139:
22:
654:. Although very successful initially, bidders quickly learned how to manipulate the mechanism. Bidding patterns exhibited a characteristic saw-tooth pattern, and the mechanism need not possess a (pure) Nash equilibrium. These deficiencies lead to the replacement of the GFP mechanism in practice, and the adoption of alternate auction designs.
638:
slots. Each slot has an associate click-through rate, the click-through rates are decreasing from top to bottom. The GFP mechanism asks each bidder for a bid. Then the highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on. On each click the highest bidder pays his bid on
657:
Recent work by Hoy et al. and DĂĽtting et al. shows that the deficiencies of the GFP mechanism can be ascribed to its bidding interface, and that adopting a more expressive bidding interface guarantees the existence of an efficient
713:
Edelman, Ben; Ostrovsky, Michael; Schwarz, Michael (2007). "Internet
Advertising and the Generalized-Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars worth of Keywords".
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646:, replacing the "flat fee" and "per-impression" model that was the standard. Overture adopted the GFP mechanism in 1997, and provided service to
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DĂĽtting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C. (2013). "Expressiveness and
Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions".
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Hoy, Darrell; Jain, Kamal; Wilkens, Chris (2013). "A Dynamic
Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions".
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Edelman, Ben; Ostrovsky, Michael (2007). "Strategic Bidder
Behavior in Sponsored Search Auctions".
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the first slot, the second highest bidder pays his bid on the second slot, and so on.
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Proceedings of the 15th
Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'14)
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Proceedings of the 14th
Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'13)
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The GFP mechanism was the first mechanism to find application in
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662:under complete information as well as an efficient
630:(a.k.a. position auctions). In sponsored search
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8:
626:) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for
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106:Learn how and when to remove this message
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634:bidders compete for the assignment of
42:Please improve this article by adding
7:
14:
55:"Generalized first-price auction"
676:Generalized second-price auction
137:
20:
620:generalized first-price auction
686:First-price sealed-bid auction
666:under incomplete information.
1:
681:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction
44:secondary or tertiary sources
860:
774:10.1016/j.dss.2006.08.008
574:Private electronic market
752:Decision Support Systems
715:American Economic Review
269:Generalized second-price
264:Generalized first-price
664:Bayes-Nash equilibrium
319:Simultaneous ascending
31:relies excessively on
354:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
737:10.1257/aer.97.1.242
234:Discriminatory price
544:Revenue equivalence
229:Deferred-acceptance
314:Sealed first-price
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394:Cancellation hunt
344:Value of revenues
214:Click-box bidding
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844:Types of auction
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660:Nash equilibrium
644:sponsored search
628:sponsored search
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539:Price of anarchy
389:Calor licitantis
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419:Tacit collusion
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284:Multi-attribute
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37:primary sources
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534:Digital goods
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334:Uniform price
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329:Traffic light
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219:Combinatorial
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57: –
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51:Find sources:
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29:This article
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469:Domain names
324:Single-price
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224:Common value
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96:January 2024
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30:
791:: 242–259.
184:Anglo-Dutch
167:Bidding fee
697:References
439:Algorithms
339:Unique bid
294:No-reserve
66:newspapers
33:references
823:1307.5216
816:: 57–74.
798:1304.7718
760:CiteSeerX
723:CiteSeerX
504:Virginity
359:Walrasian
289:Multiunit
199:Brazilian
179:Amsterdam
838:Category
670:See also
579:Software
569:Ebidding
494:Spectrum
459:Children
429:Contexts
309:Scottish
279:Knapsack
274:Japanese
204:Calcutta
131:Auctions
123:a series
121:Part of
691:AdWords
474:Flowers
464:Players
454:Charity
414:Suicide
409:Sniping
404:Rigging
384:Shading
374:Bidding
349:Vickrey
304:Reverse
254:Forward
249:English
162:Chinese
157:All-pay
80:scholar
762:
725:
648:Yahoo!
559:Online
524:Theory
499:Stamps
489:Slaves
364:Yankee
259:French
239:Double
209:Candle
172:Dollar
82:
75:
68:
61:
53:
818:arXiv
793:arXiv
514:Wives
479:Loans
444:Autos
244:Dutch
147:Types
87:JSTOR
73:books
650:and
618:The
509:Wine
484:Scam
399:Jump
299:Rank
59:news
770:doi
733:doi
652:MSN
624:GFP
449:Art
35:to
840::
768:.
756:43
754:.
731:.
719:97
717:.
705:^
125:on
46:.
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772::
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735::
636:k
632:n
622:(
607:e
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103:(
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94:(
84:·
77:·
70:·
63:·
40:.
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