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110:"is", plus a general term accompanied by the indefinite article or an adjective) that signifies a concept. Thus "Socrates is a philosopher" consists of "Socrates", which signifies the object
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Frege's distinction leads to the famous difficulty or "awkwardness of language" that some expressions which purport to signify a concept — Frege's example is "the concept
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Proops, Ian. "What is Frege's 'concept horse problem,'?" in Potter and
Sullivan "Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation" 2013 (Oxford University Press).
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Wright, C. "Why Frege does not deserve his grain of salt: a Note on the
Paradox of "The Concept Horse" and the Ascription of Bedeutungen to Predicates",
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The distinction was of fundamental importance to the development of logic and mathematics. Frege's distinction helped to clarify the notions of a
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Parsons, Terence. "Why Frege should not have said `the
Concept Horse is not A Concept'," History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1986) 449–65.
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Furth, Montgomery. "Two Types of
Denotation", in Studies in Logical Theory, ed. by N. Rescher (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968).
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cannot be associated with predication in the way that individual objects are associated with the use of
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or a general term plus the definite article) that signifies an object together with a predicate (the
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According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists of an expression (a
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151:" — are grammatically expressions that by his criterion signify an object. Thus "the concept
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Frege, G. "On
Concept and Object", originally published as "Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand" in
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sought to justify the distinction, other philosophers such as
Hartley Slater and
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16, 1892, pp. 192-205, translated in Geach & Black 1952 pp. 42–55.
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Departing from Frege: Essays in the philosophy of language
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is not a concept, whereas the city of Berlin is a city".
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This was a considerable departure from the traditional
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