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Confidence-building measures

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process of exploring, negotiating, and then implementing tailored measures, including those that promote interaction, information exchange, and constraint. It also entails the development and use of both formal and informal practices and principles associated with the cooperative development of CBMs. When conditions are supportive, the confidence building process can facilitate, focus, synchronize, amplify, and generally structure the potential for a significant positive transformation in the security relations of participating states. Confidence building in this view is a process that constitutes more than the sum of its parts.
245:) is to make the different states' (or opposition groups') behaviour more predictable. This typically involves exchanging information and making it possible to verify this information, especially information regarding armed forces and military equipment. Here, "positive" and "negative" refer to the mathematical nature of the feedback; positive feedback leads to worsening intensity in a conflict, while negative feedback leads to de-escalation of the conflict, a "peace spiral" or 542:
of deployed military equipment of certain types (typically tanks, heavily armoured combat vehicles, self-propelled artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) with new, more advanced and capable types; no modernization of deployed military equipment of certain specified types in certain key, well-defined respects; no training with new systems; no field testing of new designs; and no production of specified new systems and/or subsystems.
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When confidence building leads to the institutionalization of a collection of new rules and practices stipulating how participating states and non-state actors should cooperate and compete with each other in their security relationship, the restructured relationship can reduce the likelihood of armed
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the opportunity to monitor constrained or limited military forces, facilities, structures, and activities, principally through the use of monitoring devices. Examples include: perimeter monitors; motion sensors for no-go areas; sensors for use in restricted
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constraint measures: measures requiring or encouraging participants to avoid or limit the development and/or deployment of specified military technologies, including systems and subsystems, believed by participating states to have a destabilizing character or impact. Examples include: no replacement
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Confidence building, according to the transformation view, is a distinct activity undertaken by policy makers with the minimum intention of improving some aspects of a traditionally antagonistic security relationship through security policy coordination and cooperation. It entails the comprehensive
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constraint measures: measures requiring or encouraging participants to avoid or limit the provocative stationing or positioning of military forces. Examples include: no threatening manoeuvres or equipment tests; no threatening deployments near sensitive areas (such as tanks near borders); equipment
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constraint measures: measures requiring or encouraging participants to avoid or limit specified types of provocative military activity. Examples include: no harassing activities such as "playing chicken" on the high seas; no harassing or provocative close encounters between military aircraft and/or
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the opportunity to inspect constrained or limited military forces, facilities, structures, and activities. Examples include: special observers for sensitive movements and activities; on-site inspections of various forms; and the use of special tagging and
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the opportunity to interact with officials or experts from other countries. Examples include: military personnel exchanges; security expert exchanges; transnational secondments; joint military training and joint military exercises; and seminars discussing
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the provision (exchange) of information about military forces, facilities, structures, and activities. Examples include: publication of defence information; weapon system and force structure information exchange; consultative commissions; publication of
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that maintains the conflict. The existing negative and positive feedbacks prevent a change to a state of peace. Confidence-building measures can change the properties of the system, increasing its dimensionality, so that in the higher dimensional system, positive feedback loops to resolve the
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the opportunity to engage in non-focused "looks" at relatively small and generally-specified sections of territory within which activities of interest and/or concern may be occurring or may have recently occurred. Examples include: Open Skies
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging participants to facilitate and/or not interfere with agreed verification efforts. Examples include: agreement to not interfere with inspection and/or monitoring efforts and agreements specifying how verification efforts are to be assisted or
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form of confidence building occurs directly between ordinary people of different states. Short visits by individual children or groups of children to another state, and longer visits (6–12 months) by secondary and tertiary students to another state, have widely been used in the
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the opportunity to observe specified military activities. Examples include: mandatory and optional invitations to observe specified activities (with information about the activity) and rules of conduct for observers and
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the advance, accurate notification of specified military activities. Examples include: advance notification of exercises, force movements, and mobilizations - including associated information about forces
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Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass
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who can explain and resolve misunderstandings due to differences in language and culture which are incorrectly perceived as threatening, or encourage local knowledge of a foreign culture by funding artistic and cultural activities.
935: 1007: 398:. Evidence, however, suggests that the Internet is as likely to inflame opinion and increase conflict (or at least tensions) as individuals are exposed to significantly different points of view. 45:) are actions taken to reduce fear of attack by both (or more) parties in a situation of conflict. The term is most often used in the context of armed conflict, but is similar in logic to that of 221:
914 (x) in 1955, prompted by the U.S. "Open Skies" proposal. CBMs became a significant component of arms control during a series of negotiations and agreements produced by the
253: 455:" for the exchange of crisis-related information; joint crisis control centres; and "cool lines" for the regularized distribution of required and/or requested information. 217:), as well as the European neutral and non-aligned states, to avoid conventional or nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. The term appears to have been first used in 233:
between Israel and Egypt. There are also other historical instances of what appears to be confidence building prior to the Cold War and outside of the European context.
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Read the 'Agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area', UN Peacemaker
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model assumed by the confidence-building measure mechanism is correct, then the rapidly developing improvement in communication between ordinary people by the
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should provide extremely robust, fast methods of information exchange and verification, as well as improved people-to-people contacts and general building of
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conflict by redefining expectations of normal behaviour among participating states in a way that is more likely to handle conflict by non-military means.
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Bazin, A. (2013). Winning trust and confidence: A grounded theory model for the use of confidence-building measures in the joint operational environment.
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An alternative analytic approach to understanding confidence building looks at broader process concepts rather than concentrating on specific measures.
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as one of the methods of decreasing the tensions which had earlier led to many centuries of inter-European wars, culminating in the first and second
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constraints such as no attack aircraft within range of a neighbour's rear area territory; manpower limits; and nuclear free zones.
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can be interpreted as the result of the reduced dimensionality of a system, in which the system is changing but remains near an
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In international relations, the way that confidence-building measures are intended to reduce fear and suspicion (the positive
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measures: measures requiring or encouraging the creation and/or use of shared means of communication. Examples include: "
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The use of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as an explicit security management approach emerged from attempts by the
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military aircraft and naval or ground forces; and no harassing activities in airspace near territorial boundaries.
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in 1997, Macintosh divides CSBMs into informational type (A), verification type (B) and constraint (C) measures.
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Navigating the Landscape of Conflict: Applications of Dynamical Systems Theory to Addressing Protracted Conflict
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Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: a Canadian Perspective
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OAS, Permanent Council, Grupo de Trabajo sobre Cooperación para la Seguridad Hemisférica.
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conflict are able to overcome the negative feedbacks that tend to maintain the conflict.
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Bazin, A. (2014). Trust: A Decisive Point in COIN Operations. Infantry Magazine.
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Beltrán, Virgilio. "Buscando Nuevos Roles para los Ejércitos de América Latina",
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defence budget figures; and publication of weapon system development information.
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Confidence building in the arms control process : a transformation view
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Arms Control and International Security, Overview of 2011 Vienna Document
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for many centuries included the existence of and increased activities by
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http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/confidence_building_measures.jsp
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Existing and proposed confidence-building measures in the context of
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used to reduce conflictual situations among human individuals.
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Conflict in Central America: Approaches to Peace and Security
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Bazin, A. (2015). Winning trust under fire. Military Review.
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Type A: Information, interaction, and communication measures
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Type B: Verification and observation facilitation measures
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Verification and similar measures, such as those of the
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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
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Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. 394:networks, reducing the intensity and frequency of 932:, OAS Document CP/GT/CSH-13/92, 12 February 1992. 430:Informational and similar type measures include: 223:Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 254:modelling of peace and armed conflict situations 209:superpowers and their military alliances (the 579:Confidence-building measures in South America 473:Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 8: 909:International Congress of Military Sociology 445:doctrine, strategy, and technology issues. 219:United Nations General Assembly resolution 39:confidence- and security-building measures 412:confidence and security-building measures 370:Learn how and when to remove this message 276:Validity of the model in the Internet era 156:Learn how and when to remove this message 402:Typology of confidence-building measures 27:Actions taken to reduce fear of conflict 600: 547:Confidence building viewed as a process 62:Embassies and people to people contacts 168:Confidence-building measures between 7: 749:from the original on 28 January 2022 308:adding citations to reliable sources 265:intractable long-term armed conflict 237:Role of confidence-building measures 94:adding citations to reliable sources 504:access areas; and activity sensors. 969:) on peace and conflict resolution 211:North Atlantic Treaty Organization 25: 893:from the original on 9 June 2024. 795:from the original on 14 June 2024 729:United States Department of State 850:James Macintosh (October 1996). 717:from the original on 8 June 2024 683:from the original on 9 June 2024 284: 70: 819:from the original on 2020-02-08 650:James Macintosh (August 1985), 625:from the original on 2013-09-08 480:Observation-of-movement conduct 295:needs additional citations for 81:needs additional citations for 615:"Confidence-Building Measures" 520:Types of limitations include: 319:"Confidence-building measures" 105:"Confidence-building measures" 1: 965:- online forum and database ( 921:International Peace Academy. 914:International Peace Academy. 619:Moving Beyond Intractability 508:Facilitation of verification 416:viewed as an overall process 247:Gradual Reduction in Tension 31:Confidence-building measures 978:Stuck in the "Frenemy Zone" 930:Nuevo Concepto de Seguridad 516:Type C: Constraint measures 51:interpersonal communication 18:Confidence building measure 1024: 613:Maiese, Michelle (2003). 420:Conference on Disarmament 925:, NY: St Martin's, 1986. 231:Sinai Interim Agreement 916:Peacekeeper's Handbook 858:Global Affairs Canada 658:Global Affairs Canada 584:Preventive diplomacy 304:improve this article 178:interpersonal skills 90:improve this article 574:Conflict resolution 487:General observation 778:Berghof Foundation 705:, 1 January 1956, 867:978-0-662-25029-6 497:tracking devices. 380: 379: 372: 354: 261:dynamical systems 166: 165: 158: 140: 16:(Redirected from 1015: 1003:Peace mechanisms 918:. 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Index

Confidence building measure
trust
interpersonal communication

verification
improve this article
adding citations to reliable sources
"Confidence-building measures"
news
newspapers
books
scholar
JSTOR
Learn how and when to remove this message
sovereign states
embassies
interpersonal skills
grassroots
European Union
world wars
Cold War
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Warsaw Pact
United Nations General Assembly resolution
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
Vienna Document
Sinai Interim Agreement
feedbacks
Gradual Reduction in Tension
modelling of peace and armed conflict situations

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