434:, along with the UN Security Council, used the variant 'ultimatum' by setting a deadline of January 15, 1991, for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. When this deadline came and passed, without Saddam Hussein's compliance, Operation Desert Storm commenced and military force was used to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Despite the massive build-up of U.S. forces along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border, economic sanctions, and a declared deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein failed to remove his forces. In this instance, compellence failed, leading to the Gulf War, which concluded with the United States and coalition forces succeeding in removing Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait. Thus, when implementing compellence not only the benefits but also the aftermath must be considered. Especially in the 21st century, every nation is interdependent so other forces by state actors may affect a nation's diplomacy.
113:'Compellence', in contrast to 'deterrence', shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer. While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, "inducing his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt". When differentiating between deterrence and compellence, deterrence can be described as "drawing a line in the sand" and acting only if the adversary crosses it; in contrast, compellence "requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts" as in deterrence. "Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction."
129:. Unlike Schelling, George's theory of 'compellence' is different than Schelling's 'coercive warfare', in that he believed that compellence was "a subset of coercion and compellence". He viewed it as encompassing "defensive" compellent actions only: to force a target to stop or reverse action already taken, rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something ... Compellence essentially is the embodiment of a "carrot and stick" philosophy: motivation is used to induce a target to submit to your wishes, while appearing threatening at the same time".
244:
for compliance "is likely to be interpreted as evidence that the coercer lacks the will to implement the threat". Assurance against new demands must also be carried out for greater chance of success. Jakobsen points out that the incentive to comply with the coercer's demands will be significantly downgraded if the resisting actor fears compliance will merely invite more demands. The last requirement for successful coercion is the effective use of inducements, which are important facilitators used to give more credibility and assurance.
52:, which is a strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo (dissuading adversaries from undertaking an action), compellence entails efforts to change the status quo (persuading an opponent to change their behavior). Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence. Compellence can entail strategies to punish an adversary, raise the risk for an adversary, or deny the adversary from achieving their objectives. Successful instances of compellence in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states,
143:
government". When constructing a compellence strategy, policymakers must consider certain variables or "empty boxes" that must be filled. They must decide "what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand".
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conveying to
Khrushchev the continued threat of a possible invasion of Cuba. As a result of Kennedy's successful use of compellence added to negotiated concessions, Khrushchev agreed to remove missiles in place and to discontinue the deployment of new missiles into Cuba while the U.S. agreed to remove its
171:'. An ultimatum itself has three distinct components: "a demand on the opponent; a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable".
308:
Much of the scholarship on compellence focuses on the credibility of coercive threats as a key component of the success of compellence. According to Anne
Sartori, states rarely seek to obtain goals through bluffing, because doing so undermines their reputation in future crises. Survey experiment data
243:
The first requirement in
Jakobsen's 'ideal policy' is to make the threat so great that non-compliance will be too costly for the resisting actors. The second requirement demands that after maximizing the credibility of the threat, the coercer must set a specific deadline, as failure to set a deadline
336:
has argued that nuclear superiority enhances the probability of success in a bargaining dispute. Todd
Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann dispute that nuclear weapons have compellence utility, as they find no evidence in their dataset on compellent threats that nuclear weapons increase compellence success.
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Credibility (or reputation) refers to the degree to which an actor is expected to uphold their commitments based on past behavior. In terms of credible compellence, credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint. One of the main problems
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According to
Alexander George, compellence seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. Second, it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken. Third, it may persuade an adversary to make "fundamental changes in its
181:
Finally, the 'gradual turning of the screw' approach is similar to the 'try-and-see' method in that it makes a threat but then "relies the threat of a gradual, incremental increase of coercive pressure rather than threatening large escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does
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define compellence as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision
213:
Intrawar compellence refers to compellence within the context of a war: a war has broken out but the actors are still seeking to coerce the adversary to take a certain action. According to Thomas
Schelling, "War is always a bargaining process" where actors engage in threats and counter-threats, as
177:
The third variant of compellence, the 'try-and-see', addresses strictly the first component of the 'ultimatum' variant, "a demand on the opponent". There is no time limit set, no sense of urgency conveyed, instead the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action "to persuade the opponent
437:
Some have suggested that the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis was an attempt at compellence, which resulted in the 2022 Russian
Invasion of Ukraine when Ukraine failed to accede to Russia's demands. The invasion was also widely regarded as a failure to achieve Putin's goals though many questions
389:
To intensify the compellence strategy, Kennedy shifted from the 'Try-and-See' approach to a hybrid of a virtual 'ultimatum' and a carrot-and-the stick approach. Kennedy addressed the sense of urgency about the growing hostile situation by standing firm and tightening the naval blockade as well as
109:
as it emerges beyond deterrence. According to
Schelling, deterrence is merely a passive threat aimed at keeping an adversary from acting. It is only a threat. "Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer." Schelling believes that deterrence
385:
to persuade him that the U.S. was able and willing to use force if needed to remove this missile threat from Cuba. The blockade limited the showdown to
Kennedy and Khrushchev rather than develop into all-out war. Because of Kennedy's tough naval blockade, Khrushchev "directed all Soviet vessels
320:
are effective in doing so. Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility. Military mobilizations during a crisis may bolster compellent threats, but scholars dispute whether it is because it "ties the hands of the leader" or because it alters the local military balance of power.
44:
Compellence can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a
426:
placed economic sanctions by imposing an embargo on Iraq's imports and exports. This initial stage of the crisis was the United States' attempt to use the coercive diplomatic variant, 'Gradual
Turning of the Screw' to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply to the demands to leave Kuwait.
204:
Pape also added the strategy of decapitation, which typically entails targeting leaders. Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran distinguish between two punishment strategies: (i) Coercive victimization (which raises the costs of war for a government by targeting its civilians) and (ii)
380:
Instead of resorting to a strictly military strategy to forcibly remove the missiles, Kennedy decided to use compellence. He initiated this strategy by first using the 'Try-and-See' approach. The giant naval blockade, along with a massive buildup of U.S. military forces, was a message to
45:
bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."
214:
well as proposals and counter-proposals. According to Schelling, the bargaining process appears most prominently in the context of "limited wars" where actors hold the full use of force in reserve so as to threaten the adversary to make concessions.
89:
it may lead to costs to the reputation of the coercing state. In general, threats are costly when they fail, not only in encouraging resistance in the target, but also in negatively influencing third parties observing the outcome."
337:
A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict.
313:
in compellence is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment. Scholars have argued that when great powers increase their power, their credibility to engage in restraint decreases.
1568:
309:
from Barbara Walter and Dustin Tingley confirm the findings of Sartori's study, as they find that people "invest more heavily in reputation building if they believe a game will be repeated many times."
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Scholars have found that compellence is less likely to be successful than deterrence. Studies have indicated that "punishment" strategies that target civilians tend to be ineffective.
422:, it did little to expel him from Kuwait. Initially, the Bush administration along with the United Nations issued sanctions to pressure Iraq to withdraw troops inside Kuwait. The
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emphasizes that compellence depends upon the credibility and the cost of the threat. "If a threat is not credible, it may fail to produce acceptance
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and avert possible warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Kennedy learned of the Soviet Union's attempt to deploy forty-two
72:
Compellence typically entails efforts to change the decision calculus of an adversary by manipulating the costs and benefits of certain actions.
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succinctly identifies the four key conditions the coercer must meet to maximize the chance of success to stop or undo acts of aggression:
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The second variant of compellence, 'tacit ultimatum', is similar to 'ultimatum' except that it doesn't set forth an explicit time limit.
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34:
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38:
1399:"The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the "Resolve plus Bombs" Formula"
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586:
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125:. Like Schelling before him, Alexander George worked to create a diplomatic strategy of coercion; his was the theory of
455:- the domestic equivalent of compellence directed against citizens rather than states or non-governmental organizations
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418:; though the use of deterrence effectively convinced the Iraqi president that he could not invade further south into
110:
does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence".
2809:
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993:,” in Civilians and Warfare in History, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 288-312.
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Scholars have debated whether nuclear weapons provide states with an advantage in compelling other states.
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936:"Building a Psychological Strategy for the U.S.: Leveraging the Informational Element of National Power"
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It’s a Crime, but Is It a Blunder? Investigating the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization
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whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence and future compellence.
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used compellence successfully in 1962 when he was able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the
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A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
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Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.
102:
677:"Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea"
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Thomas Schelling and Robert Pape distinguished between coercive strategies that sought to:
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Alexander George developed a framework in which a number of "variants" or methods of using
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that attempts to get an actor (such as a state) to change its behavior through threats to
2643:
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1538:. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1351:
407:
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could be deployed to achieve these objectives. These variants include the following:
77:
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1811:"Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes"
1518:
1440:"Gulliver Unleashed? International Order, Restraint, and The Case of Ancient Athens"
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641:
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and threatened an invasion of Cuba with force to remove the missiles already there.
117:, a scholar of international relations and former professor of political science at
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1188:
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419:
73:
2007:
Coercive Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A New Framework for the "Carrot and Stick"
1415:
1398:
859:
The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might
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carrying missiles and other military equipment to Cuba to immediately turn back".
17:
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1079:
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875:
532:
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908:
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2148:
1986:
1908:
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1255:"The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach"
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1970:
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1479:"Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes"
1231:
1203:
517:
489:
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1955:
1733:
1455:
776:"Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics"
587:"Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George"
222:
Among the numerous theories on compellence, Peter Viggo Jakobsen's (1998)
2391:
2085:
1971:"Strategies of coercion: Denial, punishment, and the future of air power"
1717:
819:"Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior"
692:
403:
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1647:
1615:
1213:
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499:
1938:
Lee, Kyung Suk; Kim, James D.; Jin, Hwalmin; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2023).
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835:
818:
676:
205:
Eliminationist victimization (which removes civilians from territory).
1939:
1439:
268:
According to Robert Art, the perquisites for compellence success are:
2532:
2158:
411:
1494:
1367:
921:"Alexander George, 'giant' in international relations, dead at 86"
1569:"Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94"
975:
Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.
415:
370:
316:
To enhance the credibility of threats, some scholars argue that
167:
The first variant of the 'compellence' strategy is the classic '
2054:
2027:"Is Russia's Invasion a Case of Coercive Diplomacy Gone Wrong?"
977:
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1991
197:
Risk: Raise the probability of future costs for the adversary
97:
is differentiated from compellence. In his influential work,
1758:
Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
1397:
Bowen, Wyn; Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Moran, Matthew (2020-10-19).
1081:
Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
200:
Deny: Prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives.
1350:
Cebul, Matthew D.; Dafoe, Allan; Monteiro, Nuno P. (2020).
1302:"Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation"
615:, 2nd Rev. ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994
534:
The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics
81:
making but may also include limited uses of actual force".
1718:"Hand-Tying through Military Signals in Crisis Bargaining"
394:
stationed in Turkey and to call off any invasion of Cuba.
1054:
Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis
909:"The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory"
1114:"Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power"
287:
Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
2041:"Putin's Strategic Failure and the Risk of Escalation"
537:. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 3–5.
236:
An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
258:
A communication of that commitment to the other side
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2141:
2108:
2099:
2092:
1567:Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001).
724:"The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions"
67:. Some scholars conflate coercion and compellence.
1940:"Nuclear Weapons and Low-Level Military Conflict"
1671:"The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound"
989:Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, “
1614:Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012).
1253:Tingley, Dustin H.; Walter, Barbara F. (2011).
969:
967:
965:
963:
961:
959:
957:
955:
290:Making the target fear unacceptable escalation
2066:
1034:Jakobsen, P.V. (2007). "Coercive Diplomacy",
643:Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
607:
605:
603:
601:
8:
1891:Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2013).
1864:Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2017).
1352:"Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances"
531:Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015).
178:before threatening or taking another step".
1030:
1028:
1026:
861:New York. Cambridge University Press. 2002.
2105:
2096:
2073:
2059:
2051:
903:
901:
899:
897:
774:Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015).
1893:"Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail"
1716:Post, Abigail S; Sechser, Todd S (2024).
1669:Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011).
1414:
834:
793:
194:Punish: Raise the costs for the adversary
1616:"The Illusion of Democratic Credibility"
646:(1 ed.). Cornell University Press.
571:The United States and Coercive Diplomacy
261:The capability to back up the commitment
880:. New York: PublicAffairs. p. 45.
869:
867:
465:
239:An offer of inducements for compliance.
1867:Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy
948:from the original on November 2, 2009.
611:George, Alexander and William Simons.
574:United States Institute of Peace Press
558:
556:
554:
2258:Conseiller chargé des investissements
1785:Reputation and International Politics
1483:The American Political Science Review
1345:
1343:
1170:Reputation And International Politics
1107:
1105:
1103:
1101:
1046:
1044:
985:
983:
414:and move his military forces back to
367:intermediate-range ballistic missiles
304:Credibility (international relations)
7:
2777:
2016:Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits
1038:, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
769:
767:
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635:
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631:
629:
627:
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623:
621:
483:
481:
479:
477:
475:
473:
471:
469:
438:remain as to what those goals were.
41:or the actual use of limited force.
1057:. Johns Hopkins University Press.
857:Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman.
278:Domestic and international support
264:The will to back up the commitment
25:
1675:American Political Science Review
1573:American Political Science Review
406:, compellence failed to persuade
2776:
2765:
2764:
1535:Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
1318:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00643.x
613:The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
121:, was a pioneer in the field of
105:puts forth a general concept of
2752:Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy
1944:International Studies Quarterly
1722:International Studies Quarterly
1444:International Studies Quarterly
823:International Studies Quarterly
1870:. Cambridge University Press.
1208:. Princeton University Press.
1:
1416:10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130
1078:Press, Daryl Grayson (2005).
1036:Contemporary Security Studies
1003:Schelling, Thomas C. (1966).
817:Peterson, Timothy M. (2013).
488:Schelling, Thomas C. (1966).
251:, a credible threat entails:
2747:Twin towns and sister cities
1969:Mueller, Karl (1998-03-01).
1788:. Cornell University Press.
1761:. Cornell University Press.
1532:Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001).
1173:. Cornell University Press.
1084:. Cornell University Press.
722:Miller, Nicholas L. (2014).
163:Gradual turning of the screw
1051:Lebow, Richard Ned (1981).
63:Compellence is one form of
2826:
2740:Plenipotentiary Conference
1897:International Organization
1815:International Organization
1620:International Organization
1259:International Organization
1118:International Organization
781:International Organization
728:International Organization
301:
233:A deadline for compliance.
133:Types of coercive strategy
2760:
1987:10.1080/09636419808429354
1909:10.1017/S0020818312000392
1827:10.1017/S0020818312000367
1809:Kroenig, Matthew (2013).
1782:Mercer, Jonathan (2010).
1687:10.1017/s000305541100027x
1632:10.1017/S0020818312000161
1585:10.1017/S0003055401003148
1477:Fearon, James D. (1994).
1271:10.1017/S0020818311000026
1167:Mercer, Jonathan (1996).
1130:10.1017/S0020818310000214
1112:Sechser, Todd S. (2010).
1009:. Yale University Press.
795:10.1017/S0020818314000393
740:10.1017/S0020818314000216
494:. Yale University Press.
2730:Parliamentary delegation
2609:Diplomatic accreditation
2375:African Diplomatic Corps
2116:Permanent representative
1755:Press, Daryl G. (2007).
1544:10.1017/cbo9780511491658
640:Pape, Robert A. (1996).
218:Requirements for success
138:Alexander George's types
2178:Deputy chief of mission
2133:Resident representative
1356:The Journal of Politics
1300:Sharman, J. C. (2007).
1205:Deterrence by Diplomacy
874:Nye, Joseph S. (2011).
293:Asymmetry in motivation
255:A formulated commitment
2624:Diplomatic credentials
1202:Sartori, Anne (2005).
907:Major Lisa A. Nemeth.
681:International Security
675:Zhang, Ketian (2019).
284:Clearly stated demands
48:As distinguished from
2215:Resident commissioner
2187:Bilateral-subnational
576:, Washington, DC 2003
137:
2347:Apostolic nunciature
2247:Agricultural attaché
1450:(sqab061): 582–593.
1438:Reiter, Dan (2021).
693:10.1162/isec_a_00354
662:10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v
453:Monopoly on violence
359:Cuban Missile Crisis
209:Intrawar compellence
123:political psychology
2639:Diplomatic immunity
2599:Consular assistance
2128:Ambassador-at-large
1956:10.1093/isq/sqac067
1734:10.1093/isq/sqae028
1456:10.1093/isq/sqab061
1214:10.2307/j.ctt4cgcgz
1189:10.7591/j.ctv5rf1n9
973:George, Alexander.
934:Stephen M. Tanous.
877:The Future of Power
500:10.2307/j.ctt5vm52s
432:Bush administration
424:UN Security Council
402:During the 1990–91
373:, he established a
119:Stanford University
115:Alexander L. George
2805:Types of diplomacy
2697:Letter of credence
2659:Diplomatic uniform
2654:Diplomatic service
2634:Diplomatic illness
2629:Diplomatic history
2382:Diplomatic mission
2299:Diplomatic courier
2279:Trade commissioner
2142:Bilateral-national
1006:Arms and Influence
836:10.1111/isqu.12017
592:2011-07-20 at the
491:Arms and Influence
99:Arms and Influence
18:Coercive diplomacy
2810:Monetary hegemony
2792:
2791:
2702:Letter of protest
2670:Persona non grata
2604:Consular immunity
2402:Exclusive mandate
2335:
2334:
2287:
2286:
2252:Chargé de mission
2203:Bilateral-insular
2167:Chargé d'affaires
2154:High commissioner
1877:978-1-107-10694-9
1795:978-0-8014-7489-7
1768:978-0-8014-7415-6
1553:978-0-521-79227-1
1306:Political Studies
1180:978-0-8014-3055-8
1091:978-0-8014-4343-5
1064:978-0-8018-2311-4
1016:978-0-300-25348-1
653:978-0-8014-3134-0
567:Patrick M. Cronin
544:978-1-4422-3306-5
509:978-0-300-00221-8
448:Gunboat diplomacy
383:Nikita Khrushchev
281:Strong leadership
275:Strong motivation
249:Richard Ned Lebow
50:deterrence theory
16:(Redirected from
2817:
2780:
2779:
2768:
2767:
2619:Diplomatic cable
2397:Protecting power
2370:Diplomatic corps
2311:Foreign minister
2304:King's Messenger
2269:Military attaché
2264:Cultural attaché
2106:
2097:
2075:
2068:
2061:
2052:
2045:
2044:
2037:
2031:
2030:
2029:. 31 March 2022.
2023:
2017:
2014:
2008:
2005:
1999:
1998:
1975:Security Studies
1966:
1960:
1959:
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1928:
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1403:Security Studies
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609:
596:
583:
577:
560:
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548:
528:
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521:
485:
392:Jupiter missiles
365:and twenty-four
272:Clear objectives
103:Thomas Schelling
27:Form of coercion
21:
2825:
2824:
2820:
2819:
2818:
2816:
2815:
2814:
2795:
2794:
2793:
2788:
2756:
2718:Development aid
2706:
2680:
2649:Diplomatic rank
2582:
2406:
2387:High commission
2331:
2327:Diplomatic rank
2315:
2283:
2274:Science attaché
2231:
2198:
2182:
2173:Head of mission
2137:
2101:
2088:
2079:
2049:
2048:
2039:
2038:
2034:
2025:
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2020:
2015:
2011:
2006:
2002:
1968:
1967:
1963:
1937:
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1932:
1890:
1889:
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1862:
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1808:
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1796:
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1663:
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1566:
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1531:
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1495:10.2307/2944796
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1471:
1437:
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1396:
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1111:
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1024:
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988:
981:
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919:
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914:
906:
895:
888:
873:
872:
865:
856:
852:
816:
815:
811:
773:
772:
763:
721:
720:
716:
674:
673:
669:
654:
639:
638:
619:
610:
599:
594:Wayback Machine
584:
580:
561:
552:
545:
530:
529:
525:
510:
487:
486:
467:
462:
444:
400:
355:John F. Kennedy
348:
343:
334:Matthew Kroenig
330:
328:Nuclear weapons
306:
300:
220:
211:
188:
157:Tacit ultimatum
140:
135:
107:coercion theory
61:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2823:
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2807:
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2679:
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2656:
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2644:Diplomatic law
2641:
2636:
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2621:
2616:
2614:Diplomatic bag
2611:
2606:
2601:
2596:
2590:
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2570:
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2352:Consular corps
2349:
2343:
2341:
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2329:
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2320:Classification
2317:
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2285:
2284:
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2254:
2249:
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2236:By portfolio (
2233:
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2229:
2224:
2219:
2218:
2217:
2206:
2204:
2200:
2199:
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2156:
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2143:
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2125:
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2123:
2121:United Nations
2112:
2110:
2103:
2094:
2090:
2089:
2080:
2078:
2077:
2070:
2063:
2055:
2047:
2046:
2032:
2018:
2009:
2000:
1981:(3): 182–228.
1961:
1930:
1903:(1): 173–195.
1883:
1876:
1856:
1821:(1): 141–171.
1801:
1794:
1774:
1767:
1747:
1708:
1681:(3): 437–456.
1661:
1626:(3): 457–489.
1606:
1579:(3): 633–647.
1559:
1552:
1524:
1489:(3): 577–592.
1469:
1430:
1409:(5): 797–831.
1389:
1368:10.1086/711132
1362:(3): 975–991.
1339:
1292:
1265:(2): 343–365.
1245:
1222:
1194:
1179:
1159:
1124:(4): 627–660.
1097:
1090:
1070:
1063:
1040:
1022:
1015:
995:
979:
951:
926:
912:
893:
886:
863:
850:
829:(4): 672–682.
809:
788:(2): 473–495.
761:
734:(4): 913–944.
714:
687:(1): 117–159.
667:
652:
617:
597:
585:Jack S. Levy.
578:
550:
543:
523:
508:
464:
463:
461:
458:
457:
456:
450:
443:
440:
408:Saddam Hussein
399:
396:
375:naval blockade
347:
344:
342:
339:
329:
326:
318:audience costs
302:Main article:
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139:
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78:Matthew Waxman
60:
57:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
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2554:
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2549:
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2528:Paradiplomacy
2526:
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2516:
2514:
2511:
2509:
2506:
2504:
2501:
2499:
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2483:Full-spectrum
2481:
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2260:
2259:
2255:
2253:
2250:
2248:
2245:
2244:
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2239:
2234:
2228:
2227:Agent-general
2225:
2223:
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2216:
2213:
2212:
2211:
2208:
2207:
2205:
2201:
2195:
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2179:
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2171:
2169:
2168:
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2150:
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2144:
2140:
2134:
2131:
2129:
2126:
2122:
2119:
2118:
2117:
2114:
2113:
2111:
2107:
2104:
2102:leader titles
2098:
2095:
2091:
2087:
2083:
2076:
2071:
2069:
2064:
2062:
2057:
2056:
2053:
2043:. March 2022.
2042:
2036:
2033:
2028:
2022:
2019:
2013:
2010:
2004:
2001:
1996:
1992:
1988:
1984:
1980:
1976:
1972:
1965:
1962:
1957:
1953:
1949:
1945:
1941:
1934:
1931:
1926:
1922:
1918:
1914:
1910:
1906:
1902:
1898:
1894:
1887:
1884:
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1500:
1496:
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1417:
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1390:
1385:
1381:
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1373:
1369:
1365:
1361:
1357:
1353:
1346:
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1335:
1331:
1327:
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1284:
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1264:
1260:
1256:
1249:
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1241:
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1233:
1229:
1225:
1223:9780691134000
1219:
1215:
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1198:
1195:
1190:
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1182:
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1160:
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1135:
1131:
1127:
1123:
1119:
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1108:
1106:
1104:
1102:
1098:
1093:
1087:
1083:
1082:
1074:
1071:
1066:
1060:
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1037:
1031:
1029:
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1018:
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1008:
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986:
984:
980:
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970:
968:
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964:
962:
960:
958:
956:
952:
944:
937:
930:
927:
922:
916:
913:
910:
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902:
900:
898:
894:
889:
887:9781586488925
883:
879:
878:
870:
868:
864:
860:
854:
851:
846:
842:
837:
832:
828:
824:
820:
813:
810:
805:
801:
796:
791:
787:
783:
782:
777:
770:
768:
766:
762:
757:
753:
749:
745:
741:
737:
733:
729:
725:
718:
715:
710:
706:
702:
698:
694:
690:
686:
682:
678:
671:
668:
663:
659:
655:
649:
645:
644:
636:
634:
632:
630:
628:
626:
624:
622:
618:
614:
608:
606:
604:
602:
598:
595:
591:
588:
582:
579:
575:
572:
568:
564:
563:Robert J. Art
559:
557:
555:
551:
546:
540:
536:
535:
527:
524:
519:
515:
511:
505:
501:
497:
493:
492:
484:
482:
480:
478:
476:
474:
472:
470:
466:
459:
454:
451:
449:
446:
445:
441:
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435:
433:
428:
425:
421:
417:
413:
409:
405:
397:
395:
393:
387:
384:
378:
376:
372:
368:
364:
360:
356:
351:
345:
340:
338:
335:
327:
325:
322:
319:
314:
310:
305:
297:
292:
289:
286:
283:
280:
277:
274:
271:
270:
269:
263:
260:
257:
254:
253:
252:
250:
247:According to
245:
238:
235:
232:
229:
228:
227:
225:
217:
215:
208:
206:
199:
196:
193:
192:
191:
185:
183:
182:not comply".
179:
175:
172:
170:
162:
159:
156:
153:
152:
151:
149:
144:
132:
130:
128:
124:
120:
116:
111:
108:
104:
100:
96:
91:
88:
84:
79:
75:
70:
69:
66:
58:
56:
54:
51:
46:
43:
40:
36:
33:is a form of
32:
19:
2782:
2770:
2711:Other topics
2668:
2578:Wolf warrior
2427:
2362:
2256:
2165:
2109:Multilateral
2035:
2021:
2012:
2003:
1978:
1974:
1964:
1947:
1943:
1933:
1900:
1896:
1886:
1866:
1859:
1818:
1814:
1804:
1784:
1777:
1757:
1750:
1725:
1721:
1711:
1678:
1674:
1664:
1623:
1619:
1609:
1576:
1572:
1562:
1534:
1527:
1486:
1482:
1472:
1447:
1443:
1433:
1406:
1402:
1392:
1359:
1355:
1312:(1): 20–37.
1309:
1305:
1295:
1262:
1258:
1248:
1204:
1197:
1169:
1162:
1121:
1117:
1080:
1073:
1053:
1035:
1005:
998:
974:
929:
915:
876:
858:
853:
826:
822:
812:
785:
779:
731:
727:
717:
684:
680:
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2594:Appeasement
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1232:j.ctt4cgcgz
518:j.ctt5vm52s
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2149:Ambassador
2100:Diplomatic
460:References
353:President
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83:Joseph Nye
59:Background
2692:Exequatur
2685:Documents
2543:Ping-pong
2513:Migration
2488:Guerrilla
2478:Freelance
2453:Debt-trap
2423:Checkbook
2357:Consulate
2086:diplomats
2082:Diplomacy
1995:0963-6412
1925:154642193
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1851:155075459
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154:Ultimatum
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2771:Category
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2664:Protocol
2573:Track II
2468:Economic
2443:Culinary
2438:Cultural
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2392:Legation
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2210:Resident
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1648:23279964
1519:36315471
1287:12230887
1154:46107608
1146:40930451
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590:Archived
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410:to exit
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2783:Commons
2568:Stadium
2563:Shuttle
2558:Science
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2498:Hostage
2493:Gunboat
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