948:
percentage of failure rate applicable to the failure modes which are detected. The possibility that the detection means may itself fail latently should be accounted for in the coverage analysis as a limiting factor (i.e., coverage cannot be more reliable than the detection means availability). Inclusion of the detection coverage in the FMEA can lead to each individual failure that would have been one effect category now being a separate effect category due to the detection coverage possibilities. Another way to include detection coverage is for the FTA to conservatively assume that no holes in coverage due to latent failure in the detection method affect detection of all failures assigned to the failure effect category of concern. The FMEA can be revised if necessary for those cases where this conservative assumption does not allow the top event probability requirements to be met.
179:
dependent on the effectiveness and timeliness with which design problems are identified. Timeliness is probably the most important consideration. In the extreme case, the FMECA would be of little value to the design decision process if the analysis is performed after the hardware is built. While the FMECA identifies all part failure modes, its primary benefit is the early identification of all critical and catastrophic subsystem or system failure modes so they can be eliminated or minimized through design modification at the earliest point in the development effort; therefore, the FMECA should be performed at the system level as soon as preliminary design information is available and extended to the lower levels as the detail design progresses.
207:
to interfaces between systems and in fact at all functional interfaces. The purpose of these FMEAs is to assure that irreversible physical and/or functional damage is not propagated across the interface as a result of failures in one of the interfacing units. These analyses are done to the piece part level for the circuits that directly interface with the other units. The FMEA can be accomplished without a CA, but a CA requires that the FMEA has previously identified system level critical failures. When both steps are done, the total process is called an FMECA.
91:; often written with "failure modes" in plural) is the process of reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify potential failure modes in a system and their causes and effects. For each component, the failure modes and their resulting effects on the rest of the system are recorded in a specific FMEA worksheet. There are numerous variations of such worksheets. An FMEA can be a qualitative analysis, but may be put on a quantitative basis when mathematical
488:
part or component failure modes (such as fully fractured axle or deformed axle, or electrical contact stuck open, stuck short, or intermittent). A functional FMEA will focus on functional failure modes. These may be general (such as no function, over function, under function, intermittent function, or unintended function) or more detailed and specific to the equipment being analyzed. A PFMEA will focus on process failure modes (such as inserting the wrong drill bit).
1300:: analysis of products prior to production. These are the most detailed (in MIL 1629 called Piece-Part or Hardware FMEA) FMEAs and used to identify any possible hardware (or other) failure mode up to the lowest part level. It should be based on hardware breakdown (e.g. the BoM = bill of materials). Any failure effect severity, failure prevention (mitigation), failure detection and diagnostics may be fully analyzed in this FMEA.
278:
190:(backward logic) failure analysis that may handle multiple failures within the item and/or external to the item including maintenance and logistics. It starts at higher functional / system level. An FTA may use the basic failure mode FMEA records or an effect summary as one of its inputs (the basic events). Interface hazard analysis, human error analysis and others may be added for completion in scenario modelling.
966:). This may influence the end effect probability of failure or the worst case effect Severity. The exact calculation may not be easy in all cases, such as those where multiple scenarios (with multiple events) are possible and detectability / dormancy plays a crucial role (as for redundant systems). In that case fault tree analysis and/or event trees may be needed to determine exact probability and risk levels.
1288:: before design solutions are provided (or only on high level) functions can be evaluated on potential functional failure effects. General Mitigations ("design to" requirements) can be proposed to limit consequence of functional failures or limit the probability of occurrence in this early development. It is based on a functional breakdown of a system. This type may also be used for Software evaluation.
756:
reversed mode, too late functioning, erratic functioning, etc. Each end effect is given a
Severity number (S) from, say, I (no effect) to V (catastrophic), based on cost and/or loss of life or quality of life. These numbers prioritize the failure modes (together with probability and detectability). Below a typical classification is given. Other classifications are possible. See also
216:
the level in the hierarchy of the part to the sub-system, sub-system to the system, etc.), the basic hardware status, and the criteria for system and mission success. Every effort should be made to define all ground rules before the FMEA begins; however, the ground rules may be expanded and clarified as the analysis proceeds. A typical set of ground rules (assumptions) follows:
683:
All the potential causes for a failure mode should be identified and documented. This should be in technical terms. Examples of causes are: Human errors in handling, Manufacturing induced faults, Fatigue, Creep, Abrasive wear, erroneous algorithms, excessive voltage or improper operating conditions or use (depending on the used ground rules). A failure mode may given a
43:
401:(AIAG) first published an FMEA standard for the automotive industry. It is now in its fourth edition. The SAE first published related standard J1739 in 1994. This standard is also now in its fourth edition. In 2019 both method descriptions were replaced by the new AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook. It is a harmonization of the former FMEA standards of AIAG,
829:, like metal growing a crack, but not of critical length). It should be made clear how the failure mode or cause can be discovered by an operator under normal system operation or if it can be discovered by the maintenance crew by some diagnostic action or automatic built in system test. A dormancy and/or latency period may be entered.
449:
applicability to provide a meaningful input to critical procedures such as virtual qualification, root cause analysis, accelerated test programs, and to remaining life assessment. To overcome the shortcomings of FMEA and FMECA a failure modes, mechanisms and effect analysis (FMMEA) has often been used.
1254:
tool FMEA can augment or complement FTA and identify many more causes and failure modes resulting in top-level symptoms. It is not able to discover complex failure modes involving multiple failures within a subsystem, or to report expected failure intervals of particular failure modes up to the upper
755:
Determine the
Severity for the worst-case scenario adverse end effect (state). It is convenient to write these effects down in terms of what the user might see or experience in terms of functional failures. Examples of these end effects are: full loss of function x, degraded performance, functions in
215:
The ground rules of each FMEA include a set of project selected procedures; the assumptions on which the analysis is based; the hardware that has been included and excluded from the analysis and the rationale for the exclusions. The ground rules also describe the indenture level of the analysis (i.e.
202:
When performing an FMECA, interfacing hardware (or software) is first considered to be operating within specification. After that it can be extended by consequently using one of the 5 possible failure modes of one function of the interfacing hardware as a cause of failure for the design element under
947:
This type of analysis is useful to determine how effective various test processes are at the detection of latent and dormant faults. The method used to accomplish this involves an examination of the applicable failure modes to determine whether or not their effects are detected, and to determine the
487:
The specific manner or way by which a failure occurs in terms of failure of the part, component, function, equipment, subsystem, or system under investigation. Depending on the type of FMEA performed, failure mode may be described at various levels of detail. A piece part FMEA will focus on detailed
263:
From the above list, early identifications of SFPS, input to the troubleshooting procedure and locating of performance monitoring / fault detection devices are probably the most important benefits of the FMECA. In addition, the FMECA procedures are straightforward and allow orderly evaluation of the
206:
In addition, each part failure postulated is considered to be the only failure in the system (i.e., it is a single failure analysis). In addition to the FMEAs done on systems to evaluate the impact lower level failures have on system operation, several other FMEAs are done. Special attention is paid
173:
The FME(C)A is a design tool used to systematically analyze postulated component failures and identify the resultant effects on system operations. The analysis is sometimes characterized as consisting of two sub-analyses, the first being the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and the second,
682:
It is necessary to look at the cause of a failure mode and the likelihood of occurrence. This can be done by analysis, calculations / FEM, looking at similar items or processes and the failure modes that have been documented for them in the past. A failure cause is looked upon as a design weakness.
497:
For example; "fatigue or corrosion of a structural beam" or "fretting corrosion in an electrical contact" is a failure mechanism and in itself (likely) not a failure mode. The related failure mode (end state) is a "full fracture of structural beam" or "an open electrical contact". The initial cause
154:
Functional analyses are needed as an input to determine correct failure modes, at all system levels, both for functional FMEA or piece-part (hardware) FMEA. An FMEA is used to structure mitigation for risk reduction based on either failure mode or effect severity reduction, or based on lowering the
198:
The analysis should always be started by someone listing the functions that the design needs to fulfill. Functions are the starting point of a well done FMEA, and using functions as baseline provides the best yield of an FMEA. After all, a design is only one possible solution to perform functions
1263:
numbers, and multiplication is not defined for ordinal numbers. The ordinal rankings only say that one ranking is better or worse than another, but not by how much. For instance, a ranking of "2" may not be twice as severe as a ranking of "1", or an "8" may not be twice as severe as a "4", but
178:
should be a living document during development of a hardware design. It should be scheduled and completed concurrently with the design. If completed in a timely manner, the FMECA can help guide design decisions. The usefulness of the FMECA as a design tool and in the decision-making process is
77:
1275:
The FMEA worksheet is hard to produce, hard to understand and read, as well as hard to maintain. The use of neural network techniques to cluster and visualise failure modes were suggested starting from 2010. An alternative approach is to combine the traditional FMEA table with set of bow-tie
448:
which provides detailed guides on applying the method. The standard failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) procedures identify the product failure mechanisms, but may not model them without specialized software. This limits their
820:
The means or method by which a failure is detected, isolated by operator and/or maintainer and the time it may take. This is important for maintainability control (availability of the system) and it is especially important for multiple failure scenarios. This may involve dormant failure
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like shown below, based on Mil. Std. 882. The higher the risk level, the more justification and mitigation is needed to provide evidence and lower the risk to an acceptable level. High risk should be indicated to higher level management, who are responsible for final decision-making.
146:
A successful FMEA activity helps identify potential failure modes based on experience with similar products and processes—or based on common physics of failure logic. It is widely used in development and manufacturing industries in various phases of the product life cycle.
174:
the criticality analysis (CA). Successful development of an FMEA requires that the analyst include all significant failure modes for each contributing element or part in the system. FMEAs can be performed at the system, subsystem, assembly, subassembly or part level. The
2464:
494:
Defects in requirements, design, process, quality control, handling or part application, which are the underlying cause or sequence of causes that initiate a process (mechanism) that leads to a failure mode over a certain time. A failure mode may have more causes.
249:
Early identification of single failure points (SFPS) and system interface problems, which may be critical to mission success and/or safety. They also provide a method of verifying that switching between redundant elements is not jeopardized by postulated single
1258:
Additionally, the multiplication of the severity, occurrence and detection rankings may result in rank reversals, where a less serious failure mode receives a higher RPN than a more serious failure mode. The reason for this is that the rankings are
1891:
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA), Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA), and Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for Machinery (Machinery
245:
A documented uniform method of assessing potential failure mechanisms, failure modes and their impact on system operation, resulting in a list of failure modes ranked according to the seriousness of their system impact and likelihood of
1294:: analysis of systems or subsystems in the early design concept stages to analyse the failure mechanisms and lower level functional failures, specially to different concept solutions in more detail. It may be used in trade-off studies.
460:(OEMs) like Ford are updating their Customer Specific Requirements (CSR) to include the usage of specific FMEA software. For Ford specifically, these requirements had multiple-stage compliance deadlines of July and December of 2022.
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analysis and the failure mode ratios from a failure mode distribution catalog, such as RAC FMD-97. This method allows a quantitative FTA to use the FMEA results to verify that undesired events meet acceptable levels of risk.
1909:
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA) and Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA) and Effects Analysis for Machinery (Machinery
825:(e.g. No direct system effect, while a redundant system / item automatically takes over or when the failure only is problematic during specific mission or system states) or latent failures (e.g. deterioration failure
363:(SAE, an organization covering aviation and other transportation beyond just automotive, despite its name) publishing ARP926 in 1967. After two revisions, Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP926 has been replaced by
2446:
1938:
1239:) and retrospective approaches, have been found to have limited validity when used in isolation. Challenges around scoping and organisational boundaries appear to be a major factor in this lack of validity.
1234:
While FMEA identifies important hazards in a system, its results may not be comprehensive and the approach has limitations. In the healthcare context, FMEA and other risk assessment methods, including SWIFT
553:
The consequences of a failure mode. Severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of injury, property damage, system damage and/or time lost to repair the failure.
436:
Although initially developed by the military, FMEA methodology is now extensively used in a variety of industries including semiconductor processing, food service, plastics, software, and healthcare.
1306:: analysis of manufacturing and assembly processes. Both quality and reliability may be affected from process faults. The input for this FMEA is amongst others a work process / task breakdown.
331:
Procedures for conducting FMECA were described in 1949 in US Armed Forces
Military Procedures document MIL-P-1629, revised in 1980 as MIL-STD-1629A. By the early 1960s, contractors for the
505:
Immediate consequences of a failure on operation, or more generally on the needs for the customer / user that should be fulfilled by the function but now is not, or not fully, fulfilled.
155:
probability of failure or both. The FMEA is in principle a full inductive (forward logic) analysis, however the failure probability can only be estimated or reduced by understanding the
940:
Incorrect. An erroneous indication to an operator due to the malfunction or failure of an indicator (i.e., instruments, sensing devices, visual or audible warning devices, etc.).
2520:
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that need to be fulfilled. This way an FMEA can be done on concept designs as well as detail designs, on hardware as well as software, and no matter how complex the design.
3040:
2443:
1935:
288:
743:
1745:
Applicability of NASA Contract
Quality Management and Failure Mode Effect Analysis Procedures to the USFS Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease Management Program
1348:
1338:
52:
2355:
Kerk Y.W.; Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2017). "n
Analytical Interval Fuzzy Inference System for Risk Evaluation and Prioritization in Failure Mode and Effect Analysis".
801:
Critical (causes a loss of primary function; loss of all safety margins, 1 failure away from a catastrophe, severe damage, severe injuries, max 1 possible death)
2626:
1779:
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diagrams. The diagrams provide a visualisation of the chains of cause and effect, while the FMEA table provides the detailed information about specific events.
375:
332:
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Severity (of the event) × probability (of the event occurring) × detection (probability that the event would not be detected before the user was aware of it).
475:
The AP replaces the former risk matrix and RPN in the AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook 2019. It makes a statement about the need for additional improvement measures.
1370:
103:
in the late 1950s to study problems that might arise from malfunctions of military systems. An FMEA is often the first step of a system reliability study.
1580:
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might have been "Improper application of corrosion protection layer (paint)" and /or "(abnormal) vibration input from another (possibly failed) system".
3248:
2400:"A perceptual computing-based method to prioritize failure modes in failure mode and effect analysis and its application to edible bird nest farming"
535:
The means of detection of the failure mode by maintainer, operator or built in detection system, including estimated dormancy period (if applicable).
2669:
2554:
159:. Hence, FMEA may include information on causes of failure (deductive analysis) to reduce the possibility of occurrence by eliminating identified
1251:
397:. Ford applied the same approach to processes (PFMEA) to consider potential process induced failures prior to launching production. In 1993 the
300:
61:
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as an alternative to classic RPN model. In the new AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook (2019) the RPN approach was replaced by the AP (action priority).
3033:
1872:
253:
An effective method for evaluating the effect of proposed changes to the design and/or operational procedures on mission success and safety.
2006:
2314:
95:
models are combined with a statistical failure mode ratio database. It was one of the first highly structured, systematic techniques for
1559:
1387:
1317:
441:
1382:
1819:
Matsumoto, K.; T. Matsumoto; Y. Goto (1975). "Reliability
Analysis of Catalytic Converter as an Automotive Emission Control System".
2619:
1326:
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Development of designs and test systems to ensure that the failures have been eliminated or the risk is reduced to acceptable level.
318:
1959:
3431:
3421:
3026:
2070:
398:
923:/ working state, a second failure situation should be explored to determine whether or not an indication will be evident to all
2049:
457:
371:
3446:
2786:
2679:
2654:
2200:
Franklin, Bryony Dean; Shebl, Nada Atef; Barber, Nick (2012). "Failure mode and effects analysis: too little for too much?".
1392:
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Catastrophic (product becomes inoperative; the failure may result in complete unsafe operation and possible multiple deaths)
402:
704:
Extremely unlikely (virtually impossible or No known occurrences on similar products or processes, with many running hours)
647:
Severely reduced aircraft deceleration on ground and side drift. Partial loss of runway position control. Risk of collision
456:, an international quality standard that requires companies to have an organization-specific documented FMEA process, many
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3241:
3175:
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1243:
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3007:
2612:
1236:
445:
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During the 1970s, use of FMEA and related techniques spread to other industries. In 1971 NASA prepared a report for the
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Additional info, including the proposed mitigation or actions used to lower a risk or justify a risk level or scenario.
3426:
3381:
2822:
2735:
1529:
1533:
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A basis for in-flight troubleshooting procedures and for locating performance monitoring and fault-detection devices.
785:
Very minor, no damage, no injuries, only results in a maintenance action (only noticed by discriminating customers)
3215:
2684:
2028:
1743:
1700:
335:(NASA) were using variations of FMECA or FMEA under a variety of names. NASA programs using FMEA variants included
2315:"A new two-stage fuzzy inference system-based approach to prioritize failures in failure mode and effect analysis"
242:
It provides a documented method for selecting a design with a high probability of successful operation and safety.
3436:
3100:
2832:
2817:
1674:
1508:
182:
Remark: For more complete scenario modelling another type of reliability analysis may be considered, for example
2465:"A clustering-based failure mode and effect analysis model and its application to the edible bird nest industry"
2286:
Kmenta, Steven; Ishii, Koshuke (2004). "Scenario-Based
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Using Expected Cost".
3303:
3234:
2847:
2725:
2720:
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1586:
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Require redundant independent brake hydraulic channels and/or require redundant sealing and classify o-ring as
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review. This gives the opportunity to make the design robust against function failure elsewhere in the system.
2399:
511:
An identifier for system level and thereby item complexity. Complexity increases as levels are closer to one.
3185:
3049:
2694:
2689:
1398:
132:
100:
1563:
3210:
2969:
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124:(failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis) to indicate that criticality analysis is performed too.
2122:
3355:
3277:
3160:
2903:
2873:
2649:
1410:
934:
Normal. An indication that is evident to an operator when the system or equipment is operating normally.
31:
1708:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. 1974. M–GA–75–1
1751:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. TM X–2567
223:
All inputs (including software commands) to the item being analyzed are present and at nominal values.
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3130:
2994:
2964:
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2106:
1862:
1265:
352:
1626:
57:
3329:
3105:
3070:
2974:
2959:
2928:
2635:
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Shebl, N. A.; Franklin, B. D.; Barber, N. (2009). "Is failure mode and effect analysis reliable?".
1499:
1364:
1247:
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Abnormal. An indication that is evident to an operator when the system has malfunctioned or failed.
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Minor, low damage, light injuries (affects very little of the system, noticed by average customer)
426:
183:
160:
140:
128:
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3308:
3190:
3170:
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2730:
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2380:
2337:
2268:
2225:
1480:
1458:"On the use of fuzzy inference techniques in assessment models: part II: industrial applications"
390:
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report described the application of FMEA to wastewater treatment plants. FMEA as application for
136:
17:
3165:
2014:
1268:
for further discussion. Various solutions to this problems have been proposed, e.g., the use of
2151:"Assessing the validity of prospective hazard analysis methods: A comparison of two techniques"
1600:
944:
PERFORM DETECTION COVERAGE ANALYSIS FOR TEST PROCESSES AND MONITORING (From ARP4761 Standard):
3180:
3110:
3080:
2938:
2878:
2260:
2217:
2182:
1868:
1442:
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360:
897:
The average time that a failure mode may be undetected may be entered if known. For example:
405:, SAE and other method descriptions. As of 2024, the AIAG / VDA FMEA Handbook is accepted by
393:
introduced FMEA to the automotive industry for safety and regulatory consideration after the
3386:
3339:
3205:
3115:
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2943:
2913:
2842:
2837:
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2761:
2569:
2535:
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2414:
2372:
2329:
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2209:
2172:
2162:
2050:"17 December 2021 – Ford CSRs for use with IATF 16949 – International Automotive Task Force"
1828:
1742:
Dyer, Morris K.; Dewey G. Little; Earl G. Hoard; Alfred C. Taylor; Rayford
Campbell (1972).
1656:
1634:
1608:
1472:
422:
96:
3272:
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2989:
2888:
2883:
2827:
2802:
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1942:
1923:
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1457:
1416:
1404:
757:
656:(1) Flight computer and maintenance computer will indicate "Left main brake, pressure low"
344:
3140:
3120:
2368:
1801:
1772:
Application of Selected Industrial Engineering Techniques to Wastewater Treatment Plants
1582:
MIL-STD-1629A – Procedures for performing a failure mode effect and criticality analysis
742:
For a piece part FMEA, quantitative probability may be calculated from the results of a
3150:
3135:
3065:
2918:
2908:
2863:
2807:
2704:
2177:
2150:
1981:
406:
348:
340:
336:
2555:"Application of Self-Organizing Map to Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Methodology"
1367: – Failure analysis system used in safety engineering and reliability engineering
3415:
2898:
2893:
2868:
2740:
1728:
Design Analysis Procedure For Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
1332:
1260:
430:
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recommending the use of FMEA in assessment of offshore petroleum exploration. A 1973
2341:
2272:
2229:
1484:
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3125:
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2933:
2491:
2384:
1358:
92:
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MIL-P-1629 – Procedures for performing a failure mode effect and critical analysis
151:
refers to studying the consequences of those failures on different system levels.
2573:
2256:
3200:
3195:
3095:
2587:
2149:
Potts H.W.W.; Anderson J.E.; Colligan L.; Leach P.; Davis S.; Berman J. (2014).
1726:
1269:
970:
238:
Major benefits derived from a properly implemented FMECA effort are as follows:
2539:
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3090:
2923:
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2213:
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453:
410:
394:
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VDA: German automotive industry demands the highest quality from its products
1936:
VDA: German automotive industry demands the highest quality from its products
1407: – Estimation of risk associated with exposure to a given set of hazards
3391:
3257:
2333:
2167:
1660:
1638:
1612:
1186:
Collect information to reduce future failures, capture engineering knowledge
1164:
Development of system requirements that minimize the likelihood of failures.
2264:
2221:
2186:
1401: – Sub-discipline of systems engineering that emphasizes dependability
3018:
1907:
1889:
962:
where probability and severity includes the effect on non-detectability (
1439:
System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical Methods, and Applications
1419: – Statistical methods to improve the quality of manufactured goods
2781:
2071:"Ford Motor Company Customer-Specific Requirements For IATF-16949:2016"
1800:
Sperber, William H.; Stier, Richard F. (December 2009 – January 2010).
364:
131:(forward logic) single point of failure analysis and is a core task in
2604:
2521:"Clustering and visualization of failure modes using an evolving tree"
2299:
3360:
3145:
2771:
437:
359:. The civil aviation industry was an early adopter of FMEA, with the
356:
80:
graph with an example of steps in a failure mode and effects analysis
1653:
Procedure for Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
1631:
State of the Art Reliability Estimate of Saturn V Propulsion Systems
1361: – Frequency with which an engineered system or component fails
523:
The failure effect as it applies at the next higher indenture level.
1832:
3402:
3287:
3226:
1126:
529:
The failure effect at the highest indenture level or total system.
414:
379:
175:
121:
75:
1329: – Eight disciplines of team-oriented problem solving method
1204:
Improve the quality, reliability, and safety of a product/process
2812:
1702:
Experimenters' Reference Based Upon Skylab Experiment Management
389:
The automotive industry began to use FMEA by the mid 1970s. The
383:
3230:
3022:
2608:
1682:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration JPL. PD–AD–1307
1250:(FTA) is better suited for "top-down" analysis. When used as a
1189:
Early identification and elimination of potential failure modes
76:
1864:
Potential Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), 4th Edition
1246:
tool, FMEA may only identify major failure modes in a system.
960:
Risk is the combination of end effect probability and severity
951:
After these three basic steps the Risk level may be provided.
418:
271:
36:
1802:"Happy 50th Birthday to HACCP: Retrospective and Prospective"
1607:. Westinghouse Electric Corporation Astronuclear Laboratory.
2553:
Chang, Wui Lee; Pang, Lie Meng; Tay, Kai Meng (March 2017).
1585:. Department of Defense (USA). MIL-STD-1629A. Archived from
1498:
Project Reliability Group (July 1990). Koch, John E. (ed.).
930:
Indications to the operator should be described as follows:
517:
The failure effect as it applies to the item under analysis.
1605:
Modes of Failure Analysis Summary for the Nerva B-2 Reactor
1335: – Defects which are the underlying cause of a failure
919:
If the undetected failure allows the system to remain in a
508:
Indenture levels (bill of material or functional breakdown)
2519:
Chang, Wui Lee; Tay, Kai Meng; Lim, Chee Peng (Nov 2015).
1183:
Catalyst for teamwork and idea exchange between functions
1982:"(FMEA/DFMEA/PFMEA) Failure Mode & Effects Analysis"
1676:
Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
1579:
United States Department of Defense (24 November 1980).
1222:
Reduce the possibility of same kind of failure in future
1953:
1951:
1655:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1966.
1501:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory Reliability Analysis Handbook
296:
106:
A few different types of FMEA analyses exist, such as:
2080:: 23 – via International Automotive Task Force.
1379: – Systems with high up-time, a.k.a. "always on"
1373: – Systematic preventive approach to food safety
444:(DRBFM) approach. The method is now supported by the
226:
All consumables are present in sufficient quantities.
1322:
Pages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback
927:
and what corrective action they may or should take.
626:
Brake manifold ref. designator 2b, channel A, o-ring
606:(D) Detection (indications to operator, maintainer)
3369:
3348:
3322:
3296:
3265:
2952:
2856:
2795:
2754:
2713:
2642:
1264:multiplication treats them as though they are. See
969:Preliminary risk levels can be selected based on a
907:
2 months, detected by scheduled maintenance block X
1345:) – Systematic technique for failure analysis
468:The following covers some basic FMEA terminology.
333:U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
1731:. Society for Automotive Engineers. 1967. ARP926.
1173:To help with design choices (trade-off analysis).
1170:Development and evaluation of diagnostic systems.
1958:Kymal, Chad; Gruska, Gregory F. (19 June 2019).
886:Fault is undetected by operators or maintainers
665:Check dormancy period and probability of failure
1413: – Authority in a particular area or topic
1349:Failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis
1339:Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis
481:The loss of a function under stated conditions.
367:, which is now broadly used in civil aviation.
53:Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis
1535:Performing a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
1195:Fulfill legal requirements (product liability)
901:Seconds, auto detected by maintenance computer
3242:
3034:
2620:
2007:"Performing Failure Mode and Effect Analysis"
1780:United States Environmental Protection Agency
1541:. Goddard Space Flight Center. 431-REF-000370
615:Actions for further investigation / evidence
285:The examples and perspective in this section
8:
2144:
2142:
2111:. Reliability Analysis Center. 1997. FMD–97.
1145:Changes are made to the operating conditions
777:No relevant effect on reliability or safety
194:Functional failure mode and effects analysis
1769:Mallory, Charles W.; Robert Waller (1973).
1371:Hazard analysis and critical control points
1125:After this step the FMEA has become like a
904:8 hours, detected by turn-around inspection
382:on the Apollo Space Program moved into the
30:"FMEA" redirects here. For other uses, see
3249:
3235:
3227:
3041:
3027:
3019:
2627:
2613:
2605:
1848:Potential Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
1437:Rausand, Marvin; Høyland, Arnljot (2004).
1225:Reduce the potential for warranty concerns
632:a) O-ring compression set (creep) failure
303:, or create a new section, as appropriate.
2176:
2166:
1568:. Department of Defense (US). MIL-P-1629.
1213:Minimize late changes and associated cost
1198:Improve company image and competitiveness
846:Certain – fault will be caught on test –
653:(V) Catastrophic (this is the worst case)
440:has taken this one step further with its
319:Learn how and when to remove this message
2670:Earth systems engineering and management
1142:A new cycle begins (new product/process)
976:
831:
762:
736:Frequent (failure is almost inevitable)
728:Reasonably possible (repeated failures)
689:
567:
541:The likelihood of the failure occurring.
2398:Chai K.C.; Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2016).
1429:
1395: – Contingency planning techniques
1219:Reduce system development time and cost
220:Only one failure mode exists at a time.
2463:Tay K.M.; Jong C.H.; Lim C.P. (2015).
2313:Jee T.L.; Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2015).
2093:Logistics: Principles and Applications
2069:Ford Motor Company (January 3, 2022).
2029:"Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)"
1782:. pp. 107–110. EPA R2–73–176
1465:Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making
1216:Reduce impact on company profit margin
2005:Fadlovich, Erik (December 31, 2007).
1154:Customer feedback indicates a problem
1138:The FMEA should be updated whenever:
641:Decreased pressure to main brake hose
259:Criteria for early planning of tests.
27:Analysis of potential system failures
7:
2108:Failure Mode/Mechanism Distributions
1867:. Automotive Industry Action Group.
910:2 years, detected by overhaul task x
629:Internal leakage from channel A to B
376:U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1850:. Automotive Industry Action Group.
1560:United States Department of Defense
1388:List of materials-testing resources
1318:Design review based on failure mode
442:design review based on failure mode
1383:List of materials analysis methods
659:Built-in test interval is 1 minute
634:b) surface damage during assembly
25:
3335:Failure mode and effects analysis
2705:Sociocultural Systems Engineering
2472:Neural Computing and Applications
1327:Eight disciplines problem solving
720:Occasional (occasional failures)
712:Remote (relatively few failures)
687:with a defined number of levels.
85:Failure mode and effects analysis
18:Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
2528:Expert Systems with Applications
2322:IEEE Transactions on Reliability
1960:"Introducing the AIAG-VDA DFMEA"
458:original equipment manufacturers
399:Automotive Industry Action Group
361:Society for Automotive Engineers
276:
41:
585:Potential cause(s) / mechanism
2787:Systems development life cycle
2680:Enterprise systems engineering
2655:Biological systems engineering
1823:. SAE Technical Paper Series.
1393:Process decision program chart
1320: – critical design review
1151:New regulations are instituted
1148:A change is made in the design
556:Remarks / mitigation / actions
491:Failure cause and/or mechanism
120:Sometimes FMEA is extended to
1:
3176:Rebound effect (conservation)
2746:System of systems engineering
2660:Cognitive systems engineering
2432:AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook 2019
2123:"MIL-STD-882 E SYSTEM SAFETY"
1924:AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook 2019
67:Proposed since December 2023.
3156:Parable of the broken window
2574:10.1016/j.neucom.2016.04.073
2288:Journal of Mechanical Design
2257:10.1097/PTS.0b013e3181a6f040
2155:BMC Health Services Research
1633:. General Electric Company.
1456:Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2008).
1237:Structured What If Technique
1192:Emphasize problem prevention
446:American Society for Quality
3382:Statistical process control
2823:Quality function deployment
2736:Verification and validation
2095:. McGraw Hill. p. 488.
1530:Goddard Space Flight Center
1255:level subsystem or system.
600:(P) Probability (estimate)
429:(formerly Daimler AG), and
299:, discuss the issue on the
50:It has been suggested that
3463:
3216:Tyranny of small decisions
2685:Health systems engineering
2540:10.1016/j.eswa.2015.04.036
2419:10.1016/j.asoc.2016.08.043
2377:10.1109/JSYST.2015.2478150
1821:SAE Technical Paper 750178
1298:Detailed design / hardware
1207:Increase user satisfaction
893:Dormancy or latency period
621:
618:Mitigation / requirements
609:Detection dormancy period
574:
544:Risk priority number (RPN)
229:Nominal power is available
29:
3400:
3101:Excess burden of taxation
3056:
3003:
2833:Systems Modeling Language
2484:10.1007/s00521-014-1647-4
2245:Journal of Patient Safety
2214:10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000723
1509:Jet Propulsion Laboratory
1477:10.1007/s10700-008-9037-y
1292:Concept design / hardware
594:Next higher level effect
591:Local effects of failure
564:Example of FMEA worksheet
452:Following the release of
3304:Business process mapping
2848:Work breakdown structure
2726:Functional specification
2721:Requirements engineering
2665:Configuration management
2590:. Diametric Software Ltd
2202:BMJ Quality & Safety
2091:Langford, J. W. (1995).
1507:. Pasadena, California:
1201:Improve production yield
955:Risk level (P×S) and (D)
597:System-level end effect
520:Next higher level effect
3432:Reliability engineering
3422:Japanese business terms
3186:Self-defeating prophecy
3050:Unintended consequences
2695:Reliability engineering
2690:Performance engineering
2453:. Retrieved 2020-11-23.
2434:. Retrieved 2020-11-23.
2334:10.1109/TR.2015.2420300
2168:10.1186/1472-6963-14-41
1945:. Retrieved 2020-09-14.
1926:. Retrieved 2020-09-14.
1399:Reliability engineering
582:Potential failure mode
133:reliability engineering
3211:Tragedy of the commons
2970:Industrial engineering
2675:Electrical engineering
2407:Applied Soft Computing
1629:; et al. (1963).
744:reliability prediction
570:Example FMEA worksheet
427:Mercedes-Benz Group AG
372:U.S. Geological Survey
99:. It was developed by
81:
3447:Quality control tools
3356:Design of experiments
3278:Voice of the customer
3161:Paradox of enrichment
2904:Arthur David Hall III
2874:Benjamin S. Blanchard
2650:Aerospace engineering
1532:(GSFC) (1996-08-10).
1411:Subject-matter expert
670:critical part class 1
644:No left wheel braking
386:industry in general.
101:reliability engineers
79:
32:FMEA (disambiguation)
3442:Reliability analysis
3283:Value-stream mapping
3131:Inverse consequences
2995:Software engineering
2965:Computer engineering
2357:IEEE Systems Journal
1913:. SAE International.
1895:. SAE International.
1266:Level of measurement
612:Risk level P*S (+D)
472:Action priority (AP)
297:improve this section
287:may not represent a
60:into this article. (
3330:Root cause analysis
3106:Four Pests campaign
2975:Operations research
2960:Control engineering
2929:Joseph Francis Shea
2636:Systems engineering
2369:2017ISysJ..11.1589K
2011:Embedded Technology
1806:FoodSafety Magazine
1641:. RM 63TMP–22.
1562:(9 November 1949).
1365:Fault tree analysis
1248:Fault tree analysis
685:Probability Ranking
572:
184:fault tree analysis
141:quality engineering
129:inductive reasoning
3427:Lean manufacturing
3309:Process capability
3191:Self-refuting idea
3171:Perverse incentive
2985:Quality management
2980:Project management
2808:Function modelling
2731:System integration
2700:Safety engineering
2449:2021-03-02 at the
1941:2021-03-02 at the
568:
391:Ford Motor Company
137:safety engineering
82:
3409:
3408:
3224:
3223:
3181:Risk compensation
3016:
3015:
2939:Manuela M. Veloso
2879:Wernher von Braun
2588:"Building a FMEA"
2534:(20): 7235–7244.
2300:10.1115/1.1799614
2127:www.everyspec.com
1980:Webmaster, AIAG.
1874:978-1-60534-136-1
1377:High availability
1122:
1121:
890:
889:
813:
812:
740:
739:
675:
674:
329:
328:
321:
157:failure mechanism
74:
73:
69:
16:(Redirected from
3454:
3437:Systems analysis
3340:Multi-vari chart
3251:
3244:
3237:
3228:
3206:Streisand effect
3116:Hawthorne effect
3076:Butterfly effect
3071:Braess's paradox
3043:
3036:
3029:
3020:
2944:John N. Warfield
2914:Robert E. Machol
2843:Systems modeling
2838:Systems analysis
2777:System lifecycle
2762:Business process
2629:
2622:
2615:
2606:
2600:
2599:
2597:
2595:
2584:
2578:
2577:
2559:
2550:
2544:
2543:
2525:
2516:
2510:
2509:
2507:
2506:
2500:
2494:. Archived from
2469:
2460:
2454:
2441:
2435:
2429:
2423:
2422:
2404:
2395:
2389:
2388:
2352:
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2319:
2310:
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2283:
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2146:
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2060:
2059:
2057:
2056:
2046:
2040:
2039:
2037:
2036:
2025:
2019:
2018:
2013:. Archived from
2002:
1996:
1995:
1993:
1992:
1977:
1971:
1970:
1968:
1967:
1955:
1946:
1933:
1927:
1921:
1915:
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1750:
1739:
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1723:
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1707:
1697:
1691:
1690:
1688:
1687:
1681:
1671:
1665:
1664:
1663:. RA–006–013–1A.
1661:2060/19700076494
1649:
1643:
1642:
1639:2060/19930075105
1623:
1617:
1616:
1613:2060/19760069385
1597:
1591:
1590:
1589:on 22 July 2011.
1576:
1570:
1569:
1556:
1550:
1549:
1547:
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1540:
1526:
1520:
1519:
1517:
1516:
1506:
1495:
1489:
1488:
1462:
1453:
1447:
1446:
1441:(2nd ed.).
1434:
1354:
1344:
1323:
977:
832:
763:
690:
573:
423:Volkswagen Group
324:
317:
313:
310:
304:
280:
279:
272:
149:Effects analysis
97:failure analysis
65:
45:
44:
37:
21:
3462:
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3457:
3456:
3455:
3453:
3452:
3451:
3412:
3411:
3410:
3405:
3396:
3365:
3344:
3318:
3292:
3273:Project charter
3261:
3255:
3225:
3220:
3166:Parkinson's law
3061:Abilene paradox
3052:
3047:
3017:
3012:
2999:
2990:Risk management
2948:
2889:Harold Chestnut
2884:Kathleen Carley
2852:
2828:System dynamics
2803:Decision-making
2791:
2767:Fault tolerance
2750:
2709:
2638:
2633:
2603:
2593:
2591:
2586:
2585:
2581:
2557:
2552:
2551:
2547:
2523:
2518:
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2513:
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2498:
2467:
2462:
2461:
2457:
2451:Wayback Machine
2442:
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2100:
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2027:
2026:
2022:
2004:
2003:
1999:
1990:
1988:
1979:
1978:
1974:
1965:
1963:
1962:. qualitydigest
1957:
1956:
1949:
1943:Wayback Machine
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1615:. WANL–TNR–042.
1599:
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1578:
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1427:
1422:
1417:Taguchi methods
1405:Risk assessment
1352:
1342:
1321:
1313:
1282:
1232:
1210:Maximize profit
1180:
1161:
1136:
985:
982:
957:
917:
895:
854:Almost certain
818:
758:hazard analysis
753:
680:
678:Probability (P)
566:
466:
454:IATF 16949:2016
325:
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3188:
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3178:
3173:
3168:
3163:
3158:
3153:
3151:Osborne effect
3148:
3143:
3138:
3136:Jevons paradox
3133:
3128:
3123:
3118:
3113:
3111:Goodhart's law
3108:
3103:
3098:
3093:
3088:
3083:
3081:Campbell's law
3078:
3073:
3068:
3066:Adverse effect
3063:
3057:
3054:
3053:
3048:
3046:
3045:
3038:
3031:
3023:
3014:
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2998:
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2954:
2953:Related fields
2950:
2949:
2947:
2946:
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2926:
2921:
2919:Radhika Nagpal
2916:
2911:
2909:Derek Hitchins
2906:
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2871:
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2864:James S. Albus
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2631:
2624:
2617:
2609:
2602:
2601:
2579:
2562:Neurocomputing
2545:
2511:
2478:(3): 551–560.
2455:
2436:
2424:
2390:
2347:
2328:(3): 869–877.
2305:
2278:
2235:
2208:(7): 607–611.
2192:
2138:
2114:
2098:
2083:
2061:
2041:
2020:
2017:on 2011-11-17.
1997:
1972:
1947:
1928:
1916:
1898:
1880:
1873:
1853:
1838:
1833:10.4271/750178
1811:
1792:
1761:
1734:
1718:
1692:
1666:
1644:
1618:
1592:
1571:
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1521:
1490:
1471:(3): 283–302.
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1021:
1018:
1015:
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1009:
1005:
1004:
1001:
998:
995:
992:
989:
986:
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953:
942:
941:
938:
935:
916:
913:
912:
911:
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905:
902:
894:
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876:
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871:
868:
864:
863:
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848:
847:
844:
840:
839:
836:
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802:
799:
795:
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791:
787:
786:
783:
779:
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749:
738:
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734:
730:
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705:
702:
698:
697:
694:
679:
676:
673:
672:
666:
663:
660:
657:
654:
651:
650:(C) Occasional
648:
645:
642:
639:
636:
630:
627:
624:
620:
619:
616:
613:
610:
607:
604:
601:
598:
595:
592:
589:
588:Mission phase
586:
583:
580:
577:
565:
562:
561:
560:
557:
554:
551:
548:
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542:
539:
536:
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521:
518:
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512:
509:
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503:
502:Failure effect
500:
492:
489:
485:
482:
479:
476:
473:
465:
462:
327:
326:
291:of the subject
289:worldwide view
284:
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275:
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118:
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72:
71:
49:
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40:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3459:
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3443:
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3430:
3428:
3425:
3423:
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3404:
3399:
3393:
3390:
3388:
3385:
3383:
3380:
3378:
3375:
3374:
3372:
3370:Control phase
3368:
3362:
3359:
3357:
3354:
3353:
3351:
3349:Improve phase
3347:
3341:
3338:
3336:
3333:
3331:
3328:
3327:
3325:
3323:Analyse phase
3321:
3315:
3312:
3310:
3307:
3305:
3302:
3301:
3299:
3297:Measure phase
3295:
3289:
3286:
3284:
3281:
3279:
3276:
3274:
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3270:
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3264:
3259:
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2925:
2922:
2920:
2917:
2915:
2912:
2910:
2907:
2905:
2902:
2900:
2899:Barbara Grosz
2897:
2895:
2894:Wolt Fabrycky
2892:
2890:
2887:
2885:
2882:
2880:
2877:
2875:
2872:
2870:
2869:Ruzena Bajcsy
2867:
2865:
2862:
2861:
2859:
2855:
2849:
2846:
2844:
2841:
2839:
2836:
2834:
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2800:
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2773:
2770:
2768:
2765:
2763:
2760:
2759:
2757:
2753:
2747:
2744:
2742:
2741:Design review
2739:
2737:
2734:
2732:
2729:
2727:
2724:
2722:
2719:
2718:
2716:
2712:
2706:
2703:
2701:
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2678:
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2656:
2653:
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2648:
2647:
2645:
2641:
2637:
2630:
2625:
2623:
2618:
2616:
2611:
2610:
2607:
2589:
2583:
2580:
2575:
2571:
2567:
2563:
2556:
2549:
2546:
2541:
2537:
2533:
2529:
2522:
2515:
2512:
2501:on 2017-09-22
2497:
2493:
2489:
2485:
2481:
2477:
2473:
2466:
2459:
2456:
2452:
2448:
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2370:
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2351:
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2339:
2335:
2331:
2327:
2323:
2316:
2309:
2306:
2301:
2297:
2293:
2289:
2282:
2279:
2274:
2270:
2266:
2262:
2258:
2254:
2250:
2246:
2239:
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2231:
2227:
2223:
2219:
2215:
2211:
2207:
2203:
2196:
2193:
2188:
2184:
2179:
2174:
2169:
2164:
2160:
2156:
2152:
2145:
2143:
2139:
2128:
2124:
2118:
2115:
2110:
2109:
2102:
2099:
2094:
2087:
2084:
2079:
2078:Ford IATF CSR
2072:
2065:
2062:
2051:
2045:
2042:
2030:
2024:
2021:
2016:
2012:
2008:
2001:
1998:
1987:
1983:
1976:
1973:
1961:
1954:
1952:
1948:
1944:
1940:
1937:
1932:
1929:
1925:
1920:
1917:
1912:
1911:
1902:
1899:
1894:
1893:
1884:
1881:
1876:
1870:
1866:
1865:
1861:AIAG (2008).
1857:
1854:
1849:
1846:AIAG (1993).
1842:
1839:
1834:
1830:
1826:
1822:
1815:
1812:
1807:
1803:
1796:
1793:
1781:
1774:
1773:
1765:
1762:
1747:
1746:
1738:
1735:
1730:
1729:
1722:
1719:
1704:
1703:
1696:
1693:
1678:
1677:
1670:
1667:
1662:
1658:
1654:
1648:
1645:
1640:
1636:
1632:
1628:
1622:
1619:
1614:
1610:
1606:
1602:
1596:
1593:
1588:
1584:
1583:
1575:
1572:
1567:
1566:
1561:
1555:
1552:
1537:
1536:
1531:
1525:
1522:
1510:
1503:
1502:
1494:
1491:
1486:
1482:
1478:
1474:
1470:
1466:
1459:
1452:
1449:
1445:. p. 88.
1444:
1440:
1433:
1430:
1424:
1418:
1415:
1412:
1409:
1406:
1403:
1400:
1397:
1394:
1391:
1389:
1386:
1384:
1381:
1378:
1375:
1372:
1369:
1366:
1363:
1360:
1357:
1350:
1347:
1340:
1337:
1334:
1333:Failure cause
1331:
1328:
1325:
1319:
1316:
1315:
1310:
1305:
1302:
1299:
1296:
1293:
1290:
1287:
1284:
1283:
1279:
1277:
1273:
1271:
1267:
1262:
1261:ordinal scale
1256:
1253:
1249:
1245:
1242:If used as a
1240:
1238:
1229:
1224:
1221:
1218:
1215:
1212:
1209:
1206:
1203:
1200:
1197:
1194:
1191:
1188:
1185:
1182:
1181:
1177:
1172:
1169:
1166:
1163:
1162:
1158:
1153:
1150:
1147:
1144:
1141:
1140:
1139:
1133:
1128:
1124:
1123:
1118:Unacceptable
1117:
1114:
1111:
1108:
1105:
1102:
1099:
1098:
1095:Unacceptable
1094:
1091:
1088:
1085:
1082:
1079:
1076:
1075:
1072:Unacceptable
1071:
1068:
1065:
1062:
1059:
1056:
1053:
1052:
1049:Unacceptable
1048:
1045:
1042:
1039:
1036:
1033:
1030:
1029:
1025:
1022:
1019:
1016:
1013:
1010:
1007:
1006:
1002:
999:
996:
993:
990:
987:
979:
978:
975:
972:
967:
965:
964:dormancy time
961:
954:
952:
949:
945:
939:
936:
933:
932:
931:
928:
926:
922:
914:
909:
906:
903:
900:
899:
898:
892:
885:
882:
881:
877:
874:
873:
869:
866:
865:
861:
858:
857:
853:
850:
849:
845:
842:
841:
837:
834:
833:
830:
828:
824:
816:Detection (D)
815:
808:
805:
804:
800:
797:
796:
792:
789:
788:
784:
781:
780:
776:
773:
772:
768:
765:
764:
761:
759:
750:
748:
745:
735:
732:
731:
727:
724:
723:
719:
716:
715:
711:
708:
707:
703:
700:
699:
695:
692:
691:
688:
686:
677:
671:
667:
664:
661:
658:
655:
652:
649:
646:
643:
640:
637:
635:
631:
628:
625:
622:
617:
614:
611:
608:
605:
603:(S) Severity
602:
599:
596:
593:
590:
587:
584:
581:
578:
575:
571:
563:
558:
555:
552:
549:
546:
543:
540:
537:
534:
531:
528:
525:
522:
519:
516:
513:
510:
507:
504:
501:
499:
493:
490:
486:
483:
480:
477:
474:
471:
470:
469:
463:
461:
459:
455:
450:
447:
443:
439:
434:
432:
431:Daimler Truck
428:
424:
420:
416:
412:
408:
404:
400:
396:
392:
387:
385:
381:
377:
373:
368:
366:
362:
358:
354:
350:
346:
342:
338:
334:
323:
320:
312:
302:
298:
292:
290:
283:
274:
273:
267:
265:
258:
255:
252:
248:
244:
241:
240:
239:
233:
228:
225:
222:
219:
218:
217:
210:
208:
204:
200:
193:
191:
189:
185:
180:
177:
168:
166:
164:
163:
162:(root) causes
158:
152:
150:
144:
142:
138:
134:
130:
125:
123:
115:
112:
109:
108:
107:
104:
102:
98:
94:
90:
86:
78:
68:
63:
59:
55:
54:
48:
39:
38:
33:
19:
3377:Control plan
3334:
3314:Pareto chart
3266:Define phase
3141:Murphy's law
3126:Hydra effect
3121:Hutber's law
3086:Cobra effect
2934:Katia Sycara
2818:Optimization
2592:. Retrieved
2582:
2565:
2561:
2548:
2531:
2527:
2514:
2503:. Retrieved
2496:the original
2475:
2471:
2458:
2439:
2427:
2410:
2406:
2393:
2360:
2356:
2350:
2325:
2321:
2308:
2291:
2287:
2281:
2251:(2): 86–94.
2248:
2244:
2238:
2205:
2201:
2195:
2158:
2154:
2130:. Retrieved
2126:
2117:
2107:
2101:
2092:
2086:
2077:
2064:
2053:. Retrieved
2044:
2033:. Retrieved
2023:
2015:the original
2010:
2000:
1989:. Retrieved
1986:www.aiag.org
1985:
1975:
1964:. Retrieved
1931:
1919:
1908:
1906:SAE (2008).
1901:
1890:
1888:SAE (1994).
1883:
1863:
1856:
1847:
1841:
1824:
1820:
1814:
1808:: 42, 44–46.
1805:
1795:
1784:. Retrieved
1771:
1764:
1753:. Retrieved
1744:
1737:
1727:
1721:
1710:. Retrieved
1701:
1695:
1684:. Retrieved
1675:
1669:
1652:
1647:
1630:
1627:Dill, Robert
1621:
1604:
1595:
1587:the original
1581:
1574:
1564:
1554:
1543:. Retrieved
1534:
1524:
1513:. Retrieved
1511:. JPL-D-5703
1500:
1493:
1468:
1464:
1451:
1438:
1432:
1359:Failure rate
1303:
1297:
1291:
1285:
1274:
1257:
1241:
1233:
1137:
1115:Unacceptable
1112:Unacceptable
1092:Unacceptable
968:
963:
959:
958:
950:
946:
943:
929:
924:
920:
918:
896:
826:
822:
819:
754:
751:Severity (S)
741:
684:
681:
669:
662:Unacceptable
633:
569:
514:Local effect
496:
484:Failure mode
467:
451:
435:
395:Pinto affair
388:
369:
330:
315:
306:
286:
262:
237:
214:
211:Ground rules
205:
201:
197:
187:
181:
172:
169:Introduction
161:
156:
153:
148:
145:
126:
119:
105:
93:failure rate
88:
84:
83:
66:
51:
3201:Social trap
3196:Serendipity
3096:Externality
2568:: 314–320.
2413:: 734–747.
2363:(3): 1–12.
2294:(6): 1027.
1270:fuzzy logic
1230:Limitations
984:Probability
971:risk matrix
538:Probability
464:Basic terms
246:occurrence.
127:FMEA is an
3416:Categories
3091:CSI effect
2924:Simon Ramo
2505:2019-07-14
2132:2017-01-04
2055:2024-07-30
2035:2012-02-15
1991:2024-07-30
1966:2020-12-02
1786:2012-11-10
1755:2011-08-16
1712:2011-08-16
1686:2010-03-13
1601:Neal, R.A.
1545:2013-08-25
1515:2013-08-25
1425:References
1286:Functional
1178:Advantages
915:Indication
827:mechanisms
576:FMEA Ref.
526:End effect
411:Stellantis
110:Functional
3392:Poka-yoke
3258:Six Sigma
2714:Processes
2643:Subfields
1252:bottom-up
925:operators
870:Moderate
532:Detection
301:talk page
250:failures.
188:deductive
186:(FTA); a
3008:Category
2755:Concepts
2594:13 March
2447:Archived
2342:20987880
2273:45635417
2265:19920447
2230:46106670
2222:22447819
2187:24467813
1939:Archived
1603:(1962).
1485:12269658
1311:See also
1244:top-down
1106:Moderate
1103:Moderate
1086:Moderate
1083:Moderate
1066:Moderate
1063:Moderate
1043:Moderate
1023:Moderate
981:Severity
838:Meaning
769:Meaning
696:Meaning
550:Severity
415:Honda NA
409:, Ford,
349:Magellan
309:May 2022
295:You may
264:design.
234:Benefits
2782:V-Model
2492:7821836
2385:5878974
2365:Bibcode
2178:3906758
1304:Process
835:Rating
766:Rating
693:Rating
638:Landing
623:1.1.1.1
478:Failure
365:ARP4761
353:Galileo
345:Voyager
268:History
116:Process
62:Discuss
3361:Kaizen
3146:Nocebo
2857:People
2772:System
2490:
2383:
2340:
2271:
2263:
2228:
2220:
2185:
2175:
2161:: 41.
1871:
1483:
1134:Timing
438:Toyota
357:Skylab
355:, and
341:Viking
337:Apollo
113:Design
58:merged
3403:DMAIC
3288:SIPOC
3260:tools
2796:Tools
2558:(PDF)
2524:(PDF)
2499:(PDF)
2488:S2CID
2468:(PDF)
2403:(PDF)
2381:S2CID
2338:S2CID
2318:(PDF)
2269:S2CID
2226:S2CID
2074:(PDF)
2031:. ASQ
1910:FMEA)
1892:FMEA)
1776:(PDF)
1749:(PDF)
1706:(PDF)
1680:(PDF)
1539:(pdf)
1505:(pdf)
1481:S2CID
1461:(PDF)
1443:Wiley
1353:FMEDA
1343:FMECA
1280:Types
1127:FMECA
1026:High
862:High
823:modes
579:Item
380:HACCP
176:FMECA
122:FMECA
2813:IDEF
2596:2020
2261:PMID
2218:PMID
2183:PMID
1869:ISBN
1159:Uses
1109:High
1089:High
1069:High
1046:High
921:safe
878:Low
384:food
139:and
89:FMEA
2570:doi
2536:doi
2480:doi
2415:doi
2373:doi
2330:doi
2296:doi
2292:126
2253:doi
2210:doi
2173:PMC
2163:doi
1829:doi
1657:hdl
1635:hdl
1609:hdl
1473:doi
1080:Low
1060:Low
1057:Low
1054:III
1040:Low
1037:Low
1034:Low
1020:Low
1017:Low
1014:Low
1011:Low
1003:VI
994:III
419:BMW
403:VDA
56:be
3418::
3387:5S
2566:PP
2564:.
2560:.
2532:42
2530:.
2526:.
2486:.
2476:26
2474:.
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