289:
their means turn the powers of nature to account.… or over two thousand years, the…most influential and authoritatively orthodox tradition…has been devoted to the problem of a purely cognitive certification (perhaps by revelation, perhaps by intuition, perhaps by reason) of the antecedent immutable reality of truth, beauty, and goodness.… The crisis in contemporary culture, the confusions and conflicts in it, arise from a division of authority. Scientific inquiry seems to tell one thing, and traditional beliefs about ends and ideals that have authority over conduct tell us something quite different.… As long as the notion persists that knowledge is a disclosure of reality…prior to and independent of knowing, and that knowing is independent of a purpose to control the quality of experienced objects, the failure of natural science to disclose significant values in its objects will come as a shock.
576:
it would suggest that our sense of moral responsibility can be fully captured by a code. In fact, as we have seen in many instances, technology simply allows us to go on doing stupid things in clever ways. The questions that technology cannot solve, although it will always frame and condition the answers, are "What should we be trying to do? What kind of lives should we, as human beings, be seeking to live? And can this kind of life be pursued without exploiting others? But until we can at least propose answers to those questions we cannot really begin to do sensible things in the clever ways that technology might permit.
669:, meaning they are currently the most accurate theoretical descriptions of mind-independent natural kinds. He finds these carefully qualified statements necessary to replace earlier realist claims of intrinsic reality discredited by advancing instrumental valuations. Science has destroyed for many people the supernatural intrinsic value embraced by Weber and Ellul. But Chakravartty defended intrinsic valuations as necessary elements of all science—belief in unobservable continuities. He advances the thesis of
688:
categories facilitates these practices, and thus furnishes an excellent explanation for their success. The moral here is that however realists choose to construct particulars out of instances of properties, they do so on the basis of a belief in the existence of those properties. That is the bedrock of realism. Property instances lend themselves to different forms of packaging , but as a feature of scientific description, this does not compromise realism with respect to the relevant packages.
388:
they participate in the economic process. As we have seen, to say that an economic problem exists is to say that part of the particular patterns of human relationships has ceased or failed to provide the effective participation of its members. In so saying, we are necessarily in the position of asserting that the instrumental efficiency of the economic process is the criterion of judgment in terms of which, and only in terms of which, we may resolve economic problems.
678:
described by scientific theories. Scientific theories describe causal properties, concrete structures, and particulars such as objects, events, and processes. Semirealism maintains that under certain conditions it is reasonable for realists to believe that the best of these descriptions tell us not merely about things that can be experienced with the unaided senses, but also about some of the unobservable things underlying them.
522:
all.… t answers questions about the meaning of life, the possibility of reunion with ultimate being, the attempt to overcome human finitude, and all other questions that they have to ask and handle. But technique cannot deal with such things.… Culture exists only if it raises the question of meaning and values .… Technique is not at all concerned about the meaning of life, and it rejects any relation to values .
611:
truth or reality "in itself." By contrast, scientific realists believe that theories can "correctly describe both observable and unobservable parts of the world." Well-confirmed theories—"what ought to be" as the end of reasoning—are more than tools; they are maps of intrinsic properties of an unobservable and unconditional territory—"what is" as natural-but-metaphysical real kinds.
698:
shaping how scientific investigations are conducted, and together which and how many potentially relevant factors are incorporated into models and descriptions during the process of abstraction. The role of pragmatic constraints, however, does not undermine the idea that putative representations of factors composing abstract models can be thought to have counterparts in the world.
401:
recognize that walking is more efficient differently to crawling—an instrumental valuation of a desirable end. They learn to walk by repeatedly moving and balancing, judging the efficiency with which these means achieve their instrumental goal. When they master this new way-of-acting, they experience great satisfaction, but satisfaction is never their end-in-view.
43:
116:, by contrast, are understood to be desirable in and of themselves. A tool or appliance, such as a hammer or washing machine, has instrumental value because it helps one pound in a nail or clean clothes, respectively. Happiness and pleasure are typically considered to have intrinsic value insofar as asking
288:
Man who lives in a world of hazards…has sought to attain in two ways. One of them began with an attempt to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his destiny. It expressed itself in supplication, sacrifice, ceremonial rite and magical cult.… The other course is to invent arts and by
610:
Chakravartty began his study with rough characterizations of realist and anti-realist valuations of theories. Anti-realists believe "that theories are merely instruments for predicting observable phenomena or systematizing observation reports;" they assert that theories can never report or prescribe
448:
efficient in themselves ("what ought to be"). However, while Dewey argues that contaminated instrumental valuations can be self-correcting, Ellul concludes that technology has become intrinsically destructive. The only escape from this evil is to restore authority to unconditional sacred valuations:
283:
that people talk as if they apply instrumental and intrinsic criteria. He also agreed with Weber's observation that intrinsic value is problematic in that it ignores the relationship between context and consequences of beliefs and behaviors. Both men questioned how anything valued intrinsically "for
267:
Every social transaction has good or bad consequences depending on prevailing conditions, which may or may not be satisfied. Continuous reasoning adjusts institutions to keep them working on the right track as conditions change. Changing conditions demand changing judgments to maintain efficient and
687:
The primary motivation for thinking that there are such things as natural kinds is the idea that carving nature according to its own divisions yields groups of objects that are capable of supporting successful inductive generalizations and prediction. So the story goes, one's recognition of natural
575:
For although we have defended general principles of the moral responsibilities of professional people, it would be foolish and wrongheaded to suggest codified rules. It would be foolish because concrete cases are more complex and nuanced than any code could capture; it would be wrongheaded because
478:
is a description of the way in which an autonomous technology is in process of taking over the traditional values of every society without exception, subverting and suppressing those values to produce at last a monolithic world culture in which all non-technological difference and variety is mere
416:
Dewey's and Foster's argument that there is no intrinsic alternative to instrumental value continues to be ignored rather than refuted. Scholars continue to accept the possibility and necessity of knowing "what ought to be" independently of transient conditions that determine actual consequences of
412:
Instrumental value is the criterion of judgment which seeks instrumentally-efficient means that "work" to achieve developmentally-continuous ends. This definition stresses the condition that instrumental success is never short term; it must not lead down a dead-end street. The same point is made by
400:
Foster uses with homely examples to support his thesis that problematic situations ("what is") contain the means for judging legitimate ends ("what ought to be"). Rational efficient means achieve rational developmental ends. Consider the problem all infants face learning to walk. They spontaneously
357:
Utilitarians hold that individual wants cannot be rationally justified; they are intrinsically worthy subjective valuations and cannot be judged instrumentally. This belief supports philosophers who hold that facts ("what is") can serve as instrumental means for achieving ends, but cannot authorize
318:
Value judgments have the form: if one acted in a particular way (or valued this object), then certain consequences would ensue, which would be valued. The difference between an apparent and a real good , between an unreflectively and a reflectively valued good, is captured by its value not just as
153:
When people judge efficient means and legitimate ends at the same time, both can be considered as good. However, when ends are judged separately from means, it may result in a conflict: what works may not be right; what is right may not work. Separating the criteria contaminates reasoning about the
521:
When, in the 19th century, society began to elaborate an exclusively rational technique which acknowledged only considerations of efficiency, it was felt that not only the traditions but the deepest instincts of humankind had been violated. Culture is necessarily humanistic or it does not exist at
452:
Nothing belongs any longer to the realm of the gods or the supernatural. The individual who lives in the technical milieu knows very well that there is nothing spiritual anywhere. But man cannot live without the sacred. He therefore transfers his sense of the sacred to the very thing which has
387:
he things people want are a function of their social experience, and that is carried on through structural institutions that specify their activities and attitudes. Thus the pattern of people's wants takes visible form partly as a result of the pattern of the institutional structure through which
333:
relations, can be rational. The sole rational criterion is instrumental value. Each valuation is conditional but, cumulatively, all are developmental—and therefore socially-legitimate solutions of problems. Competent instrumental valuations treat the "function of consequences as necessary tests of
250:
he more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more "irrational" in this sense the corresponding action is. For the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its own sake…the less he is influenced by considerations of the
309:
Dewey grants the existence of "reality" apart from human experience, but denied that it is structured as intrinsically real natural kinds. Instead, he sees reality as functional continuity of ways-of-acting, rather than as interaction among pre-structured intrinsic kinds. Humans may intuit static
297:
Dewey's ethics replaces the goal of identifying an ultimate end or supreme principle that can serve as a criterion of ethical evaluation with the goal of identifying a method for improving our value judgments. Dewey argued that ethical inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry more generally.…
697:
Abstraction is a process in which only some of the potentially many relevant factors present in reality are represented in a model or description with some aspect of the world, such as the nature or behavior of a specific object or process. ... Pragmatic constraints such as these play a role in
298:
This pragmatic approach requires that we locate the conditions of warrant for our value judgments in human conduct itself, not in any a priori fixed reference point outside of conduct, such as in God's commands, Platonic Forms, pure reason, or "nature," considered as giving humans a fixed telos .
284:
its own sake" can have operationally efficient consequences. However, Dewey rejects the common belief—shared by Weber—that supernatural intrinsic value is necessary to show humans what is permanently "right." He argues that both efficient and legitimate qualities must be discovered in daily life:
275:
about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of modern life." Moreover, a "culture which permits science to destroy traditional values but which distrusts its power to create new ones is a culture which is
447:
and tackles the problem that Dewey addressed in 1929: a culture in which the authority of evolving technology destroys traditional valuations without creating legitimate new ones. Both men agree that conditionally-efficient valuations ("what is") become irrational when viewed as unconditionally
677:
Causal properties are the fulcrum of semirealism. Their relations compose the concrete structures that are the primary subject matters of a tenable scientific realism. They regularly cohere to form interesting units, and these groupings make up the particulars investigated by the sciences and
570:
instrumental value. They counter this by examining the moral reasoning of scientists whose work led to nuclear weapons: those scientists demonstrated the capacity of instrumental judgments to provide them with a moral compass to judge nuclear technology; they were morally responsible without
158:
argued that separating criteria for good ends from those for good means necessarily contaminates recognition of efficient and legitimate patterns of behavior. Economist J. Fagg Foster explained why only instrumental value is capable of correlating good ends with good means. Philosopher
682:
Chakravartty argues that these semirealist valuations legitimize scientific theorizing about pragmatic kinds. The fact that theoretical kinds are frequently replaced does not mean that mind-independent reality is changing, but simply that theoretical maps are approximating intrinsic
692:
In sum, Chakravartty argues that contingent instrumental valuations are warranted only as they approximate unchanging intrinsic valuations. Scholars continue to perfect their explanations of intrinsic value, as they deny the developmental continuity of applications of instrumental
146:"The concept of intrinsic value has been glossed variously as what is valuable for its own sake, in itself, on its own, in its own right, as an end, or as such. By contrast, extrinsic value has been characterized mainly as what is valuable as a means, or for something else's sake."
313:
People reason daily about what they ought to do and how they ought to do it. Inductively, they discover sequences of efficient means that achieve consequences. Once an end is reached—a problem solved—reasoning turns to new conditions of means-end relations. Valuations that ignore
319:
immediately experienced in isolation, but in view of its wider consequences and how they are valued.… So viewed, value judgments are tools for discovering how to live a better life, just as scientific hypotheses are tools for uncovering new information about the world.
230:): action "determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment of other human beings; these expectations are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends."
614:
Chakravartty treats criteria of judgment as ungrounded opinion, but admits that realists apply the instrumental criterion to judge theories that "work." He restricts such criterion's scope, claiming that every instrumental judgment is
263:
thought that belief in intrinsic value was a mistake. Although the application of instrumental value is easily contaminated, it is the only means humans have to coordinate group behaviour efficiently and legitimately.
592:," with which he identifies. In 2007, he published a work defending the ultimate authority of intrinsic valuations to which realists are committed. He links the pragmatic instrumental criterion to discredited
571:
intrinsic rules. Tiles and
Oberdiek's conclusion coincides with that of Dewey and Foster: instrumental value, when competently applied, is self-correcting and provides humans with a developmental moral compass.
310:
kinds and qualities, but such private experience cannot warrant inferences or valuations about mind-independent reality. Reports or maps of perceptions or intuitions are never equivalent to territories mapped.
673:, according to which well-tested theories are good maps of natural kinds, as confirmed by their instrumental success; their predictive success means they conform to mind-independent, unconditional reality.
368:: wants are intrinsically fact-free, good in themselves; whereas efficient tools are valuation-free, usable for good or bad ends. In modern North-American culture, this utilitarian belief supports the
392:
Since 'wants' are shaped by social conditions, they must be judged instrumentally; they arise in problematic situations when habitual patterns of behavior fail to maintain instrumental correlations.
642:
valuations or intrinsic kinds of knowledge of truth. Competent realists affirm that natural kinds exist in a mind-independent territory possessing 1) meaningful and 2) mappable intrinsic properties.
511:
factories, our unsatisfied senses, our working women, our estrangement from nature. Life in such an environment has no meaning." While Weber had labeled the discrediting of intrinsic valuations as
293:
Finding no evidence of "antecedent immutable reality of truth, beauty, and goodness," Dewey argues that both efficient and legitimate goods are discovered in the continuity of human experience:
149:"Among nonfinal values, instrumental value—intuitively, the value attaching a means to what is finally valuable—stands out as a bona fide example of what is not valuable for its own sake."
242:): action "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success."
440:
and J. Fagg Foster found to be the core of human rationality. He specifically criticized the valuations central to Dewey's and Foster's thesis: evolving instrumental technology.
163:
argued that instrumental value has become completely contaminated by inhuman technological consequences, and must be subordinated to intrinsic supernatural value. Philosopher
436:
made scholarly contributions to many fields, but his
American reputation grew out of his criticism of the autonomous authority of instrumental value, the criterion that
302:
Philosophers label a "fixed reference point outside of conduct' a "natural kind," and presume it to have eternal existence knowable in itself without being experienced.
517:, Ellul came to label it as "terrorism." He dates its domination to the 1800s, when centuries-old handicraft techniques were massively eliminated by inhuman industry.
372:
assertion that every individual's intrinsic right to satisfy wants makes it illegitimate for anyone—but especially governments—to tell people what they ought to do.
467:, and quickly entered ongoing disputes in the United States over the responsibility of instrumental value for destructive social consequences. The translator of
217:, who spent years studying good meanings people assigned to their actions and beliefs. According to Weber, "ocial action, like all action, may be" judged as:
167:
argued that instrumental value is only legitimate when it produces good scientific theories compatible with the intrinsic truth of mind-independent reality.
588:
came indirectly to question the autonomous authority of instrumental value. He viewed it as a foil for the currently dominant philosophical school labeled "
702:
Realist intrinsic value as proposed by
Chakravartty, is widely endorsed in modern scientific circles, while the supernatural intrinsic value endorsed by
623:
182:, as well as denoting both a criterion of judgment itself and the result of applying a criterion. To reduce ambiguity, throughout this article the noun
120:
someone would want them makes little sense: they are desirable for their own sake irrespective of their possible instrumental value. The classic names
246:
Weber's original definitions also include a comment showing his doubt that conditionally efficient means can achieve unconditionally legitimate ends:
495:, as I use it, does not mean machines, technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an end. In our technological society, technique is the
631:. Later experience might confirm a singular judgment only if it proves to have universal validity, meaning it possesses "detection properties" of
553:"All its parts are mutually implicated to such a degree that it is impossible to separate them or to settle any technical problems in isolation."
739:
409:
To guard against contamination of instrumental value by judging means and ends independently, Foster revised his definition to embrace both.
734:
657:
commitment is to the idea that these theoretical claims give us knowledge of the world. That is, predictively successful (mature, non-
383:("what ought to be") cannot serve as an intrinsic moral compass because 'wants' are themselves consequences of transient conditions.
1309:
1087:
887:
759:
650:
562:
Philosophers Tiles and
Oberdiek (1995) find Ellul's characterization of instrumental value inaccurate. They criticize him for
653:
implies that the theoretical claims about this reality have truth values, and should be construed literally.… Finally, the
338:
these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problems evoking the operations."
354:
ends—satisfaction of whatever ends individuals adopt. It requires recognizing developmental sequences of means and ends.
710:
maintains its popularity throughout the world. Doubters about the reality of instrumental and intrinsic value are few.
487:
by asserting that instrumental efficiency is no longer a conditional criterion. It has become autonomous and absolute:
425:
were prominent exponents of the truth and reality of intrinsic value as constraint on relativistic instrumental value.
53:
1319:
724:
1153:
Ranson, Baldwin (2008). "Confronting Foster's
Wildest Claim: Only the Instrumental Theory of Value Can Be applied".
314:
consequence-determining conditions cannot coordinate behavior to solve real problems; they contaminate rationality.
1228:
463:
1304:
1188:
Foster, John Fagg (1981). "Syllabus for
Problems of Modern Society: The Theory of Institutional Adjustment".
350:'s rejection of intrinsic value more operational by showing that its competent use rejects the legitimacy of
1314:
1057:
911:
661:) theories, taken literally as describing the nature of a mind-independent reality are (approximately) true.
359:
986:
617:
379:
is a useful place to attack the irrational separation of good means from good ends. He argues that
329:
1170:
967:
600:
589:
585:
507:
He blames instrumental valuations for destroying intrinsic meanings of human life: "Think of our
422:
164:
833:
1083:
1079:
883:
649:, scientific realism is committed to the existence of a mind-independent world or reality. A
1162:
1138:
Foster, John Fagg (1981). "The
Relation Between the Theory of Value and Economic Analysis".
1071:
1053:
907:
719:
563:
364:
89:
729:
604:
143:
They are "the distinction between what is good 'in itself' and what is good 'as a means'."
31:
802:
827:
749:
513:
508:
369:
351:
132:, who spent years studying good meanings people assigned to their actions and beliefs.
1298:
1174:
1072:
707:
526:
Ellul's core accusation is that instrumental efficiency has become absolute, i.e., a
433:
418:
306:
are intrinsic valuations presumed to be "mind-independent" and "theory-independent."
226:
160:
550:"It is formed by an accumulation of means which have established primacy over ends;"
1166:
876:
754:
744:
654:
632:
593:
567:
413:
the currently popular concern for sustainability—a synonym for instrumental value.
303:
238:
1110:
Value Theory and
Economic Progress: The Institutional Economics of J. Fagg Foster
197:
identifies collections of valuations, without identifying the criterion applied.
639:
17:
596:
437:
347:
260:
155:
635:. This inference is his fundamental ground for believing in intrinsic value.
703:
547:"It grows according to a process which is causal but not directed to ends;"
280:
214:
129:
646:
497:
totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency
272:
139:
provides three modern definitions of intrinsic and instrumental value:
323:
In brief, Dewey rejects the traditional belief that judging things as
658:
531:
191:
1233:
271:
For Dewey, "restoring integration and cooperation between man's
179:
175:
36:
443:
His principal work, published in 1954, bore the French title
544:
self-determinative, independent "of all human intervention;"
1050:
Elgar
Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics
904:
Elgar
Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics
541:
autonomy, "with respect to values , ideas, and the state;"
68:
1048:
Miller, Edythe. 1994. "John Fagg Foster." Pp. 256–62 in
64:
60:
30:"Means to an end" redirects here. For the album, see
985:Bird, Alexander; Tobin, Emma (17 September 2008).
875:
453:destroyed its former object: to technique itself.
534:with six intrinsically inhuman characteristics:
190:which is an object that is judged valuable. The
489:
473:
450:
385:
1008:. University of Chicago Press. pp. 54=65.
902:Tool, Marc. 1994. "John Dewey." Pp. 152–7 in
186:names a criterion of judgment, as opposed to
112:) if they help one achieve a particular end;
63:. Consider transferring direct quotations to
8:
530:; it wraps societies in a new technological
1078:. University of Notre Dame Press. pp.
1207:
1205:
1203:
1201:
1199:
961:
959:
405:Revised definition of 'instrumental value'
1244:
1242:
1023:. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. p. iv.
928:
926:
924:
922:
920:
869:
867:
832:. University of Chicago Press. pp.
665:He labels these intrinsic valuations as
1278:
1276:
1274:
1272:
1270:
1268:
1266:
1264:
1262:
1260:
1103:
1101:
1099:
991:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
972:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
966:Anderson, Elizabeth (20 January 2005).
851:
849:
847:
845:
843:
772:
740:Instrumental and value-rational action
499:(for a given stage of development) in
96:are the distinction between what is a
1226:Translator. 1964. "Introduction." In
54:too many or overly lengthy quotations
7:
1285:A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism
1034:Tiles, Mary; Oberdiek, Hans (1995).
856:Tiles, Mary; Oberdiek, Hans (1995).
782:
780:
778:
776:
638:He commits modern realists to three
362:creates what philosophers label the
268:legitimate correlation of behavior.
952:. G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 228.
789:The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory
787:Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (2015).
882:. University of California Press.
735:Instrumental and value rationality
174:is ambiguous in that it is both a
25:
1036:Living in a Technological Culture
858:Living in a Technological Culture
581:Semi realism (Anjan Chakravartty)
404:
358:ends ("what ought to be"). This
94:instrumental and intrinsic value
41:
137:Oxford Handbook of Value Theory
1167:10.1080/00213624.2008.11507163
461:was published in 1964, titled
334:the validity of propositions,
1:
1287:. Cambridge University Press.
989:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
970:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
1283:Chakravartty, Anjan (2007).
1070:MacIntyre, Alasdair (2007).
1021:Logic: the Theory of Inquiry
104:. Things are deemed to have
471:summarizes Ellul's thesis:
251:consequences of his action.
213:were coined by sociologist
128:were coined by sociologist
1336:
1190:Journal of Economic Issues
1155:Journal of Economic Issues
1140:Journal of Economic Issues
1127:. Basic Books. p. ix.
968:"Dewey's Moral Philosophy"
791:. Oxford University Press.
29:
1229:The Technological Society
1214:The Technological Society
1125:Anarchy, State and Utopia
485:The Technological Society
464:The Technological Society
1310:Sociological terminology
503:field of human activity.
61:summarize the quotations
1251:The Technological Bluff
1249:Ellul, Jacques (1990).
1212:Ellul, Jacques (1964).
1123:Nozick, Robert (1974).
1058:Edward Elgar Publishing
912:Edward Elgar Publishing
457:The English edition of
937:. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
725:Fact–value distinction
700:
690:
680:
663:
578:
524:
505:
481:
455:
390:
375:Foster finds that the
360:fact-value distinction
346:John Fagg Foster made
327:, apart from existing
321:
300:
291:
253:
1253:. William B. Erdmans.
695:
685:
675:
644:
573:
519:
476:Technological Society
469:Technological Society
316:
295:
286:
248:
222:Instrumental rational
27:Philosophical concept
1019:Dewey, John (1938).
948:Dewey, John (1963).
933:Dewey, John (1929).
826:Dewey, John (1939).
803:"instrumental value"
276:destroying itself."
1108:Tool, Marc (2000).
1004:Burke, Tom (1994).
950:Freedom and Culture
935:Quest for Certainty
878:Economy and Society
874:Weber, Max (1978).
829:Theory of Valuation
1320:Concepts in ethics
1112:. Kluwer Academic.
601:logical positivism
599:schools including
590:scientific realism
586:Anjan Chakravartty
564:anthropomorphizing
423:Anjan Chakravartty
325:good in themselves
279:Dewey agreed with
205:The classic names
165:Anjan Chakravartty
154:good. Philosopher
106:instrumental value
100:and what is as an
1006:Dewey's New Logic
651:realist semantics
381:want-satisfaction
86:
85:
16:(Redirected from
1327:
1289:
1288:
1280:
1255:
1254:
1246:
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837:
823:
817:
816:
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813:
799:
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792:
784:
762:(disambiguation)
720:Consequentialism
377:is-ought problem
365:is-ought problem
114:intrinsic values
90:moral philosophy
81:
78:
72:
45:
44:
37:
21:
1335:
1334:
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1305:Social concepts
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1002:
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987:"Natural Kinds"
984:
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957:
947:
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918:
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769:
760:Intrinsic value
730:Instrumentalism
716:
655:epistemological
605:instrumentalism
583:
560:
431:
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509:dehumanized
479:appearance.
370:libertarian
352:utilitarian
1299:Categories
812:2024-03-06
767:References
629:accidental
597:empiricist
568:demonizing
438:John Dewey
348:John Dewey
261:John Dewey
256:John Dewey
156:John Dewey
69:Wikisource
1192:: 929–35.
1175:157465132
704:Max Weber
624:heuristic
618:inductive
558:Criticism
493:technique
491:The term
330:means-end
281:Max Weber
215:Max Weber
211:intrinsic
201:Max Weber
188:valuation
170:The word
130:Max Weber
126:intrinsic
77:June 2019
65:Wikiquote
52:contains
1216:. Knopf.
1142:: 904–5.
714:See also
683:reality.
396:Examples
336:provided
273:beliefs
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693:value.
659:ad hoc
532:milieu
195:values
192:plural
178:and a
1234:Knopf
1171:S2CID
1082:–66.
501:every
184:value
172:value
1084:ISBN
884:ISBN
706:and
603:and
566:and
421:and
209:and
180:noun
176:verb
135:The
124:and
108:(or
1163:doi
836:–6.
118:why
88:In
1301::
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