Knowledge (XXG)

Defence in depth (non-military)

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258:, all safety activities, whether organizational, behavioural or equipment related, are subject to layers of overlapping provisions, so that if a failure should occur it would be compensated for or corrected without causing harm to individuals or the public at large. Defence in depth consists in a hierarchical deployment of different levels of equipment and procedures in order to maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed between radioactive materials and workers, the public or the environment, in normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences and, for some barriers, in accidents at the plant. Defence in depth is implemented through design and operation to provide a graded protection against a wide variety of transients, incidents and accidents, including equipment failures and human errors within the plant and events initiated outside the plan. 236:, wrote that sometimes redundancies backfire and produce less, not more reliability. This may happen in three ways: First, redundant safety devices result in a more complex system, more prone to errors and accidents. Second, redundancy may lead to shirking of responsibility among workers. Third, redundancy may lead to increased production pressures, resulting in a system that operates at higher speeds, but less safely. 113: 25: 66: 205:
A defence in depth strategy to fire prevention does not focus all the resources only on the prevention of a fire; instead, it also requires the deployment of fire alarms, extinguishers, evacuation plans, mobile rescue and fire-fighting equipment and even nationwide plans for deploying massive
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Defense-in-depth is incorporated into fire protection regulations for nuclear power plants. It requires preventing fires, detecting and extinguishing fires that do occur, and ensuring the capability to safely shutdown.
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Human extinction is most likely when all three defenses are weak, that is, "by risks we are unlikely to prevent, unlikely to successfully respond to, and unlikely to be resilient against".
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with four engines will be less likely to suffer total engine failure than a single-engined aircraft no matter how much effort goes into making the single engine reliable.
38: 289:: Preventing the scaling of a catastrophe to the global level. Example: Measures to prevent escalation of a small-scale nuclear exchange into an all-out nuclear war. 295:: Increasing humanity's resilience (against extinction) when faced with global catastrophes. Example: Measures to increase food security during a nuclear winter. 87: 74: 283:: Reducing the probability of a catastrophe occurring in the first place. Example: Measures to prevent outbreaks of new highly-infectious diseases. 222:– a system that keeps working when a component fails – over attempts to design components that will not fail in the first place. For example, an 245: 143: 44: 395: 437: 363: 168: 52: 341:
within the same environment. Different security products from multiple vendors may be deployed to defend different potential
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techniques to help mitigate the risk of one component of the defence being compromised or circumvented. An example could be
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NRC: 10 CFR Appendix R to Part 50β€”Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979
308: 519: 139: 79: 349:, helping prevent a shortfall in any one defence leading to a wider failure; also known as a "layered approach". 382: 273: 267: 219: 186: 129: 135: 334: 318: 458:"Defence in Depth Against Human Extinction: Prevention, Response, Resilience, and Why They All Matter" 314: 326: 251: 424: 338: 495: 477: 433: 322: 485: 469: 358: 346: 342: 232: 406: 125: 490: 457: 255: 227: 513: 330: 189:
protections, to create a reliable system despite any one layer's unreliability.
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Way to guarantee safety by means of multiple and redundant layers of protection
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The term defence in depth is now used in many non-military contexts.
124:. In particular, what is the article about? Is it a collection or 106: 59: 18: 456:
Cotton-Barratt, Owen; Daniel, Max; Sandberg, Anders (2020).
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Defense in depth is a useful framework for categorizing
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Defence in depth may mean engineering which emphasizes
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Global catastrophic risk Β§ Proposed mitigation
276:mitigation measures into three layers of defense: 122:may lack focus or may be about more than one topic 321:defence in depth represents the use of multiple 333:when there is already virus protection on the 134:Please help improve this article, possibly by 426:Defence in depth in nuclear safety (INSAG-10) 8: 423:International Nuclear Energy Agency (1996). 185:uses multi-layered protections, similar to 53:Learn how and when to remove these messages 489: 169:Learn how and when to remove this message 126:list of subject areas that use this term 90:of all important aspects of the article. 375: 246:Defense in depth (nuclear engineering) 86:Please consider expanding the lead to 7: 451: 449: 359:Defense in depth (military strategy) 138:the article and/or by introducing a 14: 364:Defence-in-depth (Roman military) 34:This article has multiple issues. 396:"Learning from Normal Accidents" 111: 64: 23: 142:, or discuss this issue on the 78:may be too short to adequately 42:or discuss these issues on the 403:Organization & Environment 88:provide an accessible overview 1: 394:Scott D. Sagan (March 2004). 309:Defense in depth (computing) 206:resources to a major blaze. 262:Existential risk mitigation 536: 306: 265: 243: 329:installed on individual 474:10.1111/1758-5899.12786 319:Information Assurance 315:information security 303:Information security 327:anti-virus software 252:nuclear engineering 140:disambiguation page 520:Safety engineering 130:broad concept page 323:computer security 179: 178: 171: 161: 160: 105: 104: 57: 527: 504: 503: 493: 453: 444: 443: 431: 420: 414: 413: 411: 405:. Archived from 400: 391: 385: 380: 274:existential risk 233:Normal accidents 183:defence in depth 174: 167: 156: 153: 147: 115: 114: 107: 100: 97: 91: 68: 60: 49: 27: 26: 19: 535: 534: 530: 529: 528: 526: 525: 524: 510: 509: 508: 507: 455: 454: 447: 440: 429: 422: 421: 417: 409: 398: 393: 392: 388: 381: 377: 372: 355: 311: 305: 270: 264: 248: 242: 216: 203: 201:Fire prevention 195: 175: 164: 163: 162: 157: 151: 148: 133: 116: 112: 101: 95: 92: 85: 73:This article's 69: 28: 24: 17: 12: 11: 5: 533: 531: 523: 522: 512: 511: 506: 505: 468:(3): 271–282. 445: 438: 415: 412:on 2004-07-14. 386: 374: 373: 371: 368: 367: 366: 361: 354: 351: 307:Main article: 304: 301: 297: 296: 290: 284: 266:Main article: 263: 260: 256:nuclear safety 244:Main article: 241: 238: 228:Charles Perrow 215: 212: 202: 199: 194: 191: 177: 176: 159: 158: 119: 117: 110: 103: 102: 82:the key points 72: 70: 63: 58: 32: 31: 29: 22: 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 532: 521: 518: 517: 515: 501: 497: 492: 487: 483: 479: 475: 471: 467: 463: 462:Global Policy 459: 452: 450: 446: 441: 439:92-0-103295-1 435: 428: 427: 419: 416: 408: 404: 397: 390: 387: 384: 379: 376: 369: 365: 362: 360: 357: 356: 352: 350: 348: 344: 340: 336: 332: 328: 324: 320: 316: 313:Likewise, in 310: 302: 300: 294: 291: 288: 285: 282: 279: 278: 277: 275: 269: 261: 259: 257: 253: 247: 239: 237: 235: 234: 229: 225: 221: 213: 211: 207: 200: 198: 192: 190: 188: 184: 173: 170: 155: 145: 141: 137: 131: 127: 123: 120:This article 118: 109: 108: 99: 89: 83: 81: 76: 71: 67: 62: 61: 56: 54: 47: 46: 41: 40: 35: 30: 21: 20: 465: 461: 425: 418: 407:the original 402: 389: 378: 331:workstations 312: 298: 292: 286: 280: 271: 249: 231: 230:, author of 217: 208: 204: 196: 182: 180: 165: 152:October 2016 149: 121: 96:October 2016 93: 77: 75:lead section 50: 43: 37: 36:Please help 33: 345:within the 214:Engineering 370:References 293:Resilience 281:Prevention 220:redundancy 39:improve it 482:1758-5899 335:firewalls 187:redundant 144:talk page 136:splitting 80:summarize 45:talk page 514:Category 500:32427180 353:See also 287:Response 224:aircraft 193:Examples 491:7228299 347:network 343:vectors 339:servers 240:Nuclear 128:, or a 498:  488:  480:  436:  430:(PDF) 410:(PDF) 399:(PDF) 496:PMID 478:ISSN 434:ISBN 337:and 254:and 486:PMC 470:doi 250:In 516:: 494:. 484:. 476:. 466:11 464:. 460:. 448:^ 432:. 401:. 317:/ 181:A 132:?. 48:. 502:. 472:: 442:. 172:) 166:( 154:) 150:( 146:. 98:) 94:( 84:. 55:) 51:(

Index

improve it
talk page
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lead section
summarize
provide an accessible overview
list of subject areas that use this term
broad concept page
splitting
disambiguation page
talk page
Learn how and when to remove this message
redundant
redundancy
aircraft
Charles Perrow
Normal accidents
Defense in depth (nuclear engineering)
nuclear engineering
nuclear safety
Global catastrophic risk Β§ Proposed mitigation
existential risk
Defense in depth (computing)
information security
Information Assurance
computer security
anti-virus software
workstations
firewalls

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