Knowledge

Credibility (international relations)

Source ๐Ÿ“

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perceived as credible. When allies are perceived not to be reliable, allies may make up for it by increasing the number of allies and include "costly reliability-enhancing provisions such as greater precision in when alliance obligations apply, issue linkage, and increased institutionalization." States with a reputation for upholding alliance commitments are more likely to be involved in future alliances.
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problems in coercive diplomacy is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment. Some scholars have argued that when great powers increase their power, their credibility to engage in restraint decreases, which may lead weaker adversaries to be less likely to comply with great power threats.
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crisis and are then seen as backing down. The implication of audience costs is that threats issued by leaders (who incur audience costs) against other states are more likely to be seen as credible and thus lead those states to meet the demands of the leader making threats. The term was popularized in
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Credibility (or reputation) refers to the degree to which an actor is expected to uphold their commitments based on past behavior. In terms of credible coercive diplomacy, credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint. One of the main
40:. Credibility is related to concepts such as reputation (how past behavior shapes perceptions of an actor's tendencies) and resolve (the willingness to stand firm while incurring costs). Reputation for resolve may be a key component of credibility, but credibility is also highly context-dependent. 55:
may affect perceptions of credibility. Misperception and miscommunication can lead to erroneous assessments of credibility. Assessments of reputation may be linked to specific leaders, as well as states. Leaders and diplomats generally consider the credibility of their state to be of paramount
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Some scholarship suggests that the credibility of threats is enhanced by costly signaling, which means that the threats themselves incur costs, which signify that the threats are genuine. Other scholars argue that sunk-cost signaling is exceedingly rare in practice, as states prefer to signal
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The functioning of military alliances revolves around perceptions of credibility: whether an ally will honor alliance commitments. Alliances that are perceived to be unreliable are more likely to end up in war. Scholars have argued that past reputation shapes whether alliance commitments are
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States may be more likely to honor alliance commitments due to costly signaling, including audience costs. Some scholars argue that indiscriminate alliance loyalty is not desirable (as that could raise the risk of conflict and entrapment), and that hawkishness may also not be desirable.
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I'm drawing here on arguments about what the IR literature usually calls 'audience costs,' which are domestic political costs a leader may pay for escalating an international dispute, or for making implicit or explicit threats, and then backing down or not following
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States may be motivated to pay high costs in order to maintain reputations for resolve. They are most likely to do so when they expect that they will face future challenges where they will benefit from having reputations for resolve.
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focuses on the credibility of coercive threats as a key component of the success of coercive diplomacy. According to Thomas Schelling, a reputation for resolve "is one of the few things worth fighting over."
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A substantial literature points to audience costs as a meaningful form of signaling. An audience cost is the domestic political cost that a leader incurs from his or her constituency if they escalate a
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where he argued that democracies carry greater audience costs than authoritarian states, which makes them better at signaling their intentions in interstate disputes. It is one of the mechanisms for
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and Dustin Tingley confirm the findings of Sartori's study, as they find that people "invest more heavily in reputation building if they believe a game will be repeated many times."
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Successful coercion frequently revolves around a demonstration of capabilities and resolve, both of which enhance the credibility of attempts to coerce others. According to
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According to Anne Sartori, states rarely seek to obtain goals through bluffing, because doing so undermines their reputation in future crises. Survey experiment data from
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is the perceived likelihood that a leader or a state follows through on threats and promises that have been made. Credibility is a key component of
2744: 1805: 1674: 1498: 1053: 968: 930: 895: 765: 703: 629: 555: 468: 401: 374: 344: 317: 2674: 1785: 1480: 418: 1849: 65: 25: 2669: 1080: 995: 1291:"The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the "Resolve plus Bombs" Formula" 1029: 2213:"International reputation and alliance portfolios: How unreliability affects the structure and composition of alliance treaties" 2704: 2699: 44: 1105: 458: 2501:"A Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-Off: Unpacking Allied Perceptions of US Extended Deterrence in Distant Regions" 231:"Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship" 2718: 277: 2639: 1664: 1403: 2684: 1331: 2739: 2713: 2694: 2632: 48: 1971:
Fearon, James D. (September 1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute".
196: 17: 2548:"Remember Kabul? Reputation, strategic contexts, and American credibility after the Afghanistan withdrawal" 2070: 131:
Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser argue that there are three main components to credibility in coercion:
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Tomz, Michael (2007). "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach".
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Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.
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are effective in doing so. Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility.
2689: 1485:. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1243: 187: 2733: 2614: 2532: 2485: 2387: 2340: 2323: 2291: 2244: 2100: 2047: 1916: 1649: 1602: 1547: 1275: 1184: 1168: 1018: 678: 527: 262: 176: 157: 99: 2444:"What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence" 2305:
Crescenzi, Mark J.C.; Kathman, Jacob D.; Kleinberg, Katja B.; Wood, Reed M. (2012).
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Gartzke, Erik A.; Carcelli, Shannon; Gannon, J. Andres; Zhang, Jiakun Jack (2017).
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Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics
2166:"How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context" 2031: 1825:
Altman, Dan; Quek, Kai (2024). "Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve?".
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Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict
2355: 2275: 2084: 1892: 1633: 1578: 1531: 1216: 1199: 1121: 1106:"The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach" 861: 844: 805: 732: 572: 502: 485: 246: 2606: 2567: 2524: 2477: 2428: 2379: 2332: 2283: 2236: 2228: 2189: 2142: 2092: 2039: 1957: 1900: 1762: 1754: 1715: 1641: 1586: 1539: 1490: 1449: 1388: 1343: 1316: 1267: 1225: 1176: 1129: 870: 813: 740: 670: 596: 511: 430: 289: 254: 2583:"Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention" 2212: 1738: 1426:"Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes" 1090: 1070: 1005: 985: 940: 920: 1380: 1200:"Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics" 845:"Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics" 486:"Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics" 2459: 1908: 1876: 1594: 1562: 821: 789: 519: 2468: 2443: 2150: 1992: 1948: 1931: 1723: 1691: 1457: 1425: 662: 1364: 573:"Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs" 336:
Of Friends and Foes: Reputation and Learning in International Politics
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The cost of military conflict (to both the challenger and the target)
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identifies 8 prerequisites for a successful compellence strategy:
1516:"Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918โ€“94" 156:
To enhance the credibility of threats, some scholars argue that
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The stakes in a dispute (to both the challenger and the target)
1842:"'Credibility' is not everything but it's not nothing either" 647:"Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics" 1289:
Bowen, Wyn; Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Moran, Matthew (2020-10-19).
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Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
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Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
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Cebul, Matthew D.; Dafoe, Allan; Monteiro, Nuno P. (2020).
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Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis
790:"Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power" 547:
Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars
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Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
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Jervis, Robert; Yarhi-Milo, Keren; Casler, Don (2021).
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Perception and Misperception in International Politics
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Ability to impose one's will militarily on the target
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Credibility may be determined through assessments of
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Renshon, Jonathan; Dafoe, Allan; Huth, Paul (2018).
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A communication of that commitment to the other side
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(2018). 1: 2599:10.1080/09636412.2018.1483609 2560:10.1080/13523260.2023.2253406 2517:10.1080/09636412.2021.2010889 2182:10.1080/03050629.2017.1237818 1786:"Signaling in Foreign Policy" 1308:10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130 919:Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). 754:Press, Daryl Grayson (2005). 390:McManus, Roseanne W. (2017). 284:. Vol. 103, no. 4. 82:, a credible threat entails: 2552:Contemporary Security Policy 2119:"Alliance Formation and War" 2032:10.1080/09636412.2012.706475 2014:Schultz, Kenneth A. (2012). 1669:. Cornell University Press. 1479:Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). 890:. Cornell University Press. 760:. Cornell University Press. 698:. Cornell University Press. 692:Lupton, Danielle L. (2020). 550:. Cornell University Press. 463:. Cornell University Press. 312:. Cornell University Press. 2719:Third World Security School 2372:10.1177/0022002794038002005 957:Lebow, Richard Ned (1981). 589:10.1177/0022002797041001004 339:. 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(1994). 1217:10.1017/S0020818314000393 1122:10.1017/S0020818311000026 925:. Yale University Press. 884:Mercer, Jonathan (1996). 862:10.1017/S0020818314000393 806:10.1017/S0020818310000214 788:Sechser, Todd S. (2010). 733:10.1177/00220027241268586 571:Fearon, James D. (1997). 503:10.1017/S0020818314000393 306:Mercer, Jonathan (2010). 247:10.1017/S0043887120000246 2229:10.1177/0022343318808844 2117:Smith, Alastair (1995). 1755:10.1177/0022002716652687 1491:10.1017/cbo9780511491658 457:Press, Daryl G. (2007). 363:Kertzer, Joshua (2016). 2442:Henry, Iain D. (2020). 1248:The Journal of Politics 1151:Sharman, J. C. (2007). 1072:Deterrence by Diplomacy 618:Jervis, Robert (2017). 197:democratic peace theory 127:Asymmetry in motivation 86:A formulated commitment 18:international relations 2448:International Security 1402:Sechser, Todd (2018). 1069:Sartori, Anne (2005). 278:"The Credibility Trap" 118:Clearly stated demands 53:dispositional factors 2460:10.1162/isec_a_00375 1363:Reiter, Dan (2021). 1332:"When Redlines Fail" 719:Casler, Don (2024). 544:Reiter, Dan (1996). 1381:10.1093/isq/sqab061 906:10.7591/j.ctv5rf1n9 1949:10.1017/eis.2021.7 987:Arms and Influence 922:Arms and Influence 663:10.1111/ajps.12335 38:military alliances 2727: 2726: 1807:978-0-19-022863-7 1676:978-0-8014-7489-7 1500:978-0-521-79227-1 1157:Political Studies 1055:978-1-107-10694-9 1032:, Washington, DC. 1023:Patrick M. Cronin 970:978-0-8018-2311-4 932:978-0-300-00221-8 897:978-0-8014-3055-8 767:978-0-8014-4343-5 705:978-1-5017-4773-1 631:978-1-4008-8511-4 557:978-0-8014-3188-3 470:978-0-8014-7415-6 403:978-1-107-17034-6 376:978-1-4008-8364-6 346:978-0-19-060952-8 319:978-0-8014-7489-7 115:Strong leadership 109:Strong motivation 80:Richard Ned Lebow 2752: 2740:Security studies 2656:Security studies 2649: 2642: 2635: 2626: 2619: 2618: 2587:Security Studies 2578: 2572: 2571: 2543: 2537: 2536: 2505:Security Studies 2496: 2490: 2489: 2471: 2439: 2433: 2432: 2422: 2398: 2392: 2391: 2351: 2345: 2344: 2326: 2302: 2296: 2295: 2255: 2249: 2248: 2208: 2202: 2201: 2161: 2155: 2154: 2114: 2108: 2107: 2078: 2058: 2052: 2051: 2020:Security Studies 2011: 2005: 2004: 1968: 1962: 1961: 1951: 1927: 1921: 1920: 1872: 1866: 1865: 1859: 1857: 1848:. 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Art 1015: 1012: 1007: 1003: 999: 997:9780300002218 993: 989: 988: 980: 977: 972: 966: 962: 961: 953: 951: 947: 942: 938: 934: 928: 924: 923: 915: 912: 907: 903: 899: 893: 889: 888: 880: 877: 872: 868: 863: 858: 854: 850: 846: 839: 836: 831: 827: 823: 819: 815: 811: 807: 803: 799: 795: 791: 784: 782: 780: 778: 774: 769: 763: 759: 758: 750: 747: 742: 738: 734: 730: 726: 722: 715: 712: 707: 701: 697: 696: 688: 685: 680: 676: 672: 668: 664: 660: 656: 652: 648: 641: 638: 633: 627: 623: 622: 614: 611: 606: 602: 598: 594: 590: 586: 582: 578: 574: 567: 564: 559: 553: 549: 548: 540: 538: 534: 529: 525: 521: 517: 513: 509: 504: 499: 495: 491: 487: 480: 477: 472: 466: 462: 461: 453: 451: 449: 447: 443: 432: 428: 424: 420: 413: 410: 405: 399: 395: 394: 386: 383: 378: 372: 368: 367: 359: 357: 353: 348: 342: 338: 337: 329: 326: 321: 315: 311: 310: 302: 300: 296: 291: 287: 283: 279: 272: 269: 264: 260: 256: 252: 248: 244: 240: 236: 232: 225: 222: 215: 213: 209: 202: 200: 198: 194: 189: 183: 178: 177:Audience cost 170: 168: 164: 161: 159: 154: 150: 148: 140: 137: 134: 133: 132: 126: 123: 120: 117: 114: 111: 108: 105: 104: 103: 101: 94: 91: 88: 85: 84: 83: 81: 76: 73: 67: 59: 57: 56:importance. 54: 50: 46: 41: 39: 35: 31: 27: 23: 19: 2705:Paris School 2700:Welsh School 2590: 2586: 2576: 2551: 2541: 2508: 2504: 2494: 2454:(4): 45โ€“83. 2451: 2447: 2437: 2413:(1): 63โ€“83. 2410: 2406: 2396: 2363: 2359: 2349: 2314: 2310: 2300: 2267: 2263: 2253: 2220: 2216: 2206: 2173: 2169: 2159: 2126: 2122: 2112: 2104: 2066: 2062: 2056: 2023: 2019: 2009: 1976: 1972: 1966: 1939: 1935: 1925: 1884: 1880: 1870: 1861: 1854:. 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Index

international relations
coercion
compellence
deterrence
military alliances
power
Situational
dispositional factors
Coercion (international relations)
coercion
Richard Ned Lebow
Robert Art
Barbara Walter
audience costs
Audience cost
foreign policy
James Fearon
democratic peace theory
"Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship"
doi
10.1017/S0043887120000246
ISSN
0043-8871
S2CID
230529327
"The Credibility Trap"
ISSN
0015-7120

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