298:. In his theory, Inglehart hypothesizes that a political cleavage emerges between generations over policy priorities due to different sets of values. On the one hand Inglehart claims that mostly younger generations, such as the 'generation X', have developed post-materialist values such as belonging, self-expression and the overall quality of life. These values can for example be translated politically in policies for fair trade, peace, environmental protection and solidarity for low-income countries, resulting in potential support for political parties such as Die Grünen (
268:
owns the means of production (capitalist) versus who does not (laborer). Rather, it is a cleavage between who is part of the sector that profits from globalization and open borders versus who is excluded from these sectors. Kriesi et al. (2008) therefore argue that this cleavage has largely become politicized over conflicts such as integration, Europeanization, open border policies and multiculturalism. For the 'losers', this new cleavage may for instance translate itself into
82:(1967) for example used the term in their often cited essay on cleavage structures in West European politics. In their essay, the authors argue how the European party systems at their time of writing were still largely based on the social and cultural cleavages that characterized European societies a century earlier. They therefore argue that these 'frozen party systems' can be seen as political expressions of historically determined societal divisions.
31:
329:
explained by the rise of the influence of values upon voting behavior. Citizens do not only take into account economics parameters, but also cultural ones. This new trend, the
Authoritarian populist-Libertarian pluralist cleavage, is slowly replacing the former Western-countries political cleavage which is the Left-Right fight. The term for this new cleavage was coined by
263:. This cleavage has emerged because globalization supposedly affects citizens within Western European states differently. Due to the increased global circulation of goods and services, migration rates have increased and low-income jobs have partially been relocated to low-income settings. Accordingly, globalization creates a distinction between those in the
245:
both sides of the political spectrum have consciously moved their policy further toward the centre ground, ensuring the support of a wider variety of voters that transcends class divisions. As a result of this, some authors argue that from this period onwards cleavages have therefore lost their overall importance for political outcomes.
240:
argues that the rise of affluence, particularly in the middle classes, has led to voting behaviour and party affiliations no longer being primarily based on class. While this brings into question the continued existence of the Left-Right cleavage, it also leaves room for voters to based their vote on
214:
led to stable party systems. Barbara Geddes extended Lipset and Rokkan's argument to Latin
American states, finding that Lipset and Rokkan's argument did not successfully explain the party systems there even though the cases were consistent with the initial conditions outlined by Lipset and Rokkan in
197:
Lipset and Rokkan claim that the political parties that emerged in
Western Europe during the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century were formed on the base of these structural cleavages in societies. At the time of writing their essay (1967), they observed that these party systems had, for
352:
In terms of electoral outcomes and emerging patterns in voting behaviour, Pippa Norris and Ronald
Inglehart argue that both the rise of populism, and this new cleavage can be used to explain why the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union in 2016, and President Donald Trump's successful bid
340:
Those who align with this cleavage share are usually socially conservative and working class, leading them to lean towards voting for right wing parties. Authoritarian populists share a view of elites as untrustworthy and hold their leadership in very high regard. In terms of political values, this
310:
in the UK. Such post-materialism ideology contradicts the materialist values of physical sustenance and safety, which is supposedly held by older generations. These values could be translated into policies in favor of national security, protection of private property, tradition and authority within
85:
Although some authors have claimed that the cleavages in Lipset and Rokkan's theory are still dominant for contemporary voting behaviors in
Western Europe, others have argued that these traditional cleavages have become less important and new conflict lines have emerged. Conflicts that have emerged
347:
Liberal pluralists also tend to be working class but hold core liberal values. In contrast to the authoritarian populists, liberal pluralists are usually in favour of immigration and diversity and hold experts in high esteem. In a
British context, a liberal pluralist would be pro-membership of the
218:
There have been noteworthy exceptions to Lipset and Rokkan's theory of
Western European party systems, however. As the authors claim, the fascist or national-socialist authoritarian politics of for example Spain, Italy and Germany were not based on these historical cleavages. Thus, not all Western
267:
sectors that profit from a globalized economy and the opening of labor markets (the 'winners') versus those in sectors negatively affected by cheap labor influxes (the 'losers'). This new cleavage differs from the traditional class cleavage in the sense that it is not about a division between who
244:
A third explanation for dealignment of cleavages is a top-down approach. Rather than voters being the cause of the breaking down of the Left-Right divide, it is actually caused by political parties themselves. In an attempt to appeal to a wider variety of voters it has been argued that parties on
360:
and Will
Jennings, new cleavages are forming in Western democracies around education, age, geography, and attitudes to immigration. These cleavages were made politically salient due to increased ethnic diversity and certain structural economic changes for advanced economies in the last decades.
169:
a class cleavage, causing the formation of parties of the left and parties of the right. This cleavage was particularly present in
Western countries. It concerned mostly economical conflicts, such as the choice between Keynesian economics and Liberal economics. Sometimes it is argued that this
328:
ones. This is known as
Populism and many examples from the 2020s can be highlighted: the election of several populist presidents and parties (Erdogan in Turkey, Trump in the US, The Five Stars Movement in Italy), the vote of citizens (the 2016-UK-referendum leading to the Brexit). This can be
98:
The cleavages in Lipset and Rokkan's classical theory have its origins in two developments in 19th century Western Europe. On the one hand, European societies at the time saw a period of so-called national revolutions. These events were revolutionary as the centralized state came to take over
315:
In some 21st century Western European countries like Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland, a new cultural divide is suggested to have arisen, challenging the old primary political cleavage over economic conflicts. This transformation has occurred since the late 1960s, with the
198:
the biggest part, not changed. Parties then still seemed to be based on the aforementioned four cleavages, making many European party systems seem 'frozen'. The main explanation they give for this is that with the development of labor parties as well as the introduction of
50:
is a historically determined social or cultural line which divides citizens within a society into groups with differing political interests, resulting in political conflict among these groups. Social or cultural cleavages thus become political cleavages once they get
236:. A second theory is one linked to class affiliations. Historically, those who identify as working class would tend to vote for left or left leaning parties, while those in a stronger economic position would vote for parties on the right of the political spectrum.
227:
From the 1960s onwards, the party systems discussed in Lipset and Rokkan's theory partially 'unfroze' as the traditional cleavages seemed to become less deterministic for voting behaviors than before. In political science, this is termed
184:
Conflict between industrial and agricultural sectors on trade policies such as continued state exercise of control over tariffs, against freedom of control for industrial enterprise. This creates agrarian and peasant parties such as the
252:), emphasizing the persisting value of cleavage theory for political science and sociology. As argued by several scholars, the following new political cleavages have seemed to gain importance in the late 20th and early 21st century:
99:
political roles that had formerly been assigned to decentralized and/or religious communities. According to Lipset and Rokkan, these historical national revolutions gave rise to the following two societal and political cleavages:
272:, which could reinforce support for populist protest parties that favor trade barriers to protect local manufacturing and 'locals first' policies in the labor market. This ideology is represented by political parties such as the
71:, who vote and view the world in a similar way. It is distinct from other common political theories on voting behavior in the sense that it focuses on aggregate and structural patterns instead of individual voting behaviors.
361:
However, Raul Gomez argues that, while structural changes can increase the salience of cultural issues, their actual political consequences will depend on how individual political parties respond to them.
457:
170:
cleavage represents a conflict between the rich and poor. Various parties have claimed to represent either interest, though this may or may not be genuine. Socialist parties such as the
232:. The arguments for the causes of dealignment are varied. One argument is that the importance of the religious cleavage, for example, has significantly declined because of widespread
74:
Classical cleavage theories have generally been focused on the persistence of dominant conflicts within national political systems over the course of history. Political sociologists
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and Ronald Inglehart. It has been argued that the pattern that can be seen emerging in terms of election outcomes in America and across Europe is as a result of this new cleavage.
956:
Irvine, W. P., & Gold, H. (1980). Do Frozen Cleavages Ever Go Stale? The Bases of the Canadian and Australian Party Systems. British Journal of Political Science, 10, 187-218.
430:
617:
Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein (1967). "Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction". In Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein (eds.).
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and the Swedish Democratic Workers' Party represent the left while the British Conservative Party and the Republican Party in the United States represent the right.
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Oesch, Daniel (2012). "The Class Basis of the Cleavage between the New Left and the Radical Right: an analysis for Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland". In
86:
around several new political cleavages are for example cultural, such as conflicts over integration and multiculturalism, or environmental, such as ongoing
151:
1035:
Bornschier, Simon; Kriesi, Hanspeter (2012). "The populist right, the working class, and the changing face of class politics". In Rydgren, Jens (ed.).
798:
Knutsen, Oddbjorn (1988). "The Impact of Structural and Ideological Party Cleavages in West European Democracies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis".
202:
at the beginning of the 20th century all groups of civil society were in a way represented in the political arenas of these states. According to
248:
However, other scholars have argued that new cleavages have replaced the traditional ones and have become determinants for political outcomes (
764:
552:
Van der Brug, Wouter; Van Praag, Philip; Van der Eijk, Cees (2017). "Verkiezingen, scheidslijnen en kiesgedrag". In Van Praag, Philip (ed.).
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between elites in the central administrative areas and those in more outlying areas. This usually expresses itself in terms of
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144:
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129:
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1134:"How have secularisation and educational expansion affected support for the mainstream right in Western Europe?"
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and universalistic values, and a populist right reaction arising from the 1980s espousing traditionalist and
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264:
128:
between religious and secular voters. In the Netherlands until the 1970s there were five major parties: the
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as such. Cleavage theory accordingly argues that political cleavages predominantly determine a country's
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472:
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159:
75:
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Identity, competition, and electoral availability. The stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985
68:
632:
Kriesi, Hanspeter (1998). "The transformation of cleavage politics. The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture".
122:, where some states were better than others at assimilating other cultures into the majority nation.
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Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in western countries
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parties. This division is, according to Lipset and Rokkan, caused by the creation of modern
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Ford, Robert, and Will Jennings. 2020. "The Changing Cleavage Politics of Western Europe".
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European Union. Supporting marginalised groups and minority rights are of high importance.
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291:
207:
60:
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Van Hooren, Franca (2017). "De verzorgingsstaat onder druk". In Van Praag, Philip (ed.).
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Tuckel, Peter; Tejera, Felipe (1983). "Changing patterns in American voting behavior".
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321:
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920:"Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan and the transnational cleavage"
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Franklin, M.N. (1992). "The decline of cleavage politics". In Franklin, M.N. (ed.).
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factors other than class, such a concerns regarding the environment or immigration.
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79:
56:
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Kriesi, H.; Grande, E.; Lachat, R.; Dolezal, M.; Bornschier, S.; Frey, T. (2008).
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The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics
838:
The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics
528:
Kriesi, Hanspeter; Koopmans, Ruud; Duyvendak, Jan Willem; Giugni, Marco (1995).
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17:
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European states had had 'frozen party systems' for the period concerned.
746:
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681:
706:
34:
Cleavages in West European societies according to Lipset & Rokkan
697:
882:
431:"Das "Konfliktlinienmodell einer Gesellschaft" nach Lipset/Rokkan"
111:
29:
751:. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. pp. 148–173.
682:"Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics"
568:
619:
Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives
422:
Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives
341:
cleavage puts emphasis on conformity, nationalism and security.
1061:
Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism
494:
Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism
840:. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 195–215.
556:. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 147–172.
473:"Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments"
458:
University of Florida College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
784:. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 383–431.
569:"Cleavage Structures and Voter Alignments within Nations"
970:. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 77–96.
567:
Magin, Raphael; Freitag, Markus; Vatter, Adrian (2009).
471:
Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein (2009-07-14).
429:
Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein (1999-05-06).
1093:"The Changing Cleavage Politics of Western Europe"
905:West European Politics in the Age of Globalization
259:: a cleavage introduced by political sociologist
158:On the other hand, the authors claim that the
433:(in German). Dr. Andreas Hahn. Archived from
8:
1073:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
985:. Oxford University Press. pp. 225–228.
215:their study of mostly European party stems.
206:, the account by Lipset and Rokkan typifies
666:Gallagher, M., Laver, M., Mair, P. (2006),
353:for the American presidency the same year.
67:. These blocs are distinguished by similar
668:Representative Government in Modern Europe
1149:
1108:
1059:Norris, Pippa, Ronald, Inglehart (2019).
968:Politicologie en de veranderende politiek
705:
554:Politicologie en de veranderende politiek
492:Norris, Pippa; Inglehart, Ronald. (2019)
162:also generated two persistent cleavages:
1063:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1005:. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
907:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
517:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
513:Bartolini, Stefano; Mair, Peter (1990).
152:People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
505:
1066:
918:Hooghe, Liesbeth; Marks, Gary (2018).
634:European Journal of Political Research
530:New Social Movements in Western Europe
257:Winners versus losers of globalization
1110:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052217-104957
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686:The American Political Science Review
670:. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 268-269.
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1037:Class Politics and the Radical Right
1022:Class Politics and the Radical Right
800:British Journal of Political Science
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320:that arose in this period espousing
288:Materialism versus post-materialism:
193:and Polish Peasants People's Party.
1097:Annual Review of Political Science
487:Annual Review of Political Science
154:(VVD), the last two being secular.
25:
924:Journal of European Public Policy
114:many regions have regionalist or
621:. The Free Press. pp. 1–64.
63:of citizens, dividing them into
1091:; Jennings, Will (2020-05-11).
856:Elections and Voters in Britain
858:. London: Palgrave Macmillian.
69:socio-economic characteristics
1:
1151:10.1080/01402382.2022.2150943
936:10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279
210:, as cleavages at particular
1039:. Routledge. pp. 10–29.
1024:. Routledge. pp. 31–52.
532:. London: UCL Press Limited.
449:Kreppel, Amie (2002-01-28).
386:Urban–rural political divide
88:politics over climate change
176:Argentinian Socialist Party
1213:
1132:Gomez, Raul (2022-12-08).
1001:Inglehart, Ronald (1977).
981:Caramani, Daniele (2017).
836:Inglehart, Ronald (1977).
748:Paradigms and Sand Castles
424:. Free Press. p. 554.
138:Christian Historical Union
59:as well as the individual
812:10.1017/S0007123400005159
585:10.1007/s12286-009-0062-1
311:the family and the state.
290:this cleavage stems from
871:Public Opinion Quarterly
745:Geddes, Barbara (2003).
338:Authoritarian Populists:
134:Anti-Revolutionary Party
104:Centre versus periphery:
646:10.1111/1475-6765.00379
294:by political scientist
292:post-materialist theory
187:Australian County Party
130:Catholic People's Party
1138:West European Politics
854:Denver, D. T. (2020).
680:Pierson, Paul (2000).
414:Lipset, Seymour Martin
376:Cross-cutting cleavage
308:Women's Equality Party
300:Alliance 90/The Greens
132:(KVP), the Protestant
35:
1187:Political terminology
282:Danish People's Party
274:UK Independence Party
182:Land versus industry:
160:Industrial Revolution
76:Seymour Martin Lipset
33:
983:Comparative Politics
451:"Cleavages overhead"
191:Finnish Centre Party
172:British Labour Party
167:Owner versus worker:
126:State versus church:
108:regional nationalism
94:Frozen party systems
27:Sociological concept
345:Liberal Pluralists:
110:. For example, in
757:10.3998/mpub.11910
270:welfare chauvinism
212:critical junctures
200:universal suffrage
36:
1197:Identity politics
766:978-0-472-09835-4
142:social democratic
40:political science
16:(Redirected from
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