52:, in contrast to classical mechanism design in economics which often makes distributional assumptions about the agents. It also considers computational constraints to be of central importance: mechanisms that cannot be efficiently implemented in polynomial time are not considered to be viable solutions to a mechanism design problem. This often, for example, rules out the classic economic mechanism, the
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is to design a system for multiple self-interested participants, such that the participants' self-interested actions at equilibrium lead to good system performance. Typical objectives studied include revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. Algorithmic mechanism design differs from
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classical economic mechanism design in several respects. It typically employs the analytic tools of
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and Amir Ronen first coined "Algorithmic mechanism design" in a research paper published in 1999.
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243:, Seminar Report, University of Karlsruhe, Fakultät für Informatik, archived from
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Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of
Computing
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119:; Ronen, Amir (1999), "Algorithmic mechanism design (Extended abstract)",
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Nisan, Noam; Ronen, Amir (2001). "Algorithmic
Mechanism Design".
234:DĂĽtting, Paul; Geiger, Andreas (May 9, 2007),
219:. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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23:) lies at the intersection of economic
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97:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
35:. The prototypical problem in
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54:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction
237:Algorithmic Mechanism Design
42:theoretical computer science
17:Algorithmic mechanism design
156:Games and Economic Behavior
82:Computational social choice
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213:Algorithmic Game Theory
77:Algorithmic game theory
178:10.1006/game.1999.0790
130:10.1145/301250.301287
123:, pp. 129–140,
103:References and notes
92:Incentive compatible
50:approximation ratios
46:worst case analysis
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208:Tardos, Éva
200:Nisan, Noam
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25:game theory
278:Algorithms
267:Categories
65:Noam Nisan
44:, such as
164:CiteSeerX
254:June 11,
210:(2007).
87:Metagame
71:See also
60:History
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256:2015
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