730:, but nothing could be seen on the horizon. At 17:00, the submarine altered its course in order to proceed directly towards the noise source. Concurrently, the periscope was elevated, through which an adversarial submarine, identified as a German U-boat, was observed approximately 4β5 miles away. This was in fact the upper masts of the German fleet, which, according to the reconstruction, were situated approximately 22 miles away. The capacity to observe vessels at such a considerable distance was a consequence of refraction over the surface of the sea. A torpedo attack was announced on the boat, and a command was issued to prepare torpedo tubes for firing. At approximately the same time, Lunin, who had been awakened by a messenger, entered
935:
periscope and increased the submarine's sinking depth to 30 metres, subsequently returning it to its original course and leading away from the German squadron. The refusal to observe the results of the attack was argued by Lunin on the basis of a sharp turn of one of the destroyers towards the submarine, which is not confirmed by German documents. The authors of the reconstruction posit that this manoeuvre was a manifestation of reasonable caution. Following the launch of torpedoes, the probability of detection of the submarine, especially from aircraft, was increased. Conversely, Lunin realised the unlikelihood of success and saw no point in continuing observations through the periscope.
175:
1177:, which had been sunk by British aircraft in November 1944. A representative of the Shipbuilding Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of the Navy participated in this work at the invitation of the British side. The investigation revealed that no traces of repair work had been carried out to repair damage caused by torpedoes. Concurrently, the British provided the Soviets with an extract from the battleship's combat log, which made no mention of the K-21 attack. Nevertheless, the textbook for students and cadets of naval educational institutions, published in 1953β1954, reiterated the information that as a consequence of the attack, the
187:
786:'s logbook gave the impression that the submarine intended to attack the squadron from the bow torpedo tubes on a course of approach. Concurrently, the lids of the bow torpedo tubes (Nos. 1 and 2) were never opened, thereby confirming the intention to launch the attack with the stern torpedo tubes. The authors of the reconstruction have determined that this decision was erroneous. They contend that Lunin incorrectly determined the distance to the German squadron and laid on a course of departure instead of a course of rapprochement. As a result, the
154:
451:
regarding the location of the convoy's long-range covering squadron, the order to commence the operation was postponed. Concurrently, British intelligence had received reports of German heavy ships leaving the
Trondheim base, but had no precise information on their further whereabouts. Given the speed of the German ships, they could have overtaken the convoy by the late evening of 4 July, risking the complete destruction of the convoy itself, as well as the forces of direct protection and close cover. In view of this, the
1048:
Concurrently, German air reconnaissance lost contact with the
British long-range cover detachment, which included an aircraft carrier. This created the potential risk of the German squadron being intercepted. Finally, from submarines, aviation and radio intelligence, numerous reports were received indicating the disbanding of the convoy and the dispersal of its ships at great distances from each other. This made the continuation of the operation pointless. After a period of indecision, the commander of the
648:, had been sunk. By mid-1942, Lunin had developed his own tactical style, characterised by, among other things, active search for the enemy, maximum use of acoustic observation data, preference for firing from long and even extreme distances with full bow or stern salvos, poor use of the periscope after the initial detection of the target (the commander concentrated on observing only the selected target, which often led to the detection of only part of the enemy convoy or formation), excessive use of aft
397:
1129:
Soviet intelligence also received information about a single torpedo hitting the stern of the battleship
Tirpitz; Morozov and Skrynnikov note that Soviet intelligence reportedly had no agents in the area where the German battleship was based and received information through German patriots communicating with the local population. It is likely that the distorted information received was based on the damage caused by the landing on the rocks and subsequent repair of the heavy cruiser
742:
distance of 6β7 miles. He then proceeded to attack one of them, also utilising the stern torpedo tubes. In point of fact, Lunin continued to observe the tops of the masts of the German heavy ships, which, according to the reconstruction, were at that time approximately 17 miles away. At 17:18, the submarine commander finally correctly identified the target, estimating the distance to the German heavy ships to be 10β12 miles (14β15 miles according to the reconstruction).
1367:, under the command of Lunin, fired six torpedoes at "the enemy transport of the type of German dry cargo ships "Cordoba" of 7400 tonns displacement" from a distance of 2.2 miles. The commander did not observe the result of the attack, but recorded two explosions after 2 minutes and 56 seconds, which served as a sufficient reason for the higher command to confirm the success. However, German documents deny the presence of any ships in the area at the time in question.
568:. At 16:06, the squadron commenced its transit across the open sea, increasing its speed to 24 knots and reorganising its formation in accordance with the anti-submarine defence protocol. This entailed a frontline formation with torpedo boats positioned at the flanks, preceding the heavy ships. Such a formation forced the submarine attacking from a forward course (and attacking fast surface ships was only possible from a submarine's underwater position) to lower its
139:
863:, and for this reason, as the authors of the reconstruction suggest, was mistaken for it by Lunin. To explain the observed position of the squadron, Lunin states in the log that at 17:50 the German squadron allegedly made a "sudden" turn to the right, quickly reorganising itself from a column to a front. Lunin promptly lowered the periscope, increased the diving depth to 20 metres and rotated the
1197:, who commanded the Northern Fleet in 1942, was published. In this work, the attack was described in detail with reference to diary entries and claimed its success. Concurrently, the original diary entries of Golovko do not mention the K-21 attack. According to the memoirs of the admiral's relatives, the text of the memoirs was altered in preparation for printing without the author's consent.
652:, exaggerated assessment of the enemy's anti-submarine defence capabilities (which led to firing from long distances and frequent refusal to observe the results of attacks), careless attitude to facts and maximally optimistic assessment of the results of his torpedo attacks (all observations were interpreted solely to confirm success, and facts to the contrary were not taken into account.)
41:
1025:
the coordinates and speed of the squadron, indicating that it was moving at a speed of 10 knots. The radiogram transmitted by the aircraft was decoded almost simultaneously with the K-21 radiogram. Its content was also communicated to the
British mission and served as the basis for a new message transmitted by the Cleethorpes radio station. At approximately 20:24, the British submarine
389:, two battleships, two cruisers and 12 destroyers. Furthermore, a curtain of 13 submarines β comprising eight British, four Soviet and one French vessel β was positioned in the vicinity of potential German surface ship transit routes. At the same time, there were significant limitations on the use of these forces - the cruiser and long-range cover detachments could not operate east of
807:'s logbook offers a markedly disparate account, with Lunin stating that by 17:36, the German squadron had executed a 90-100Β° left turn, reorganising itself into a column. Due to the intricate manoeuvring of German ships during the turn, as well as the limited observation through the periscope, it can be assumed that Lunin may have lacked an accurate understanding of the situation.
476:
1009:
914:
832:
766:
690:
1281:, which was subsequently republished on multiple occasions. In this chapter, Professor Dotsenko noted several key facts regarding the attack, including the following: Despite the prevailing opinion that the attack on K-21 was unsuccessful, there is no evidence that the participants in the campaign, including members of the crew of the battleship
1363:
Lunin's reports on previous attacks, noting that, in general, he reported the sounds of torpedoes exploding after the attacks. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the German side's documents not only failed to record any losses, but also failed to record the fact of the attack itself. The case of the attack on 31 March 1942 is illustrative.
824:
Given the implausibility of such a gross error occurring at such a distance (approximately five miles) in conditions of good visibility, the authors of the reconstruction have concluded that Lunin's fictitious parameters of the German squadron are the most probable explanation. According to the reconstruction, Lunin intended to attack the
301:
on the German squadron, and moreover, the attack itself was not detected. The German ships continued on their original course for approximately five hours, after which they turned back due to the inherent riskiness of the operation and the futility of continuing it against a convoy that had effectively ceased to exist as a unified entity.
1193:, published under the "secret" cover, reached the conclusion that the attack of the K-21 ended in a miss, based on the analysis of the extract of the log of battleship combat operations and the examination of publications in the foreign press. At the same time in 1960, the first edition of the memoirs of Admiral
1358:
could have reached the bottom (after which their detonation from impact with the rocky bottom was possible) at approximately 18:07-18:14. This is inconsistent with the recorded times of both the first two explosions at 18:04 and the subsequent rolling explosions at 18:25-18:27. Concurrently, there is
1229:
was published in
English. It was subsequently translated into Russian and published in the USSR in 1971. In the Russian edition, the book was subjected to selective edits, with a particular focus on the removal of a fragment in which the author expressed a critical attitude towards the results of the
1063:
commenced a change of direction, and at approximately 11:40 on 6 July, the German squadron arrived at the forward anchorage in
Altafjord. Following the replenishment of fuel, the squadron proceeded to its permanent base in Bugen Bay, completing the transition at approximately 04:00 on 8 July. Further
882:
was no longer a viable option, as the distance to it was 2.4 miles, which exceeded the maximum range of torpedoes, and continued to increase. However, an opportune moment for the salvo was missed. Lunin was reluctant to ascend to periscope depth in order to ascertain the situation and make a decision
584:
with the objective of searching for enemy submarines. The squadron proceeded on a course of 30Β° (north-northeast), with the intention of reaching a distance of 25 miles from the coast as expeditiously as possible, given that the risk of submarine attack was greatest in this area. The distance between
1370:
The origin of the rolling explosions recorded at 18:25 and 18:27 is also unclear. One hypothesis suggests that they could be explained by German naval sappers detonating drifting or landed sea mines on the
Norwegian coast. Another hypothesis suggests that they could be explained by a German aircraft
1047:
Concurrently, the German fleet command conducted an assessment of the potential for continuing the operation. The receipt of reports from the radio station in
Cleethorpes provided clear evidence of the squadron's detection, thereby increasing the probability of establishing a permanent surveillance.
823:
and other German ships and the information provided in German documents. At the time in question, the German vessels were facing the submarine with their bow or left cheekbone and were moving in a front-to-east formation, rather than in a north-northwest-bound column as indicated in Lunin's records.
794:
watch log is devoid of any information regarding the target bearing, and there are no entries in the acoustic watch log between 17:23 and 17:33. The authors of the reconstruction posit that these data did not correspond to Lunin's ex post facto version of the attack and, therefore, were not included
709:
was in an underwater position at a depth of 20 metres and was sailing at a speed of 3 knots. The hydroacoustician reported that the target was located at a distance of 12 miles from the submarine, with a heading angle of 30Β° on the starboard side. The reconstruction presented by N. Skrynnikov and M.
300:
from a considerable distance. The result of the attack was not directly observed by Lunin, but the sounds of explosions were noted, which he interpreted as the result of torpedo hits. This was the basis for Soviet press claims that the battleship had been damaged. However, no torpedo hits were noted
1326:
attack. The author's analysis of the movement patterns of the Soviet submarine and German ships leads to the conclusion that the attack had no theoretical chance of success due to the excessive distance between the launching of the torpedoes and their maximum range of travel. In 2019, M. E. Morozov
1136:
By August 1942, scepticism prevailed in the Soviet Navy leadership that the attack had been unsuccessful or had resulted in minimal, quickly repaired damage to the German battleship. On 24 August 1942, an order was issued to award the K-21 crew combat decorations for the submarine's fifth and sixth
1024:
reconnaissance plane, under the command of
Captain I. Y. Garbuz. However, the observations made by Captain Garbuz were not entirely accurate. He determined the composition of the German squadron to be 11 ships, without identifying their specific classes. Furthermore, he made an error in determining
981:
surfaced at periscope depth, observing the smoke and mast tops of the departing German squadron (the distance between the submarine and the German squadron had by this time reached 16 miles). At 18:31, 18:32, and 18:38, the submarine's watch log records the occurrence of muffled rolling explosions,
462:
From that point on, Operation RΓΆsselsprung was pointless, since the task of destroying the ships in the convoy, which were travelling separately, could be done much more effectively by submarine and air attack (which was eventually done). However, the
Germans did not have full information about the
317:
did not require repairs. A British-led team, including a Soviet specialist, conducted an examination of the hull of the battleship, which had been sunk in 1944. The examination revealed no evidence of torpedo hits or repairs on the ship. A contemporary reconstruction, based on the fullest available
1335:
From our point of view, on July 5, 1942, the following happened in the Barents Sea: despite all the efforts and courage of the crew of the "K-21", due to the imperfection of equipment, insufficient training of sailors (first of all, the boat commander), as well as objective difficulties that arose
1205:
Following the publication of Golovko's memoirs, a contradiction emerged within Soviet historiography between official sources intended for the elite and those intended for the masses. During the 1960s, there was no unified position, with various publications either citing the Sovinformburo report,
1188:
entitled "Operation of the German Navy against the convoy PQ-17." One of the sections of the article was devoted to the attack of the K-21. Ewan relied on German documents and his correspondence with the participants of the operation from the German side to reach the conclusion that the attack was
802:
The attack prepared by Lunin from aft torpedo launchers was thwarted. However, at 17:35-17:37, the German squadron, maintaining the front line, began a right turn to a course of 90Β° β the general course to the east. This course was believed by Schneewind to lead the German ships to the convoy. The
781:
commenced an attack course, increasing speed to 6 knots. This was ordered by Lunin, who had previously instructed the submarine to put the rudder on the starboard side. Based on the true course of the German squadron, such a course would have allowed the submarine to attack the Admiral Scheer on a
572:
and increase its depth to avoid being detected and attacked by the destroyers; but after passing the destroyers, the submarine had no time to organise a successful attack on the protected heavy ships. An attempt by a submarine to evade the order had a similar result - it simply did not have enough
1128:
The conclusions drawn from the submarine brigade headquarters documents posit that one torpedo struck the battleship and another the destroyer, following the sinking of the latter. It is postulated that the explosions heard 20β30 minutes after the attack were the result of depth bombs detonating.
404:
Simultaneously, the German military was formulating a strategy to thwart the convoy. In addition to the deployment of aircraft and submarines, the plan included the use of large surface vessels. The operation, designated as RΓΆsselsprung, or "Horse Walk," permitted the utilization of all available
956:
acoustic watch log, which, as of 18 August, indicated only vague noises on the aft corners of the starboard side. These noises were reminiscent of the sound of a submarine passage. The German squadron did not record any explosions and did not search for the enemy submarine, as the attack was not
450:
and three destroyers sustaining damage from rock landings and being withdrawn from the operation. Following the refuelling of the German squadron under Admiral Otto Schneewind in the afternoon of 4 July, the squadron was prepared to embark on a sea voyage. However, due to the lack of information
761:
logbook is erroneously depicted as 85Β° (east), rather than the true course of 30Β° (north-northeast). Such a gross error in determining the course of an experienced commander in conditions of excellent visibility is difficult to explain; the reconstruction concluded that it was most likely not a
372:
and favourable weather conditions. The utilisation of enemy submarines and surface ships was also greatly facilitated by this circumstance. Nonetheless, for political reasons (in the summer of 1942, the situation at the front for the Soviet Union was critical and the country was in dire need of
1362:
Morozov and Skrynnikov posit that the explosions recorded at 18:04 were most likely the result of an auditory aberration by one of the sailors. However, they do not rule out the possibility that one of the torpedoes exploded when it hit the bottom. Additionally, Morozov and Skrynnikov examined
1156:
By the afternoon of 6 July, the British naval command had already concluded that the K-21 raid was ineffective; later, the study of aerial reconnaissance data and the decoding of German communications intercepts reinforced this opinion, which was communicated to the Soviet side at its request.
1004:
The K-21 radiogram was decoded at the Northern Fleet Headquarters at 19:55 on 5 July. The content of the radiogram was immediately transmitted to the British military mission, which at 20:04 transmitted the corresponding radiogram to the Admiralty, as well as to the ships of the British fleet.
934:
and the battleship was estimated to be between 1.8 and 2 miles, which is close to the maximum range of the torpedoes. The reconstruction indicates that the distance between the submarines was 3.3 miles, which precluded the success of the attack. Upon launching the torpedoes, Lunin lowered the
741:
commenced a left turn, and at 17:10, it increased its speed to 5 knots, preparing to engage the enemy "submarine" with its stern torpedo tubes. At 17:12, Lunin altered the target identification, assuming that instead of a submarine, he was observing two torpedo boats in a ledge formation at a
463:
convoy's break-up and believed it had split into two groups. On the morning of 5 July, after a German reconnaissance plane had spotted a long-range convoy escort moving westwards and posing no threat at that distance, the German command decided to launch the operation. At 11:55 on 5 July, the
1123:
Undoubtedly hit 2 torpedoes during the attack on the LC "Tirpitz" is reliable, which should be established by reconnaissance, but at the same time I admit the possibility that the lead destroyer, turned at the time of the shot on the countercourse with the battleship intercepted torpedoes on
996:
In this instance, both the trajectory of the German squadron and the coordinates of the point of attack were determined with a certain degree of inaccuracy. Having received confirmation of the receipt of the radiogram, the submarine submerged once more. The subsequent voyage of the submarine
659:
commenced its fifth combat cruise on 18 June 1942. The primary objective of the campaign was to detect and attack heavy enemy surface vessels. Consequently, four of the six torpedoes in the bow torpedo tubes were configured with a 5 m depth of travel setting, which ensured that deep-seated
573:
time to get within torpedo range of the attacked ships, the squadron literally whizzed past the submarine. To reduce the risk of torpedoing the destroyers, at 16:46 Schneewind ordered them to move in a small zigzag. The heavy ships continued to move without zigzagging. Furthermore, the
1246:, the first edition of which was published in 1970, had a significant impact on the formation of public opinion on the discussed issue. The novel asserted the success of the attack and harshly criticised foreign historians, as well as suggesting that the combat log of the battleship
895:
surfaced to periscope depth. According to the reconstruction, by this time the Admiral Hipper was at a distance of 1.6 miles and was actually showing the stern to the Soviet submarine commander. At the same time, the Tirpitz was at a distance of approximately three miles from the
664:. The remaining torpedoes (two in the bow torpedo tubes and four in the stern torpedo tubes) were set to a depth of 2 metres. On the morning of 19 June, the submarine was travelling in a surface position in low cloud conditions when it was attacked by an enemy aircraft. Two
925:
After a brief period of deliberation, Lunin reached a decision. At 18:01, he turned the boat to the left in order to provide the necessary angle of anticipation. At 18:01:30, he launched four torpedoes at four-second intervals from the stern torpedo tubes at the battleship
312:
had not been struck by torpedoes, given the absence of documentary evidence attesting to the success of the attack. This evidence was not present in German documents or the memoirs of the participants on the German side. Following the return of the squadron, the battleship
1005:
Subsequently, a report on the enemy was transmitted by an unencrypted message "on the fleet" working on long wavelengths to a powerful radio station located in Cleethorpes. This message was received by both British ships and submarines, as well as by the German squadron.
564:. Schneewind's reasoning was that he considered the eastern channel to be more dangerous, both in terms of enemy submarines and the risk of mines being detonated. However, the route chosen by Schneewind took the German squadron into the area of the patrolling submarine
1336:
during the attack of a fast, well-protected ship formation, the torpedoes fired by the submarine did not hit anything. Instead of analyzing the reasons for the failure, it was followed, as has happened many times in our recent past, by declaring it a major victory.
986:
once again surfaced at periscope depth. Having found no evidence of the attack, it rose to the surface and commenced transmitting a radiogram at 19:09. The exact text of the radiogram remains classified, but it can be reconstructed from records in other documents:
1254:
current, whose adherents believe that the K-21 attack was successful and its denial is the result of a vast anti-Russian conspiracy. They further argue that Soviet official historiography since the mid-1970s has established the practice of mentioning the
951:
continued to alter its course, leaning to the west. Concurrently, the logbook recorded the noise of destroyers in front and on the sides of the boat. The data regarding the noises emitted by the destroyers appears to be at odds with the findings of the
1297:
from April 1943 to December 1944. In this edition, for the first time, extensive extracts from the log book of the K-21 and the recollections of eyewitnesses of the attack were published. The materials of the book were used in the 8-part TV series
904:
torpedoes, which was 2.2 miles, rendered it impossible to hit the battleship. According to the recollections of an eyewitness of the attack, Lieutenant A. Kotov, the submarine commander expressed doubt as to the expediency of launching torpedoes:
676:
was subjected to a second attack by enemy aircraft. However, the bombs that were dropped near the board failed to detonate, limiting the damage to eight bullet holes in the light hull. On the night of 28 June, following the receipt of an order,
1072:
between 27 July and 31 July, 17 September and 21 September, 14 October and 15 October, 28 September and 1 October, 19 October and 22 October, and 23 October and 24 October. On 23 October and 24 October, the vessel passed from Bugen Bay to
318:
evidence, demonstrates that the attack had no theoretical possibility of success, given that the torpedoes were launched from a distance exceeding their maximum range. Nevertheless, the event is of significant historical importance to the
1272:
Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russian historiography initially continued the practice of Soviet historiography, including the K-21 attack without specifying its results. This information is presented in the three-volume edition
1349:
remains uncertain. The German squadron did not conduct acoustic surveillance due to the ineffectiveness of such an operation when travelling at full speed, and no detonations were observed visually. German ships did not utilise
1259:
attack but not its result, under the influence of Pikul's novel. In 1991, the first part of K. Yuan's book, The Soviet Navy in the War, was published in Paris. In this work, the author attempted to reconstruct the scheme of the
991:
At 18.00 at W=71Β°25'N D=23Β°40'ost attacked enemy ships consisting of battleships "Tirpitz", "Scheer" and eight destroyers, heading for Nord-Ost. Went out to attack the LC "Tirpitz". Heard two explosions. The commander of the
360:. The 35 transports of the convoy carried cargo consisting of 297 aircraft, 594 tanks, over 4,000 vehicles and more than 156,000 tonnes of other cargo. Convoying this convoy entailed a significant degree of risk. The
818:
submerges, sharply turning the rudder to the starboard side and, by 17:46, setting a new course, rapidly approaching the enemy. Concurrently, the submarine's watch log reveals a discrepancy between the course of the
1189:
unsuccessful. In the same year, the article was translated into Russian and subsequently entered the library of the Historical Department of the General Staff of the USSR Navy. In 1959, the military-historical work
1285:, suffered any torpedo hits after returning to the base for repairs. He based this conclusion on the evidence presented. In 1999, A.V. Platonov, senior lecturer (later professor) at the Naval Academy, in his book
946:
slightly changed course and increased the diving depth to 40 meters. This was evidenced by the noise of destroyers sharply increased to the right and left of the submarine. Subsequently, between 18:08 and 18:10,
887:
and the Admiral Hipper began to increase rapidly, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the angle of the torpedo encounter. This resulted in the submarine and the squadron "running away" from each other.
803:
speed was reduced to 21 knots for the duration of the turn. This manoeuvre is reflected in numerous German documents, particularly in the combat logs of all German ships that were part of the squadron. The
1309:
In 2006, M. E. Morozov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of the Department of the Institute of Military History of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation, published an appendix to the book
883:
to launch torpedoes, given his proximity to the destroyer escort. Consequently, the anti-submarine formation of the German squadron was able to fulfil its task. Following 17:57, the distance between the
1165:
In early 1943, the Submarine Department of the USSR People's Commissariat of the Navy prepared a methodological document analysing the actions of Soviet submarines. Lunin's actions during the attack on
1234:
attack. In the same year, 1971, the first edition of Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov's memoirs was published, in which the submarine attack was mentioned, but the author refrained from assessing its results.
745:
At 17:02, the submarine deviates to the left, which results in her deviating from the course of the German ships. At 17:23, Lunin estimates the composition of the enemy squadron to be the battleship
1359:
a possibility that the torpedo launched from Torpedo Apparatus No. 8 could have reached the bottom much earlier, given that the submarine crew's report indicates that it was defective, leaking air.
1289:, also noted the failure of the attack and suggested that Lunin had either adjusted the distance of the torpedo launch or the timing of the explosions. The same year saw the publication of the book
1112:, the German squadron was forced to abandon the attack on the convoy and return to port. This information was also disseminated in the media of the anti-Hitler coalition countries, and foreign
1170:
were criticised, and the result of the attack was described as a "minor combat success". The document was distributed to fleets, command authorities and naval training establishments.
2462:
1214:, as well as in the 1969 textbook for higher naval schools, the authors asserted the ineffectiveness of the attack. The same conclusion was reached by the authors of the study
867:
90Β° to the right in order to launch an attack with the aft torpedo tubes. Meanwhile, the German squadron had completed the 90Β° turn by 17:55 and increased speed to 24 knots.
1141:, which was not among the highest honours. The proposal of the Northern Fleet Command to award the K-21 the rank of Guard was changed by the decision of the Navy Commissar
672:, resulting in the inability to use the fast dive tank and equalisation tank No. 1. This limited the submarine's manoeuvrability in the underwater position. On 27 June,
630:
and JelmsΓΈya. By this time, Nikolay Lunin had accrued considerable experience as a submariner, having completed seven combat missions (five of which he commanded the
377:, decided to send the convoy. Its protection was provided by a close protection force of 19 warships and two submarines, a close protection cruiser force of four
1153:(with its inclusion in the number of victories inscribed on the deckhouse of K-21), but was not included in the official lists of losses inflicted on the enemy.
957:
detected. The German ships continued to move in the same direction, at the same speed and in the same formation as before. According to the reconstruction, the
1264:
attack at the tactical level. However, due to the lack of access to Soviet archives, K. Yuan was constrained to rely on general data from open Soviet sources.
1098:, hitting it with two torpedoes and causing significant damage to the battleship. The following day, more detailed articles were published in the newspapers
596:
In accordance with the operation to provide escort for the PQ-17 convoy, the Soviet Northern Fleet allocated four submarines to attack German heavy ships:
452:
1331:. In this work, the authors analysed a large number of sources and performed a computer reconstruction of the attack. Their conclusions were as follows:
1040:
and six destroyers, travelling at a speed of 22 knots. Due to the unfavorable mutual position of the submarine and the squadron, the commander of the
86:
2457:
828:, but made a mistake, considering the intermediate course of 60Β° taken by the heavy cruiser in the process of turning for the new general course.
434:
On 1 July, the convoy was identified by German aerial reconnaissance, and by the evening of 2 July, the German ships commenced their transit from
814:, which is in the process of turning, is on a course aimed directly at the submarine at a distance of approximately seven miles. At 17:40, the
2321:
640:). He claimed the destruction of eight enemy transports, although a post-war study of German documents revealed that only one ship, the 2975
622:, Captain 2nd Rank Nikolai Lunin, was assigned position No. 2A, situated in proximity to the Norwegian coast and tasked with obstructing the
1173:
Following the conclusion of the Second World War, a team of British specialists conducted an investigation into the hull of the battleship
1206:
mentioning the attack itself without assessing its result, or simply omitting any mention of the attack. In the 1966 publication by the
982:
each lasting approximately 20 seconds. The acoustic watch log indicates that two explosions were recorded at 18:25 and 18:27. At 19:05,
859:
from a distance of 3.5 miles. In silhouette, especially when viewed from the bow, this heavy cruiser was very similar to the battleship
714:
at that moment was approximately 35 miles, with a course angle of 3Β°. This suggests that the German squadron proceeded directly towards
497:
503:
2394:
2371:
2348:
2123:
1044:, C. E. Oxborough, was unable to launch an attack. Consequently, he transmitted a radiogram of enemy sightings shortly after 22:00.
762:
mistake, but a deliberate distortion of the facts by Lunin to present his actions in a more favourable light to the higher command.
304:
In the Soviet Union, literature aimed at the masses was dominated by an opinion of the success of the attack. This was based on the
1302:(K.M. Sergeev was one of the historical advisors of the series), released in 2004, which presented a version of the success of the
1371:
attacking an imaginary target (a submarine). However, neither of these hypotheses has been substantiated by documentary evidence.
681:
proceeded to position No. 2A, where it conducted patrols over the following days, having no contact with the enemy until 5 July.
459:, ordered on the evening of 4 July that the convoy be scattered and that the close-cover cruiser group be recalled to the west.
345:
710:
Morozov (hereinafter referred to as the reconstruction) indicates that the actual distance between the German squadron and
427:
415:
226:
220:
753:, and eight torpedo boats. Additionally, he notes the presence of a seaplane Ar 196 over the squadron. The heavy cruiser
1277:. In 1997, Professor V. D. Dotsenko of the Naval Academy dedicated a separate chapter to the attack on K-21 in his work
605:
705:
hydroacoustician A. Smetanin heard a noise, which he identified as the sound of ships' propellers. At that moment, the
1463:
1434:
1145:
to the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, which was considered less prestigious; the K-21 never received the title of
722:
at the time of the acoustic contact was Senior Mate F. Lukyanov, the boat commander was asleep in his cabin. At 16:40
942:'s logbook, two minutes and 15 seconds after the torpedoes were launched, the sub heard two explosions. In response,
1119:
On or before 30 July 1942, Lunin prepared a report on the results of the attack, in which he expressed his opinion:
1146:
421:
1091:
631:
262:
214:
45:
1242:
619:
322:, as it represents the only instance of Soviet submariners launching an attack against a heavy (larger that a
1108:, in which the name of the boat commander was mentioned. It was stated that, due to damage to the battleship
1207:
1138:
847:
once again raised her periscope. By this time, the German squadron was in the final stages of the turn. The
547:
293:
179:
790:
moved too far away from the course of the German squadron. It is notable that between 17:23 and 17:46, the
2427:[Miroslav Morozov on the attack of the K-21 submarine on the battleship Tirpitz (video lecture)].
641:
541:
390:
2452:
308:
report and wartime press articles. The historiography of foreign countries initially concurred that the
284:
206:
556:
to the west of RolvsΓΈy Island as the optimal route for accessing the open sea, rather than the eastern
396:
553:
532:
526:
520:
514:
508:
757:
is not identified until the end of the attack. The course of the German squadron as recorded in the
560:
fairway prescribed by the higher command, which afforded access to the open sea in the vicinity of
1399:
The maximum speed of the squadron was constrained by the condition of the machines on the cruiser
2412:]. ΠΠΎΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΌΡΠ°ΡΡ (in Russian) (3 ed.). Moscow: Π€ΠΈΠ½Π°Π½ΡΡ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°. pp. 111β116.
851:
was observed to be positioned to the left of the submarine at a distance of 4.5 miles, while the
909:
Lunin - shoot, don't shoot? It's a long distance. And the XO: "Shoot, Comrade Commander, shoot!"
1435:"Admiralty War Diaries of World War 2. Commander in Chief, Home Fleet β July to September 1942"
2390:
2367:
2344:
2317:
2119:
1251:
2340:
2115:
561:
386:
290:
1464:"Admiralty War Diaries of World War 2. Commander in Chief, Home Fleet β April to June 1942"
1250:
had been falsified. Morozov and Skrynnikov posit that Pikul's novel gave rise to a kind of
874:
had missed the destroyers above her and was in a favourable position to attack the cruiser
585:
the heavy ships was initially 2,000 metres, but at 16:47 it was increased to 3,000 metres.
270:
191:
1237:
1194:
1142:
668:
exploded approximately 30β40 metres from the boat. The concussion caused damage to the
1216:
Combat Activity of Submarines of the USSR Navy in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945
2446:
1149:. At the same time, the submarine was credited with the destruction of the destroyer
1053:
1021:
439:
378:
305:
76:
1351:
1222:
1124:
themselves, in favor of this assumption testify to the subsequent large explosions.
1056:
1049:
1026:
649:
538:
456:
374:
341:
335:
319:
278:
274:
236:
186:
174:
159:
144:
627:
1471:
1442:
900:, which created the illusion that it could be hit. In fact, the maximum range of
697:
and the German squadron at the time of the first acoustic contact. Reconstruction
1387:
1113:
1069:
665:
661:
365:
357:
80:
40:
1184:
In 1957, the French historian Cloade Ewan published an article in the magazine
660:
battleships and cruisers were hit in the vulnerable part of the hull below the
2424:
921:
and German squadron at 18.01.30 (the moment of torpedo launch). Reconstruction
475:
258:
211:
101:
88:
1074:
1059:, gave the order to cease the operation. At 22:51 on 5 July, the battleship
782:
course of departure from the aft torpedo tubes. However, the entries in the
727:
569:
443:
435:
382:
369:
361:
323:
281:
232:
203:
52:
2425:"ΠΠΈΡΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π² ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² ΠΎΠ± Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π»ΠΎΠ΄ΠΊΠΈ "Π-21" Π»ΠΈΠ½ΠΊΠΎΡΠ° "Π’ΠΈΡΠΏΠΈΡ" (Π²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΠΎΠ»Π΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡ)"
1008:
577:
348:
that delivered weapons and resources necessary for the war effort to the
1020:
On 5 July at 19:16, the German squadron was detected by the crew of the
913:
831:
765:
689:
353:
297:
267:
2313:
1100:
574:
557:
406:
1191:
The Navy of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945
446:. The concentration was concluded on 4 July, with the heavy cruiser
393:
due to limited fuel reserves and the risk of enemy aircraft attack.
1327:
and N. R. Skrynnikov published a monograph on the attack, entitled
1210:
teachers A. I. Kozlov and V. I. Kozlov and V. S. Shlomin, entitled
1137:
combat tours, and Lunin and 16 other crew members were awarded the
1314:
by A. A. Malov and S. V. Patyanin. V. Patyanin's book Battleships
1032:
detected the Schniewinda squadron, identifying its composition as
1007:
912:
830:
764:
688:
623:
474:
395:
349:
483:
The German squadron that set sail consisted of the battleship
2389:] (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Π¦ΠΈΡΠ°Π΄Π΅Π»Ρ, ΠΠ°Π»Π΅Ρ-ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½Ρ.
878:, which was only 0.7 miles away. Attacking the battleship
795:
in the documents (completed after the attack). At 17:29,
467:
lifted anchor and the German squadron began to set sail.
16:
1942 World War II attack on the German battleship Tirpitz
1354:. The calculations indicate that the torpedoes fired by
1094:, which stated that a Soviet submarine had attacked the
930:. The watch log indicates that the distance between the
400:
PQ-17 convoy ships shortly before departure from Iceland
2246:ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ², Π.Π. (2006). "Π’ΠΎΡΠΏΠ΅Π΄Π½Π°Ρ Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ° ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π»ΠΎΠ΄ΠΊΠΈ Π-21".
2112:ΠΠΎΠ»ΡΡ ΡΠΌΠ΅Π»Ρ Π½Π°Π΄ ΠΌΠΎΡΠ΅ΠΌ. ΠΠΎΠΎΠ½Π·ΡΠ½Π΄. Π Π΅ΠΊΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ°Π²Π°Π½Ρ PQ-17
965:
wake about 1.5 miles astern of the cruiser and sank.
455:(Chief of the Naval Staff) of Great Britain, Admiral
266:, sailing as part of a squadron under the command of
1322:contains an article devoted to the analysis of the
799:slightly corrected its course, changing it by 5Β°.
368:area, was able to operate around the clock due to
2288:
2276:
2264:
2233:
2210:
2174:
2162:
2150:
2138:
2097:
2085:
2073:
2049:
2037:
2025:
2013:
2001:
1989:
1977:
1965:
1953:
1941:
1929:
1917:
1905:
1893:
1881:
1869:
1857:
1845:
1833:
1821:
1809:
1797:
1785:
1773:
1761:
1746:
1734:
1722:
1710:
1698:
1686:
1674:
1662:
1650:
1638:
1626:
1614:
1602:
1590:
1578:
1566:
1554:
1539:
1527:
1515:
1503:
1491:
1421:
479:German squadron order after 16:46 on July 5, 1942
2383:ΠΠΎΠΌΠ°Π½Π΄ΠΈΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π²ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
Π»ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠΊ 1941β1945 Π³Π³
1218:, published in 1969 under the cover of secrecy.
997:proceeded without incident, and on 9 July 1942,
839:and the German squadron at 17:46. Reconstruction
773:and the German squadron at 17:25. Reconstruction
373:assistance), the British War Cabinet, headed by
1333:
1121:
989:
977:At 18:31 (i.e. half an hour after the attack),
907:
21:
2198:
1275:Three Centuries of the Russian Navy 1696-1996
8:
1161:Between the fall of 1942 and the early 1960s
2463:World War II submarines of the Soviet Union
1201:Between the early 1960s and the early 1990s
1090:On 8 July 1942, a report was issued by the
870:At 17:57, according to the reconstruction,
2387:Commanders of Soviet submarines 1941-1945.
1279:Myths and Legends of Russian Naval History
1268:Between the early 1990s and the late 2010s
385:, and a long-range protection force of an
39:
18:
2366:] (in Russian). Moscow: Π―ΡΠ·Π°, ΠΠΊΡΠΌΠΎ.
1287:Commanders of Soviet Submarines 1941-1945
364:, which had numerical superiority in the
2304:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ², Π.Π .; ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ², Π.Π. (2019).
1181:was damaged and the destroyer was sunk.
973:and the German squadron after the attack
2222:
2186:
2061:
1414:
1379:
1345:The source of the detonations heard on
1081:Evaluation of the results of the attack
2431:(in Russian). TacticMedia. 2019-03-19
2337:Myths and legends of the Russian Navy
1757:
1755:
1550:
1548:
1329:The Unknown Attack of Commander Lunin
1116:were officially given Lunin's photo.
7:
2381:ΠΠ»Π°ΡΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ², Π.Π.; ΠΡΡΡΠ΅, Π.Π. (1999).
1293:by K.M. Sergeev, who served on the
2306:ΠΠ΅ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅ΡΡΠ½Π°Ρ Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ°Π½Π΄ΠΈΡΠ° ΠΡΠ½ΠΈΠ½Π°
14:
1139:Order of the Red Banner of Battle
1086:Initial period (JulyβAugust 1942)
580:was launched from the battleship
471:German squadron before the attack
2333:ΠΠΈΡΡ ΠΈ Π»Π΅Π³Π΅Π½Π΄Ρ Π ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ»ΠΎΡΠ°
2310:Commander Lunin's unknown attack
1312:Bismarck and Tirpitz Battleships
1068:exercises were conducted in the
431:, and their respective escorts.
185:
173:
152:
137:
2364:Lunin is attacking the Tirpitz!
855:was observed to be approaching
2458:Arctic convoys of World War II
2289:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2277:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2265:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2234:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2211:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2175:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2163:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2151:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2139:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2098:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2086:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2074:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2050:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2038:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2026:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2014:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
2002:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1990:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1978:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1966:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1954:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1942:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1930:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1918:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1906:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1894:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1882:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1870:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1858:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1846:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1834:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1822:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1810:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1798:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1786:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1774:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1762:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1747:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1735:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1723:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1711:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1699:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1687:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1675:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1663:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1651:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1639:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1627:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1615:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1603:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1591:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1579:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1567:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1555:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1540:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1528:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1516:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1504:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1492:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1422:Π‘ΠΊΡΡΠ½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² & ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ·ΠΎΠ² (2019
1227:The Defeat of the PQ-17 Convoy
938:At 18:04, as indicated in the
405:heavy German naval vessels in
1:
626:exits between the islands of
352:, commenced its journey from
2118:: Π’ΡΡ
Π°Π½Ρ. pp. 645β651.
1221:In 1968, the English writer
442:Bay to the forward base in
409:, including the battleship
296:. The submarine fired four
257:On 5 July 1942, the German
2479:
2279:, pp. 40β41, 182β183)
2199:ΠΠ»Π°ΡΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ² & ΠΡΡΡΠ΅ (1999
552:. Schneewind selected the
333:
1291:Lunin attacks the Tirpitz
718:. The watch commander of
242:
197:
166:
129:
58:
38:
33:
22:Attack on the battleship
2248:ΠΠ°Π»ΠΎΠ² Π. Π., ΠΠ°ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΠ½ Π‘.
2004:, pp. 253β258, 263)
1243:Requiem for Convoy PQ-17
620:Hero of the Soviet Union
2360:ΠΡΠ½ΠΈΠ½ Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅Ρ "Π’ΠΈΡΠΏΠΈΡ"!
835:Mutual position of the
769:Mutual position of the
644:displacement transport
2404:ΠΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΊΠΎ, Π.Π. (1984).
2358:Π‘Π΅ΡΠ³Π΅Π΅Π², Π.Π. (2005).
2331:ΠΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΎ, Π.Π. (2002).
1338:
1126:
1017:
1001:returned to its base.
994:
961:torpedoes crossed the
922:
911:
840:
774:
698:
614:. Of these, submarine
480:
401:
277:, was attacked by the
167:Commanders and leaders
2410:Along with the fleet.
2110:ΠΠΈΠΊΡΠ»Ρ, Π.Π‘. (1993).
1011:
916:
834:
768:
692:
478:
399:
340:On 27 June 1942, the
243:Casualties and losses
2339:] (in Russian).
2312:] (in Russian).
2252:Β«ΠΠΈΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΒ» ΠΈ Β«Π’ΠΈΡΠΏΠΈΡΒ»
1896:, pp. 156, 237)
1341:Origin of explosions
749:, the heavy cruiser
34:Part of World War II
2291:, pp. 193β202)
2236:, pp. 299β302)
2213:, pp. 298β300)
2189:, pp. 101β103)
2177:, pp. 298β299)
2165:, pp. 296β298)
2153:, pp. 292β293)
2141:, pp. 286β291)
2100:, pp. 285β286)
2088:, pp. 282β285)
2076:, pp. 277β282)
2064:, pp. 111β116)
2028:, pp. 264β265)
2016:, pp. 242β245)
1992:, pp. 244β245)
1956:, pp. 216β218)
1932:, pp. 223β229)
1920:, pp. 202β208)
1908:, pp. 174β177)
1884:, pp. 178β182)
1860:, pp. 153β154)
1848:, pp. 149β153)
1836:, pp. 148β149)
1824:, pp. 143β145)
1812:, pp. 142β147)
1800:, pp. 139β141)
1764:, pp. 134β136)
1749:, pp. 126β131)
1713:, pp. 119β125)
1701:, pp. 115β121)
1689:, pp. 107β112)
1677:, pp. 103β107)
1665:, pp. 104β105)
1629:, pp. 111β112)
917:Mutual location of
726:surfaced under the
693:Mutual position of
291:Captain Second Rank
98: /
1593:, pp. 61, 67)
1212:The Northern Fleet
1018:
923:
841:
775:
699:
498:Z4 Richard Beitzen
481:
402:
75:the border of the
2323:978-5-00111-243-3
2201:, pp. 17β18)
1725:, pp. 95β96)
1653:, pp. 63β64)
1641:, pp. 62β63)
1605:, pp. 39β43)
1542:, pp. 81β83)
1530:, pp. 74β76)
1506:, pp. 66β73)
1494:, pp. 65β66)
1468:naval-history.net
1439:naval-history.net
1424:, pp. 58β61)
1186:La Revue Maritime
592:before the attack
504:Z14 Friedrich Inn
487:, heavy cruisers
413:, heavy cruisers
326:) enemy warship.
255:
254:
219:, heavy cruisers
125:
124:
102:71.583Β°N 24.883Β°E
51:in the Norwegian
26:by the submarine
2470:
2439:
2437:
2436:
2413:
2400:
2377:
2354:
2341:Saint Petersburg
2327:
2292:
2286:
2280:
2274:
2268:
2262:
2256:
2255:
2251:
2243:
2237:
2231:
2225:
2220:
2214:
2208:
2202:
2196:
2190:
2184:
2178:
2172:
2166:
2160:
2154:
2148:
2142:
2136:
2130:
2129:
2116:Saint Petersburg
2107:
2101:
2095:
2089:
2083:
2077:
2071:
2065:
2059:
2053:
2047:
2041:
2035:
2029:
2023:
2017:
2011:
2005:
1999:
1993:
1987:
1981:
1975:
1969:
1963:
1957:
1951:
1945:
1939:
1933:
1927:
1921:
1915:
1909:
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1489:
1483:
1482:
1480:
1479:
1470:. Archived from
1460:
1454:
1453:
1451:
1450:
1441:. Archived from
1431:
1425:
1419:
1404:
1397:
1391:
1384:
562:Porsangerfjorden
387:aircraft carrier
190:
189:
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2406:ΠΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅ Ρ ΡΠ»ΠΎΡΠΎΠΌ
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2397:
2380:
2374:
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2072:
2068:
2060:
2056:
2048:
2044:
2036:
2032:
2024:
2020:
2012:
2008:
2000:
1996:
1988:
1984:
1976:
1972:
1964:
1960:
1952:
1948:
1940:
1936:
1928:
1924:
1916:
1912:
1904:
1900:
1892:
1888:
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1876:
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1864:
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1398:
1394:
1385:
1381:
1377:
1343:
1270:
1203:
1163:
1088:
1083:
975:
969:Actions of the
687:
618:, commanded by
594:
473:
362:German aviation
338:
332:
289:, commanded by
271:Otto Schniewind
192:Otto Schniewind
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2419:
2418:External links
2416:
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2299:
2296:
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2269:
2267:, p. 308)
2257:
2238:
2226:
2223:Π‘Π΅ΡΠ³Π΅Π΅Π² (2005)
2215:
2203:
2191:
2179:
2167:
2155:
2143:
2131:
2124:
2102:
2090:
2078:
2066:
2054:
2052:, p. 277)
2042:
2040:, p. 272)
2030:
2018:
2006:
1994:
1982:
1980:, p. 240)
1970:
1968:, p. 171)
1958:
1946:
1944:, p. 289)
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1872:, p. 175)
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1776:, p. 138)
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1401:Admiral Scheer
1392:
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1342:
1339:
1269:
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1202:
1199:
1195:Arseny Golovko
1162:
1159:
1143:N.G. Kuznetsov
1087:
1084:
1082:
1079:
1038:Admiral Hipper
974:
967:
891:At 18:00, the
876:Admiral Hipper
853:Admiral Hipper
849:Admiral Scheer
826:Admiral Scheer
812:Admiral Scheer
810:At 17:38, the
755:Admiral Hipper
751:Admiral Scheer
686:
683:
655:The submarine
646:Konsul Schulte
593:
587:
493:Admiral Hipper
489:Admiral Scheer
472:
469:
453:First Sea Lord
428:Admiral Hipper
416:Admiral Scheer
379:heavy cruisers
346:Arctic convoys
334:Main article:
331:
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228:Admiral Hipper
222:Admiral Scheer
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2396:5-8172-0026-0
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2379:
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2373:5-699-09530-6
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2187:ΠΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΎ (2002
2183:
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2125:5-900147-05-3
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2062:ΠΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΊΠΎ (1984
2058:
2055:
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2034:
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2015:
2010:
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1788:, p. 96)
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1617:, p. 62)
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1581:, p. 81)
1580:
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1569:, p. 87)
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1557:, p. 89)
1556:
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1521:
1518:, p. 79)
1517:
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1505:
1500:
1497:
1493:
1488:
1485:
1474:on 2013-02-23
1473:
1469:
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1456:
1445:on 2013-02-21
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1352:depth charges
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1238:V. S. Pikul's
1235:
1233:
1228:
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1219:
1217:
1213:
1209:
1208:Naval Academy
1200:
1198:
1196:
1192:
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1125:
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1117:
1115:
1114:news agencies
1111:
1107:
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1102:
1097:
1093:
1092:Sovinformburo
1085:
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1054:Grand Admiral
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539:torpedo boats
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495:, destroyers
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344:, one of the
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306:Sovinformburo
302:
299:
295:
294:Nikolai Lunin
292:
288:
287:
283:
280:
276:
273:to intercept
272:
269:
265:
264:
260:
251:no casualties
250:
248:no casualties
247:
246:
241:
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237:torpedo boats
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183:
181:
180:Nikolai Lunin
176:
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149:
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134:
133:
128:
121:Failed attack
120:
117:
116:
111:
82:
78:
77:Norwegian Sea
73:
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69:
65:
62:
61:
57:
54:
50:
49:
42:
37:
32:
29:
25:
20:
2453:World War II
2433:. Retrieved
2428:
2409:
2405:
2386:
2382:
2363:
2359:
2336:
2332:
2309:
2305:
2298:Bibliography
2284:
2272:
2260:
2247:
2241:
2229:
2218:
2206:
2194:
2182:
2170:
2158:
2146:
2134:
2111:
2105:
2093:
2081:
2069:
2057:
2045:
2033:
2021:
2009:
1997:
1985:
1973:
1961:
1949:
1937:
1925:
1913:
1901:
1889:
1877:
1865:
1853:
1841:
1829:
1817:
1805:
1793:
1781:
1769:
1742:
1730:
1718:
1706:
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1670:
1658:
1646:
1634:
1622:
1610:
1598:
1586:
1574:
1562:
1535:
1523:
1511:
1499:
1487:
1476:. Retrieved
1472:the original
1467:
1458:
1447:. Retrieved
1443:the original
1438:
1429:
1417:
1400:
1395:
1386:Hereinafter
1382:
1369:
1364:
1361:
1355:
1346:
1344:
1334:
1328:
1323:
1319:
1315:
1311:
1308:
1303:
1300:Convoy PQ-17
1299:
1294:
1290:
1286:
1282:
1278:
1274:
1271:
1261:
1256:
1247:
1241:
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1127:
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1118:
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1099:
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1089:
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1050:Kriegsmarine
1046:
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1019:
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978:
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892:
890:
884:
879:
875:
871:
869:
864:
860:
856:
852:
848:
844:
842:
836:
825:
820:
815:
811:
809:
804:
801:
796:
791:
787:
783:
778:
776:
770:
758:
754:
750:
746:
744:
738:
736:
731:
723:
719:
715:
711:
706:
702:
700:
694:
678:
673:
669:
666:aerial bombs
656:
654:
645:
637:
636:and two the
632:
615:
611:
606:
601:
597:
595:
589:
581:
565:
548:
542:
533:
527:
521:
515:
509:
502:
496:
492:
488:
484:
482:
464:
461:
457:Dudley Pound
447:
433:
426:
420:
414:
410:
403:
375:W. Churchill
342:convoy PQ 17
339:
336:Convoy PQ 17
320:Russian Navy
314:
309:
303:
285:
275:convoy PQ 17
261:
256:
227:
221:
215:
145:Soviet Union
130:Belligerents
47:
27:
23:
2429:YouTube.com
2343:: ΠΠΎΠ»ΠΈΠ³ΠΎΠ½.
1388:Moscow time
1223:D. Irving's
1106:Krasny Flot
1070:Vestfjorden
662:armour belt
391:Bear Island
366:Barents Sea
358:Arkhangelsk
105: /
81:Barents Sea
66:5 July 1942
46:Battleship
2447:Categories
2435:2021-01-16
2254:: 123β125.
2250:Π. ΠΠΈΠ½ΠΊΠΎΡΡ
1478:2021-01-23
1449:2021-01-23
1410:References
1252:conspiracy
843:At 17:50,
777:At 17:25,
737:At 17:02,
701:At 16:30,
685:The attack
383:destroyers
330:Background
259:battleship
233:destroyers
212:battleship
2316:: ΠΠ±ΡΠΈΡ.
1390:is given.
1075:Trondheim
1057:E. Raeder
1016:submarine
734:control.
728:periscope
570:periscope
444:Altafjord
436:Trondheim
370:polar day
324:destroyer
298:torpedoes
282:submarine
204:submarine
53:Altafjord
1316:Bismarck
1306:attack.
1042:Unshaken
1029:Unshaken
1014:Unshaken
963:Hipper's
633:Shch-421
612:Shch-403
578:seaplane
381:and two
198:Strength
71:Location
1320:Tirpitz
1283:Tirpitz
1248:Tirpitz
1179:Tirpitz
1175:Tirpitz
1168:Tirpitz
1151:Tirpitz
1110:Tirpitz
1096:Tirpitz
1066:Tirpitz
1061:Tirpitz
1034:Tirpitz
928:Tirpitz
880:Tirpitz
861:Tirpitz
821:Tirpitz
747:Tirpitz
582:Tirpitz
554:fairway
485:Tirpitz
465:Tirpitz
411:Tirpitz
354:Iceland
315:Tirpitz
310:Tirpitz
268:Admiral
263:Tirpitz
216:Tirpitz
160:Germany
93:24Β°53β²E
90:71Β°35β²N
48:Tirpitz
24:Tirpitz
2393:
2370:
2347:
2320:
2314:Moscow
2122:
1240:novel
1131:Lutzow
1101:Pravda
992:"K-21"
628:SΓΈrΓΈya
575:Ar 196
558:skerry
537:, and
448:LΓΌtzow
425:, and
422:LΓΌtzow
407:Norway
279:Soviet
235:and 2
157:
142:
118:Result
2408:[
2385:[
2362:[
2335:[
2308:[
1375:Notes
1225:work
1147:Guard
624:fjord
440:Bogen
2391:ISBN
2368:ISBN
2345:ISBN
2318:ISBN
2120:ISBN
1365:K-21
1356:K-21
1347:K-21
1324:K-21
1318:and
1304:K-21
1295:K-21
1262:K-21
1257:K-21
1232:K-21
1104:and
1027:HMS
1022:Il-4
1012:HMS
999:K-21
984:K-21
979:K-21
971:K-21
959:K-21
954:K-21
949:K-21
944:K-21
940:K-21
932:K-21
919:K-21
902:K-21
898:K-21
893:K-21
885:K-21
872:K-21
865:K-21
857:K-21
845:K-21
837:K-21
816:K-21
805:K-21
797:K-21
792:K-21
788:K-21
784:K-21
779:K-21
771:K-21
759:K-21
739:K-21
732:K-21
724:K-21
720:K-21
716:K-21
712:K-21
707:K-21
703:K-21
695:K-21
679:K-21
674:K-21
670:K-21
657:K-21
638:K-21
616:K-21
610:and
607:K-22
602:K-21
590:K-21
566:K-21
546:and
491:and
438:and
350:USSR
286:K-21
231:, 7
225:and
207:K-21
79:and
63:Date
28:K-21
642:grt
598:K-2
549:T15
534:Z30
528:Z29
522:Z28
516:Z27
510:Z24
356:to
2449::
2114:.
1754:^
1547:^
1466:.
1437:.
1133:.
1077:.
1052:,
1036:,
604:,
600:,
543:T7
531:,
525:,
519:,
513:,
507:,
501:,
419:,
2438:.
2399:.
2376:.
2353:.
2326:.
2128:.
1481:.
1452:.
1403:.
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