761:
remaining requirements and effectively creates a distinction between the total formula's analytic and synthetic components. Specifically, for requirement 2: The conditional sentence does not make any information claim about the O-sentences in TC, it states only that "if" the variables in are satisfied by the relations, "then" the O-sentences will be true. This means that every O-sentence in TC that is logically implied by the sentence TC → TC is L-true (i.e., every O-sentence in AT is true or not-true: the metal expands or it does not; the chemical turns blue or it does not, etc.). Thus TC can be taken as the non-informative (i.e., non-factual) component of the statement, or A
304:, Carnap found the method he needed to take the next step, which was to substitute variables for each T-term, then to quantify existentially all T-terms in both T-sentences and C-rules. The resulting "Ramsey sentence" effectively eliminated the T-terms as such, while still providing an account of the theory's empirical content. The evolution of the formula proceeds thus:
812:
would call the entire "holistic" universe relating to any specified theory would require long and complicated renderings of TC → TC. Instead, it is to be taken as demonstrating logically that there is a way that science could formulate empirical, observational explications of theoretical concepts –
130:
characterized the difference linguistically, as the difference between the German verbs "kennen" (knowing as being acquainted with a thing – perception) and "erkennen" (knowing as understanding a thing – even if non-observable). This linguistic distinction may explain Carnap's decision to divide the
121:
naturally distinguish predicate terms on the basis of an observational categorization. As Carnap admitted, "The line separating observable from non-observable is highly arbitrary." For example, the predicate "hot" can be perceived by touching a hand to a lighted coal. But "hot" might take place at
600:
In this form, the Ramsey sentence captures the factual content of the theory. Though Ramsey believed this formulation was adequate to the needs of science, Carnap disagreed, with regard to a comprehensive reconstruction. In order to delineate a distinction between analytic and synthetic content,
760:
Carnap's solution is to make the two statements conditional. If there are some relations such that is satisfied when the variables are assigned some relations, then the relations assigned to those variables by the original theory will satisfy – or: TC → TC. This important move satisfies both
150:
The next step for Carnap was to connect these separate concepts by what he calls "correspondence rules" (C-rules), which are "mixed" sentences containing both T- and O-terms. Such a theory can be formulated as: T + C = df: the conjunction of T-postulates + the conjunction of C-rules – i.e.,
297:). Though this enabled Carnap to establish what it means for a theory to be "empirical," this sentence neither defines the T-terms explicitly nor draws any distinction between its analytic and its synthetic content, therefore it was not yet sufficient for Carnap's purposes.
800:. This is met by using two distinct processes in the formulation: drawing an empirical connection between the statement's factual content and the original theory (observational equivalence), and by requiring the analytic content to be observationally non-informative.
96:
not only exist and have meaning but are "useful" to the scientists who work with them. To accommodate such internal questions in a way that would justify their theoretical content empirically – and to do so while maintaining a distinction between
471:
139:"), those terms we are acquainted with (kennen) and will accept arbitrarily. Accordingly, the terms thus distinguished were incorporated into comparable sentence structures: T-terms into theoretical sentences (
84:
truths. Rather, they were meaningless "pseudo-questions without cognitive content,” asked from outside a language framework of science. Inside this framework, entities such as electrons or
688:(L-truth) of either statement, and the reconstruction FT has the same O-sentences as the theory itself, hence TC is observationally equivalent to TC : (i.e., for every O-sentence: O,
678:
595:
813:
and in that context the Ramsey and Carnap construct can be said to provide a formal justificatory distinction between scientific observation and metaphysical inquiry.
364:
743:
271:
369:
273:. This can be further expanded to include class terms such as for the class of all molecules, relations such as "betweenness," and predicates: e.g., TC ( t
1421:
846:
509:) is satisfied when the variables are assigned these relations. (This is equivalent to an interpretation as an appropriate model: there are relations
749:
does contain observational information (such-and-such a theoretical entity is observed to do such-and-such, or hold such-and-such a relation); and A
1742:
1518:
105:
propositions – Carnap set out to develop a systematized way to consolidate theory and empirical observation in a meaningful language formula.
68:. However, they should not be confused with Carnap sentences, which are neutral on whether there exists anything to which the term applies.
808:
Carnap's reconstruction as it is given here is not intended to be a literal method for formulating scientific propositions. To capture what
1014:
797:
37:
attempting to draw a line between science and metaphysics. A Ramsey sentence aims at rendering propositions containing non-observable
1702:
1686:
1542:
1694:
1082:
837:
attacked Carnap's initial assumptions by emphasizing the ambiguity that persists between observable and non-observable terms.
477:
Step 3 is the complete Ramsey sentence, expressed "TC," and to be read: "There are some (unspecified) relations such that TC (
80:
real?” and “Can you prove electrons are real?” were not legitimate questions, nor did they contain any great philosophical or
1940:
1558:
1766:
1102:
113:
Carnap began by differentiating observable things from non-observable things. Immediately, a problem arises: neither the
1550:
1436:
1148:
1750:
1582:
1399:
1945:
1710:
1606:
1590:
1574:
1374:
634:
1790:
1342:
1327:
1879:
1726:
1443:
1337:
1332:
1007:
131:
vocabulary into two artificial categories: a vocabulary of non-observable ("theoretical") terms (hereafter "V
1853:
1566:
1369:
1347:
1092:
954:(Allegemeine Erkenntnislehre). Trans. Albert Blumberg. Open Court Publishing, Chicago/La Salle, IL. (2002).
684:
Requirement 1 is satisfied by TC in that the existential quantification of the T-terms does not change the
135:"): i.e., terms we know of but are not acquainted with (erkennen), and a vocabulary of observable terms ("V
1277:
1243:
1774:
1394:
1379:
1283:
102:
825:, who extended the requirements to include an "observationally non-creative" restriction on Carnap's A
1782:
1453:
1416:
1317:
1312:
1248:
1107:
98:
1921:
1758:
1206:
1189:
1143:
1133:
1000:
628:
568:
1843:
982:
1833:
1634:
1510:
1384:
1305:
1269:
1077:
887:
822:
61:
987:
745:). As stated, however, requirements 2 and 3 remain unsatisfied. That is, taken individually, A
1808:
1649:
1624:
1500:
969:
349:
122:
such a microlevel (e.g., the theoretical "heat" generated by the production of proteins in a
1813:
1734:
1718:
1644:
1598:
1163:
1072:
879:
601:
Carnap thought the reconstructed sentence would have to satisfy three desired requirements:
118:
1828:
1823:
1359:
1194:
1168:
1112:
923:
301:
114:
962:
466:{\displaystyle \exists x_{1}\ldots \exists x_{n}TC(x_{1}\ldots x_{n},o_{1}\ldots o_{m})}
1490:
1431:
1264:
1199:
1184:
1087:
908:
Carnap, R. (1950) "Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology," in Paul Moser and Arnold Nat,
830:
127:
691:
154:
1934:
1669:
1664:
1639:
1448:
1389:
1300:
1228:
1158:
1153:
685:
65:
1524:
1322:
1253:
1213:
1041:
958:
809:
72:
Distinction between scientific (real) questions and metaphysical (pseudo-)questions
17:
1848:
1838:
1818:
1238:
1218:
1128:
1051:
919:(esp. Parts III, and V), ed. Martin Gardner. Dover Publications, New York. 1995.
834:
81:
34:
1659:
1654:
1629:
1409:
1233:
1097:
1046:
1023:
126:
cell) that it is virtually non-observable (at present). Physicist-philosopher
123:
85:
1900:
1886:
1874:
1858:
1426:
1364:
1223:
1056:
922:
Carnap, R. (2000) "Theoretical
Concepts in Science," with introduction by
609:) component must be observationally equivalent to the original theory (TC).
1138:
77:
891:
936:
867:
1884:
1354:
883:
1893:
93:
785:
nothing more than a reformulation of the original theory, hence A
89:
1470:
996:
992:
796:
Carnap took as a fundamental requirement a respect for the
970:"Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism"
694:
637:
571:
372:
352:
327:
Step 2 (substitution of variables for T-terms): TC (x
157:
1867:
1801:
1678:
1617:
1534:
1481:
1293:
1262:
1177:
1121:
1065:
1034:
983:"Epistemic Structural Realism and Ramsey Sentences"
765:. Requirement 3 is satisfied by inference: given A
737:
672:
616:) component must be observationally uninformative.
589:
465:
358:
265:
33:are formal logical reconstructions of theoretical
308:Step 1 (empirical theory, assumed true): TC ( t
109:Distinction between observable and non-observable
1519:Fourth Great Debate in international relations
1008:
673:{\displaystyle F_{T}+A_{T}\Leftrightarrow TC}
8:
1898:
1508:
1498:
1488:
1204:
928:Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
917:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
1478:
1467:
1031:
1015:
1001:
993:
821:Among critics of the Ramsey formalism are
1422:Relationship between religion and science
847:Ramsey-style epistemic structural realism
714:
693:
655:
642:
636:
570:
454:
441:
428:
415:
396:
380:
371:
351:
251:
232:
219:
200:
181:
168:
156:
143:); O-terms into observational sentences (
60:Ramsey sentences were introduced by the
1743:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
943:Moser, P. K. and vander Nat, A. (2003)
858:
1098:Machian positivism (empirio-criticism)
27:Construct in the philosophy of science
7:
366:-quantification of the variables):
76:For Carnap, questions such as “Are
1375:Nomothetic–idiographic distinction
965:, Oxford University Press, p. 109.
753:does not necessarily follow from F
631:to the original theory – that is,
389:
373:
353:
45:) clear by substituting them with
25:
1703:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
1687:Materialism and Empirio-criticism
1543:The Course in Positive Philosophy
940:, eds. R. Creath and M. Friedman.
938:The Cambridge Companion to Carnap
868:"How to Define Theoretical Terms"
912:Oxford University Press. (2003).
1695:History and Class Consciousness
1559:Critical History of Philosophy
988:"Theoretical Terms in Science"
798:analytic–synthetic distinction
732:
711:
695:
661:
460:
408:
260:
257:
212:
206:
161:
158:
1:
1767:Knowledge and Human Interests
1103:Rankean historical positivism
590:{\displaystyle 1\leq i\leq m}
1885:
1551:A General View of Positivism
1751:Conjectures and Refutations
1583:The Logic of Modern Physics
1400:Deductive-nomological model
952:General Theory of Knowledge
1962:
1711:The Poverty of Historicism
1607:The Universe in a Nutshell
1591:Language, Truth, and Logic
1575:The Analysis of Sensations
1919:
1791:The Rhetoric of Economics
1477:
1472:Positivist-related debate
1466:
1030:
872:The Journal of Philosophy
1727:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
1444:Structural functionalism
1370:Naturalism in literature
359:{\displaystyle \exists }
88:, and relations such as
1854:Willard Van Orman Quine
1567:Idealism and Positivism
1159:Critique of metaphysics
1093:Sociological positivism
950:Schlick, Moritz (1918)
561:is assigned the value r
1899:
1868:Concepts in contention
1509:
1499:
1489:
1380:Objectivity in science
1278:Non-Euclidean geometry
1244:Methodological dualism
1205:
957:Hallvard Lillehammer,
739:
674:
591:
467:
360:
267:
49:(terms employed by an
1941:Philosophy of science
1775:The Poverty of Theory
1395:Philosophy of science
1284:Uncertainty principle
740:
675:
592:
557:) is satisfied when x
468:
361:
268:
41:(terms employed by a
1783:The Scientific Image
1454:Structuration theory
1417:Qualitative research
1318:Criticism of science
1313:Critical rationalism
1249:Problem of induction
866:David Lewis (1970).
692:
635:
629:logically equivalent
619:The combination of F
569:
370:
350:
155:
51:observation language
43:theoretical language
1759:One-Dimensional Man
1207:Geisteswissenschaft
1190:Confirmation holism
947:Oxford Univ. Press.
300:In the theories of
47:observational terms
1834:Hans-Georg Gadamer
1635:Alexander Bogdanov
1511:Positivismusstreit
1306:Post-behavioralism
1270:history of science
1122:Principal concepts
1078:Logical positivism
915:Carnap, R. (1966)
735:
670:
587:
463:
356:
263:
62:logical empiricist
55:empirical language
18:Observational term
1946:Sentences by type
1928:
1927:
1915:
1914:
1911:
1910:
1809:Theodor W. Adorno
1625:Richard Avenarius
1501:Werturteilsstreit
1462:
1461:
1410:Sense-data theory
1108:Polish positivism
1083:Positivist school
968:Stathis Psillos,
39:theoretical terms
16:(Redirected from
1953:
1904:
1890:
1814:Gaston Bachelard
1735:Truth and Method
1719:World Hypotheses
1599:The Two Cultures
1514:
1504:
1494:
1479:
1468:
1210:
1164:Unity of science
1073:Legal positivism
1032:
1017:
1010:
1003:
994:
896:
895:
863:
744:
742:
741:
738:{\displaystyle }
736:
719:
718:
679:
677:
676:
671:
660:
659:
647:
646:
596:
594:
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588:
472:
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420:
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385:
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365:
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272:
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266:{\displaystyle }
264:
256:
255:
237:
236:
224:
223:
205:
204:
186:
185:
173:
172:
119:English language
31:Ramsey sentences
21:
1961:
1960:
1956:
1955:
1954:
1952:
1951:
1950:
1931:
1930:
1929:
1924:
1907:
1863:
1829:Paul Feyerabend
1824:Wilhelm Dilthey
1797:
1674:
1613:
1530:
1473:
1458:
1405:Ramsey sentence
1360:Instrumentalism
1289:
1267:
1265:paradigm shifts
1258:
1195:Critical theory
1173:
1169:Verificationism
1117:
1113:Russian Machism
1061:
1026:
1021:
979:
963:Ramsey's legacy
945:Human Knowledge
924:Stathis Psillos
910:Human Knowledge
905:
900:
899:
884:10.2307/2023861
878:(13): 427–446.
865:
864:
860:
855:
843:
828:
819:
806:
792:
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776:
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768:
764:
756:
752:
748:
710:
690:
689:
651:
638:
633:
632:
626:
622:
615:
612:The analytic (A
608:
567:
566:
564:
560:
556:
547:
540:
531:
524:
515:
508:
499:
492:
483:
450:
437:
424:
411:
392:
376:
368:
367:
348:
347:
342:
338:
334:
330:
323:
319:
315:
311:
302:Frank P. Ramsey
296:
292:
288:
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276:
247:
228:
215:
196:
177:
164:
153:
152:
138:
134:
111:
74:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
1959:
1957:
1949:
1948:
1943:
1933:
1932:
1926:
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1920:
1917:
1916:
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1896:
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1877:
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1715:
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1699:
1691:
1682:
1680:
1676:
1675:
1673:
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1667:
1662:
1657:
1652:
1650:Émile Durkheim
1647:
1642:
1637:
1632:
1627:
1621:
1619:
1615:
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1603:
1595:
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1547:
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1516:
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1491:Methodenstreit
1485:
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1471:
1464:
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1432:Social science
1429:
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1419:
1414:
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1407:
1402:
1392:
1387:
1385:Operationalism
1382:
1377:
1372:
1367:
1362:
1357:
1352:
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1200:Falsifiability
1197:
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1185:Antipositivism
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1088:Postpositivism
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1665:Berlin Circle
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1645:Eugen DĂĽhring
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1535:Contributions
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1525:Science wars
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1323:Epistemology
1254:Reflectivism
1214:Hermeneutics
1066:Declinations
1042:Antihumanism
1035:Perspectives
959:D. H. Mellor
951:
944:
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1880:Objectivity
1849:Karl Popper
1839:Thomas Kuhn
1819:Mario Bunge
1570:(1879–1884)
1505:(1909–1959)
1239:Metaphysics
1219:Historicism
1134:Demarcation
1129:Consilience
1052:Rationalism
903:Works cited
835:Carl Hempel
829:– and both
823:John Winnie
804:Application
145:O-sentences
141:T-sentences
86:sound waves
1935:Categories
1660:Ernst Mach
1655:Ernst Laas
1630:A. J. Ayer
1618:Proponents
1437:Philosophy
1234:Humanities
1178:Antitheses
1047:Empiricism
1024:Positivism
293:, . . ., o
281:, . . ., t
124:eukaryotic
1901:Verstehen
1887:Phronesis
1875:Knowledge
1859:Max Weber
1679:Criticism
1427:Sociology
1365:Modernism
1343:pluralism
1328:anarchism
1224:Historism
1144:Induction
1057:Scientism
817:Criticism
769:, infer F
727:⊨
712:⇔
705:⊨
662:⇔
582:≤
576:≤
448:…
422:…
390:∃
387:…
374:∃
354:∃
245:∧
242:⋯
239:∧
226:∧
194:∧
191:⋯
188:∧
175:∧
103:synthetic
78:electrons
1922:Category
1338:nihilism
1333:idealism
1263:Related
1139:Evidence
961:(2005),
841:See also
627:must be
346:Step 3 (
117:nor the
99:analytic
1802:Critics
1527:(1990s)
1521:(1980s)
1515:(1960s)
1495:(1890s)
1348:realism
1280:(1830s)
1268:in the
972:, 2000.
892:2023861
339:. . . o
331:. . . x
320:. . . o
312:. . . t
1794:(1986)
1786:(1980)
1778:(1978)
1770:(1968)
1762:(1964)
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1730:(1951)
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1698:(1923)
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1610:(2001)
1602:(1959)
1594:(1936)
1586:(1927)
1578:(1886)
1562:(1869)
1554:(1848)
1546:(1830)
1482:Method
1355:Holism
1286:(1927)
890:
793:Ăł TC.
565:, and
548:. . .
532:. . .
516:. . .
500:. . .
484:. . .
115:German
1894:Truth
888:JSTOR
853:Notes
623:and A
94:force
933:(1).
833:and
316:, o
285:, o
101:and
92:and
90:mass
880:doi
789:Ă™ F
781:+ F
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649:+
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640:F
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210:+
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202:n
198:T
183:2
179:T
170:1
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