207:. The argument asks us to imagine a subject with beliefs and experiences identical to ours, but the subject is being systematically deceived by a malicious Cartesian demon so that all their beliefs turn out false. In spite of the subject's unfortunate deception, the argument goes, we do not think this subject ceases to be rational in taking things to be as they appear as we do. After all, it is possible that we could be radically deceived in the same way, yet we are still justified in holding most of our beliefs in spite of this possibility. Since reliabilism maintains that one's beliefs are justified via reliable belief-forming processes (where reliable means yielding true beliefs), the subject in the evil demon scenario would not likely have any justified beliefs according to reliabilism because all of their beliefs would be false. Since this result is supposed to clash with our intuitions that the subject is justified in their beliefs in spite of being systematically deceived, some take the new evil demon problem as a reason for rejecting externalist views of justification.
454:, for example, have defended internalist accounts of thought content according to which the contents of our thoughts are fixed by descriptions that pick out the individuals and kinds that our thoughts intuitively pertain to the sorts of things that we take them to. In the Ike/Tina example, one might agree that Ike's thoughts pertain to Ike's mother and that Tina's thoughts pertain to Tina's but insist that this is because Ike thinks of that woman as his mother and we can capture this by saying that he thinks of her as 'the mother of the speaker'. This descriptive phrase will pick out one unique woman. Externalists claim this is implausible, as we would have to ascribe to Ike knowledge he wouldn't need to successfully think about or refer to his mother.
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right now (to not steal from the poor person next to him), even though he doesn't care to do so? The reasons externalist answers in the affirmative ("Yes, Sasha has a reason not to steal from that poor person."), since he believes that one can have reasons for action even if one does not have the relevant desire. Conversely, the reasons internalist answers the question in the negative ("No, Sasha does not have a reason not to steal from that poor person, though others might."). The reasons internalist claims that external reasons are unintelligible; one has a reason for action only if one has the relevant desire (that is, only internal reasons can be reasons for action). The reasons internalist claims the following: the moral facts are a reason
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cognitive grasp of any reasons or facts which make their belief justified. The externalist's assessment of justification can be contrasted with access internalism, which demands that the believer have internal reflective access to reasons or facts which corroborate their belief in order to be justified in holding it. Externalism, on the other hand, maintains that the justification for someone's belief can come from facts that are entirely external to the agent's subjective awareness.
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the same response (e.g., one where the person was very recently turned into a brain in a vat, so that their words "brain" and "vat" still pick out real brains and vats, rather than simulated ones). Further, if even brains in vats can correctly believe "I am not a brain in a vat," then the skeptic can still press us on how we know we are not in that situation (though the externalist will point out that it may be difficult for the skeptic to describe that situation).
199:. At minimum, access internalism requires that the believer have some kind of reflective access or awareness to whatever justifies her belief. Ontological internalism is the view that justification for a belief is established by one's mental states. Ontological internalism can be distinct from access internalism, but the two are often thought to go together since we are generally considered to be capable of having reflective access to mental states.
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prevent her from putting these together and coming to know a priori that the world contains water? If we should say that no one could possibly know whether water exists a priori, it seems either we cannot know content externalism to be true on the basis of thought experiments or we cannot know what we are thinking without first looking into the world to see what it is like.
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78:) is the view that moral convictions (which are not necessarily beliefs, e.g. feelings of moral approval or disapproval) are intrinsically motivating. That is, the motivational internalist believes that there is an internal, necessary connection between one's conviction that X ought to be done and one's motivation to do X. Conversely, the
86:) claims that there is no necessary internal connection between moral convictions and moral motives. That is, there is no necessary connection between the conviction that X is wrong and the motivational drive not to do X. (The use of these terms has roots in W.D. Falk's (1947) paper "'Ought' and Motivation").
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The traditional discussion on externalism was centered around the semantic aspect of mental content. This is by no means the only meaning of externalism now. Externalism is now a broad collection of philosophical views considering all aspects of mental content and activity. There are various forms of
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Apart from disputes over the success of the argument or the plausibility of the specific type of semantic externalism required for it to work, there is question as to what is gained by defeating the skeptical worry with this strategy. Skeptics can give new skeptical cases that wouldn't be subject to
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A unique consequence of reliabilism (and other forms of externalism) is that one can have a justified belief without knowing one is justified (this is not possible under most forms of epistemic internalism). In addition, we do not yet know which cognitive processes are in fact reliable, so anyone who
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For example, suppose that Ike and Tina's mothers are identical twins and that Ike and Tina are raised in isolation from one another in indistinguishable environments. When Ike says, "I want my mommy," he expresses a want satisfied only if he is brought to his mommy. If we brought Tina's mommy, Ike
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comes in two varieties, depending on whether meaning is construed cognitively or linguistically. On a cognitive construal, externalism is the thesis that what concepts (or contents) are available to a thinker is determined by their environment, or their relation to their environment. On a linguistic
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O even before scientists had discovered that chemical composition. The fact that the substance out in the world we were calling "water" actually had that composition at least partially determined the meaning of the word. One way to use this in a response to skepticism is to apply the same strategy
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is something that one has independent of one's subjective motivational set. For example, suppose that Sally is going to drink a glass of poison, because she wants to commit suicide and believes that she can do so by drinking the poison. Sally has an internal reason to drink the poison, because she
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O. It seems this speaker could know a priori that they think that water is wet. This is the thesis of privileged access. It also seems that they could know on the basis of simple thought experiments that they can only think that water is wet if they live in a world that contains water. What would
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to follow the moral law (or if not stealing from the poor person is a way to satisfy his other current goals—that is, part of what
Williams calls his "subjective motivational set"). In short, the reasoning behind reasons internalism, according to Williams, is that reasons for action must be able to
102:, because the motivational externalist thinks that moral judgments about what is right do not necessitate some motivation to do those things that are judged to be the right thing to do; rather, an independent desire—such as the desire to do the right thing—is required (Brink, 2003), (Rosati, 2006).
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To clarify how this argument is supposed to work: Imagine that there is brain in a vat, and a whole world is being simulated for it. Call the individual who is being deceived "Steve." When Steve is given an experience of walking through a park, semantic externalism allows for his thought, "I am
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Consider the following situation. Suppose that it's against the moral law to steal from the poor, and Sasha knows this. However, Sasha doesn't desire to follow the moral law, and there is currently a poor person next to him. Is it intelligible to say that Sasha has a reason to follow the moral law
276:(BIV). (See also DeRose, 1999.) If semantic externalism is true, then the meaning of a word or sentence is not wholly determined by what individuals think those words mean. For example, semantic externalists maintain that the word "water" referred to the substance whose chemical composition is H
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is unintelligible (and metaphysically impossible). An amoralist is not simply someone who is immoral, rather it is someone who knows what the moral things to do are, yet is not motivated to do them. Such an agent is unintelligible to the motivational internalist, because moral judgments about the
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Externalist views of justification emerged in epistemology during the late 20th century. Externalist conceptions of justification assert that facts external to the believer can serve as the justification for a belief. According to the externalist, a believer need not have any internal access or
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Externalists say that if we assume competent speakers know what they think, and say what they think, the difference in what these two speakers mean corresponds to a difference in the thoughts of the two speakers that is not (necessarily) reflected by a difference in the internal make up of the
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is one in which he is walking through a park. Similarly, what it takes for his thought, "I am a brain in a vat," to be true is for the simulated reality to be one where he is a brain in a vat. But in the simulated reality, he is not a brain in a vat.
404:'s seminal essay, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," (1975). Putnam stated that we can easily imagine pairs of individuals that are microphysical duplicates embedded in different surroundings who use the same words but mean different things when using them.
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speakers or thinkers. They urge us to move from externalism about meaning of the sort Putnam defended to externalism about contentful states of mind. The example pertains to singular terms, but has been extended to cover kind terms as well such as
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might not notice the difference, but he doesn't get what he wants. It seems that what he wants and what he says when he says, "I want my mommy," will be different from what Tina wants and what she says she wants when she says, "I want my mommy."
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Some philosophers embrace the existence of both kinds of reason, while others deny the existence of one or the other. For example, Bernard
Williams (1981) argues that there are really only internal reasons for action. Such a view is called
400:), some mental states, such as believing that water is wet, and fearing that the Queen has been insulted, have contents we can capture using 'that' clauses. The content externalist often appeal to observations found as early as
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wants to commit suicide. However, one might say that she has an external reason not to drink the poison because, even though she wants to die, one ought not to kill oneself no matter what—regardless of whether one wants to die.
151:) is the denial of reasons internalism. It is the view that there are external reasons for action; that is, there are reasons for action that one can have even if the action is not part of one's subjective motivational set.
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Two main varieties of epistemic internalism about justification are access internalism and ontological internalism. Access internalists require that a believer must have internal access to the justifier(s) of their belief
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Internalism is the thesis that no fact about the world can provide reasons for action independently of desires and beliefs. Externalism is the thesis that reasons are to be identified with objective features of the world.
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right thing to do have built into them corresponding motivations to do those things that are judged by the agent to be the moral things to do. On the other hand, an amoralist is entirely intelligible to the motivational
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Critics have also claimed that content externalists are committed to epistemological absurdities. Suppose that a speaker can have the concept of water we do only if the speaker lives in a world that contains
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One popular argument for internalism is known as the 'new evil demon problem'. The new evil demon problem indirectly supports internalism by challenging externalist views of justification, particularly
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construal, externalism is the thesis that the meaning of a word is environmentally determined. Likewise, one can construe semantic internalism in two ways, as a denial of either of these two theses.
726:
Putnam, H. (1981): "Brains in a vat" in Reason, Truth, and
History, Cambridge University Press; reprinted in DeRose and Warfield, editors (1999): Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford UP.
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externalism that consider either the content or the vehicles of the mind or both. Furthermore, externalism could be limited to cognition, or it could address broader issues of consciousness.
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If I am a BIV, then, when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true (because "brain" and "vat" would only pick out the brains and vats being simulated, not real brains and real vats).
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is, roughly, something that one has in light of one's own "subjective motivational set"—one's own commitments, desires (or wants), goals, etc. On the other hand, an
191:. For the access internalist, justification amounts to something like the believer being aware (or capable of being aware) of certain facts that make her belief in
41:. These include human motivation, knowledge, justification, meaning, and truth. The distinction arises in many areas of debate with similar but distinct meanings.
646:
Finlay, Stephen & Schroeder, Mark (2008). "Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External" (§1.1). The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.))
416:(e.g., 'water') and for kinds of artifacts (e.g., 'espresso maker'). There is no general agreement amongst content externalists as to the scope of the thesis.
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is the theory that the contents of at least some of one's mental states are dependent in part on their relationship to the external world or one's environment.
782:
Chalmers, David (2002) "The
Components of Content", in Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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is the view that the history of science is due to its social context – the socio-political climate and the surrounding economy determines scientific progress.
1959:
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Smith, Basil (2013). "Internalism and
Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language," 'The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,' P. Saka (ed.). (
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embraces reliabilism must concede that we do not always know whether some of our beliefs are justified (even though there is a fact of the matter).
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As mentioned, content externalism (limited to the semantic aspects) is only one among many other options offered by externalism by and large.
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Burge, Tyler (1979) "Individualism and the Mental", in French, Uehling, and
Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV, Minneapolis:
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Fodor, Jerry (1980) "Methodological
Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:1.
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427:(anti-externalist mental content). Some, then, align themselves as endorsing one view of content exclusively, or both. For example,
222:, one of the most well-known proponents of externalism in epistemology, is known for developing a popular form of externalism called
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Critics of the view have questioned the original thought experiments saying that the lessons that Putnam and later writers such as
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Brink, David (1989) "Moral
Realism and the Foundations of Ethics", New York: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 3, pp. 37–80.
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Brink, David (1989) "Moral
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226:. In his paper, “What is Justified Belief?” Goldman characterizes the reliabilist conception of justification as such:
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Rosati, Connie S. (2006). "Moral Motivation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
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Fodor, Jerry (1980) "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology",
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Alexander Bird, "Kuhn and the Historiography of Science" in Alisa Bokulich and William J. Devlin (eds.),
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is a distinction used in philosophy to divide an ontology into two parts: an internal part concerning
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Burge, Tyler (1982) "Other Bodies", in Woodfield, Andrew, ed., Thought and Object. New York: Oxford.
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Burge, Tyler (1982) "Other Bodies", in Woodfield, Andrew, ed., Thought and Object. New York: Oxford.
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Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 333–347. Print
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By Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 305–309. Print.
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results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S’s belief in
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and pure natural science can exist in any society and at any time given the intellectual capacity.
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Goldman notes that a reliable belief-forming process is one which generally produces true beliefs.
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Ed. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 365. Print.
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Falk, W. D. (1947) "'Ought' and Motivation", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 48: 492–510
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Pappas, George (2005) "Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification",
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431:(1980) argues for narrow content (although he comes to reject that view in his 1995), while
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1964:
979:, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 131–93 (reprinted in Putnam (1975),
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Finlay, Stephen & Schroeder, Mark (2008). "Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External".
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according to which the contents of mental states can have both wide and narrow content.
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are two opposite ways of integration of explaining various subjects in several areas of
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122:(1979, reprinted in 1981), concerning internal and external reasons for an action. An
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have various implications. In particular, if motivational internalism is true, then
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DeRose, Keith (1999) "Responding to Skepticism", Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader.
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Le Morvan, Pierre (2005) "A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism",
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Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath. Introduction to Part V.
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concerning mental content, since the contents of one's thoughts (specifically,
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Externalism and internalism in semantics is closely tied to the distinction in
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to the terms used in a skeptical argument in the following way (DeRose, 1999):
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Putnam, Hilary (1975) "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", in Keith Gunderson (ed.)
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Steve Fuller, "Internalism versus Externalism" in Arne Hessenbruch (ed.),
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Sosa, Ernest (1991) "Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue," in E. Sosa,
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Warfield, Ted A. Skepticism (1999, ed. with Keith DeRose, Oxford, 1999)
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As to the traditional discussion on semantic externalism (often dubbed
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Chalmers, David (2002) "The Components of Content", in Chalmers (ed.)
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355:) are usually taken to be semantic objects that are truth-evaluable.
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1057:"Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language"
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Another attempt to use externalism to refute skepticism is done by
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not to steal from the poor person next to him only if he currently
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BonJour, Laurence. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.”
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IV, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 73–121.
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If I am not a BIV, then when I say "I am not a BIV", it is true.
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Kostas Gavroglu, Yorgos Goudaroulis, P. Nicolacopoulos (eds.),
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rational, or them being able to give reasons for her belief in
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Brueckner, Anthony (1999). "Semantic Answers to Skepticism".
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explain one's action; and only internal reasons can do this.
1029:, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–13.
981:
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610:, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–13.
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is a notable proponent of historiographical externalism.
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is a notable proponent of historiographical internalism.
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
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Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50 Years On
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related to philosophy, and an external part concerning
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yields "an argument we can give that shows we are not
446:(1979, 1982) have urged us to draw can be resisted.
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Lau, Joe (2004) "Externalism About Mental Content",
671:"The New Evil Demon Problem" by Clayton Littlejohn,
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The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics
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754:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 43–60.
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302:walking through a park" to be true so long as the
900:DeRose, Keith (1999) "Responding to Skepticism",
893:Cohen, Stewart (1984) "Justification and Truth",
328:things, unlike a BIV's thoughts, which cannot be
501:claims that science is completely distinct from
968:(Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
866:(Spring 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
283:
1001:Rosati, Connie S. (2006). "Moral Motivation",
862:Brown, Curtis (2007) "Narrow Mental Content",
831:Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change
710:Goldman, Alvin I. “What is Justified Belief?”
385:Within the context of the philosophy of mind,
322:. It involves the claim that our thoughts are
3206:
1110:
1042:"Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology"
950:(Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
907:Falk, W. D. (1947) "'Ought' and Motivation",
419:Philosophers now tend to distinguish between
8:
990:Putnam, Hilary (1982) "Brains in a Vat", in
582:"Collingwood, psychologism and internalism,"
513:Externalism in the historiography of science
365:for more about the two construals of meaning
983:, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (
576:
574:
3213:
3199:
3191:
2879:
2870:
2853:
2549:
2256:
2028:
1665:
1606:
1595:
1144:
1133:
1117:
1103:
1095:
602:
600:
598:
596:
941:Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism
736:
734:
732:
297:My utterance of "I am not a BIV" is true.
818:Reader's Guide to the History of Science
812:
810:
1003:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
966:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
948:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
916:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
909:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
864:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
683:, http://www.iep.utm.edu/, today's date
673:The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
570:
1075:"Semantic Internalism and Externalism"
187:in order to be justified in believing
706:
704:
702:
285:Either I am a BIV, or I am not a BIV.
7:
1022:, Cambridge Press, pp. 131–145.
1085:Internalist Explorations of Meaning
1062:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1047:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
887:, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
70:In contemporary moral philosophy,
25:
902:Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader
752:Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader
423:(externalist mental content) and
3174:
3173:
3160:
994:, Cambridge University Press. (
939:Kornblith, Hilary (ed.) (2001)
110:There is also a distinction in
3637:Analytic–synthetic distinction
585:European Journal of Philosophy
1:
927:Behavioral and Brain Sciences
875:Midwest Studies in Philosophy
793:University of Minnesota Press
474:Twin Earth thought experiment
375:Twin Earth thought experiment
43:Internal–external distinction
3859:Justification (epistemology)
2646:Ordinary language philosophy
977:Language, Mind and Knowledge
3849:Internalism and externalism
3682:Internalism and externalism
2696:Contemporary utilitarianism
2611:Internalism and externalism
256:As a response to skepticism
18:Internalism and Externalism
3890:
1960:Svatantrika and Prasangika
992:Reason, Truth, and History
918:, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
488:
118:, largely made popular by
3808:
3513:Evolutionary epistemology
3154:
2869:
2852:
2259:
1605:
1594:
1182:Philosophy of mathematics
1172:Philosophy of information
1143:
1132:
889:Preprint available online
833:, Springer, 2012, p. 211.
498:historiography of science
485:Historiography of science
437:two dimensional semantics
353:intentional mental states
145:Externalism about reasons
137:internalism about reasons
3854:Epistemological theories
3785:Philosophy of perception
3588:Representational realism
3558:Naturalized epistemology
1020:Knowledge In Perspective
1005:Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
961:36(5), pp. 688–707.
80:motivational externalist
72:motivational internalism
3765:Outline of epistemology
3598:Transcendental idealism
2651:Postanalytic philosophy
2592:Experimental philosophy
936:, Cambridge: MIT Press.
491:Rational reconstruction
332:things (DeRose, 1999).
53:related to philosophy.
3712:Problem of other minds
2784:Social constructionism
1796:Hellenistic philosophy
1212:Theoretical philosophy
1187:Philosophy of religion
1177:Philosophy of language
299:
3790:Philosophy of science
3770:Faith and rationality
3652:Descriptive knowledge
3523:Feminist epistemology
3463:Nicholas Wolterstorff
3167:Philosophy portal
2686:Scientific skepticism
2666:Reformed epistemology
1192:Philosophy of science
897:46, pp. 279–296.
895:Philosophical Studies
3722:Procedural knowledge
3707:Problem of induction
2587:Critical rationalism
2294:Edo neo-Confucianism
2138:Acintya bheda abheda
2117:Renaissance humanism
1828:School of the Sextii
1202:Practical philosophy
1197:Political philosophy
932:Fodor, Jerry (1995)
435:(2002) argues for a
341:Semantic externalism
270:semantic externalism
3800:Virtue epistemology
3795:Social epistemology
3775:Formal epistemology
3662:Epistemic injustice
3657:Exploratory thought
3458:Ludwig Wittgenstein
2158:Nimbarka Sampradaya
2069:Korean Confucianism
1816:Academic Skepticism
590:(2):163–177 (2004).
496:Internalism in the
398:content externalism
268:(1982) claims that
149:reasons externalism
141:reasons internalism
27:Philosophical terms
3453:Timothy Williamson
3243:Augustine of Hippo
2779:Post-structuralism
2681:Scientific realism
2636:Quinean naturalism
2616:Logical positivism
2572:Analytical Marxism
1791:Peripatetic school
1703:Chinese naturalism
1230:Aesthetic response
1157:Applied philosophy
1089:Harvard University
943:, Blackwell Press.
846:, Springer (2015).
820:, Routledge, 2013.
580:Giuseppina D'Oro,
479:Extended cognition
381:Philosophy of mind
371:thought experiment
349:philosophy of mind
229:"If S’s believing
157:for Sasha's action
3836:
3835:
3702:Privileged access
3338:Søren Kierkegaard
3188:
3187:
3150:
3149:
3146:
3145:
3142:
3141:
2848:
2847:
2844:
2843:
2840:
2839:
2567:Analytic feminism
2539:
2538:
2501:Kierkegaardianism
2463:Transcendentalism
2423:Neo-scholasticism
2269:Classical Realism
2246:
2245:
2018:
2017:
1833:Neopythagoreanism
1590:
1589:
1586:
1585:
1207:Social philosophy
1087:reading group at
559:Simulated reality
529:Anti-psychologism
503:social influences
304:simulated reality
260:In responding to
84:moral externalist
76:moral internalism
16:(Redirected from
3881:
3780:Metaepistemology
3758:Related articles
3732:Regress argument
3667:Epistemic virtue
3418:Bertrand Russell
3393:Duncan Pritchard
3353:Hilary Kornblith
3268:Laurence BonJour
3215:
3208:
3201:
3192:
3177:
3176:
3165:
3164:
3163:
2880:
2871:
2854:
2744:Frankfurt School
2691:Transactionalism
2641:Normative ethics
2621:Legal positivism
2597:Falsificationism
2582:Consequentialism
2577:Communitarianism
2550:
2418:New Confucianism
2257:
2064:Neo-Confucianism
2029:
1838:Second Sophistic
1823:Middle Platonism
1666:
1607:
1596:
1439:Epiphenomenalism
1306:Consequentialism
1240:Institutionalism
1145:
1134:
1119:
1112:
1105:
1096:
1081:
1079:
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1051:
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591:
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120:Bernard Williams
91:moral psychology
61:Moral philosophy
21:
3889:
3888:
3884:
3883:
3882:
3880:
3879:
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3838:
3837:
3832:
3804:
3753:
3672:Gettier problem
3602:
3533:Foundationalism
3479:
3428:Wilfrid Sellars
3383:Alvin Plantinga
3263:George Berkeley
3230:Epistemologists
3224:
3219:
3189:
3184:
3161:
3159:
3138:
3102:
3002:
2964:
2911:
2865:
2864:
2836:
2825:Russian cosmism
2798:
2794:Western Marxism
2759:New Historicism
2724:Critical theory
2710:
2706:Wittgensteinian
2602:Foundationalism
2535:
2472:
2453:Social contract
2309:Foundationalism
2242:
2224:
2208:Illuminationism
2193:Aristotelianism
2179:
2168:Vishishtadvaita
2121:
2073:
2014:
1981:
1852:
1781:Megarian school
1776:Eretrian school
1717:
1678:Agriculturalism
1655:
1601:
1582:
1529:
1501:
1458:
1410:
1367:
1351:Incompatibilism
1320:
1292:
1244:
1216:
1139:
1128:
1123:
1077:
1071:Farkas, Katalin
1069:
1054:
1039:
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854:Further reading
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544:Foundationalism
525:
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487:
461:
383:
363:Linguistic turn
338:
294:
292:
290:
286:
279:
274:brains in a vat
258:
245:is justified.”
213:
180:
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128:external reason
124:internal reason
108:
89:These views in
68:
63:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3887:
3885:
3877:
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3874:Theory of mind
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3498:Constructivism
3495:
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3478:
3477:
3470:
3465:
3460:
3455:
3450:
3448:Baruch Spinoza
3445:
3443:P. F. Strawson
3440:
3435:
3433:Susanna Siegel
3430:
3425:
3420:
3415:
3410:
3408:W. V. O. Quine
3405:
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3390:
3385:
3380:
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3360:
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3320:
3315:
3310:
3308:Nelson Goodman
3305:
3300:
3298:Edmund Gettier
3295:
3290:
3285:
3283:René Descartes
3280:
3275:
3273:Gilles Deleuze
3270:
3265:
3260:
3255:
3250:
3248:William Alston
3245:
3240:
3238:Thomas Aquinas
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2970:Middle Eastern
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2734:Existentialism
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2729:Deconstruction
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2589:
2584:
2579:
2574:
2569:
2564:
2562:Applied ethics
2558:
2556:
2547:
2541:
2540:
2537:
2536:
2534:
2533:
2528:
2526:Nietzscheanism
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2508:
2503:
2498:
2497:
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2486:
2480:
2478:
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2468:Utilitarianism
2465:
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2410:
2405:
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2368:
2366:Transcendental
2363:
2358:
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2316:
2311:
2306:
2304:Existentialism
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2099:
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2092:Augustinianism
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2005:Zoroastrianism
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1091:, autumn 2007.
1082:
1067:
1055:Smith, Basil.
1052:
1035:
1034:External links
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534:Dream argument
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3579:
3576:
3574:
3571:
3569:
3566:
3564:
3563:Phenomenalism
3561:
3559:
3556:
3554:
3553:Naïve realism
3551:
3549:
3546:
3544:
3541:
3539:
3536:
3534:
3531:
3529:
3526:
3524:
3521:
3519:
3516:
3514:
3511:
3509:
3506:
3504:
3503:Contextualism
3501:
3499:
3496:
3494:
3491:
3490:
3488:
3486:
3482:
3476:
3475:
3471:
3469:
3468:Vienna Circle
3466:
3464:
3461:
3459:
3456:
3454:
3451:
3449:
3446:
3444:
3441:
3439:
3436:
3434:
3431:
3429:
3426:
3424:
3421:
3419:
3416:
3414:
3411:
3409:
3406:
3404:
3403:Hilary Putnam
3401:
3399:
3396:
3394:
3391:
3389:
3386:
3384:
3381:
3379:
3378:Robert Nozick
3376:
3374:
3373:John McDowell
3371:
3369:
3366:
3364:
3361:
3359:
3356:
3354:
3351:
3349:
3346:
3344:
3341:
3339:
3336:
3334:
3333:Immanuel Kant
3331:
3329:
3326:
3324:
3321:
3319:
3316:
3314:
3311:
3309:
3306:
3304:
3303:Alvin Goldman
3301:
3299:
3296:
3294:
3291:
3289:
3286:
3284:
3281:
3279:
3276:
3274:
3271:
3269:
3266:
3264:
3261:
3259:
3256:
3254:
3251:
3249:
3246:
3244:
3241:
3239:
3236:
3235:
3233:
3231:
3227:
3223:
3216:
3211:
3209:
3204:
3202:
3197:
3196:
3193:
3181:
3180:
3171:
3169:
3168:
3157:
3156:
3153:
3135:
3132:
3130:
3127:
3125:
3122:
3120:
3117:
3115:
3112:
3111:
3109:
3107:Miscellaneous
3105:
3099:
3096:
3094:
3091:
3089:
3086:
3084:
3081:
3079:
3076:
3074:
3071:
3069:
3066:
3064:
3061:
3059:
3056:
3054:
3051:
3049:
3046:
3044:
3041:
3039:
3036:
3032:
3029:
3028:
3027:
3024:
3022:
3019:
3017:
3014:
3013:
3011:
3009:
3005:
2999:
2996:
2994:
2991:
2989:
2986:
2984:
2981:
2979:
2976:
2975:
2973:
2971:
2967:
2961:
2958:
2956:
2953:
2951:
2948:
2946:
2943:
2941:
2938:
2936:
2933:
2931:
2928:
2926:
2923:
2922:
2920:
2918:
2914:
2908:
2905:
2903:
2900:
2898:
2895:
2893:
2890:
2889:
2887:
2885:
2881:
2878:
2876:
2872:
2868:
2860:
2859:
2855:
2851:
2833:
2832:
2828:
2826:
2823:
2821:
2818:
2816:
2813:
2811:
2808:
2807:
2805:
2803:Miscellaneous
2801:
2795:
2792:
2790:
2789:Structuralism
2787:
2785:
2782:
2780:
2777:
2775:
2774:Postmodernism
2772:
2770:
2767:
2765:
2764:Phenomenology
2762:
2760:
2757:
2755:
2752:
2750:
2747:
2745:
2742:
2740:
2737:
2735:
2732:
2730:
2727:
2725:
2722:
2721:
2719:
2717:
2713:
2707:
2704:
2702:
2701:Vienna Circle
2699:
2697:
2694:
2692:
2689:
2687:
2684:
2682:
2679:
2677:
2674:
2672:
2669:
2667:
2664:
2662:
2659:
2657:
2654:
2652:
2649:
2647:
2644:
2642:
2639:
2637:
2634:
2632:
2631:Moral realism
2629:
2627:
2624:
2622:
2619:
2617:
2614:
2612:
2609:
2607:
2603:
2600:
2598:
2595:
2593:
2590:
2588:
2585:
2583:
2580:
2578:
2575:
2573:
2570:
2568:
2565:
2563:
2560:
2559:
2557:
2555:
2551:
2548:
2546:
2542:
2532:
2529:
2527:
2524:
2522:
2519:
2517:
2514:
2512:
2509:
2507:
2504:
2502:
2499:
2495:
2492:
2491:
2490:
2487:
2485:
2482:
2481:
2479:
2475:
2469:
2466:
2464:
2461:
2459:
2456:
2454:
2451:
2449:
2446:
2444:
2441:
2439:
2436:
2434:
2433:Phenomenology
2431:
2429:
2426:
2424:
2421:
2419:
2416:
2414:
2411:
2409:
2406:
2404:
2401:
2399:
2396:
2394:
2391:
2389:
2386:
2384:
2381:
2379:
2376:
2374:
2373:Individualism
2371:
2367:
2364:
2362:
2359:
2357:
2354:
2352:
2349:
2347:
2344:
2342:
2339:
2338:
2337:
2334:
2330:
2327:
2326:
2325:
2322:
2320:
2317:
2315:
2312:
2310:
2307:
2305:
2302:
2300:
2297:
2295:
2292:
2290:
2287:
2285:
2282:
2280:
2277:
2275:
2272:
2270:
2267:
2265:
2262:
2261:
2258:
2255:
2253:
2249:
2239:
2238:Judeo-Islamic
2236:
2235:
2233:
2231:
2227:
2221:
2218:
2216:
2215:
2214:ʿIlm al-Kalām
2211:
2209:
2206:
2204:
2201:
2199:
2196:
2194:
2191:
2190:
2188:
2186:
2182:
2176:
2173:
2169:
2166:
2164:
2163:Shuddhadvaita
2161:
2159:
2156:
2154:
2151:
2149:
2146:
2144:
2141:
2139:
2136:
2135:
2134:
2131:
2130:
2128:
2124:
2118:
2115:
2113:
2110:
2108:
2105:
2103:
2100:
2098:
2097:Scholasticism
2095:
2093:
2090:
2088:
2085:
2084:
2082:
2080:
2076:
2070:
2067:
2065:
2062:
2060:
2057:
2055:
2052:
2050:
2047:
2045:
2042:
2040:
2037:
2036:
2034:
2030:
2027:
2025:
2021:
2011:
2008:
2006:
2003:
2001:
1998:
1996:
1993:
1992:
1990:
1988:
1984:
1976:
1973:
1971:
1968:
1966:
1963:
1961:
1958:
1956:
1953:
1951:
1948:
1946:
1943:
1941:
1938:
1936:
1933:
1932:
1931:
1928:
1924:
1921:
1919:
1916:
1915:
1914:
1911:
1907:
1904:
1902:
1899:
1897:
1894:
1892:
1889:
1887:
1884:
1882:
1879:
1877:
1874:
1872:
1869:
1868:
1867:
1864:
1863:
1861:
1859:
1855:
1849:
1846:
1844:
1841:
1839:
1836:
1834:
1831:
1829:
1826:
1824:
1821:
1817:
1814:
1812:
1809:
1807:
1804:
1802:
1799:
1798:
1797:
1794:
1792:
1789:
1787:
1784:
1782:
1779:
1777:
1774:
1772:
1769:
1767:
1764:
1760:
1757:
1755:
1752:
1750:
1747:
1745:
1742:
1740:
1737:
1736:
1735:
1732:
1731:
1729:
1727:
1724:
1720:
1714:
1711:
1709:
1706:
1704:
1701:
1699:
1696:
1694:
1691:
1689:
1686:
1684:
1681:
1679:
1676:
1675:
1673:
1671:
1667:
1664:
1662:
1658:
1650:
1647:
1645:
1642:
1640:
1637:
1635:
1632:
1630:
1627:
1626:
1625:
1622:
1620:
1617:
1616:
1614:
1612:
1608:
1604:
1597:
1593:
1579:
1576:
1574:
1571:
1569:
1566:
1564:
1561:
1559:
1556:
1554:
1551:
1549:
1548:Conceptualism
1546:
1544:
1541:
1540:
1538:
1536:
1532:
1526:
1523:
1521:
1518:
1516:
1513:
1512:
1510:
1508:
1504:
1498:
1495:
1493:
1490:
1488:
1485:
1483:
1480:
1478:
1477:Particularism
1475:
1473:
1470:
1469:
1467:
1465:
1461:
1455:
1452:
1450:
1447:
1445:
1444:Functionalism
1442:
1440:
1437:
1435:
1432:
1430:
1429:Eliminativism
1427:
1425:
1422:
1421:
1419:
1417:
1413:
1407:
1404:
1402:
1399:
1397:
1394:
1392:
1389:
1387:
1384:
1382:
1379:
1378:
1376:
1374:
1370:
1364:
1361:
1357:
1354:
1353:
1352:
1349:
1345:
1342:
1341:
1340:
1337:
1335:
1334:Compatibilism
1332:
1331:
1329:
1327:
1323:
1317:
1314:
1312:
1309:
1307:
1304:
1303:
1301:
1299:
1295:
1289:
1286:
1284:
1281:
1279:
1276:
1274:
1273:Particularism
1271:
1269:
1266:
1264:
1261:
1259:
1256:
1255:
1253:
1251:
1247:
1241:
1238:
1236:
1233:
1231:
1228:
1227:
1225:
1223:
1219:
1213:
1210:
1208:
1205:
1203:
1200:
1198:
1195:
1193:
1190:
1188:
1185:
1183:
1180:
1178:
1175:
1173:
1170:
1168:
1165:
1163:
1160:
1158:
1155:
1154:
1152:
1150:
1146:
1142:
1135:
1131:
1127:
1120:
1115:
1113:
1108:
1106:
1101:
1100:
1097:
1090:
1086:
1083:
1076:
1072:
1068:
1064:
1063:
1058:
1053:
1049:
1048:
1043:
1040:Poston, Ted.
1038:
1037:
1033:
1028:
1024:
1021:
1017:
1015:
1011:
1008:
1004:
1000:
997:
993:
989:
986:
982:
978:
974:
971:
967:
963:
960:
956:
953:
949:
945:
942:
938:
935:
931:
928:
924:
921:
917:
913:
911:, 48: 492–510
910:
906:
903:
899:
896:
892:
890:
886:
882:
879:
876:
872:
869:
865:
861:
858:
857:
853:
845:
839:
836:
832:
826:
823:
819:
813:
811:
807:
801:
798:
795:, pp. 73–121.
794:
788:
785:
779:
776:
770:
767:
761:
758:
753:
746:
743:
737:
735:
733:
729:
723:
721:
717:
713:
712:Epistemology.
707:
705:
703:
699:
695:
694:Epistemology.
689:
686:
682:
678:
674:
668:
665:
661:
660:Epistemology.
655:
653:
649:
643:
640:
634:
631:
625:
622:
616:
613:
609:
603:
601:
599:
597:
593:
589:
586:
583:
577:
575:
571:
564:
560:
557:
555:
552:
550:
547:
545:
542:
540:
539:Emic and etic
537:
535:
532:
530:
527:
526:
522:
520:
518:
514:
510:
508:
504:
500:
499:
492:
484:
480:
477:
475:
472:
471:
470:
467:
464:
455:
453:
449:
448:Frank Jackson
445:
440:
438:
434:
430:
426:
422:
417:
415:
414:natural kinds
409:
405:
403:
402:Hilary Putnam
399:
394:
390:
388:
380:
376:
373:
370:
367:
364:
361:
360:
359:
356:
354:
350:
345:
342:
335:
333:
331:
327:
326:
321:
317:
312:
308:
305:
298:
295:
287:
282:
275:
271:
267:
266:Hilary Putnam
263:
255:
253:
249:
246:
244:
240:
236:
232:
227:
225:
221:
220:Alvin Goldman
217:
210:
208:
206:
200:
198:
194:
190:
186:
177:
173:Justification
172:
167:
165:
162:
158:
152:
150:
146:
142:
138:
132:
129:
125:
121:
117:
116:action theory
113:
105:
103:
101:
96:
92:
87:
85:
81:
77:
73:
65:
60:
58:
54:
52:
48:
44:
40:
36:
32:
19:
3746:
3681:
3647:Common sense
3625:A posteriori
3624:
3616:
3578:Reductionism
3472:
3423:Gilbert Ryle
3293:Fred Dretske
3278:Keith DeRose
3222:Epistemology
3172:
3158:
2829:
2820:Postcritique
2810:Kyoto School
2769:Posthumanism
2749:Hermeneutics
2610:
2604: /
2545:Contemporary
2521:Newtonianism
2484:Cartesianism
2443:Reductionism
2279:Conservatism
2274:Collectivism
2212:
1940:Sarvāstivadā
1918:Anekantavada
1843:Neoplatonism
1811:Epicureanism
1744:Pythagoreans
1683:Confucianism
1649:Contemporary
1639:Early modern
1543:Anti-realism
1497:Universalism
1454:Subjectivism
1250:Epistemology
1060:
1045:
1026:
1019:
1002:
991:
980:
976:
965:
958:
947:
940:
933:
926:
915:
908:
901:
894:
884:
874:
863:
843:
838:
830:
825:
817:
800:
787:
778:
769:
760:
751:
745:
711:
693:
688:
672:
667:
659:
642:
633:
624:
615:
607:
587:
584:
512:
511:
507:Imre Lakatos
495:
494:
468:
465:
456:
441:
424:
421:wide content
420:
418:
410:
406:
397:
395:
391:
384:
357:
346:
339:
329:
323:
313:
309:
300:
296:
288:
284:
259:
250:
247:
242:
238:
234:
230:
228:
218:
214:
201:
196:
192:
188:
184:
181:
168:Epistemology
160:
156:
153:
148:
144:
140:
136:
133:
127:
123:
109:
99:
88:
83:
79:
75:
71:
69:
55:
34:
30:
29:
3727:Proposition
3697:Objectivity
3583:Reliabilism
3573:Rationalism
3518:Fallibilism
3493:Coherentism
3438:Ernest Sosa
3413:Thomas Reid
3398:James Pryor
3368:G. E. Moore
3358:David Lewis
3348:Saul Kripke
3343:Peter Klein
3323:Susan Haack
3253:Robert Audi
2815:Objectivism
2754:Neo-Marxism
2716:Continental
2626:Meta-ethics
2606:Coherentism
2511:Hegelianism
2448:Rationalism
2408:Natural law
2388:Materialism
2314:Historicism
2284:Determinism
2175:Navya-Nyāya
1950:Sautrāntika
1945:Pudgalavada
1881:Vaisheshika
1734:Presocratic
1634:Renaissance
1573:Physicalism
1558:Materialism
1464:Normativity
1449:Objectivism
1434:Emergentism
1424:Behaviorism
1373:Metaphysics
1339:Determinism
1278:Rationalism
517:Thomas Kuhn
452:John Searle
444:Tyler Burge
429:Jerry Fodor
387:externalism
224:reliabilism
211:Externalism
205:reliabilism
178:Internalism
100:externalist
47:observation
35:externalism
31:Internalism
3864:Metaethics
3843:Categories
3828:Discussion
3818:Task Force
3737:Simplicity
3717:Perception
3593:Skepticism
3568:Positivism
3543:Infinitism
3508:Empiricism
3363:John Locke
3328:David Hume
3318:Anil Gupta
3313:Paul Grice
3288:John Dewey
3258:A. J. Ayer
3114:Amerindian
3021:Australian
2960:Vietnamese
2940:Indonesian
2489:Kantianism
2438:Positivism
2428:Pragmatism
2403:Naturalism
2383:Liberalism
2361:Subjective
2299:Empiricism
2203:Avicennism
2148:Bhedabheda
2032:East Asian
1955:Madhyamaka
1935:Abhidharma
1801:Pyrrhonism
1568:Nominalism
1563:Naturalism
1492:Skepticism
1482:Relativism
1472:Absolutism
1401:Naturalism
1311:Deontology
1283:Skepticism
1268:Naturalism
1258:Empiricism
1222:Aesthetics
1126:Philosophy
1027:Moral Luck
608:Moral Luck
565:References
549:Relativism
489:See also:
469:See also:
358:See also:
262:skepticism
66:Motivation
39:philosophy
3869:Semantics
3692:Knowledge
3677:Induction
3627:knowledge
3619:knowledge
2993:Pakistani
2955:Taiwanese
2902:Ethiopian
2875:By region
2861:By region
2676:Scientism
2671:Systemics
2531:Spinozism
2458:Socialism
2393:Modernism
2356:Objective
2264:Anarchism
2198:Averroism
2087:Christian
2039:Neotaoism
2010:Zurvanism
2000:Mithraism
1995:Mazdakism
1766:Cyrenaics
1693:Logicians
1326:Free will
1288:Solipsism
1235:Formalism
681:2161-0002
369:Swamp man
336:Semantics
316:Brueckner
95:amorality
3813:Category
3632:Analysis
3617:A priori
3608:Concepts
3548:Innatism
3485:Theories
3179:Category
3134:Yugoslav
3124:Romanian
3031:Scottish
3016:American
2945:Japanese
2925:Buddhist
2907:Africana
2897:Egyptian
2739:Feminist
2661:Rawlsian
2656:Quietism
2554:Analytic
2506:Krausism
2413:Nihilism
2378:Kokugaku
2341:Absolute
2336:Idealism
2324:Humanism
2112:Occamism
2079:European
2024:Medieval
1970:Yogacara
1930:Buddhist
1923:Syādvāda
1806:Stoicism
1771:Cynicism
1759:Sophists
1754:Atomists
1749:Eleatics
1688:Legalism
1629:Medieval
1553:Idealism
1507:Ontology
1487:Nihilism
1391:Idealism
1149:Branches
1138:Branches
1073:(2006).
523:See also
320:Warfield
51:question
3748:more...
3528:Fideism
3474:more...
3129:Russian
3098:Spanish
3093:Slovene
3083:Maltese
3078:Italian
3058:Finland
3026:British
3008:Western
2998:Turkish
2983:Islamic
2978:Iranian
2930:Chinese
2917:Eastern
2884:African
2831:more...
2516:Marxism
2346:British
2289:Dualism
2185:Islamic
2143:Advaita
2133:Vedanta
2107:Scotism
2102:Thomism
2044:Tiantai
1987:Persian
1975:Tibetan
1965:Śūnyatā
1906:Cārvāka
1896:Ājīvika
1891:Mīmāṃsā
1871:Samkhya
1786:Academy
1739:Ionians
1713:Yangism
1670:Chinese
1661:Ancient
1624:Western
1619:Ancient
1578:Realism
1535:Reality
1525:Process
1406:Realism
1386:Dualism
1381:Atomism
1263:Fideism
106:Reasons
3642:Belief
3538:Holism
3088:Polish
3068:German
3063:French
3048:Danish
3038:Canada
2988:Jewish
2950:Korean
2935:Indian
2477:People
2398:Monism
2351:German
2319:Holism
2252:Modern
2230:Jewish
2153:Dvaita
2126:Indian
2049:Huayan
1901:Ajñana
1858:Indian
1723:Greco-
1708:Taoism
1698:Mohism
1644:Modern
1611:By era
1600:By era
1515:Action
1396:Monism
1316:Virtue
1298:Ethics
679:
112:ethics
3823:Stubs
3742:Truth
3388:Plato
3119:Aztec
3073:Greek
3053:Dutch
3043:Czech
2892:Bantu
2329:Anti-
1876:Nyaya
1866:Hindu
1726:Roman
1520:Event
1162:Logic
1078:(PDF)
1014:link)
330:about
325:about
161:wants
2220:Sufi
2054:Chan
1913:Jain
1886:Yoga
1416:Mind
1356:Hard
1344:Hard
1007:link
996:link
985:link
970:link
952:link
929:3:1.
920:link
868:link
677:ISSN
450:and
318:and
147:(or
139:(or
114:and
82:(or
74:(or
33:and
2494:Neo
2059:Zen
293:---
241:at
233:at
143:).
3845::
1059:.
1044:.
809:^
731:^
719:^
701:^
675:,
651:^
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573:^
264:,
3214:e
3207:t
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1118:e
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987:)
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460:2
458:H
278:2
243:t
239:p
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20:)
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