103:
probability vector (i.e. S â„ 0 and S_1 + S_2... + S_n = 1) this is called the state vector of the population. Using this the function F(i|s) can be made, F(i|s) refers to the fitness of I in state S. The state vector of the population (S) is not static. The idea behind it is that the more fit a strategy at the moment the more likely it is to be employed in the future, thus the state vector (S) will change. Using game theory we can look how (S) changes over time and try to figure out in what state it has reached an equilibrium. Let K be the set of all probability vectors of length N, this is the state space of the population. Thus element P in K represents a possible strategy mix. A state P in K is called an equilibrium state if F(i|p) is equal for all pure strategies i for which P_i > 0, That is, supp(p) = {i :p,â 0}. If Q is in K: F(q|p) + (ÎŁQ_1 x F(i|p). We can see F(q|p) as the expected fitness of an individual using mixed strategy Q against the population in state P. If P is an equilibrium state and the supp(q) is contained in supp(p) then F(q|p) = F(q|p).(supp(p) are the I's for which P_i > 0). Thus a state p is called an ESS (evolutionary stable state) if for every state Q â P, if we let pÌ
=(1-Δ)p + Δq (the perturbed state), then F(q|p) < F(p|pÌ
) for sufficiently small Δ>0
78:
While
Maynard Smith had originally defined an ESS as being a single "uninvadable strategy," Thomas generalized this to include a set of multiple strategies employed by individuals. In other words, a collection of simultaneously present strategies could be considered uninvadable as a group. Thomas noted that evolutionary stability can exist in either model, allowing for an evolutionarily stable state to exist even when multiple strategies are used within the population.
52:
describes a population that returns as a whole to its previous composition even after being disturbed. In short: the ESS refers to the strategy itself, uninterrupted and supported through natural selection, while the evolutionarily stable state refers more broadly to a population-wide balance of one or more strategies that may be subjected to temporary change.
86:
The strategy employed by individuals (or ESS) is thought to depend on fitness: the better the strategy is at supporting fitness, the more likely the strategy is to be used. When it comes to an evolutionarily stable state, all of the strategies used within the population must have equal fitness. While
77:
There has been variation in how the term is used and exploration of under what conditions an evolutionarily stable state might exist. In 1984, Benhard Thomas compared "discrete" models in which all individuals use only one strategy to "continuous" models in which individuals employ mixed strategies.
51:
An ESS is a strategy that, if adopted by all individuals within a population, cannot be invaded by alternative or mutant strategies. This strategy becomes fixed in the population because alternatives provide no fitness benefit that would be selected for. In comparison, an evolutionarily stable state
131:
as a whole provides a theoretical framework examining interactions of organisms in a system where individuals have repeated interactions within a population that persists on an evolutionarily relevant timescale. This framework can be used to better understand the evolution of interaction strategies
102:
In a game of individuals in competition with each other there are (N) possible strategies available. Thus each individual is using one of these (N) strategies. If we denote each strategy as I we let S_i be the proportion of individuals who are currently using strategy I. Then S=(S_1 -> S_n) is a
115:
It has been suggested by Ross
Cressman that criteria for evolutionary stability include strong stability, as it would describe evolution of both frequency and density (whereas Maynard Smith's model focused on frequency). Cressman further demonstrated that in habitat selection games modeling only a
252:
631:
31:
when that population's "genetic composition is restored by selection after a disturbance, provided the disturbance is not too large" (Maynard Smith, 1982). This population as a whole can be either monomorphic or
107:
In summary, a state P is evolutionarily stable whenever a small change from P to state pÌ
the expected fitness in the perturbed state is less than the expected fitness of the remaining population.
90:
One of the base mathematical models for identifying an evolutionarily stable state was outlined by Taylor & Jonker in 1978. Their base equilibrium model for ES states stipulates that
412:
94:
A state p is called an ESS (evolutionary stable state) if for every state q â p, if we let pÌ
=(1-Δ)p + Δq (the perturbed state), then F(q|p) < F(p|pÌ
) for sufficiently small Δ>0.
87:
the equilibrium may be disturbed by external factors, the population is considered to be in an evolutionarily stable state if it returns to the equilibrium state after the disturbance.
143:
For the purpose of predicting evolutionary outcomes, the replicator equation is also a frequently utilized tool. Evolutionarily stable states are often taken as solutions to the
319:
348:
284:
140:
are closely related to the evolutionarily stable state. There are various potential refinements proposed to account for different theory games and behavioral models.
63:
Maynard Smith developed the ESS drawing in part from game theory and
Hamilton's work on the evolution of sex ratio. The ESS was later expanded upon in his book
153:
713:
614:
Cressman, R., & KĆivan, V. (2010). The ideal free distribution as an evolutionarily stable state in densityâdependent population games.
1617:
458:
1434:
964:
762:
1780:
1253:
1072:
668:
524:
445:
65:
869:
1343:
879:
45:
1213:
1394:
807:
782:
1744:
1170:
919:
909:
844:
959:
939:
1429:
1678:
1399:
1057:
894:
889:
137:
1714:
1637:
1373:
924:
849:
706:
356:
1729:
1462:
1348:
1145:
934:
752:
128:
1532:
1734:
1333:
1303:
954:
742:
117:
1668:
1759:
1739:
1719:
1338:
1243:
1102:
1052:
1047:
974:
944:
864:
792:
33:
772:
48:(ESS), evolutionarily stable states are not identical and the two terms cannot be used interchangeably.
1218:
1203:
289:
1552:
1537:
1424:
1419:
1323:
1308:
1273:
1238:
832:
777:
699:
1709:
1328:
1278:
1115:
1042:
1017:
874:
757:
144:
132:
and stable states, though many different specific models have been used under this framework. The
1688:
1547:
1378:
1358:
1208:
1087:
987:
914:
859:
56:
324:
260:
1673:
1642:
1597:
1492:
1363:
1318:
1293:
1223:
1097:
1022:
1012:
904:
854:
802:
664:
598:
Cressman, R. (1990). Strong stability and density-dependent evolutionarily stable strategies.
520:
470:
441:
1754:
1749:
1683:
1647:
1627:
1587:
1557:
1512:
1467:
1452:
1409:
1263:
1037:
899:
836:
822:
787:
133:
1652:
1612:
1567:
1482:
1477:
1198:
1150:
1032:
797:
767:
737:
1517:
440:
Maynard Smith, J.. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge
University Press.
17:
632:
Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable
Strategies and the Evolution of Biological Interactions
1592:
1582:
1572:
1507:
1497:
1487:
1472:
1268:
1248:
1233:
1228:
1188:
1155:
1140:
1135:
1125:
929:
1774:
1632:
1622:
1577:
1562:
1542:
1368:
1313:
1288:
1160:
1130:
1120:
1107:
1007:
949:
884:
817:
679:
Cressman, R., & Tao, Y. (2014). The replicator equation and other game dynamics.
555:
Maynard Smith, J. (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts.
582:
Taylor, P. D, Jonker, L. B. (1978). Evolutionarily stable states and Game
Dynamics.
1607:
1602:
1457:
1027:
663:
Cressman, R. (2003) Evolutionary
Dynamics and Extensive Form Games. The MIT Press.
619:
649:
Computing Nash
Equilibria and Evolutionarily Stable States of Evolutionary Games.
1724:
1527:
1522:
1502:
1298:
1283:
1092:
1062:
992:
982:
812:
747:
723:
603:
648:
587:
560:
504:
1353:
1002:
247:{\displaystyle {\dot {x_{i}}}=x_{i}\left(\left(Ax\right)_{i}-x^{T}Ax\right),}
1258:
1178:
997:
120:(IFD) is itself an evolutionarily stable state containing mixed strategies.
98:
In greater detail, the Taylor & Jonker model can be understood this way
684:
1693:
1193:
691:
1414:
1404:
1082:
539:
Maynard Smith, J., Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict.
515:
Maynard Smith, J. (1972). Game Theory and the
Evolution of Fighting.
544:
1183:
499:
Thomas, B. (1984). Evolutionary stability: States and strategies.
695:
459:"Evolutionary game theory: ESS, convergence stability, and NIS"
69:
in 1982, which also discussed the evolutionarily stable state.
40:
History & connection to evolutionary stable strategy
82:
Mathematical formulation & evolutionary game theory
359:
327:
292:
263:
156:
681:
Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 111
36:. This is now referred to as convergent stability.
1702:
1661:
1443:
1387:
1169:
1071:
973:
831:
730:
406:
342:
313:
278:
246:
652:IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 20
457:Apaloo, J.; Brown, J. S.; Vincent, T. L. (2009).
620:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0706.2010.17845.x
286:is said to be evolutionarily stable if for all
707:
604:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80112-2
27:A population can be described as being in an
8:
588:https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9
561:https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6
505:https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(84)90023-6
407:{\displaystyle x^{T}Ax<{\hat {x}}^{T}Ax}
714:
700:
692:
647:Li, J., Kendall, G., and John, R. (2015).
392:
381:
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364:
358:
329:
328:
326:
300:
299:
291:
265:
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224:
211:
183:
164:
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157:
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685:https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1400823111
422:
7:
578:
576:
574:
572:
570:
568:
535:
533:
495:
493:
491:
489:
487:
436:
434:
432:
430:
428:
426:
600:Journal of Theoretical Biology, 145
44:While related to the concept of an
763:First-player and second-player win
501:Theoretical Population Biology, 26
25:
66:Evolution and the Theory of Games
870:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
545:https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0
314:{\displaystyle x\neq {\hat {x}}}
59:in an essay from the 1972 book
55:The term ESS was first used by
880:Evolutionarily stable strategy
519:. Edinburgh University Press.
386:
334:
305:
270:
147:, here in linear payoff form:
46:evolutionarily stable strategy
1:
808:Simultaneous action selection
683:(Supplement 3), 10810-10817.
463:Evolutionary Ecology Research
1745:List of games in game theory
920:Quantal response equilibrium
910:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
845:Bayes correlated equilibrium
636:Nature Education Knowledge 3
1214:Optional prisoner's dilemma
940:Self-confirming equilibrium
584:Mathematical Biosciences 40
124:In evolutionary game theory
29:evolutionarily stable state
1797:
1679:Principal variation search
1395:Aumann's agreement theorem
1058:Strategy-stealing argument
965:Trembling hand equilibrium
895:Markov perfect equilibrium
890:Mertens-stable equilibrium
343:{\displaystyle {\hat {x}}}
279:{\displaystyle {\hat {x}}}
73:Mixed v. single strategies
1715:Combinatorial game theory
1374:Princess and monster game
925:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
850:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
469:: 489â515. Archived from
18:Evolutionary stable state
1781:Evolutionary game theory
1730:Evolutionary game theory
1463:Antoine Augustin Cournot
1349:Guess 2/3 of the average
1146:Strictly determined game
935:Satisfaction equilibrium
753:Escalation of commitment
321:in some neighborhood of
129:Evolutionary game theory
1735:Glossary of game theory
1334:Stackelberg competition
955:Strong Nash equilibrium
118:ideal free distribution
1760:Tragedy of the commons
1740:List of game theorists
1720:Confrontation analysis
1430:SpragueâGrundy theorem
945:Sequential equilibrium
865:Correlated equilibrium
408:
344:
315:
280:
248:
105:
96:
1533:Jean-François Mertens
630:Cowden, C. C. (2012)
409:
345:
316:
281:
249:
100:
92:
1662:Search optimizations
1538:Jennifer Tour Chayes
1425:Revelation principle
1420:Purification theorem
1359:Nash bargaining game
1324:Bertrand competition
1309:El Farol Bar problem
1274:Electronic mail game
1239:Lewis signaling game
778:Hierarchy of beliefs
357:
325:
290:
261:
154:
116:single species, the
111:Additional proposals
1710:Bounded rationality
1329:Cournot competition
1279:Rock paper scissors
1254:Battle of the sexes
1244:Volunteer's dilemma
1116:Perfect information
1043:Dominant strategies
875:Epsilon-equilibrium
758:Extensive-form game
145:replicator equation
1689:Paranoid algorithm
1669:Alphaâbeta pruning
1548:John Maynard Smith
1379:Rendezvous problem
1219:Traveler's dilemma
1209:Gift-exchange game
1204:Prisoner's dilemma
1121:Large Poisson game
1088:Bargaining problem
988:Backward induction
960:Subgame perfection
915:Proper equilibrium
404:
340:
311:
276:
244:
57:John Maynard Smith
1768:
1767:
1674:Aspiration window
1643:Suzanne Scotchmer
1598:Oskar Morgenstern
1493:Donald B. Gillies
1435:Zermelo's theorem
1364:Induction puzzles
1319:Fair cake-cutting
1294:Public goods game
1224:Coordination game
1098:Intransitive game
1023:Forward induction
905:Pareto efficiency
885:Gibbs equilibrium
855:Berge equilibrium
803:Simultaneous game
389:
337:
308:
273:
173:
16:(Redirected from
1788:
1755:Topological game
1750:No-win situation
1648:Thomas Schelling
1628:Robert B. Wilson
1588:Merrill M. Flood
1558:John von Neumann
1468:Ariel Rubinstein
1453:Albert W. Tucker
1304:War of attrition
1264:Matching pennies
1038:Pairing strategy
900:Nash equilibrium
823:Mechanism design
788:Normal-form game
743:Cooperative game
716:
709:
702:
693:
687:
677:
671:
661:
655:
645:
639:
628:
622:
618:(8), 1231-1242.
612:
606:
596:
590:
580:
563:
557:J Theor Biol. 47
553:
547:
537:
528:
513:
507:
497:
482:
481:
479:
478:
454:
448:
438:
413:
411:
410:
405:
397:
396:
391:
390:
382:
369:
368:
349:
347:
346:
341:
339:
338:
330:
320:
318:
317:
312:
310:
309:
301:
285:
283:
282:
277:
275:
274:
266:
253:
251:
250:
245:
240:
236:
229:
228:
216:
215:
210:
206:
188:
187:
175:
174:
169:
168:
159:
134:Nash Equilibrium
21:
1796:
1795:
1791:
1790:
1789:
1787:
1786:
1785:
1771:
1770:
1769:
1764:
1698:
1684:max^n algorithm
1657:
1653:William Vickrey
1613:Reinhard Selten
1568:Kenneth Binmore
1483:David K. Levine
1478:Daniel Kahneman
1445:
1439:
1415:Negamax theorem
1405:Minimax theorem
1383:
1344:Diner's dilemma
1199:All-pay auction
1165:
1151:Stochastic game
1103:Mean-field game
1074:
1067:
1033:Markov strategy
969:
835:
827:
798:Sequential game
783:Information set
768:Game complexity
738:Congestion game
726:
720:
690:
678:
674:
662:
658:
646:
642:
629:
625:
613:
609:
597:
593:
581:
566:
554:
550:
543:(5427), 15-18.
538:
531:
514:
510:
498:
485:
476:
474:
456:
455:
451:
439:
424:
420:
379:
360:
355:
354:
323:
322:
288:
287:
259:
258:
220:
199:
195:
194:
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189:
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160:
152:
151:
126:
113:
84:
75:
42:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
1794:
1792:
1784:
1783:
1773:
1772:
1766:
1765:
1763:
1762:
1757:
1752:
1747:
1742:
1737:
1732:
1727:
1722:
1717:
1712:
1706:
1704:
1700:
1699:
1697:
1696:
1691:
1686:
1681:
1676:
1671:
1665:
1663:
1659:
1658:
1656:
1655:
1650:
1645:
1640:
1635:
1630:
1625:
1620:
1618:Robert Axelrod
1615:
1610:
1605:
1600:
1595:
1593:Olga Bondareva
1590:
1585:
1583:Melvin Dresher
1580:
1575:
1573:Leonid Hurwicz
1570:
1565:
1560:
1555:
1550:
1545:
1540:
1535:
1530:
1525:
1520:
1515:
1510:
1508:Harold W. Kuhn
1505:
1500:
1498:Drew Fudenberg
1495:
1490:
1488:David M. Kreps
1485:
1480:
1475:
1473:Claude Shannon
1470:
1465:
1460:
1455:
1449:
1447:
1441:
1440:
1438:
1437:
1432:
1427:
1422:
1417:
1412:
1410:Nash's theorem
1407:
1402:
1397:
1391:
1389:
1385:
1384:
1382:
1381:
1376:
1371:
1366:
1361:
1356:
1351:
1346:
1341:
1336:
1331:
1326:
1321:
1316:
1311:
1306:
1301:
1296:
1291:
1286:
1281:
1276:
1271:
1269:Ultimatum game
1266:
1261:
1256:
1251:
1249:Dollar auction
1246:
1241:
1236:
1234:Centipede game
1231:
1226:
1221:
1216:
1211:
1206:
1201:
1196:
1191:
1189:Infinite chess
1186:
1181:
1175:
1173:
1167:
1166:
1164:
1163:
1158:
1156:Symmetric game
1153:
1148:
1143:
1141:Signaling game
1138:
1136:Screening game
1133:
1128:
1126:Potential game
1123:
1118:
1113:
1105:
1100:
1095:
1090:
1085:
1079:
1077:
1069:
1068:
1066:
1065:
1060:
1055:
1053:Mixed strategy
1050:
1045:
1040:
1035:
1030:
1025:
1020:
1015:
1010:
1005:
1000:
995:
990:
985:
979:
977:
971:
970:
968:
967:
962:
957:
952:
947:
942:
937:
932:
930:Risk dominance
927:
922:
917:
912:
907:
902:
897:
892:
887:
882:
877:
872:
867:
862:
857:
852:
847:
841:
839:
829:
828:
826:
825:
820:
815:
810:
805:
800:
795:
790:
785:
780:
775:
773:Graphical game
770:
765:
760:
755:
750:
745:
740:
734:
732:
728:
727:
721:
719:
718:
711:
704:
696:
689:
688:
672:
656:
640:
623:
607:
602:(3), 319-330.
591:
564:
548:
529:
508:
483:
449:
421:
419:
416:
415:
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403:
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395:
388:
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125:
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109:
83:
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71:
41:
38:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1793:
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1761:
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1728:
1726:
1723:
1721:
1718:
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1713:
1711:
1708:
1707:
1705:
1703:Miscellaneous
1701:
1695:
1692:
1690:
1687:
1685:
1682:
1680:
1677:
1675:
1672:
1670:
1667:
1666:
1664:
1660:
1654:
1651:
1649:
1646:
1644:
1641:
1639:
1638:Samuel Bowles
1636:
1634:
1633:Roger Myerson
1631:
1629:
1626:
1624:
1623:Robert Aumann
1621:
1619:
1616:
1614:
1611:
1609:
1606:
1604:
1601:
1599:
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1594:
1591:
1589:
1586:
1584:
1581:
1579:
1578:Lloyd Shapley
1576:
1574:
1571:
1569:
1566:
1564:
1563:Kenneth Arrow
1561:
1559:
1556:
1554:
1551:
1549:
1546:
1544:
1543:John Harsanyi
1541:
1539:
1536:
1534:
1531:
1529:
1526:
1524:
1521:
1519:
1516:
1514:
1513:Herbert Simon
1511:
1509:
1506:
1504:
1501:
1499:
1496:
1494:
1491:
1489:
1486:
1484:
1481:
1479:
1476:
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1471:
1469:
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1461:
1459:
1456:
1454:
1451:
1450:
1448:
1442:
1436:
1433:
1431:
1428:
1426:
1423:
1421:
1418:
1416:
1413:
1411:
1408:
1406:
1403:
1401:
1398:
1396:
1393:
1392:
1390:
1386:
1380:
1377:
1375:
1372:
1370:
1367:
1365:
1362:
1360:
1357:
1355:
1352:
1350:
1347:
1345:
1342:
1340:
1337:
1335:
1332:
1330:
1327:
1325:
1322:
1320:
1317:
1315:
1314:Fair division
1312:
1310:
1307:
1305:
1302:
1300:
1297:
1295:
1292:
1290:
1289:Dictator game
1287:
1285:
1282:
1280:
1277:
1275:
1272:
1270:
1267:
1265:
1262:
1260:
1257:
1255:
1252:
1250:
1247:
1245:
1242:
1240:
1237:
1235:
1232:
1230:
1227:
1225:
1222:
1220:
1217:
1215:
1212:
1210:
1207:
1205:
1202:
1200:
1197:
1195:
1192:
1190:
1187:
1185:
1182:
1180:
1177:
1176:
1174:
1172:
1168:
1162:
1161:Zero-sum game
1159:
1157:
1154:
1152:
1149:
1147:
1144:
1142:
1139:
1137:
1134:
1132:
1131:Repeated game
1129:
1127:
1124:
1122:
1119:
1117:
1114:
1112:
1110:
1106:
1104:
1101:
1099:
1096:
1094:
1091:
1089:
1086:
1084:
1081:
1080:
1078:
1076:
1070:
1064:
1061:
1059:
1056:
1054:
1051:
1049:
1048:Pure strategy
1046:
1044:
1041:
1039:
1036:
1034:
1031:
1029:
1026:
1024:
1021:
1019:
1016:
1014:
1011:
1009:
1008:De-escalation
1006:
1004:
1001:
999:
996:
994:
991:
989:
986:
984:
981:
980:
978:
976:
972:
966:
963:
961:
958:
956:
953:
951:
950:Shapley value
948:
946:
943:
941:
938:
936:
933:
931:
928:
926:
923:
921:
918:
916:
913:
911:
908:
906:
903:
901:
898:
896:
893:
891:
888:
886:
883:
881:
878:
876:
873:
871:
868:
866:
863:
861:
858:
856:
853:
851:
848:
846:
843:
842:
840:
838:
834:
830:
824:
821:
819:
818:Succinct game
816:
814:
811:
809:
806:
804:
801:
799:
796:
794:
791:
789:
786:
784:
781:
779:
776:
774:
771:
769:
766:
764:
761:
759:
756:
754:
751:
749:
746:
744:
741:
739:
736:
735:
733:
729:
725:
717:
712:
710:
705:
703:
698:
697:
694:
686:
682:
676:
673:
670:
669:9780262033053
666:
660:
657:
654:(3), 460-469.
653:
650:
644:
641:
637:
633:
627:
624:
621:
617:
611:
608:
605:
601:
595:
592:
589:
585:
579:
577:
575:
573:
571:
569:
565:
562:
559:(1). 209-221.
558:
552:
549:
546:
542:
536:
534:
530:
526:
525:0-85224-223-9
522:
518:
512:
509:
506:
502:
496:
494:
492:
490:
488:
484:
473:on 2017-08-09
472:
468:
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460:
453:
450:
447:
446:0-521-28884-3
443:
437:
435:
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431:
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365:
361:
353:
352:
351:
331:
302:
296:
293:
267:
241:
237:
233:
230:
225:
221:
217:
212:
207:
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200:
196:
190:
184:
180:
176:
170:
165:
161:
150:
149:
148:
146:
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139:
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119:
110:
108:
104:
99:
95:
91:
88:
81:
79:
72:
70:
68:
67:
62:
61:On Evolution.
58:
53:
49:
47:
39:
37:
35:
30:
19:
1608:Peyton Young
1603:Paul Milgrom
1518:Hervé Moulin
1458:Amos Tversky
1400:Folk theorem
1111:-player game
1108:
1028:Grim trigger
680:
675:
659:
651:
643:
635:
626:
615:
610:
599:
594:
583:
556:
551:
540:
517:On Evolution
516:
511:
503:(1), 49-67.
500:
475:. Retrieved
471:the original
466:
462:
452:
256:
142:
138:folk theorem
127:
114:
106:
101:
97:
93:
89:
85:
76:
64:
60:
54:
50:
43:
28:
26:
1725:Coopetition
1528:Jean Tirole
1523:John Conway
1503:Eric Maskin
1299:Blotto game
1284:Pirate game
1093:Global game
1063:Tit for tat
993:Bid shading
983:Appeasement
833:Equilibrium
813:Solved game
748:Determinacy
731:Definitions
724:game theory
586:, 145-156.
34:polymorphic
1369:Trust game
1354:Kuhn poker
1018:Escalation
1013:Deterrence
1003:Cheap talk
975:Strategies
793:Preference
722:Topics of
616:Oikos, 119
541:Nature 246
477:2018-01-10
418:References
257:The state
1553:John Nash
1259:Stag hunt
998:Collusion
387:^
335:^
306:^
297:≠
271:^
218:−
171:˙
136:(NE) and
1775:Category
1694:Lazy SMP
1388:Theorems
1339:Deadlock
1194:Checkers
1075:of games
837:concepts
1446:figures
1229:Chicken
1083:Auction
1073:Classes
638:(10):6.
667:
523:
444:
1184:Chess
1171:Games
860:Core
665:ISBN
521:ISBN
442:ISBN
377:<
1444:Key
1777::
1179:Go
634:.
567:^
532:^
486:^
467:11
465:.
461:.
425:^
350:.
1109:n
715:e
708:t
701:v
527:.
480:.
402:x
399:A
394:T
384:x
374:x
371:A
366:T
362:x
332:x
303:x
294:x
268:x
242:,
238:)
234:x
231:A
226:T
222:x
213:i
208:)
204:x
201:A
197:(
191:(
185:i
181:x
177:=
166:i
162:x
20:)
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