurance has also the potential to be a market solution that can align with economic incentives of cyber-insurers, users (individuals/organizations), policymakers, and security software vendors. i.e., the cyber-insurers will earn profit from appropriately pricing premiums, network users will seek to hedge potential losses by jointly buying insurance and investing in self-defense mechanisms, policymakers would ensure the increase in overall network security, and the security software vendors could experience an increase in their product sales via forming alliances with cyber-insurers.
571:
adversely affect loss probabilities after the insurance contract is signed, i.e., the so-called moral hazard problem. The challenge due to the interdependent and correlated nature of cyber-risks is particular to cyber-insurance and differentiates traditional insurance scenarios (e.g., car or health insurance) from the former. In a large distributed system such as the
Internet, risks span a large set of nodes and are correlated. Thus, user investments in security to counter risks generate positive externalities for other users in the network. The aim of cyber-insurance here is to enable individual users to internalize the externalities in the network so that each user optimally invests in security solutions, thereby alleviating moral hazard and improving network security. In traditional insurance scenarios, the risk span is quite small (sometimes it spans only one or two entities) and uncorrelated, thus internalizing the externalities generated by user investments in safety, is much easier.
617:
cyber-insurers. Lelarge et al. do not model information asymmetry in their work. Although Shetty et al. prove that cyber-insurance markets are inefficient under conditions of information asymmetry, their results do not generally extend to settings where insured organizations are networked among each other. Johnson et al. discuss the role of the joint existence of self-insurance and market insurance on the adoption of the different types of insurance by users, but do not model the network of interdependent organizations. In most recent work, Pal et al. in a series of joint articles prove the inefficiency of cyber-insurance markets under conditions of partial information asymmetry and correlated risks and show the existence of efficient markets (both regulated and unregulated) under premium discrimination.
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case of aggregating light-tailed and independently sourced cyber-risks (a practically less probable event) will efficient cyber-insurance markets be sustainable. In all other cases, cyber (re-)insurance markets will exist but will be largely inefficient with symptoms such as low premium injection, market for lemons, high supply demand gap, and few re-insurers. Information asymmetry between the insured and the insurance provider alongside the correlated nature of cyber-risks are the primary reasons for such market inefficiencies.
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identified in the first generation" of cyber-insurance literature until about 2005. The latter aspect may cause frustration when claiming compensation for damages. Furthermore, entities considering cyber-insurance must undergo a series of often invasive security evaluation procedures, revealing their IT infrastructures and policies. Meanwhile, witnessing thousands of vulnerabilities, millions of attacks, and substantial improvement in defining security standards and
625:(thereby eliminating information asymmetry) in practically feasible time - leave alone humans. While Cunningham logically argues for this problem to be Turing Undecidable, Pal et al., and Liu et al., are the first to formally prove that the problem is NP-Hard and derive an approximation solution to alleviate the information asymmetry problem. The results justify why the cyber (re-)insurance markets have been so sparse over the last decade.
494:, intrusion-detection systems (IDSs), and other add-ons to reduce the likelihood of being affected by threats. In practice, a large industry (companies like Symantec, McAfee, etc.) as well as considerable research efforts are currently centered around developing and deploying tools and techniques to detect threats and anomalies in order to protect the cyber infrastructure and its users from the resulting negative impact of the anomalies.
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to gauge the risk they are taking on by offering the policy to the entity. By completing the IT security audit the entity procuring the policy will be required, in some cases, to make necessary improvements to their IT security vulnerabilities before the cyber-insurance policy can be procured. This will in-turn help reduce risk of cyber crime against the company procuring cyber-insurance.
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average annual premium for a cyber liability limit of $ 250,000 with a $ 2,500 deductible was $ 739. In addition to location, the main drivers of cost for cyber insurance include the type of business, the number of credit/debit card transactions performed, and the storage of sensitive personal information such as date of birth and Social
Security numbers.
620:
Recent work on mathematical cyber-risk modeling to study the market sustainability of covering aggregate cyber-risk by cyber (re-)insurers have been undertaken only by Pal et al. Based on a series of rigorous modeling analysis on the dimensions of economics and statistics. they prove that only in the
616:
The works by
Lelarge and Bolot; and Shetty et al. present the benefits of cyber-insurance in incentivizing Internet users to invest appropriately in security. However, their works address restricted market types that only consider independent residual cyber-risks from various user sources arriving to
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With cyber insurance premiums expected to grow from around $ 2 billion in 2015 to an estimated $ 20 billion or more by 2025, insurers and reinsurers are continuing to refine underwriting requirements. Market immaturity and lack of standardization are two reasons why underwriting cyber products today
554:
In 2022, Kentucky and
Maryland enacted insurance data security legislation based upon the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) Insurance Data Security Model Law (MDL-668). Maryland's SB 207 takes effect on October 1, 2023. Kentucky's House Bill 474 goes into effect on January 1,
263:
Bruce
Schneier has postulated that existing insurance practices tend to follow either the "Flood or Fire" model however Cyber events don't appear to be modeled by either of these event types, this has led to the situation where the scope of Cyber Insurance is further restricted to decrease the risk
246:
As a side benefit, many cyber-insurance policies require entities attempting to procure cyber-insurance policies to participate in an IT security audit before the insurance carrier will bind the policy. This will help companies determine their current vulnerabilities and allow the insurance carrier
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Pal, Ranjan; Psounis, Konstantinos; Crowcroft, Jon; Kelly, Frank; Hui, Pan; Tarkoma, Sasu; Kumar, Abhishek; Kelly, John; Chatterjee, Aritra; Golubchik, Leana; Sastry, Nishanth; Nag, Bodhibrata (2020). "When Are Cyber
Blackouts in Modern Service Networks Likely?: A Network Oblivious Theory on Cyber
608:
It is well known from market practice that cyber-insurance markets have not blossomed in terms of injected premium inflow as per its visionary potential. There is a big multi-billion-dollar supply demand gap indicating market failure in an economic sense. While policy and legal studies have had a
546:' helps protect all interested parties - executives, regulators, judges, the public who can be affected by those risks. The Duty of Care Risk Analysis Standard (DoCRA) provides practices and principles to help balance compliance, security, and business objectives when developing security controls.
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Insurance relies upon sound actuarial data against a largely static background of risk. Given that these don't exist at present it is unlikely that either the buyers of these products will achieve the value outcomes that they desire. This view of the market is reflected in the current market state
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As insurers payout on cyber-losses, and as cyber threats develop and change, insurance products are increasingly being purchased alongside existing IT security services. Indeed, the underwriting criteria for insurers to offer cyber-insurance products are also early in development, and underwriters
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As of 2019, the average cost of cyber liability insurance in the United States was estimated to be $ 1,501 per year for $ 1 million in liability coverage, with a $ 10,000 deductible. The average annual premium for a cyber liability limit of $ 500,000 with a $ 5,000 deductible was $ 1,146, and the
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As of 2014, 90% of the cyber-insurance premium volume was covering exposure in the United States. Although at least 50 insurance companies have cyber-insurance product offerings, the actual writing is concentrated within a group of five underwriters. Many insurance companies have been hesitant to
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FM Global in 2019 conducted a survey of CFOs at companies with over $ 1 billion in turnover. The survey found that 71% of CFOs believed that their insurance provider would cover "most or all" of the losses their company would suffer in a cyber security attack or crime. Nevertheless, many of those
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Given the above-mentioned inevitable barriers to near 100% risk mitigation, the need arises for alternative methods for risk management in cyberspace. To highlight the importance of improving the current state of cyber-security, US President Barack Obama issued a cyber-security executive order in
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Recent history shows that the purchase of cyber insurance has increased due to the rise in internet-based attacks, such as ransomware attacks. Government
Accountability Office, "Insurance clients are opting in for cyber coverage—up from 26% in 2016 to 47% in 2020. At the same time, U.S. insurance
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Examples of seminal modeling work studying the economic efficiency of non-accumulative cyber-risk covering cyber insurance markets include (i) Lelarge and Bolot, (ii) Pal et al., (iii) Pal et al., (iv) Pal et al., (v) Johnson et al., and (vi) Shetty, et al. These works first show the free-riding
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CFOs reported that they expected damages related with cyber attacks that are not covered by typical cyber attack policies. Specifically, 50% of the CFOs mentioned that they anticipated after a cyber attack a devaluation of their company's brand while more than 30% expected a decline in revenue.
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If not the first, at least one of the first, cyber liability policies as we now call them was developed for the Lloyd's of London market in 2000. The policy was spearheaded by Keith
Daniels and Rob Hamesfahr then attorneys with the Chicago, IL law firm of Blatt, Hammesfahr & Eaton. Working
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Because the cyber-insurance market in many countries is relatively small compared to other insurance products, its overall impact on emerging cyber threats is difficult to quantify. As the impact to people and businesses from cyber threats is also relatively broad when compared to the scope of
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Cunningham, Pfleeger, Pal, Liu et al., and Liu et al. computationally argue against the existence of sustainable cyber (re-)insurance markets under information asymmetry. The common message out of their study is that IT driven systems have too many vulnerabilities for computers to detect them
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As well as directly improving security, cyber-insurance is enormously beneficial in the event of a large-scale security breach. Insurance provides a smooth funding mechanism for recovery from major losses, helping businesses to return to normal and reducing the need for government assistance.
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Information asymmetry has a significant negative effect on most insurance environments, where typical considerations include inability to distinguish between users of different (high and low risk) types, i.e., the so-called adverse selection problem, as well as users undertaking actions that
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In practice, several obstacles have prevented the market for cyber-insurance from achieving maturity; absence of reliable actuarial data to compute insurance premiums, lack of awareness among decision-makers contributing to too little demand, as well as legal and procedural hurdles have been
534:
Cyber-insurance is a risk management technique via which network user risks are transferred to an insurance company, in return for a fee, i.e., the insurance premium. Examples of potential cyber-insurers might include ISP, cloud provider, traditional insurance organizations. Proponents of
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make it an interesting place to be in the insurance world. Not only do you have an insurance marketplace that's trying to reach a standard and accommodate the needs of today's insured, but you also, at the same time, have a rapidly developing exposure landscape and capacity available.
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Even a 2002 conservative forecast, which predicted a global market for cyber-insurance worth $ 2.5 billion in 2005, turned out to be five times higher than the size of the market in 2008. Overall, in relative terms, the market for cyber-insurance shrank as the
Internet economy grew.
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Information Technology is an inherent facet of virtually all modern businesses, the requirement for a separate product only exists because of a deliberate scoping exercise which has excluded theft and damage associated with modern technologies from the existing product lines.
405:. Covers loss of monies (or similar monetary instrument) resulting from the theft of such assets by a malicious actor(s) whose fraudulent activity, primarily the unauthorized access to the policyholder's systems, allows such actor to gain such assets by fraudulent transfer.
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According to Josephine Wolff, cyber insurance has been "ineffective at curbing cybersecurity losses because it normalizes the payment of online ransoms, whereas the goal of cybersecurity is the opposite—to disincentivize such payments to make ransomware less profitable."
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to the underwriters. Compounding this is a paucity of data relating to actual damage correlated with the type of event, a lack of standards associated with the classification of events, and a lack of evidence associated with the efficacy of "Industry best practices".
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Despite improvements in risk protection techniques over the last decade due to hardware, software, and cryptographic methodologies, it is impossible to achieve perfect/near-perfect cyber-security protection. The impossibility arises due to a number of reasons:
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enter this coverage market, as sound actuarial data for cyber exposure is non-existent. Hampering the development of this actuarial data is inadequate disclosure regarding cyber attacks by those affected. After a significant malware incident in 2017, however,
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Finally, insurance allows cyber-security risks to be distributed fairly, with the cost of premiums commensurate with the size of expected loss from such risks. This avoids potentially dangerous concentrations of risk while also preventing free-riding.
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policies or at least are not specifically defined in traditional insurance products. Coverage provided by cyber-insurance policies may include first and third parties coverage against losses such as data destruction, extortion, theft, hacking, and
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February 2013 that emphasizes the need to reduce cyber-threats and be resilient to them. In this regard, some security researchers in the recent past have identified cyber-insurance as a potential tool for effective risk management.
423:. Provides coverage for the costs associated with the investigation of threats to commit cyber attacks against the policyholder's systems and for payments to extortionists who threaten to obtain and disclose sensitive information.
293:, the market for cyber-insurance failed to thrive and remained in a niche for unusual demands. Coverage is tightly limited, and clients include SMBs (small and medium businesses) in need of insurance to qualify for tenders, or
435:. Covers physical damage to, or loss of use of, computer-related assets, including the costs of retrieving and restoring data, hardware, software, or other information destroyed or damaged as the result of a cyber attack.
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Early works in the 1990s focused on the general merits of cyber-insurance. In the late 1990s, when the business perspective of information security became more prominent, visions of cyber-insurance as a
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Network users taking advantage of the positive security effects generated by other users' investments in security, in turn, themselves not investing in security and resulting in the free-riding problem.
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released information on how much the cyberattack would impact financial performance, leading some analysts to believe the trend is for companies to be more transparent with data from cyber incidents.
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behavior of Internet users (primarily users and organizations) without the presence of cyber-insurance, and then study how insurance can reduce free-riding within a network of organizations.
156:; liability coverage indemnifying companies for losses to others caused, for example, by errors and omissions, failure to safeguard data, or defamation; and other benefits including regular
592:- explicitly excluding damage from acts of war. While the majority of cyber insurance claims will relate to simple criminal behaviour, increasingly companies are likely to fall victim to
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Consequently, during 2005, a “second generation" of cyber-insurance literature emerged targeting risk management of current cyber-networks. The authors of such literature link the
676:
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411:. Covers the legal, technical, or forensic services necessary to assess whether a cyber attack has occurred, to assess the impact of the attack, and to stop an attack.
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attacks by nation-states or terrorist organizations - whether specifically targeted or simply collateral damage. After the US and UK, governments characterized the
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with fundamental properties of information technology, specially correlated risk information asymmetries between insurers and insureds, and inter-dependencies.
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sound say in why that is the case, it is the field of mathematical modeling research that have formally established the fact on why it is so.
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Pal, Ranjan; Golubchik, Leana; Psounis, Konstantinos; Hui, Pan (2014). "Will Cyber-Insurance Improve Network Security: A Market Analysis".
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Pal, Ranjan; Golubchik, Leana; Psounis, Konstantinos; Hui, Pan (2014). "Will Cyber-Insurance Improve Network Security: A Market Analysis".
1152:"Cyber insurance may create false sense of security among senior financial executives at world's top companies, suggests FM Global survey"
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The infrastructure, the users, and the services offered on computer networks today are all subject to a wide variety of risks posed by
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entities saw the costs of cyberattacks nearly double between 2016 and 2019. As a result, insurance premiums also saw major increases."
2026:
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1955:
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Pal, Ranjan; Golubchik, Leana; Psounis, Konstantinos; Hui, Pan (2018). "Improving Cyber-Security via Profitable Insurance Markets".
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Misaligned incentives between network users, security product vendors, and regulatory authorities regarding protecting the network.
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669:
356:
195:
53:
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Pal, Ranjan; Golubchik, Leana (2010). "Analyzing Self-Defense Investments in Internet Security under Cyber-Insurance Coverage".
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1991:
1981:
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Pal, Ranjan; Lu, Taoan; Liu, Peihan; Xinlong, Yin (2021). "CYBER (RE-)INSURANCE POLICY WRITING IS NP-HARD IN IOT SOCIETIES".
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Pal, Ranjan; Lu, Taoan; Liu, Peihan; Xinlong, Yin (2021). "CYBER (RE-)INSURANCE POLICY WRITING IS NP-HARD IN IOT SOCIETIES".
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417:. Covers lost income and related costs where a policyholder is unable to conduct business due to a cyber event or data loss.
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1482:"Will Catastrophic Cyber-Risk Aggregation Thrive in the IoT Age? A Cautionary Economics Tale for (Re-)Insurers and Likes"
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2011:
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Lelarge, Marc; Bolot, Jean (2009). "Economic Incentives to Increase Security in the Internet: The Case for Insurance".
79:
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441:. Covers expenses related with the restoration or recreation of data that were lost due to security or system failure.
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Cyberinsurance policy : rethinking risk in an age of ransomware, computer fraud, data breaches, and cyberattacks
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where standard exclusions result in a situation where "An insurer could argue they apply to almost any data breach".
184:
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The problem of a lemons market, whereby security vendors have no incentive to release robust products in the market.
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1655:"How Hard is Cyber-Risk Management in IT/OT Systems? A Theory to Classify and Conquer Hardness of Insuring ICSs"
1599:"How Hard is Cyber-Risk Management in IT/OT Systems? A Theory to Classify and Conquer Hardness of Insuring ICSs"
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Cyberinsurance Policy: Rethinking Risk in an Age of Ransomware, Computer Fraud, Data Breaches, and Cyberattacks
2337:
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Shetty, Nikhil; Schwartz, Galina; Walrand, Jean (2010). "Can Competitive Insurers Improve Network Security?".
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482:, etc. In order to counter the risk posed by these threats, network users have traditionally resorted to
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calls into question the validity of these factors to causally explain the lack of an insurance market.
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704:
Tsohou, Aggeliki; Diamantopoulou, Vasiliki; Gritzalis, Stefanos; Lambrinoudakis, Costas (2023-06-01).
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A key area to manage risk is to establish what is an acceptable risk for each organization or what is
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Anderson, Ross; Moore, Tyler. "The economics of information security: A survey and open questions".
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protection provided by insurance products, insurance companies continue to develop their services.
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2016:
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Johnson, Benjamin; Böhme, Rainer; Grossklags, Jens (2011). "Security Games with Market Insurance".
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Proceedings of 5th International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security & Assurance
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attack as a Russian military cyber-attack insurers are arguing that they do not cover such events.
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tool were formulated. Although its roots in the 1980s looked promising, battered by events such as
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Difficulty to measure risks resulting in challenges to designing pertinent risk removal solutions.
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884:"Rising Cyberthreats Increase Cyber Insurance Premiums While Reducing Availability | U.S. GAO"
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Kesan, Jay P.; Majuca, Ruperto P.; Yurcik, William J. "The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance".
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infrastructure and activities. Risks of this nature are typically excluded from traditional
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Johnson, Benjamin; Böhme, Rainer; Grossklags, Jens. "Security Games with Market Insurance".
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160:, post-incident public relations and investigative expenses, and criminal reward funds.
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Why are Cyber-Insurance and Cyber Re-Insurance Markets Commercially Not Popular Enough?
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475:
298:
294:
1201:"NotPetya an 'act of war,' cyber insurance firm taken to task for refusing to pay out"
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Difficulty in designing solutions catered to varied intentions behind network attacks.
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1227:"Losses From Malware May Not Be Covered Due To Your Policy's Hostile Acts Exclusion"
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Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
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User naiveness in optimally exploiting feature benefits of technical solutions.
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2422:
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Pfleeger, Shari; Cunningham, Robert (2010). "Why Measuring Security Is Hard".
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are actively partnering with IT security companies to develop their products.
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1175:"Big Companies Thought Insurance Covered a Cyberattack. They May Be Wrong"
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Customer lock-in and first-mover effects of vulnerable security products.
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819:"Insurer cites cyber policy exclusion to dispute data breach settlement"
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1409:. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 6101. pp. 308–322.
1376:. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 7037. pp. 117–130.
670:"Insurance for Cyber Attacks: The Issue of Setting Premiums in Context"
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1015:"Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity"
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Like other insurance policies, cyber insurance typically includes a
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429: : Insurance against reputation attacks and cyber defamation.
801:"Cyberinsurance Tries to Tackle the Unpredictable World of Hacks"
706:"Cyber insurance: state of the art, trends and future directions"
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Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 2004
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29:
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Schwartz, Galina; Bohme, Rainer. "Modeling Cyber-Insurance".
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399:- Insurance for loss derived from a cyber or hacking event.
139:
product intended to protect businesses from Internet-based
1653:
Pal, Ranjan; Liu, Peihan; Lu, Taoan; Hua, Edward (2022).
1597:
Pal, Ranjan; Liu, Peihan; Lu, Taoan; Hua, Edward (2022).
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Office, U. S. Government Accountability (2023-09-27).
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974:"Is Your Business Vulnerable to these Cyber Threats?"
1766:"Average costs of cyber liability insurance studied"
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for their specific working environment. Practicing '
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1739:"Reckitt seeks to quantify havoc of malware attack"
60:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
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1486:ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems
1441:ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems
1521:Pal, Ranjan; Huang, Ziyuan; Yin, Xinlong (2021).
923:"Network Eavesdropping Attacks and How They Work"
1696:Proceedings of IEEE Winter Simulation Conference
1640:Proceedings of IEEE Winter Simulation Conference
786:"Cybersecurity Insurance - Schneier on Security"
523:Liability shell games played by product vendors.
1712:"Data scarce for insurers covering cyber risks"
1523:Interoperability of Heterogeneous IoT Platforms
502:Scarce existence of sound technical solutions.
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710:International Journal of Information Security
8:
1339:ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
143:, and more generally from risks relating to
363:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
202:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
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1659:ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
1603:ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
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383:Learn how and when to remove this message
222:Learn how and when to remove this message
120:Learn how and when to remove this message
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1764:Lerner, Matthew (September 19, 2019).
297:too small to hedge the risks of their
1374:Decision and Game Theory for Security
1056:"Duty of Care Risk Analysis Standard"
27:Information technology risk insurance
7:
1199:Osborne, Charlie (11 January 2019).
361:adding citations to reliable sources
200:adding citations to reliable sources
58:adding citations to reliable sources
1480:Pal, Ranjan; Huang, Ziyuan (2021).
1225:Menapace, Michael (10 March 2019).
1079:"INSURANCE DATA SECURITY MODEL LAW"
1871:Accidental death and dismemberment
1790:Mak, Adrian (September 17, 2019).
927:Cybersecurity Risks for Businesses
433:Computer data loss and restoration
25:
1792:"Average Cost of Cyber Insurance"
1173:Satariano, Adam (15 April 2019).
1997:Directors and officers liability
1162:from the original on 2020-09-20.
972:Morriss, Sean (6 January 2015).
682:from the original on 2020-07-27.
333:
172:
34:
1709:Veysey, Sarah (June 10, 2015).
1407:Trust and Trustworthy Computing
948:"Network Eavesdropping - OWASP"
909:In Proceedings of GameSec, 2011
45:needs additional citations for
1150:Global, F. M. (30 July 2019).
1:
2764:Savings and loan association
1439:(Re)Insurance Feasibility".
1415:10.1007/978-3-642-13869-0_23
1382:10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_11
1137:In Proceedings of WEIS, 2010
149:commercial general liability
2197:Insurance-linked securities
1564:IEEE Security & Privacy
1309:Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM
1276:10.1109/INFCOM.2009.5062066
1042:Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM
460:intrusions of various kinds
2845:
1886:Total permanent disability
1100:"Maryland Senate Bill 207"
722:10.1007/s10207-023-00660-8
2789:
2626:Health insurance coverage
1891:Business overhead expense
1737:Daneshkhu, Scheherazade.
1531:10.1007/978-3-030-82446-4
1122:Kentucky General Assembly
1019:Obama Whitehouse Archives
832:Wolff, Josephine (2022).
456:denial of service attacks
454:that include distributed
154:denial of service attacks
2027:Protection and indemnity
2484:Explanation of benefits
1956:Variable universal life
1351:10.1145/3273996.3273999
1231:The National Law Review
2621:Health insurance costs
2022:Professional liability
1745:. No. 7 July 2017
1525:. Internet of Things.
1270:. pp. 1494–1502.
762:"Schneier on Security"
409:Forensic investigation
145:information technology
2477:Out-of-pocket expense
2338:Workers' compensation
1992:Collateral protection
1982:Business interruption
584:War exclusion clauses
540:'reasonable security'
415:Business interruption
2700:Corpus Juris Civilis
590:war exclusion clause
575:Ambiguities in terms
427:Reputation Insurance
357:improve this section
196:improve this section
54:improve this article
2759:Rochdale Principles
2754:Mutual savings bank
2749:Mutual organization
2734:Cooperative banking
2651:Mesopotamian banker
1931:Longevity insurance
1576:10.1109/MSP.2010.60
2829:Types of insurance
2511:Insurable interest
2012:Payment protection
1913:Payment protection
1770:Business Insurance
1251:Wolff, Josephine.
1021:. 12 February 2013
799:Wolff, Josephine.
488:anti-spam software
319:computer forensics
2824:Internet security
2811:
2810:
2656:Code of Hammurabi
2631:Vehicle insurance
2526:Replacement value
2418:Actual cash value
2382:Adverse selection
2372:Actuarial science
2346:
2345:
2278:Kidnap and ransom
2251:Extended warranty
1898:Income protection
1540:978-3-030-82445-7
1424:978-3-642-13868-3
1391:978-3-642-25279-2
1285:978-1-4244-3512-8
1268:IEEE Infocom 2009
1060:The DoCRA Council
845:978-0-262-37075-2
668:Toregas, Costis.
636:Reckitt Benckiser
462:, eavesdropping,
393:
392:
385:
232:
231:
224:
130:
129:
122:
104:
69:"Cyber insurance"
16:(Redirected from
2836:
2769:Social insurance
2724:Friendly society
2616:Health insurance
2444:Short rate table
2192:Catastrophe bond
2093:Lenders mortgage
1854:
1834:
1827:
1820:
1811:
1804:
1803:
1801:
1799:
1787:
1781:
1780:
1778:
1776:
1761:
1755:
1754:
1752:
1750:
1734:
1728:
1727:
1725:
1723:
1714:
1706:
1700:
1699:
1691:
1685:
1684:
1674:
1650:
1644:
1643:
1635:
1629:
1628:
1618:
1594:
1588:
1587:
1559:
1553:
1552:
1518:
1512:
1511:
1501:
1477:
1471:
1470:
1460:
1435:
1429:
1428:
1402:
1396:
1395:
1369:
1363:
1362:
1334:
1328:
1327:
1319:
1313:
1312:
1304:
1298:
1297:
1263:
1257:
1256:
1248:
1242:
1241:
1239:
1237:
1222:
1216:
1215:
1213:
1211:
1196:
1190:
1189:
1187:
1185:
1170:
1164:
1163:
1147:
1141:
1140:
1132:
1126:
1125:
1118:"House Bill 474"
1114:
1108:
1107:
1096:
1090:
1089:
1083:
1074:
1068:
1067:
1062:. Archived from
1052:
1046:
1045:
1037:
1031:
1030:
1028:
1026:
1011:
1005:
1004:
996:
990:
989:
987:
985:
980:on 11 March 2015
976:. Archived from
969:
963:
962:
960:
959:
950:. Archived from
944:
938:
937:
935:
933:
919:
913:
912:
904:
898:
897:
895:
894:
879:
873:
872:
864:
858:
857:
829:
823:
822:
815:
809:
808:
796:
790:
789:
782:
776:
775:
773:
772:
766:www.schneier.com
758:
752:
751:
741:
701:
695:
690:
684:
683:
681:
674:
665:
439:Data Restoration
397:Network Security
388:
381:
377:
374:
368:
337:
329:
227:
220:
216:
213:
207:
176:
168:
125:
118:
114:
111:
105:
103:
62:
38:
30:
21:
2844:
2843:
2839:
2838:
2837:
2835:
2834:
2833:
2814:
2813:
2812:
2807:
2785:
2781:Insurance cycle
2744:Fraternal order
2637:
2568:
2562:
2521:Proximate cause
2516:Insurance fraud
2496:General average
2455:Claims adjuster
2397:Risk management
2392:Risk assessment
2356:
2353:
2342:
2308:Prize indemnity
2175:
2123:
2117:
2046:
2007:Over-redemption
1965:
1917:
1908:National health
1849:
1843:
1838:
1808:
1807:
1797:
1795:
1789:
1788:
1784:
1774:
1772:
1763:
1762:
1758:
1748:
1746:
1743:Financial Times
1736:
1735:
1731:
1721:
1719:
1717:Cyber Insurance
1708:
1707:
1703:
1693:
1692:
1688:
1672:10.1145/3568399
1652:
1651:
1647:
1637:
1636:
1632:
1616:10.1145/3568399
1596:
1595:
1591:
1561:
1560:
1556:
1541:
1520:
1519:
1515:
1499:10.1145/3446635
1479:
1478:
1474:
1449:10.1145/3386159
1437:
1436:
1432:
1425:
1404:
1403:
1399:
1392:
1371:
1370:
1366:
1336:
1335:
1331:
1321:
1320:
1316:
1306:
1305:
1301:
1286:
1265:
1264:
1260:
1250:
1249:
1245:
1235:
1233:
1224:
1223:
1219:
1209:
1207:
1198:
1197:
1193:
1183:
1181:
1172:
1171:
1167:
1149:
1148:
1144:
1134:
1133:
1129:
1116:
1115:
1111:
1098:
1097:
1093:
1081:
1076:
1075:
1071:
1054:
1053:
1049:
1039:
1038:
1034:
1024:
1022:
1013:
1012:
1008:
998:
997:
993:
983:
981:
971:
970:
966:
957:
955:
946:
945:
941:
931:
929:
921:
920:
916:
906:
905:
901:
892:
890:
881:
880:
876:
866:
865:
861:
846:
831:
830:
826:
817:
816:
812:
798:
797:
793:
784:
783:
779:
770:
768:
760:
759:
755:
703:
702:
698:
691:
687:
679:
672:
667:
666:
662:
657:
648:
631:
606:
586:
577:
561:
559:Existing issues
448:
403:Theft and fraud
389:
378:
372:
369:
354:
338:
327:
295:community banks
283:risk management
278:
257:
228:
217:
211:
208:
193:
177:
166:
135:is a specialty
133:Cyber-insurance
126:
115:
109:
106:
63:
61:
51:
39:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2842:
2840:
2832:
2831:
2826:
2816:
2815:
2809:
2808:
2806:
2805:
2802:List of topics
2798:
2790:
2787:
2786:
2784:
2783:
2778:
2777:
2776:
2771:
2766:
2761:
2756:
2751:
2746:
2741:
2736:
2731:
2717:
2712:
2711:
2710:
2696:
2695:
2694:
2689:
2687:Burial society
2677:
2676:
2675:
2669:§235–238; §240
2661:§100–105; §126
2653:
2647:
2645:
2639:
2638:
2636:
2635:
2634:
2633:
2628:
2623:
2618:
2613:
2611:Climate change
2603:
2601:United Kingdom
2598:
2593:
2588:
2583:
2578:
2572:
2570:
2564:
2563:
2561:
2560:
2559:
2558:
2548:
2546:Underinsurance
2543:
2538:
2536:Self-insurance
2533:
2528:
2523:
2518:
2513:
2508:
2503:
2498:
2493:
2486:
2481:
2480:
2479:
2474:
2469:
2459:
2458:
2457:
2447:
2446:
2445:
2442:
2430:
2425:
2420:
2415:
2414:
2413:
2408:
2399:
2394:
2389:
2384:
2379:
2369:
2363:
2361:
2348:
2347:
2344:
2343:
2341:
2340:
2335:
2330:
2325:
2320:
2315:
2310:
2305:
2303:Political risk
2300:
2295:
2290:
2285:
2283:Legal expenses
2280:
2275:
2270:
2269:
2268:
2258:
2253:
2248:
2243:
2238:
2233:
2232:
2231:
2226:
2216:
2211:
2206:
2201:
2200:
2199:
2194:
2183:
2181:
2177:
2176:
2174:
2173:
2168:
2163:
2158:
2153:
2148:
2143:
2138:
2133:
2127:
2125:
2119:
2118:
2116:
2115:
2110:
2105:
2100:
2095:
2090:
2085:
2080:
2075:
2070:
2065:
2063:Builder's risk
2060:
2054:
2052:
2048:
2047:
2045:
2044:
2039:
2034:
2029:
2024:
2019:
2014:
2009:
2004:
1999:
1994:
1989:
1987:Business owner
1984:
1979:
1973:
1971:
1967:
1966:
1964:
1963:
1958:
1953:
1951:Universal life
1948:
1943:
1938:
1933:
1927:
1925:
1919:
1918:
1916:
1915:
1910:
1905:
1903:Long-term care
1900:
1895:
1894:
1893:
1888:
1878:
1873:
1868:
1862:
1860:
1851:
1845:
1844:
1839:
1837:
1836:
1829:
1822:
1814:
1806:
1805:
1794:. AdvisorSmith
1782:
1756:
1729:
1701:
1686:
1645:
1630:
1589:
1554:
1539:
1513:
1472:
1430:
1423:
1397:
1390:
1364:
1329:
1314:
1299:
1284:
1258:
1243:
1217:
1191:
1179:New York Times
1165:
1142:
1127:
1109:
1091:
1069:
1066:on 2018-08-14.
1047:
1032:
1006:
991:
964:
939:
914:
899:
874:
859:
844:
824:
810:
791:
777:
753:
716:(3): 737–748.
696:
685:
659:
658:
656:
653:
647:
644:
630:
627:
605:
602:
585:
582:
576:
573:
565:market failure
560:
557:
528:
527:
524:
521:
518:
515:
512:
509:
506:
503:
447:
444:
443:
442:
436:
430:
424:
418:
412:
406:
400:
391:
390:
341:
339:
332:
326:
323:
299:online banking
277:
274:
256:
253:
230:
229:
212:September 2017
180:
178:
171:
165:
162:
158:security-audit
128:
127:
42:
40:
33:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2841:
2830:
2827:
2825:
2822:
2821:
2819:
2804:
2803:
2799:
2797:
2796:
2792:
2791:
2788:
2782:
2779:
2775:
2772:
2770:
2767:
2765:
2762:
2760:
2757:
2755:
2752:
2750:
2747:
2745:
2742:
2740:
2737:
2735:
2732:
2730:
2727:
2726:
2725:
2721:
2718:
2716:
2713:
2709:
2708:
2704:
2703:
2702:
2701:
2697:
2693:
2690:
2688:
2685:
2684:
2683:
2682:
2678:
2674:
2670:
2666:
2662:
2659:
2658:
2657:
2654:
2652:
2649:
2648:
2646:
2644:
2640:
2632:
2629:
2627:
2624:
2622:
2619:
2617:
2614:
2612:
2609:
2608:
2607:
2606:United States
2604:
2602:
2599:
2597:
2594:
2592:
2589:
2587:
2584:
2582:
2579:
2577:
2574:
2573:
2571:
2565:
2557:
2554:
2553:
2552:
2549:
2547:
2544:
2542:
2539:
2537:
2534:
2532:
2529:
2527:
2524:
2522:
2519:
2517:
2514:
2512:
2509:
2507:
2504:
2502:
2499:
2497:
2494:
2492:
2491:
2490:Force majeure
2487:
2485:
2482:
2478:
2475:
2473:
2470:
2468:
2465:
2464:
2463:
2460:
2456:
2453:
2452:
2451:
2448:
2443:
2441:
2440:
2436:
2435:
2434:
2431:
2429:
2426:
2424:
2421:
2419:
2416:
2412:
2411:Value of life
2409:
2407:
2403:
2400:
2398:
2395:
2393:
2390:
2388:
2385:
2383:
2380:
2378:
2375:
2374:
2373:
2370:
2368:
2365:
2364:
2362:
2360:
2355:
2349:
2339:
2336:
2334:
2331:
2329:
2326:
2324:
2321:
2319:
2316:
2314:
2311:
2309:
2306:
2304:
2301:
2299:
2296:
2294:
2291:
2289:
2286:
2284:
2281:
2279:
2276:
2274:
2273:Interest rate
2271:
2267:
2264:
2263:
2262:
2259:
2257:
2254:
2252:
2249:
2247:
2244:
2242:
2239:
2237:
2234:
2230:
2227:
2225:
2222:
2221:
2220:
2217:
2215:
2212:
2210:
2207:
2205:
2202:
2198:
2195:
2193:
2190:
2189:
2188:
2185:
2184:
2182:
2178:
2172:
2169:
2167:
2164:
2162:
2159:
2157:
2154:
2152:
2149:
2147:
2144:
2142:
2141:Inland marine
2139:
2137:
2136:GAP insurance
2134:
2132:
2129:
2128:
2126:
2124:Communication
2120:
2114:
2111:
2109:
2106:
2104:
2101:
2099:
2096:
2094:
2091:
2089:
2086:
2084:
2081:
2079:
2076:
2074:
2071:
2069:
2066:
2064:
2061:
2059:
2056:
2055:
2053:
2049:
2043:
2040:
2038:
2035:
2033:
2030:
2028:
2025:
2023:
2020:
2018:
2015:
2013:
2010:
2008:
2005:
2003:
2000:
1998:
1995:
1993:
1990:
1988:
1985:
1983:
1980:
1978:
1975:
1974:
1972:
1968:
1962:
1959:
1957:
1954:
1952:
1949:
1947:
1946:Unitised fund
1944:
1942:
1939:
1937:
1936:Mortgage life
1934:
1932:
1929:
1928:
1926:
1924:
1920:
1914:
1911:
1909:
1906:
1904:
1901:
1899:
1896:
1892:
1889:
1887:
1884:
1883:
1882:
1879:
1877:
1874:
1872:
1869:
1867:
1864:
1863:
1861:
1859:
1855:
1852:
1846:
1842:
1835:
1830:
1828:
1823:
1821:
1816:
1815:
1812:
1793:
1786:
1783:
1771:
1767:
1760:
1757:
1744:
1740:
1733:
1730:
1718:
1713:
1705:
1702:
1697:
1690:
1687:
1682:
1678:
1673:
1668:
1664:
1660:
1656:
1649:
1646:
1641:
1634:
1631:
1626:
1622:
1617:
1612:
1608:
1604:
1600:
1593:
1590:
1585:
1581:
1577:
1573:
1569:
1565:
1558:
1555:
1550:
1546:
1542:
1536:
1532:
1528:
1524:
1517:
1514:
1509:
1505:
1500:
1495:
1491:
1487:
1483:
1476:
1473:
1468:
1464:
1459:
1454:
1450:
1446:
1442:
1434:
1431:
1426:
1420:
1416:
1412:
1408:
1401:
1398:
1393:
1387:
1383:
1379:
1375:
1368:
1365:
1360:
1356:
1352:
1348:
1344:
1340:
1333:
1330:
1325:
1318:
1315:
1310:
1303:
1300:
1295:
1291:
1287:
1281:
1277:
1273:
1269:
1262:
1259:
1254:
1247:
1244:
1232:
1228:
1221:
1218:
1206:
1202:
1195:
1192:
1180:
1176:
1169:
1166:
1161:
1157:
1153:
1146:
1143:
1138:
1131:
1128:
1123:
1119:
1113:
1110:
1105:
1101:
1095:
1092:
1087:
1080:
1073:
1070:
1065:
1061:
1057:
1051:
1048:
1043:
1036:
1033:
1020:
1016:
1010:
1007:
1002:
995:
992:
979:
975:
968:
965:
954:on 2014-12-05
953:
949:
943:
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2729:Cooperative
2402:Uncertainty
2261:Index-based
2229:Multi-peril
2187:Reinsurance
2146:Public auto
2051:Residential
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1492:(2): 1–36.
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888:www.gao.gov
693:BIGS (2017)
550:Legislation
18:Hacksurance
2818:Categories
2569:by country
2567:Insurance
2541:Total loss
2462:Deductible
2423:Cash value
2367:Act of God
2352:Insurance
2266:Parametric
2246:Expatriate
2122:Transport/
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2073:Earthquake
1961:Whole life
1881:Disability
1798:January 7,
1775:January 7,
984:2 February
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164:Advantages
110:April 2018
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2681:Collegium
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1941:Term life
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