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Coercion (international relations)

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Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about
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as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also
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Credibility may be determined through assessments of past reputation, current interests, and signaling. Misperception and miscommunication can lead to erroneous assessments of credibility. Assessments of reputation may be linked to specific leaders, as well as states. Some scholars question whether
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Successful coercive diplomacy entails clearly communicated threats, a cost-benefit calculus, credibility, and reassurance. It frequently revolves around a demonstration of capabilities and resolve, both of which enhance the credibility of attempts to coerce others. Scholars have identified several
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Credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint. One of the main problems in coercive diplomacy is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment. If the coerced state perceives that it will be punished
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Some scholarship suggests that the credibility of threats is enhanced by costly signaling, which means that the threats themselves incur costs, which signify that the threats are genuine. Other scholars argue that sunk-cost signaling is exceedingly rare in practice, as states prefer to signal
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Pape also added the strategy of decapitation, which typically entails targeting leaders. Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran distinguish between two punishment strategies: (i) Coercive victimization (which raises the costs of war for a government by targeting its civilians) and (ii)
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Coercion frequently takes the form of threats or the use of limited military force. It is commonly seen as analytically distinct from persuasion (which may not necessarily involve the imposition of costs), brute force (which may not be intended to shape the adversary's behavior), or full-on
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Coercion takes the form of either deterrence or compellence. Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence because of difficulties in getting actors to withdraw
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Credibility in international relations refers to the perceived likelihood that a leader or a state follows through on threats and promises that have been made. Credibility is a key component of
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Compellence is the attempt to get an actor to change its behavior through threats to use of force or the actual use of limited force. As distinguished from
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effectively enhance the credibility of threats. Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility.
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Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to
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regardless of whether it complies or not, then that might increase the likelihood of non-compliance.
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It’s a Crime, but Is It a Blunder? Investigating the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization
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whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence and future compellence.
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Successful instances of coercive diplomacy in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states,
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Gartzke, Erik A.; Carcelli, Shannon; Gannon, J. Andres; Zhang, Jiakun Jack (2017).
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Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics
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The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might
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Altman, Dan; Quek, Kai (2024). "Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve?".
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Action by a state to compel international entities to do (or not) something
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and Robert Pape distinguished between coercive strategies that sought to:
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One influential typology of coercion distinguishes between strategies to
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Eliminationist victimization (which removes civilians from territory).
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According to Robert Art, the perquisites for coercion success are:
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an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo).
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credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.
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Risk: Raise the probability of future costs for the adversary
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Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
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Deny: Prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives.
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Cebul, Matthew D.; Dafoe, Allan; Monteiro, Nuno P. (2020).
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The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics
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Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity
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Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis
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Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars
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Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
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factors as contributing to successful coercion, such as
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Jervis, Robert; Yarhi-Milo, Keren; Casler, Don (2021).
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Bowen, Wyn; Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Moran, Matthew (2020).
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Perception and Misperception in International Politics
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Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics
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Renshon, Jonathan; Dafoe, Allan; Huth, Paul (2018).
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A communication of that commitment to the other side
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Cambridge University Press. 2002. 301:Greenhill, Kelly M.; Krause, Peter (2018). 1677: 1668: 1645: 1631: 1623: 562:Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). 1579:Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011). 1207: 625: 579: 135:Punish: Raise the costs for the adversary 1526:"The Illusion of Democratic Credibility" 1337:Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics 826:The United States and Coercive Diplomacy 418: 416: 345:(1 ed.). Cornell University Press. 163:The capability to back up the commitment 153:, successful coercion tends to involve: 871:Gartzke, Eric; Lindsay, Jon R. (2019). 290: 274:credibility and resolve in other ways. 106:include limited uses of actual force". 39:) or to compel them to take an action ( 35:to prevent them from taking an action ( 27:refers to the imposition of costs by a 1345:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.481 1287: 1285: 1185: 1183: 829:United States Institute of Peace Press 726: 724: 1830:Conseiller chargĂ© des investissements 1393:The American Political Science Review 1229: 1227: 1135: 1133: 1131: 1111:Reputation and International Politics 1040:American Journal of Political Science 866: 864: 847:. SAGE Publications. pp. 26–30. 696: 694: 692: 651:"The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace" 603: 601: 599: 442:. SAGE Publications. pp. 26–30. 246:Credibility (international relations) 7: 2349: 557: 555: 553: 380: 378: 376: 374: 372: 370: 334: 332: 330: 328: 326: 324: 296: 294: 277:Some scholars argue that incurring 1374:Journal of Global Security Studies 883:10.1093/oso/9780190908645.001.0001 797:. Johns Hopkins University Press. 422:Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. 180:Domestic and international support 166:The will to back up the commitment 14: 1585:American Political Science Review 1483:American Political Science Review 844:Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis 439:Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis 2348: 2337: 2336: 1445:Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy 1361:from the original on 2018-11-28. 258:, as well as the functioning of 2324:Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy 614:International Studies Quarterly 737:Journal of Conflict Resolution 1: 1333:"Signaling in Foreign Policy" 1209:10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130 667:10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396 608:Peterson, Timothy M. (2013). 385:Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). 2319:Twin towns and sister cities 1442:Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). 1114:. Cornell University Press. 1087:. Cornell University Press. 1081:Lupton, Danielle L. (2020). 986:. Cornell University Press. 707:. Cornell University Press. 510:Miller, Nicholas L. (2014). 877:. Oxford University Press. 841:Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). 791:Lebow, Richard Ned (1981). 749:10.1177/0022002797041001004 436:Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). 307:. Oxford University Press. 2393: 2312:Plenipotentiary Conference 1530:International Organization 1292:Pauly, Reid B. C. (2024). 1240:International Organization 568:International Organization 516:International Organization 243: 225: 203: 2332: 1597:10.1017/s000305541100027x 1542:10.1017/S0020818312000161 1495:10.1017/S0003055401003148 1387:Fearon, James D. (1994). 1252:10.1017/S0020818310000214 1234:Sechser, Todd S. (2010). 1108:Mercer, Jonathan (2010). 951:10.1017/S0043887120000246 731:Fearon, James D. (1997). 581:10.1017/S0020818314000393 528:10.1017/S0020818314000216 391:. Yale University Press. 2302:Parliamentary delegation 2181:Diplomatic accreditation 1947:African Diplomatic Corps 1688:Permanent representative 1454:10.1017/cbo9780511491658 701:Press, Daryl G. (2007). 339:Pape, Robert A. (1996). 64:an adversary, raise the 1750:Deputy chief of mission 1705:Resident representative 1146:The Journal of Politics 1007:Jervis, Robert (2017). 195:Asymmetry in motivation 157:A formulated commitment 21:international relations 2196:Diplomatic credentials 1298:International Security 469:International Security 463:Zhang, Ketian (2019). 186:Clearly stated demands 1787:Resident commissioner 1759:Bilateral-subnational 68:for an adversary, or 1919:Apostolic nunciature 1819:Agricultural attachĂ© 1310:10.1162/isec_a_00488 980:Reiter, Dan (1996). 481:10.1162/isec_a_00354 361:10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v 31:on other states and 2211:Diplomatic immunity 2171:Consular assistance 1700:Ambassador-at-large 2377:Types of diplomacy 2269:Letter of credence 2231:Diplomatic uniform 2226:Diplomatic service 2206:Diplomatic illness 2201:Diplomatic history 1954:Diplomatic mission 1871:Diplomatic courier 1851:Trade commissioner 1714:Bilateral-national 1052:10.1111/ajps.12335 627:10.1111/isqu.12017 388:Arms and Influence 260:military alliances 252:coercive diplomacy 2364: 2363: 2274:Letter of protest 2242:Persona non grata 2176:Consular immunity 1974:Exclusive mandate 1907: 1906: 1859: 1858: 1824:ChargĂ© de mission 1775:Bilateral-insular 1739:ChargĂ© d'affaires 1726:High commissioner 1463:978-0-521-79227-1 1354:978-0-19-022863-7 1121:978-0-8014-7489-7 1094:978-1-5017-4773-1 1020:978-1-4008-8511-4 993:978-0-8014-3188-3 919:978-1-4422-3306-5 892:978-0-19-090960-4 854:978-0-8039-0819-2 831:, Washington, DC. 822:Patrick M. Cronin 804:978-0-8018-2311-4 714:978-0-8014-7415-6 449:978-0-8039-0819-2 398:978-0-300-00221-8 352:978-0-8014-3134-0 314:978-0-19-084633-6 234:deterrence theory 218:nuclear weapons. 206:Deterrence theory 183:Strong leadership 177:Strong motivation 151:Richard Ned Lebow 116:as a synonym for 2384: 2352: 2351: 2340: 2339: 2191:Diplomatic cable 1969:Protecting power 1942:Diplomatic corps 1883:Foreign minister 1876:King's Messenger 1841:Military attachĂ© 1836:Cultural attachĂ© 1678: 1669: 1647: 1640: 1633: 1624: 1617: 1616: 1576: 1570: 1569: 1521: 1515: 1514: 1474: 1468: 1467: 1439: 1433: 1432: 1384: 1378: 1377: 1369: 1363: 1362: 1328: 1322: 1321: 1289: 1280: 1279: 1231: 1222: 1221: 1211: 1196:Security Studies 1187: 1178: 1177: 1137: 1126: 1125: 1105: 1099: 1098: 1078: 1072: 1071: 1031: 1025: 1024: 1004: 998: 997: 977: 971: 970: 930: 924: 923: 903: 897: 896: 868: 859: 858: 838: 832: 815: 809: 808: 788: 782: 775: 769: 768: 728: 719: 718: 698: 687: 686: 655:Security Studies 646: 640: 639: 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Index

international relations
state
non-state actors
deterrence
compellence
war
power
Daniel Byman
Matthew Waxman
Robert Pape
Thomas Schelling
Richard Ned Lebow
Deterrence theory
dissuade
Compellence
deterrence theory
Credibility (international relations)
coercive diplomacy
deterrence
military alliances
audience costs


Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics
ISBN
978-0-19-084633-6



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