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Buffer overflow protection

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682: 160: 385:) technique for tagging the type of a piece of data in memory, used mainly for type checking. By marking certain areas of memory as non-executable, it effectively prevents memory allocated to store data from containing executable code. Also, certain areas of memory can be marked as non-allocated, preventing buffer overflows. 300:
and other methods that return upon copying a null character, while the undesirable result is that the canary is known. Even with the protection, an attacker could potentially overwrite the canary with its known value and control information with mismatched values, thus passing the canary check code,
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In addition, random XOR canaries can protect against a certain type of attack involving overflowing a buffer in a structure into a pointer to change the pointer to point at a piece of control data. Because of the XOR encoding, the canary will be wrong if the control data or return value is changed.
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Normally, a random canary is generated at program initialization, and stored in a global variable. This variable is usually padded by unmapped pages so that attempting to read it using any kinds of tricks that exploit bugs to read off RAM cause a segmentation fault, terminating the program. It may
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outside of the intended data structure, which is usually a fixed-length buffer. Stack buffer overflow bugs are caused when a program writes more data to a buffer located on the stack than what is actually allocated for that buffer. This almost always results in corruption of adjacent data on the
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vulnerabilities. A stack buffer overflow occurs when a program writes to a memory address on the program's call stack outside of the intended data structure, which is usually a fixed-length buffer. Stack buffer overflow bugs are caused when a program writes more data to a buffer located on the
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value that, when destroyed by a stack buffer overflow, shows that a buffer preceding it in memory has been overflowed. By verifying the canary value, execution of the affected program can be terminated, preventing it from misbehaving or from allowing an attacker to take control over it. Other
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are known values that are placed between a buffer and control data on the stack to monitor buffer overflows. When the buffer overflows, the first data to be corrupted will usually be the canary, and a failed verification of the canary data will therefore alert of an overflow, which can then be
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Random XOR canaries have the same vulnerabilities as random canaries, except that the "read from stack" method of getting the canary is a bit more complicated. The attacker must get the canary, the algorithm, and the control data in order to re-generate the original canary needed to spoof the
146:; structures are expected to be the same between modules, especially with shared libraries. Any data in a structure after a buffer is impossible to protect with canaries; thus, programmers must be very careful about how they organize their variables and use their structures. 540:
StackGuard and ProPolice cannot protect against overflows in automatically allocated structures that overflow into function pointers. ProPolice at least will rearrange the allocation order to get such structures allocated before function pointers. A separate mechanism for
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to include a "canary" value that, when destroyed, shows that a buffer preceding it in memory has been overflowed. This provides the benefit of preventing an entire class of attacks. According to some researchers, the performance impact of these techniques is negligible.
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Bounds checking is a compiler-based technique that adds run-time bounds information for each allocated block of memory, and checks all pointers against those at run-time. For C and C++, bounds checking can be performed at pointer calculation time or at dereference time.
320:, in order to prevent an attacker from knowing their value. Usually, it is not logically possible or plausible to read the canary for exploiting; the canary is a secure value known only by those who need to know it—the buffer overflow protection code in this case. 346:
Although these canaries protect the control data from being altered by clobbered pointers, they do not protect any other data or the pointers themselves. Function pointers especially are a problem here, as they can be overflowed into and can execute
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Linux distribution from 1998 to 2003, and was extended with implementations for terminator, random and random XOR canaries. StackGuard was suggested for inclusion in GCC 3.x at the GCC 2003 Summit Proceedings, but this was never achieved.
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stack, and in cases where the overflow was triggered by mistake, will often cause the program to crash or operate incorrectly. Stack buffer overflow is a type of the more general programming malfunction known as
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to hijack execution paths) transparently, automatically protecting all applications without requiring binary or source modifications. The performance impact is negligible, less than one percent. The resulting
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Stack-smashing protection is unable to protect against certain forms of attack. For example, it cannot protect against buffer overflows in the heap. There is no sane way to alter the layout of data within a
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stack than what is actually allocated for that buffer. This almost always results in corruption of adjacent data on the stack, which could lead to program crashes, incorrect operation, or security issues.
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to inject executable code into the running program and take control of the process. This is one of the oldest and more reliable methods for attackers to gain unauthorized access to a computer.
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use the observation that most buffer overflow attacks are based on certain string operations which end at string terminators. The reaction to this observation is that the canaries are built of
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These systems have different tradeoffs in terms of performance penalty, memory overhead, and classes of detected bugs. Stack protection is standard in certain operating systems, including
1051: 642:, StackGhost is a simple tweak to the register window spill/fill routines which makes buffer overflows much more difficult to exploit. It uses a unique hardware feature of the 73:
because the stack contains the return addresses for all active function calls. However, similar implementation-specific protections also exist against heap-based overflows.
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are random canaries that are XOR-scrambled using all or part of the control data. In this way, once the canary or the control data is clobbered, the canary value is wrong.
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engineers identified problems with ProPolice though, and in 2005 re-implemented stack-smashing protection for inclusion in GCC 4.1. This work introduced the
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Intel's C and C++ compiler supports stack-smashing protection with options similar to those provided by GCC and Microsoft Visual Studio.
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is an open-source memory-safe ANSI C compiler that performs bounds checking based on fat pointers and object-oriented memory access.
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two years later, allowing enabling of the feature. Following this event, the StackGhost code was integrated (and optimized) into
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flag to strike a better balance between security and performance. This flag protects more kinds of vulnerable functions than
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Overfilling a buffer allocated on the stack is more likely to influence program execution than overfilling a buffer on the
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is any of various techniques used during software development to enhance the security of executable programs by detecting
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Historically, tagging has been used for implementing high-level programming languages; with appropriate support from the
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still be possible to read the canary if the attacker knows where it is or can get the program to read from the stack.
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Implementations of this approach use either a central repository, which describes each allocated block of memory, or
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architecture (that being: deferred on-stack in-frame register window spill/fill) to detect modifications of return
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Because of the pointer, the control data or return value can be changed without overflowing over the canary.
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handled, for example, by invalidating the corrupted data. A canary value should not be confused with a
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Typically, buffer overflow protection modifies the organization of stack-allocated data so it includes a
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The compiler suite from Microsoft implements buffer overflow protection since version 2003 through the
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The Gentoo hardened GCC switches on the stack protector by default unless explicitly requested not to.
1263:"FS#18864 : Consider enabling GCC's stack-smashing protection (ProPolice, SSP) for all packages" 715: 918: 41:-allocated variables, and preventing them from causing program misbehavior or from becoming serious 1479: 663: 639: 382: 313: 1458: 1584: 1150:"Han Shen(ææ) - [PATCH] Add a new option "-fstack-protector-strong" (patch / doc inside)" 542: 373:, which contain both the pointer and additional data, describing the region that they point to. 1413: 1221:"#1128 (switching from "-fstack-protector" to "-fstack-protector-strong" in Fedora 20) – FESCo" 1045: 42: 1241: 955: 643: 593: 525:
base system since 8.0. Stack protection is standard in certain operating systems, including
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A stack buffer overflow occurs when a program writes to a memory address on the program's
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There are several implementations of buffer overflow protection, including those for the
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which is executed soon before the specific processor's return-from-call instruction.
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Typically, buffer overflow protection modifies the organization of data in the
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Stack buffer overflow can be caused deliberately as part of an attack known as
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command-line switch, which is enabled by default since version 2005. Using
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clang comes with stack protection enabled by default, equivalent to the
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Four different tricks to bypass StackShield and StackGuard protection
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was proposed in PointGuard and is available on Microsoft Windows.
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The terminology is a reference to the historic practice of using
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Stack-smashing protection can be turned on by the compiler flag
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does, but not every function, providing better performance than
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flag, which protects all functions whether they need it or not.
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since 2011. All Arch Linux packages built since 4 May 2014 use
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developed GCC patches for stack-smashing protection, known as
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flag, which protects only some vulnerable functions, and the
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Tagging is a compiler-based or hardware-based (requiring a
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stack protection extension, which is enabled by default.
517:. Stack protection is only used for some packages in 1033:. May 2003. Archived from the original on 2004-07-15 976:"ClearPath Enterprise Servers MCP Security Overview" 421:Stack-smashing protection was first implemented by 1386:"12th USENIX Security Symposium — Technical Paper" 735:Fithen, William L.; Seacord, Robert (2007-03-27). 1645:StackGhost: Hardware Facilitated Stack Protection 1640:Original StackGuard paper in USENIX Security 1998 1050:: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown ( 482:. It is available in GCC since its version 4.9. 1007:"Papers - 7th USENIX Security Symposium, 1998" 885:. Staff.aist.go.jp. 2013-05-07. Archived from 56:buffer overflow protection techniques include 832: 830: 8: 1650:FreeBSD 5.4 and 6.2 propolice implementation 804: 802: 588:options as GCC and a stronger "safe stack" ( 1480:"SafeStack — Clang 17.0.0git documentation" 981:. Public.support.unisys.com. Archived from 877: 875: 873: 188:. Unsourced material may be challenged and 1028:"Proceedings of the GCC Developers Summit" 942:Steenkiste, Peter; Hennessy, John (1987). 250:There are three types of canaries in use: 959: 208:Learn how and when to remove this message 312:are randomly generated, usually from an 838:"SAFECode: Secure Virtual Architecture" 759:"Smashing The Stack for Fun and Profit" 727: 433:2.7. StackGuard was maintained for the 1540:"OpenBSD's clang-local(1) manual page" 1302:"Debian Security Hardening Statistics" 1043: 858: 856: 854: 1621:Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit 7: 1348:"OpenBSD's gcc-local(1) manual page" 186:adding citations to reliable sources 1414:"/GS (Buffer Security Check) (C++)" 1327:"FreeBSD 8.0-RELEASE Release Notes" 1172:""Strong" stack protection for GCC" 948:ACM Sigops Operating Systems Review 737:"VT-MB. Violation of Memory Bounds" 425:in 1997, and published at the 1998 1369:"Hardened/Toolchain - Gentoo Wiki" 701:Address space layout randomization 497:since Fedora 20. Most packages in 25: 1242:"Security/Features - Ubuntu Wiki" 840:. Sva.cs.illinois.edu. 2009-08-12 1187:It has made its way into GCC 4.9 680: 158: 1615:The GCC 2003 Summit Proceedings 1461:. Clang.llvm.org. 28 April 2017 1170:Edge, Jake (February 5, 2014). 396:hardware feature, supported by 812:. Doc.ic.ac.uk. Archived from 1: 1304:. Outflux.net. Archived from 417:GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) 27:Software security techniques 1635:Immunix StackGuard Homepage 1202:. FedoraProject. 2013-12-11 706:Executable space protection 688:Computer programming portal 634:StackGhost (hardware-based) 489:packages are compiled with 1696: 1680:Computer security exploits 1521:. Safecode.cs.illinois.edu 470:engineers implemented the 358: 95: 31:Buffer overflow protection 1329:. Freebsd.org. 2013-11-13 1152:. Gcc.gnu.org. 2012-06-14 908:"Tuesday, April 05, 2005" 561:disables the protection. 509:package is compiled with 493:since Fedora Core 5, and 427:USENIX Security Symposium 1660:Stack Smashing Protector 1548:option on other systems. 1546:-fstack-protector-strong 1440:. Publib.boulder.ibm.com 1009:. Usenix.org. 2002-04-12 662:issues were resolved by 584:Clang supports the same 515:-fstack-protector-strong 495:-fstack-protector-strong 472:-fstack-protector-strong 1630:ProPolice official home 883:"Fail-Safe C: Top Page" 810:"Bounds Checking for C" 549:Microsoft Visual Studio 88:, and other compilers. 86:Microsoft Visual Studio 78:GNU Compiler Collection 696:Control-flow integrity 241:canaries in coal mines 653:(a common way for an 590:-fsanitize=safe-stack 480:-fstack-protector-all 461:-fstack-protector-all 98:Stack buffer overflow 1459:"Clang mailing list" 1265:. Bugs.archlinux.org 716:Static code analysis 182:improve this section 1352:gcc comes with the 1200:"Security Features" 961:10.1145/36204.36183 864:"google/sanitizers" 521:, and only for the 441:From 2001 to 2005, 383:tagged architecture 333:Random XOR canaries 328:Random XOR canaries 282:Terminator canaries 277:Terminator canaries 1565:software.intel.com 1418:msdn.microsoft.com 1223:. Fedorahosted.org 1068:. Research.ibm.com 598:-fsanitize=address 543:pointer protection 505:since 6.10. Every 501:are compiled with 1290:on July 18, 2014. 1244:. Wiki.ubuntu.com 1176:Linux Weekly News 954:(4). ACM: 50–59. 602:-fsanitize=bounds 586:-fstack-protector 511:-fstack-protector 503:-fstack-protector 491:-fstack-protector 476:-fstack-protector 457:-fstack-protector 218: 217: 210: 16:(Redirected from 1687: 1602: 1601: 1599: 1598: 1592:Staff.aist.go.jp 1589: 1581: 1575: 1574: 1572: 1571: 1557: 1551: 1550: 1536: 1530: 1529: 1527: 1526: 1515: 1509: 1508: 1506: 1505: 1500:. 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Index

Canary value
buffer overflows
stack
security
canary
bounds checking
heap
GNU Compiler Collection
LLVM
Microsoft Visual Studio
Stack buffer overflow
call stack
buffer overflow
stack smashing
webserver
attacker
stack frame
function call
structure

cite
sources
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removed
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sentinel value
canaries in coal mines
XOR
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