233:, although Thomson uses separate analogies to argue in cases other than rape. In the violinist scenario, the pregnant woman was kidnapped; she did not consent to having the violinist plugged into her and she did nothing to cause the violinist to be plugged in, just as a woman who is pregnant due to rape did nothing to cause the pregnancy. In some cases of abortion, the pregnant woman had voluntary intercourse, and thus has either tacitly consented to allow the fetus to use her body (the tacit consent objection), or else has a duty to sustain the fetus because the pregnant woman herself caused the fetus to stand in need of her body (the responsibility objection). Other common objections turn on the claim that the fetus is the pregnant woman's
172:. The woman in question does not want a people-seed to root itself in her house, and so she takes the necessary precautions and measures to protect herself with the best mesh screens and then voluntarily opens the windows. In the event that a single people-seed finds its way through the window screens, unwelcome as it may be, Thomson asks whether the simple fact that the woman knowingly risked such an occurrence when opening her window deny her the ability to rid her house of the intruder. She observes that some may argue the affirmative to this question, stating: "fter all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors." Thomson responds that in following this logic any woman could avoid
137:
thought to be the person inside the house and the fetus to be the growing child. In such a case, the mothers's life is being threatened, and the fetus is the one who threatens it. Because for no reason should the pregnant woman's life be threatened and also for no reason is the fetus threatening it, both are innocent and thus no third party can intervene. Thomson asserts that the person threatened can intervene, by which justification a mother can rightfully abort. Returning to the expanding child example, she argues:
192:"just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad", and declares this to be "positively indecent". Thomson also explicitly rejects the claim that pregnant women have a right to kill their offspring. She argues for the right of the pregnant woman to stop being pregnant even if this results in the death of the offspring but not for the right to ensure that the offspring is dead. For example, if a
180: – an extreme procedure simply to safeguard against such a possibility. Thomson concludes that although there may be times when the fetus has a right to the pregnant woman's body, it does not have a right to her body in most cases. This analogy raises the issue of whether all abortions are unjust killing.
163:
Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however,
126:
to abortion may hinge on the doctor's willingness to perform it. If the doctor refuses, then the pregnant woman is denied her right. To base the pregnant woman's right on the accordance or refusal of a doctor, she argues that it is to ignore the pregnant woman's full personhood and subsequently her
241:
objection). Defenders of
Thomson's argument reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not matter, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not
150:
If one says that no one may help the mother obtain an abortion, this is a failure to acknowledge her right over her own body or property. Thomson says that one is not personally obligated to help the pregnant woman, although this does not rule out the possibility that someone else may act. Thomson
131:
Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house and a rapidly growing child – you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you'll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is
113:
woman's body and life-supporting functions – to which it has no right. Thus, by choosing to terminate her pregnancy, Thomson concludes that a pregnant woman does not normally violate the fetus's right to life but merely withdraws its use of her own body, which usually causes the fetus to die.
212:
debate about the ethics of abortion. Critics of her view have formulated many objections to her argument, and defenders have responded in kind in a back and forth that continues in philosophy journals. Thomson's imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made "A Defense of
Abortion"
103:
Thomson argues that one can permissibly unplug oneself from the violinist even though this will cause his death; this is due to limits on the right to life, which does not include the right to use another person's body, and so by unplugging the violinist one does not violate his right to life but
225:
calculus implies that one is morally obliged to stay connected to the violinist. Thomson observes that the woman's right to abortion does not include the right to directly insist upon the death of the child should the fetus happen to be viable, that is, capable of surviving outside the womb. She
136:
Thomson concedes that a third party cannot make the choice to kill either the person being crushed or the child but argues that this does not mean the person being crushed cannot act in self-defense and attack the child to save his or her own life. To liken this to pregnancy, the mother can be
145:
the house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do
108:
on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due." For the same reason, Thomson says that abortion does not violate the fetus's legitimate right to life but merely deprives the fetus of something – the non-consensual use of the
237:, whereas the violinist is a stranger (the stranger versus offspring objection), or that abortion directly and intentionally kills the fetus, whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die of natural causes (the killing versus
83:. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right
217:
that abortion is permissible by arguing that there are morally relevant differences between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. One notable exception to this general agreement is
213:
perhaps "the most widely reprinted essay in all of contemporary philosophy". Critics of
Thomson's argument generally grant the permissibility of unplugging the violinist but seek to block the
141:
For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house, which has, by unfortunate mistake, been rented to both: the mother
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merely deprives him of something – the use of someone else's body – to which he has no right. She argues: "f you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a
682:
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writes: "All the same, I agree that the desire for the child's death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child alive."
242:
apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed. Thomson's defenders also point to her people-seeds argument as a strong analogy to typical cases of abortion.
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Thomson criticizes the common method of deducing a woman's right to abort from the permissibility of a third party committing the abortion. In most instances, a
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can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.
251:
1269:
797:
1239:
Parks, Brian D. (2006). "The
Natural–Artificial Distinction and Conjoined Twins: A Response to Judith Thomson's Argument for Abortion Rights".
1144:
Hershenov, David B. (2001). "Abortions and
Distortions: An Analysis of Morally Irrelevant Factors in Thomson's Violinist Thought Experiment".
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In this example, the people-seeds flying through the window represent conception, despite the precautionary mesh screen, which functions as
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In "A Defense of
Abortion", Thomson grants for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life but defends the permissibility of
841:
Pavlischek, Keith J. (1993). "Abortion Logic and
Paternal Responsibilities: One More Look at Judith Thomson's 'A Defense of Abortion'".
699:
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accidentally results in the birth of a living baby, then
Thomson would conclude that the mother has no right to kill the baby.
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To illustrate an example of pregnancy due to voluntary intercourse, Thomson presents the people-seeds situation. She writes:
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to argue that the right to life does not include, entail, or imply the right to use someone else's body to survive and that
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done to stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end, he'll simply burst open the house and walk out a free man.
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Thomson does not support abortion in all circumstances, and she gives as an example a hypothetical woman who seeks a
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and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root.
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reminds that the house belongs to the pregnant woman; similarly, the body which holds a fetus also belongs to her.
1194:
1428:
736:
Manninen, Bertha
Alvarez (2013). "Yes, the Baby Should Live: A Pro-Choice Response to Giubilini and Minerva".
58:, but it continues to receive defense. Despite criticism, "A Defense of Abortion" remains highly influential.
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The most common objection is that
Thomson's violinist argument can justify abortion only in cases of
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right to her own body. Thomson presents the hypothetical example of the expanding child. She writes:
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826:. Parent, William (ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. vii–x.
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is therefore morally permissible. Thomson's argument has critics on both sides of the
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You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious
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1205:. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. pp. 13–26, esp. pp. 20–21.
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Silverstein, Harry S. (1987). "On a Woman's 'Responsibility' for the Fetus".
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1107:(1973). "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson".
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700:"Principles and Passions: The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights"
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Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights
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Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses
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By positing a moral justification for abortion even if one grants a
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Pregnancy resulting from voluntary intercourse – "people-seeds"
1349:"Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument"
234:
39:
606:
Abbott, Philip (1978). "Philosophers and the Abortion Question".
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658:"Stories of Rights: Developing Moral Theory and Teaching Law"
1270:"Artificial Wombs, Thomson and Abortion – What Might Change?"
720:
Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy
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Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics
1268:
Pruski, Michal; Playford, Richard C. (21 October 2022).
466:
464:
493:
491:
1193:(2005). "The Wrong of Abortion". In Cohen, Andrew I.;
782:"Artificial Wombs Will Change Abortion Rights Forever"
770:
The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life
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Third-party participation – the "expanding child"
1001:(1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion".
917:(3rd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
818:
Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory
1224:(5th ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth. pp. 69–80.
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in 1971. Granting for the sake of argument that the
731:. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
208:, Thomson's article opened up a new avenue in the
75:by appealing to a thought experiment. She writes:
67:Violinist – the "use of someone else's body"
221:, who argues that, despite human intuitions, a
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129:
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814:Parent, William (1986). "Editor's Preface".
252:Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate
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16:1971 ethics essay by Judith Jarvis Thomson
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1241:The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly
656:Cain, Patricia; Love, Jean (1 May 1988).
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95:was plugged into yours, so that your
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969:(1972). "Abortion and Infanticide".
772:. New York: Oxford University Press.
722:. New York: Oxford University Press.
698:Johnson, Nicholas (1 January 1997).
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91:you, and last night the violinist's
874:. Chicago: Loyola University Press.
303:
929:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
800:from the original on 16 April 2024
14:
937:(1971). "A Defense of Abortion".
683:"How Not to Argue About Abortion"
780:Moran, Rosalind (3 April 2023).
971:Philosophy & Public Affairs
35:Philosophy & Public Affairs
1158:10.5840/soctheorpract200127124
872:The Moral Question of Abortion
729:Abortion and Unborn Human Life
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1310:(1973). "Rights and Deaths".
1109:Philosophy and Public Affairs
1057:"Living High and Letting Die"
939:Philosophy and Public Affairs
190:late termination of pregnancy
87:to help. They have therefore
1220:Munson, Ronald, ed. (1996).
870:Schwarz, Stephen D. (1990).
687:Philosophy Research Archives
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1195:Wellman, Christopher Heath
1146:Social Theory and Practice
881:Social Theory and Practice
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1353:Journal of Medical Ethics
1073:10.1017/S0031819101000377
1055:Bourbaki, Nicola (2001).
738:Journal of Medical Ethics
681:Griffith, Steven (1985).
843:Public Affairs Quarterly
1015:10.5840/monist197357133
1308:Thomson, Judith Jarvis
935:Thomson, Judith Jarvis
824:Thomson, Judith Jarvis
647:Boonin, David (2003).
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1408:A Defense of Abortion
1347:Wiland, Eric (2000).
727:Lee, Patrick (1996).
649:A Defense of Abortion
30:Judith Jarvis Thomson
21:A Defense of Abortion
1366:10.1136/jme.26.6.466
636:Beckwith, Francis J.
452:Cain & Love 1988
1449:Thought experiments
1302:on 24 October 2023.
1253:10.5840/ncbq2006646
662:Michigan Law Review
422:, pp. 111–112.
378:, pp. 133–134.
206:fetal right to life
176:by simply having a
174:pregnancy from rape
48:thought experiments
32:first published in
1287:10.33392/diam.1794
346:, pp. 48–49;
194:late-term abortion
93:circulatory system
1439:Philosophy papers
1410: – full text
1231:978-0-534-52039-7
1212:978-1-4051-1548-3
1191:George, Robert P.
999:Warren, Mary Anne
923:Steinbock, Bonnie
833:978-0-674-76980-9
406:, pp. 52–53.
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376:Boonin 2003
320:Boonin 2003
276:Warren 1973
272:Tooley 1972
239:letting die
223:utilitarian
1418:Categories
1061:Philosophy
1003:The Monist
693:: 347–354.
332:Moran 2023
259:References
85:blood type
1375:1473-4257
1324:1088-4963
1296:1733-5566
1274:Diametros
1261:1938-1646
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893:0037-802X
855:0887-0373
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750:0306-6800
710:: 97–197.
674:0026-2234
620:0090-5917
316:Kamm 1992
215:inference
200:Responses
89:kidnapped
81:violinist
28:essay by
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1197:(eds.).
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925:(1992).
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718:(1992).
638:(1993).
304:Lee 1996
246:See also
146:nothing.
111:pregnant
106:kindness
73:abortion
62:Overview
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