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member; and that, within broad limits, officials’ influence on bureau policy is always correlated with rank and those nearest the top of bureaus are the most influential. Dunleavy therefore discards
Niskanen’s assumption that a bureau’s behaviour will be wholly in line with the preferences of a single senior bureaucrat. In a bureau, where no individual has complete hegemony, budget maximisation is a collective, not an individual good. Rational utility maximising individuals will thus tend to favour strategies that directly advance their personal interests ahead of strategies that advance the collective good. The interaction of the maximising activities of individuals within a bureau will not necessarily lead to budget maximizing.
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bodies by having policy determination and advice separated from the implementation of the legislated practices of government (as in the UK 'Next Steps' programme, Australian
Department - Agency system) or off-loading functions to contractors and privatization. In the health and social work fields, officials will favour '
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Added to these are two assumptions which greatly weaken the budget-maximising conclusion. These are that a bureau’s aggregate policy behaviour is set by some combination of individual decisions made by its officials, although the actual combination that results may be an outcome desired by no bureau
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and doing interesting work, rather than to run large-budget agencies with many staff but also many risks and problems. For the same reasons, and to avoid risks, the bureau-shaping model also predicts that senior government bureaucrats will often favour either 'agencification' to other public sector
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public goods) but also x-inefficiency (by producing public goods inefficiently). Patrick
Dunleavy, a British political scientist who set out to demolish the public choice arguments on bureaucracy, came instead in the end to develop a public choice model of bureaucratic behaviour which combines
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It was propounded in response to
William Niskanen's harsh criticism of Public Bureaucracies in his Budget Maximising Model. The Niskanen model predicts that in representative democracies, public bureaucracies will not only generate allocative inefficiency (by
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elements of
Peacock’s insight with the original American model. The Dunleavy (1985, p. 300) model of public bureaucracy is built on six basic assumptions. The first three are consistent with Niskanen’s model:
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Dollery, Brian and
Hamburger, Peter, The Dunleavy and Niskanen Models of Bureaucracy: The Case of the Australian Federal Budget Sector 1982-92.
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