Knowledge (XXG)

Extended mind thesis

Source đź“ť

31: 137:), in which objects within the environment function as a part of the mind. They argue that the separation between the mind, the body, and the environment is an unprincipled distinction. Because external objects play a significant role in aiding cognitive processes, the mind and the environment act as a "coupled system" that can be seen as a complete cognitive system of its own. In this manner, the mind is extended into the physical world. The main criterion that Clark and Chalmers list for classifying the use of external objects during cognitive tasks as a part of an extended cognitive system is that the external objects must function with the same purpose as the internal processes. 238:(contrasted with a hypothesis of embedded cognition) in other work, some of these objections have inspired more moderate reformulations of the extended mind thesis. Thus, the extended mind thesis may no longer depend on the parity considerations of Clark and Chalmers' original argument but, instead, emphasize the "complementarity" of internal and external elements of cognitive systems or processes. This version might be understood as emphasizing the explanatory value of the extended mind thesis for cognitive science rather than maintaining it as an ontological claim about the nature of mind or cognition. 148:, and has written all of his directions down in a notebook to serve the function of his memory. Inga is able to recall the internal directions within her memory. The argument is that the only difference existing in these two cases is that Inga's memory is being internally processed by the brain, while Otto's memory is being served by the notebook. In other words, Otto's mind has been extended to include the notebook as the source of his memory. The notebook qualifies as such because it is 167:" claim was not that the processes in Otto and Inga are identical, or even similar, in terms of their detailed implementation. It is simply that, with respect to the role that the long-term encodings play in guiding current response, both modes of storage can be seen as supporting dispositional beliefs. It is the way the information is poised to guide reasoning ... and behavior that counts." 326:
In 2021, biology and social science writer Annie Murphy Paul published “The Extended Mind: The Power of Thinking Outside the Brain.” Inspired by Clark's and Chalmers's work, the book synthesizes the results of various scientific papers and studies that examine the intelligence that exists beyond the
244:
argues that the extended mind "sounds like a substantive thesis, the truth of which we should investigate. But actually the thesis turns about to be just a statement on where the demarcations for the 'mental' are to be set" and that "this discussion about demarcation is merely verbal and thus to be
298:
This "4E" view of cognition contrasts with the view of the mind as a processing center that creates mental representations of reality and uses them to control the body's behaviour. The field of extended cognition focuses upon the processes involved in this creation and subsumes these processes as
201:
When focusing on cognition, the thesis confuses claims about what is constitutive about the concept of cognition with claims about causal influences on cognition (the "causal-constitutional fallacy"). For example, Adams and Aizawa (2010) write, "Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4?,
38:
anecdote about a wealthy freedman who wished to make himself appear cultured by reciting poetry at dinner parties but was hampered by a bad memory. So he bought educated slaves and had one memorise Homer, another Hesiod, and so on, on the theory that what his slaves knew, he knew too.”
208:
It uses coarse-grained functionalism about the mind that ignores plausible differences between internal and external processes, such as differences between beliefs and external props and devices; or for creating a notion of cognition too heterogeneous to make up a scientific natural
180:
hypothesis yields yet another perspective to the idea of extended mind. Based on evidence in neuroscience and psychophysiological research, Research Professor Igor Val Danilov proposed that an embryo's nervous system (being a part of the external environment to the mother's
225:
One can imagine circumstances under which a biological being might retain information in non-neural ways (a hypothetical Martian with a bitmap-based memory, or humans with prosthetics to support memory). Thus, being neural cannot be a necessary condition for being
217:
While coupling is important for cognition, that is not to say that it is sufficient – coupling must play a functional role in cognition. Many couplings do not do so and thus would not be 'extensions' (and this is consistent with a strong extended mind
221:
Any putative part of a system – internal or external – is unlikely to yield "cognition" on its own. Thus, examples such as calculators, and pencils, should be considered in parallel with neural regions. Simply looking at the part is not enough for
317:
involved in developing an awareness of, and a reformation of, the environment. For example, JapyassĂş and Laland argue that some spider's web is something between part of its sensory system and an additional part of its cognitive system.
600:
Szymanski, C., Pesquita, A., Brennan, A.A., Perdikis, D., Enns, J.T., Brick, T.R., et al. (2017). "Teams on the same wavelength perform better: Inter-brain phase synchronization constitutes a neural substrate for social facilitation."
586:
Fishburn, F.A., Murty, V.P., Hlutkowsky, C.O., MacGillivray, C.E., Bemis, L.M., Murphy, M.E., et al. (2018). "Putting our heads together: Interpersonal neural synchronization as a biological mechanism for shared intentionality."
185:) can take part in the mother's cognitive process and function as an extension of the mother's mind. This neuronal coupling provides social learning during the embryonal period. From this perspective, the 643:
McClung, J. S., Placì, S., Bangerter, A., Clément, F., & Bshary, R. (2017). "The language of cooperation: shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership."
156:
by him. They also suggest Otto's notebook should be considered an extension of himself; the notebook in a way becomes a "fragile biological limb or organ" that Otto wants to protect from harm.
1210: 205:
It stretches the limits of our ordinary concept of cognition too far ("cognitive bloating"), potentially implying that everything on the Internet is part of individual cognitive systems.
614:
Astolfi, L., Toppi, J., De Vico Fallani, F., Vecchiato, G., Salinari, S., Mattia, D., et al. (2010). "Neuroelectrical hyperscanning measures simultaneous brain activity in humans."
677:
Val Danilov, I., Svajyan, A., Mihailova, S. (2023). "A New Computer-Aided Method for Assessing Children's Cognition in Bioengineering Systems for Diagnosing Developmental Delay."
560:
Painter, D.R., Kim, J.J., Renton, A.I., Mattingley, J.B. (2021). "Joint control of visually guided actions involves concordant increases in behavioural and neural coupling."
159:
The thought experiment has been criticised with the notion that what happens with Otto is not very similar to what happens with Inga. This criticism is addressed by Clark in
30: 544:
Liu, J., Zhang, R., Xie, E. et al. (2023). "Shared intentionality modulates interpersonal neural synchronization at the establishment of communication system."
144:
to illustrate the environment's role in connection to the mind. The fictional characters Otto and Inga are both travelling to a museum simultaneously. Otto has
307:, the body is involved in cognition, but there is a 'high' level where cultural factors play a role. This view of cognition is sometimes referred to as 693:
Val Danilov, I., Mihailova, S., Svajyan, A. (2022). "Computerized Assessment of Cognitive Development in Neurotypical and Neurodivergent Children."
299:
part of consciousness, which is no longer confined to the brain or body but involves interaction with the environment. At a 'low' level, like
1060: 573:
Hu, Y., Pan, Y., Shi, X., Cai, Q., Li, X., Cheng, X. (2018). "Inter-brain synchrony and cooperation context in interactive decision making."
712:"Low-Frequency Oscillations for Nonlocal Neuronal Coupling in Shared Intentionality Before and After Birth: Toward the Origin of Perception" 927:"Consciousness as the emergent property of the interaction between brain, body, & environment: the crucial role of haptic perception" 926: 985: 958: 864: 627:
Val Danilov I. & Mihailova S. (2023). "Empirical Evidence of Shared Intentionality: Towards Bioengineering Systems Development."
901: 745:"Shared Intentionality Modulation at the Cell Level: Low-Frequency Oscillations for Temporal Coordination in Bioengineering Systems" 529: 488: 660:
Shteynberg, G., & Galinsky, A. D. (2011). "Implicit coordination: Sharing goals with similar others intensifies goal pursuit."
1184: 775:
Val Danilov, I. (2023). "Theoretical Grounds of Shared Intentionality for Neuroscience in Developing Bioengineering Systems."
1151: 947:
Pietro Morasso (2007). "Chapter 14: The crucial role of haptic perception". In Antonio Chella; Riccardo Manzotti (eds.).
1246: 134: 1241: 975: 71:
and in that way function as extensions of the mind itself. Examples of such objects are written calculations, a
109:), the EMT has the implication that some parts of a person's identity can be determined by their environment. 885: 356: 1251: 429: 371: 145: 83:. The hypothesis considers the mind to encompass every level of cognition, including the physical level. 336: 186: 177: 744: 711: 698: 682: 632: 272:
involves more than the brain, including a more general involvement of bodily structures and processes.
241: 1029: 464: 404: 366: 341: 141: 106: 44: 35: 521: 1159: 1107: 1056: 993: 981: 954: 948: 942: 907: 897: 893: 860: 525: 484: 304: 102: 76: 68: 1012:
McGann, Marek; De Jaegher, Hanne; Di Paolo, Ezequiel (June 2013). "Enaction and psychology".
848: 476: 1097: 1089: 1048: 1021: 933: 889: 756: 723: 513: 456: 1125: 129:(1998) is the paper that originally stated the EMT. Clark and Chalmers present the idea of 1102: 1077: 300: 182: 126: 91: 1235: 828:
MĂĽller, Vincent C. "The extended mind thesis is about demarcation and use of words".
514: 262: 67:. The thesis proposes that some objects in the external environment can be part of a 313:
to emphasise the role of interplay between the organism and its environment and the
1033: 761: 728: 351: 64: 17: 314: 197:
Philosophical arguments against the extended mind thesis include the following.
95: 80: 98:, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes." 1093: 911: 400: 346: 122: 87: 60: 1163: 665: 549: 648: 460: 1111: 498: 853:
The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology
361: 309: 213:
Each of these arguments is addressed in Clark (2008), in which he notes:
468: 789:
Adams, Fred; Aizawa, Ken (2010). "Defending the Bounds of Cognition".
1025: 997: 790: 699:
https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-06-03-137
683:
https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-189
633:
https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-02-167
27:
Philosophy of mind where the mind resides beyond the brain and body
447:
Andy Clark, David J Chalmers (January 1998). "The extended mind".
189:
approach provides empirical evidence of the extended mind thesis.
72: 56: 29: 815:
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
516:
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
94:
in "The Extended Mind" (1998). They describe the idea as "active
1126:"Why You Should Think With Your Environment, Not Just Your Mind" 284:
involving not only neural processes but also things an organism
52: 1051:. In Stewart, John; Oliver Gapenne; Ezequiel A DiPaolo (eds.). 202:
Clark’s Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician."
1211:"Where does great thinking come from? Look beyond the brain" 1047:
Stewart, John; Gapenne, Oliver; DiPaolo, Ezequiel A (2014).
996:
of how the physical body/brain produces mental, subjective
880:
Newen, Albert; Bruin, Leon; Gallagher, Shaun, eds. (2018).
434:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition)
992:
Culture produces the mind; brain circuitry does not. The
977:
Macro Cultural Psychology: A Political Philosophy of Mind
1185:"'The Extended Mind' Review: Thinking Outside the Brain" 1000:, is the wrong way to frame the origin of consciousness. 645:
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
681:
2023; 7(4): 189; doi:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304189.
631:
2023; 7(2): 167; doi:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2302167.
234:
Clark defends a strong version of the hypothesis of
779:
2023; 7(1): 156; doi:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2301156
278:
functioning only in a related external environment.
884:. Oxford Library of Psychology. Oxford; New York: 697:2022;6(3):18; doi:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2203137. 428:Wilson, Robert A.; Foglia, Lucia (25 July 2011). 1055:(Paperback ed.). MIT Press. p. vii. 808: 806: 79:; in general, it concerns objects that store 8: 1076:JapyassĂş, Hilton F; Laland, Kevin N (2017). 1152:"There Is More to Us Than Just Our Brains" 666:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.04.012 662:Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 550:https://doi.org/10.1038/s42003-023-05197-z 1101: 760: 727: 649:http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1682 980:. Oxford University Press. p. 96. 894:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.001.0001 383: 792:Defending the bounds of cognition, in 475:Andy Clark, David J Chalmers (2010). 150:constantly and immediately accessible 7: 830:Italian Journal of Cognitive Science 520:. Oxford University Press. pp.  55:does not exclusively reside in the 25: 1209:Balcetis, Emily (June 18, 2021). 1183:Hutson, Matthew (May 24, 2021). 497:Clark, Andy; Chalmers, David J. 405:"Reading Ancient Slavery (2010)" 294:into the organism's environment. 941:Slides related to a chapter on 882:Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition 953:. Academic. pp. 234–255. 849:"Chapter 3: The mind embedded" 762:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304185 729:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304192 477:"Chapter 2: The extended mind" 1: 945:(recognition through touch): 483:. MIT Press. pp. 27–42. 432:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). 140:Clark and Chalmers present a 1150:Pinker, Susan (2021-06-11). 1014:Review of General Psychology 799:. MIT Press. pp. 67–80. 1078:"Extended spider cognition" 495:; and available online as: 479:. In Richard Menary (ed.). 1268: 817:. Oxford University Press. 743:Val Danilov, Igor (2023). 710:Val Danilov, Igor (2023). 1094:10.1007/s10071-017-1069-7 855:. MIT Press. pp. 51 589:Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 133:(not to be confused with 950:Artificial Consciousness 925:Morasso, Pietro (2005). 265:, mental processes are: 886:Oxford University Press 847:Rowlands, Mark (2010). 63:, but extends into the 372:The Extended Phenotype 169: 154:automatically endorsed 40: 974:Ratner, Carl (2011). 796:(Eds, Richard Menary) 647:284(1863), 20171682. 461:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 337:Distributed cognition 187:Shared intentionality 178:Shared intentionality 165: 33: 512:Clark, Andy (2008). 430:"Embodied Cognition" 357:Landauer's principle 232:Supersizing the Mind 161:Supersizing the Mind 135:semantic externalism 49:extended mind thesis 1215:The Washington Post 1189:Wall Street Journal 664:47(6), 1291-1294., 605:2017; 152: 425-436. 499:"The extended mind" 152:to Otto, and it is 146:Alzheimer's disease 113:"The Extended Mind" 86:It was proposed by 1247:Enactive cognition 1156:The New York Times 618:2010; 23: 243-256. 591:2018; 13: 841-849. 390:(Epistles 27.5-8). 367:Situated cognition 342:Embodied cognition 315:feedback processes 236:extended cognition 172:Empirical evidence 142:thought experiment 131:active externalism 107:philosophy of self 101:For the matter of 45:philosophy of mind 41: 18:Extended cognition 1242:Cognitive science 1062:978-0-262-52601-2 994:mind-body problem 943:haptic perception 794:The Extended Mind 577:2018; 133: 54-62. 481:The Extended Mind 305:haptic perception 242:Vincent C. MĂĽller 119:The Extended Mind 103:personal identity 69:cognitive process 16:(Redirected from 1259: 1226: 1225: 1223: 1221: 1206: 1200: 1199: 1197: 1195: 1180: 1174: 1173: 1171: 1170: 1147: 1141: 1140: 1138: 1137: 1122: 1116: 1115: 1105: 1082:Animal Cognition 1073: 1067: 1066: 1044: 1038: 1037: 1026:10.1037/a0032935 1009: 1003: 1002: 971: 965: 964: 940: 938: 932:. Archived from 931: 922: 916: 915: 877: 871: 870: 844: 838: 837: 825: 819: 818: 810: 801: 800: 786: 780: 777:OBM Neurobiology 773: 767: 766: 764: 749:OBM Neurobiology 740: 734: 733: 731: 716:OBM Neurobiology 707: 701: 695:OBM Neurobiology 691: 685: 679:OBM Neurobiology 675: 669: 658: 652: 641: 635: 629:OBM Neurobiology 625: 619: 612: 606: 598: 592: 584: 578: 571: 565: 558: 552: 542: 536: 535: 519: 509: 503: 502: 494: 473:; reprinted as: 472: 444: 438: 437: 425: 419: 418: 416: 415: 397: 391: 388: 261:As described by 21: 1267: 1266: 1262: 1261: 1260: 1258: 1257: 1256: 1232: 1231: 1230: 1229: 1219: 1217: 1208: 1207: 1203: 1193: 1191: 1182: 1181: 1177: 1168: 1166: 1149: 1148: 1144: 1135: 1133: 1124: 1123: 1119: 1075: 1074: 1070: 1063: 1046: 1045: 1041: 1011: 1010: 1006: 988: 973: 972: 968: 961: 946: 936: 929: 924: 923: 919: 904: 879: 878: 874: 867: 846: 845: 841: 827: 826: 822: 812: 811: 804: 788: 787: 783: 774: 770: 742: 741: 737: 709: 708: 704: 692: 688: 676: 672: 659: 655: 642: 638: 626: 622: 613: 609: 599: 595: 585: 581: 572: 568: 559: 555: 548:6, 832 (2023). 543: 539: 532: 511: 510: 506: 496: 491: 474: 446: 445: 441: 427: 426: 422: 413: 411: 399: 398: 394: 389: 385: 380: 333: 324: 322:Further reading 259: 195: 174: 115: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 1265: 1263: 1255: 1254: 1249: 1244: 1234: 1233: 1228: 1227: 1201: 1175: 1142: 1117: 1088:(3): 375–395. 1068: 1061: 1049:"Introduction" 1039: 1020:(2): 203–209. 1004: 987:978-0199706297 986: 966: 960:978-1845400705 959: 939:on 2006-05-08. 917: 902: 872: 866:978-0262014557 865: 839: 820: 802: 781: 768: 735: 702: 686: 670: 653: 636: 620: 607: 593: 579: 566: 553: 537: 530: 504: 489: 439: 420: 403:(2012-08-09). 392: 382: 381: 379: 376: 375: 374: 369: 364: 359: 354: 349: 344: 339: 332: 329: 323: 320: 312: 301:motor learning 296: 295: 289: 279: 273: 258: 247: 228: 227: 223: 219: 211: 210: 206: 203: 194: 191: 183:nervous system 173: 170: 127:David Chalmers 114: 111: 92:David Chalmers 65:physical world 51:says that the 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1264: 1253: 1252:Consciousness 1250: 1248: 1245: 1243: 1240: 1239: 1237: 1216: 1212: 1205: 1202: 1190: 1186: 1179: 1176: 1165: 1161: 1157: 1153: 1146: 1143: 1131: 1127: 1121: 1118: 1113: 1109: 1104: 1099: 1095: 1091: 1087: 1083: 1079: 1072: 1069: 1064: 1058: 1054: 1050: 1043: 1040: 1035: 1031: 1027: 1023: 1019: 1015: 1008: 1005: 1001: 999: 995: 989: 983: 979: 978: 970: 967: 962: 956: 952: 951: 944: 935: 928: 921: 918: 913: 909: 905: 903:9780198735410 899: 895: 891: 887: 883: 876: 873: 868: 862: 858: 854: 850: 843: 840: 835: 831: 824: 821: 816: 813:Andy (2008). 809: 807: 803: 798: 797: 793: 785: 782: 778: 772: 769: 763: 758: 754: 750: 746: 739: 736: 730: 725: 721: 717: 713: 706: 703: 700: 696: 690: 687: 684: 680: 674: 671: 667: 663: 657: 654: 650: 646: 640: 637: 634: 630: 624: 621: 617: 616:Brain Topogr. 611: 608: 604: 597: 594: 590: 583: 580: 576: 575:Biol Psychol. 570: 567: 564:2021; 4: 816. 563: 557: 554: 551: 547: 541: 538: 533: 531:9780195333213 527: 523: 518: 517: 508: 505: 500: 492: 490:9780262014038 486: 482: 478: 470: 466: 462: 458: 454: 450: 443: 440: 435: 431: 424: 421: 410: 406: 402: 401:Hall, Edith M 396: 393: 387: 384: 377: 373: 370: 368: 365: 363: 360: 358: 355: 353: 350: 348: 345: 343: 340: 338: 335: 334: 330: 328: 327:human brain. 321: 319: 316: 311: 308: 306: 302: 293: 290: 287: 283: 280: 277: 274: 271: 268: 267: 266: 264: 263:Mark Rowlands 256: 252: 248: 246: 243: 239: 237: 233: 224: 220: 216: 215: 214: 207: 204: 200: 199: 198: 192: 190: 188: 184: 179: 171: 168: 164: 162: 157: 155: 151: 147: 143: 138: 136: 132: 128: 124: 120: 112: 110: 108: 104: 99: 97: 93: 89: 84: 82: 78: 74: 70: 66: 62: 58: 54: 50: 46: 37: 32: 19: 1218:. Retrieved 1214: 1204: 1192:. Retrieved 1188: 1178: 1167:. Retrieved 1155: 1145: 1134:. Retrieved 1132:. 2021-08-12 1129: 1120: 1085: 1081: 1071: 1052: 1042: 1017: 1013: 1007: 991: 976: 969: 949: 934:the original 920: 881: 875: 856: 852: 842: 833: 829: 823: 814: 795: 791: 784: 776: 771: 752: 748: 738: 719: 715: 705: 694: 689: 678: 673: 661: 656: 644: 639: 628: 623: 615: 610: 602: 596: 588: 582: 574: 569: 562:Commun Biol. 561: 556: 545: 540: 515: 507: 501:. Cogprints. 480: 452: 448: 442: 433: 423: 412:. Retrieved 409:Academia.edu 408: 395: 386: 352:Extelligence 325: 297: 291: 285: 281: 275: 269: 260: 254: 250: 249:Relation to 240: 235: 231: 229: 212: 196: 175: 166: 160: 158: 153: 149: 139: 130: 118: 116: 100: 85: 59:or even the 48: 42: 755:(4): 1–17. 722:(4): 1–17. 603:Neuroimage. 546:Commun Biol 455:(1): 7–19. 96:externalism 81:information 1236:Categories 1169:2022-04-22 1136:2022-04-22 912:1057357626 414:2024-03-20 378:References 347:Enactivism 245:avoided". 226:cognitive. 222:cognition. 123:Andy Clark 88:Andy Clark 1220:April 22, 1194:April 22, 1164:0362-4331 836:: 335–48. 257:cognition 230:While in 193:Criticism 105:(and the 1112:28176133 1053:Enaction 449:Analysis 362:Language 331:See also 310:enaction 292:Extended 276:Embedded 270:Embodied 251:embodied 218:thesis). 1103:5394149 1034:8986622 469:3328150 282:Enacted 255:enacted 75:, or a 1162:  1110:  1100:  1059:  1032:  998:qualia 984:  957:  910:  900:  863:  528:  487:  467:  47:, the 36:Seneca 1030:S2CID 937:(PDF) 930:(PDF) 465:JSTOR 209:kind. 121:" by 73:diary 57:brain 1222:2022 1196:2022 1160:ISSN 1108:PMID 1057:ISBN 982:ISBN 955:ISBN 908:OCLC 898:ISBN 861:ISBN 526:ISBN 485:ISBN 303:and 286:does 253:and 176:The 125:and 90:and 61:body 53:mind 1098:PMC 1090:doi 1022:doi 890:doi 757:doi 724:doi 457:doi 43:In 1238:: 1213:. 1187:. 1158:. 1154:. 1130:GQ 1128:. 1106:. 1096:. 1086:20 1084:. 1080:. 1028:. 1018:17 1016:. 990:. 906:. 896:. 888:. 859:. 857:ff 851:. 832:. 805:^ 751:. 747:. 718:. 714:. 524:. 522:96 463:. 453:58 451:. 407:. 77:PC 1224:. 1198:. 1172:. 1139:. 1114:. 1092:: 1065:. 1036:. 1024:: 963:. 914:. 892:: 869:. 834:2 765:. 759:: 753:7 732:. 726:: 720:7 668:. 651:. 534:. 493:. 471:. 459:: 436:. 417:. 288:. 163:: 117:" 34:“ 20:)

Index

Extended cognition

Seneca
philosophy of mind
mind
brain
body
physical world
cognitive process
diary
PC
information
Andy Clark
David Chalmers
externalism
personal identity
philosophy of self
Andy Clark
David Chalmers
semantic externalism
thought experiment
Alzheimer's disease
Shared intentionality
nervous system
Shared intentionality
Vincent C. MĂĽller
Mark Rowlands
motor learning
haptic perception
enaction

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

↑