428:. Anti-Humeans often assert that everyone has a reason to be moral. But this seems to be incompatible with the Humean position, according to which reasons depend on desires and not everyone has a desire to be moral. This poses the following threat: it may lead to cases where an agent simply justifies his immoral actions by pointing out that he had no desire to be moral. One way to respond to this problem is to draw a clear distinction between rationality and morality. If rationality is concerned with what should be done according to the agent's own perspective then it may well be rational to act immorally in cases when the agent lacks moral desires. Such actions are then rationally justified but immoral nonetheless. But it is a contested issue whether there really is such a gap between rationality and morality.
312:. For example, the action of flipping a light switch rests, on the one hand, on the agent's belief that this bodily movement would turn on the light and, on the other hand, on the desire to have light. According to Davidson, it is not just the bodily behavior that counts as the action but also the consequences that follow from it. So the movement of the finger flipping the switch is part of the action as well as the electrons moving through the wire and the light bulb turning on. Some consequences are included in the action even though the agent did not intend them to happen. It is sufficient that what the agent does "can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional". So, for example, if flipping the light switch alerts the burglar then alerting the burglar is part of the agent's actions.
398:. On the one hand, it is the thesis that we should be motivated to employ the means necessary for the ends we have. Failing to do so would be irrational. Expressed in terms of practical reasons, it states that if an agent has a reason to realize an end, this reason is transmitted from the end to the means, i.e. the agent also has a derivative reason to employ the means. This thesis is seldom contested since it seems quite intuitive. Failing to follow this requirement is a form of error, not only when judged from an external perspective, but even from the agent's own perspective: the agent cannot plead that he does not care since he already has a desire for the corresponding end.
181:: "here is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves". Jessica Wilson provides the following contemporary formulation: "here are no metaphysically necessary connections between wholly distinct, intrinsically typed, entities". Hume's intuition motivating this thesis is that while experience presents us with certain ideas of various objects, it might as well have presented us with very different ideas. So when I perceive a bird on a tree, I might as well have perceived a bird without a tree or a tree without a bird. This is so because their
215:. To see how this might work, consider the case of salt being thrown into a cup of water and subsequently dissolving. This can be described as a series of two events, a throwing-event and a dissolving-event. Necessitarians hold that all possible worlds with the throwing-event also contain a subsequent dissolving-event. But the two events are distinct entities, so according to Hume's dictum, it is possible to have one event without the other.
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be that, instead of opening the holding hand intentionally, the intention makes the first climber so nervous that the rope slips through his hand and thus leads to the other climber's death. Davidson addresses this issue by excluding cases of wayward causation from his account since they are not examples of intentional behavior in the strict sense. So bodily behavior only constitutes an action if it was caused by intentions
169:, this means that causal relations should be studied by attending to sensory experience. The problem with this is that the causal relation itself is never given directly in perception. Through visual perception, for example, we can know that a stone was first thrown in the direction of a window and that subsequently, the window broke, but we do not directly see that the throwing caused the breaking. This leads to Hume's
402:
this view, whether the agent has this desire is not a matter of being rational or not. Rationality just requires that an agent who wants to swim at the beach should be motivated to travel there. This thesis has proved most controversial. Some have argued that desires do not provide reasons at all, or only in special cases. This position is often combined with an
593:. On this account, two perceptions belong to the same mind if they resemble each other and/or stand in the right causal relations to each other. Hume's particular version of this approach is usually rejected, but there are various other proposals on how to solve this problem compatible with the bundle theory. They include accounting for the unity in terms of
223:: "anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else". Combined with the assumption that reality consists on the most fundamental level of nothing but a spatio-temporal distribution of local natural properties, this thesis is known as "
580:, i.e. how the mind is unified with itself at different times or how it persists through time. But it can also be understood in terms of synchronic unity, i.e. how at one specific time, there is unity among the different mental states had by the same subject. A substance, unlike a simple collection, can explain either type of unity. This is why
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view of rationality: that reasons are given not from the agent's psychological states but from objective facts about the world, for example, from what would be objectively best. This is reflected, for example, in the view that some desires are bad or irrational and can be criticized on these grounds.
401:
On the other hand, contemporary
Humeanism about practical reason includes the assertion that only our desires determine which initial reasons we have. So having a desire to swim at the beach provides the agent with a reason to do so, which in turn provides him with a reason to travel to the beach. On
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if the intention caused its goal to realize but in a very unusual way that was not intended, e.g. because the skills of the agent are not exercised in the way planned. For example, a rock climber forms the intention to kill the climber below him by letting go of the rope. A wayward causal chain would
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conclusion: that, strictly speaking, we do not know that a causal relation was involved. Instead, we just assume it based on earlier experiences that had very similar chains of events as their contents. This results in a habit of expecting the later event given the impression of the earlier one. On
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which want something for the sake of something else and thereby depend on other desires. So on this view, practical reason is about how to achieve something but it does not concern itself with what should be achieved. What should be achieved is determined by the agent's intrinsic desires. This may
509:
merely express the speaker's emotional attitudes in the form of approval or disapproval. The debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism concerns the semantic level about the meaning and truth-value of statements. It is reflected on the metaphysical level as the dispute about whether normative
421:, like evaluative beliefs or deliberation, that also determine what we should do. This can be combined with the thesis that practical reason has something to say about which ends we should follow, for example, by having an impact either on these other states or on desires directly.
292:
arises instead from psychological states and processes like beliefs, desires and deliberation. Some actions are initiated upon concluding an explicit deliberation on which course of action to take. But for many other actions, this is not the case. Hume infers from this that
468:
has been a frequent source of error in the history of philosophy. Based on this distinction, interpreters have often attributed various related philosophical theses to Hume in relation to contemporary debates in metaethics. One of these theses concerns the dispute between
283:
or guided "under an idea". On this issue, Hume's analysis of action emphasizes the role of psychological faculties and states, like reasoning, sensation, memory, and passion. It is characteristic of his outlook that it manages to define action without reference to an
164:
about the world knowable only a posteriori through perception and memory. Causal relations fall under the category of matters of facts, according to Hume, since it is conceivable that they do not obtain, which would not be the case if they were necessary. For Hume's
52:, which in its strongest form states that causation is nothing but constant conjunction of certain types of events without any underlying forces responsible for this regularity of conjunction. This is closely connected to his metaphysical thesis that there are
584:
are not equated with mere collections, the difference being that the bundled elements are linked to each other by a relation often referred to as "compresence", "co-personality" or "co-consciousness". Hume tried to understand this relation in terms of
243:, instead claiming that Hume's view concerning causality remained within the field of epistemology as a skeptical position on the possibility of knowing about causal relations. Others, sometimes referred to as the "New Hume tradition", reject the
231:
on this distribution of local natural properties. An even wider application is to use Hume's dictum as the foundational principle determining which propositions or worlds are possible and which are impossible based on the notion of recombination.
568:
claim about what selves actually are, which goes beyond the semantic claim about what the word "self" means. But others contend that this constitutes a misinterpretation of Hume since he restricts his claims to the epistemic and semantic level.
564:. This is the case because, according to Hume, words are associated with ideas and ideas are based on impressions. So without impressions of a mental substance, we lack the corresponding idea. Hume's theory is often interpreted as involving an
100:
of the self. It states that the self is to be understood as a bundle of mental states and not as a substance acting as the bearer of these states, as is the traditional conception. Many of these positions were initially motivated by Hume's
105:. It emphasizes the need to ground one's theories in experience and faults opposing theories for failing to do so. But many philosophers within the Humean tradition have gone beyond these methodological restrictions and have drawn various
174:
the metaphysical level, this conclusion has often been interpreted as the thesis that causation is nothing but constant conjunction of certain types of events. This is sometimes termed the "simple regularity theory of causation".
304:. Following Hume in defining actions without reference to an agent, he holds that actions are bodily movements that are caused by intentions. The intentions themselves are explained in terms of
44:
and to the tradition of thought inspired by him. Hume was an influential
Scottish philosopher well known for his empirical approach, which he applied to various fields in philosophy. In the
193:. On this view, there cannot be any causal relation in a robust sense since this would involve one event necessitating another event, the possibility of which is denied by Hume's dictum.
548:: that such a substance is never given as part of our experience. Instead, introspection only shows a manifold of mental states, referred to by Hume as "perceptions". For Hume, this
522:
are about facts, he is usually interpreted as an anti-realist. But interpreters of Hume have raised various doubts both for labeling him as an anti-realist and as a non-cognitivist.
544:, that the mind is constituted by a substance or an immaterial soul that acts as the bearer of all its mental states. The key to Hume's critique of this conception comes from his
417:, which determine what should be done. Others allow that desires provide reasons in the relevant sense but deny that this role is played only by desires. So there may be
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the later event. Hume's account of causality has been influential. His first question is how to categorize causal relations. On his view, they belong either to
1990:
540:
of the self. In his analyses, he uses the terms "self", "mind" and "person" interchangeably. He denies the traditional conception, usually associated with
72:
concerning which means to employ to achieve a given end. But it denies reason a direct role regarding which ends to follow. Central to Hume's position in
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2000:
340:. But this response has been criticized because of its vagueness since spelling out what "right way" means has proved rather difficult.
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on causation of the Humean tradition presented in the last paragraphs actually reflects Hume's own position. Some argue against the
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is that "reason is...the slave of the passions". It expresses the idea that it is the function of practical reason to find the
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A common dispute between
Humeans and Anti-Humeans in the field of practical reason concerns the status of
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One important objection to
Davidson's and similar Humean theories focuses on the central role assigned to
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In contemporary philosophy, Hume's theory of practical reason is often understood in terms of norms of
1517:
Stoecker, Ralf (2003). "Climbers, Pigs and
Wiggled Ears-The Problem of Waywardness in Action Theory".
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have meaning at all, although the more common approach is to account for their meaning in other ways.
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try to determine what actions are, specifically their essential features. One important feature of
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is that "reason is...the slave of the passions". It restricts the sphere of practical reason to
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claims about what should be done or what has value. The key aspect of this difference is that
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without the need to refer to an agent responsible for this. The slogan of Hume's theory of
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do not depend upon one another. Followers and interpreters of Hume have sometimes used
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in this sense, which is rejected by non-cognitivists. Some non-cognitivists deny that
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vary a lot from person to person since different people want very different things.
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as prescriptions or commands, which are meaningful without having a truth-value.
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1310:"Agency: 3.3 Disappearing agents, naturalism, and dual standpoint theory"
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453:
444:. It is guided by the idea that there is an important difference between
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31:
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One problem for the bundle theory of the self is how to account for the
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182:
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2100:
1809:
1714:
The
Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality
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1711:
Audi, Robert (2001). "5 Desires, Intentions, and
Reasons for Action".
1697:
The
Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality
1695:
1518:
1478:
1402:
1071:
Gibbs, Cameron (2019). "2. Constraints on
Formulating Hume's Dictum".
999:
17:
2246:"The Self : A Humean Bundle and/or a Cartesian Substance ?"
2245:
1929:
1166:
1083:
915:
884:
536:
In philosophy of mind, Hume is well known for his development of the
374:
196:
Hume's dictum has been employed in various arguments in contemporary
2273:
2193:
2056:
2017:
1989:
Cohon, Rachel (2008). "1. Our Common
Reading of Hume's Metaethics".
1930:"David Hume: Moral Philosophy: 1d. Hume and Contemporary Metaethics"
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1439:
1422:
1336:
1278:
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838:
777:
710:
300:
The most prominent philosopher of action in the Humean tradition is
1496:"Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains"
1495:
1243:
Wilson, George; Shpall, Samuel; Piñeros Glasscock, Juan S. (2016).
378:, which are about things that are wanted for their own sake or are
1840:
247:
by holding that Hume was, despite his skeptical outlook, a robust
1219:
Railton, Peter (2006). "Humean Theory of Practical Rationality".
2316:
1137:
935:
748:
2298:
Strawson, Galen (2009). "7.6 Thin subjects: James and Hume".
464:. This is important, according to Hume, because this type of
227:". It states that laws of nature and causal relations merely
132:
where the earlier event is responsible for bringing about or
1783:"Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation"
657:
510:
facts about what should be the case are part of reality, as
84:, which concern facts about the natural world, do not imply
1694:
Audi, Robert (2001). "4 The Sources of Practical Reasons".
407:
On this position, psychological states like desires may be
903:
Gibbs, Cameron (2019). "6. The argument from plenitude".
861:
from the original on Jun 23, 2023 – via PhilPapers.
1337:"From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action"
556:
conclusion: that the words "mind" or "self" cannot mean
92:
claims about what should be done or what has value. In
2343:"Personal Identity: 4. Psychological-Continuity Views"
2055:
Craig, Edward (1996). "Value, ontological status of".
1880:"The Conceptual Link between Morality and Rationality"
1757:"Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction"
360:. Important for this issue is the distinction between
200:. It can be used, for example, as an argument against
2274:"Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense"
1004:. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 88 – via PhilPapers.
62:
bodily behavior caused by mental states and processes
2116:
Finlay, Stephen (2006). "Emotive theory of ethics".
817:
Hume, David (1739). "Book I, Part III, Section VI".
629:
Morris, William Edward; Brown, Charlotte R. (2021).
576:
of the self. This is usually understood in terms of
448:, which concern facts about the natural world, and
323:by intention. The problem has been referred to as
177:A closely related metaphysical thesis is known as
54:no necessary connections between distinct entities
2119:Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition
2102:Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition
1171:Journal of the American Philosophical Association
1110:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
1023:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
778:"Did Hume Hold a Regularity Theory of Causation?"
2192:Craig, Edward (1996). "Mind, bundle theory of".
1251:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
219:follows this line of thought in formulating his
152:involve necessary connections that are knowable
128:is usually understood as a relation between two
96:, Hume is well known for his development of the
2349:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
2168:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
2141:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
2080:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1967:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1789:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1736:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1637:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1382:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1316:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1160:
1158:
690:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
637:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
485:, i.e. are either true or false. They resemble
297:" are not a necessary requirement for actions.
27:Philosophy and tradition inspired by David Hume
1416:
1414:
2207:
2205:
782:British Journal for the History of Philosophy
8:
1131:
1129:
839:"What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It?"
832:
830:
2301:Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
2293:
2291:
2239:
2237:
2235:
2233:
1841:"Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism"
1730:"Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External"
1658:
1656:
1654:
1652:
1225:. Oxford University Press. pp. 265–81.
872:Gibbs, Cameron (2019). "1. Preliminaries".
1961:"Hume's Moral Philosophy: 5. Is and ought"
1923:
1921:
1214:
1212:
1210:
1208:
1206:
1204:
1202:
1200:
771:
769:
711:"Hume's Fork, and His Theory of Relations"
599:or seeing it as a primitive aspect of the
1984:
1982:
1954:
1952:
1950:
1728:Finlay, Stephen; Schroeder, Mark (2017).
1238:
1236:
1234:
1232:
1082:
914:
883:
2187:
2185:
2183:
2099:Carson, Thomas L. (2006). "Metaethics".
1992:Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication
1596:Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
1376:"Donald Davidson: 2.1 Reasons as Causes"
1272:
1270:
1268:
1266:
1264:
1262:
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843:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
742:
740:
738:
736:
715:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
624:
622:
620:
618:
616:
211:are necessary, i.e. are the same in all
2347:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2267:
2265:
2263:
2250:European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
2166:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2139:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2078:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2074:"Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism"
1965:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1787:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1734:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1635:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1380:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1314:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1249:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1108:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1077:. University of Massachusetts Amherst.
1021:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
909:. University of Massachusetts Amherst.
878:. University of Massachusetts Amherst.
688:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
635:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
612:
419:other psychological states or processes
1480:The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
962:"Necessarily, Salt Dissolves in Water"
812:
810:
319:in defining action as bodily behavior
1523:. Imprint Academic. pp. 296–322.
1222:The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
518:contend. Based on Hume's denial that
144:. This distinction is referred to as
7:
2395:Philosophical schools and traditions
2195:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2058:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1755:Botros, Sophie (22 September 2006).
1424:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
235:Not all interpreters agree that the
2321:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1934:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1142:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1102:Menzel, Christopher (Feb 8, 2016).
940:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
753:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
662:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
48:, he is notable for developing the
1681:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1991.tb00320.x
1404:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
1091:from the original on Nov 30, 2023.
923:from the original on Nov 30, 2023.
892:from the original on Nov 30, 2023.
386:, on the other hand, are based on
189:as the metaphysical foundation of
25:
1540:Journal of Philosophical Research
1401:Honderich, Ted (2005). "Action".
331:causal chains. A causal chain is
2278:American Philosophical Quarterly
1857:10.1111/j.0966-8373.2004.00205.x
1826:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00679.x
1761:Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
1520:Physicalism and Mental Causation
1421:Craig, Edward (1996). "Action".
1279:"What's Special About Humeanism"
1114:from the original on 22 Feb 2024
1027:from the original on 22 Feb 2024
855:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00342.x
413:, which move the agent, but not
1669:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
505:, on the other hand, hold that
348:The slogan of Hume's theory of
109:conclusions from Hume's ideas.
1845:European Journal of Philosophy
1665:"Autonomy, Reason, and Desire"
684:"The Metaphysics of Causation"
436:Central to Hume's position in
237:reductive metaphysical outlook
119:Humean definition of causality
50:regularity theory of causation
1:
1483:. Cambridge University Press.
1440:"Meditation and Self-Control"
275:, which sets them apart from
160:, on the other hand, concern
156:independently of experience.
2133:Sayre-McCord, Geoff (2020).
40:refers to the philosophy of
1995:. Oxford University Press.
1536:"Non-Deviant Causal Chains"
682:Schaffer, Jonathan (2016).
477:. Cognitivists assert that
2426:
2304:. Oxford University Press.
2018:"Two Dogmas of Metaethics"
1839:D'Oro, Giuseppina (2004).
1808:Miller, Christian (2008).
1717:. Oxford University Press.
1700:. Oxford University Press.
1407:. Oxford University Press.
1308:Schlosser, Markus (2019).
1074:A Defense of Hume's Dictum
1015:Weatherson, Brian (2016).
1001:On the Plurality of Worlds
906:A Defense of Hume's Dictum
875:A Defense of Hume's Dictum
820:A Treatise of Human Nature
558:substance of mental states
529:
258:
221:principle of recombination
191:Hume's theory of causation
116:
29:
2072:van Roojen, Mark (2018).
2034:10.1007/s11098-005-2509-9
1608:10.1017/S1358246100007359
1534:Shope, Robert K. (1991).
1456:10.1007/s11098-015-0578-y
1353:10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9
1335:Stuchlik, Joshua (2013).
1277:Hubin, Donald C. (1999).
794:10.1080/09608789308570875
776:Broackes, Justin (1993).
526:Bundle theory of the self
1592:"Values, Means and Ends"
1165:Strawson, Galen (2015).
1138:"Hume, David: Causation"
960:Bird, Alexander (2001).
837:Wilson, Jessica (2010).
823:. The Project Gutenberg.
749:"Hume, David: Causation"
709:Millican, Peter (2017).
596:psychological continuity
356:for realizing pre-given
70:instrumental rationality
30:Not to be confused with
2341:Olson, Eric T. (2021).
2244:Benovsky, Jiri (2009).
2217:Encyclopedia Britannica
2160:Joyce, Richard (2016).
2016:Bloomfield, P. (2007).
1781:Alvarez, Maria (2017).
1629:Schroeder, Tim (2020).
1500:Behavior and Philosophy
1295:10.1111/0029-4624.00141
1051:Encyclopedia Britannica
981:10.1111/1467-8284.00304
162:contingent propositions
113:Causality and necessity
56:. The Humean theory of
1959:Cohon, Rachel (2018).
1810:"Motivation in Agents"
1590:Grant, Robert (1995).
1566:"means-ends reasoning"
380:valuable in themselves
2405:Philosophy of science
2315:Korfmacher, Carsten.
2272:Pike, Nelson (1967).
2022:Philosophical Studies
1663:Audi, Robert (1991).
1477:Audi, Robert (1999).
1444:Philosophical Studies
1374:Malpas, Jeff (2019).
1047:"David Kellogg Lewis"
998:Lewis, David (1986).
562:bundle of perceptions
452:, which are moral or
88:, which are moral or
46:philosophy of science
2162:"Moral Anti-Realism"
1878:Baier, Kurt (1982).
1494:Enç, Berent (2004).
1438:Latham, Noa (2016).
601:compresence-relation
442:is-ought distinction
410:motivational reasons
388:instrumental desires
225:Humean supervenience
207:, the view that the
78:is-ought distinction
2380:Action (philosophy)
2317:"Personal Identity"
1552:10.5840/jpr_1991_35
1183:10.1017/apa.2014.13
279:, is that they are
241:metaphysical aspect
60:defines actions as
727:10.1111/phpr.12385
552:finding implies a
514:claim, or not, as
466:mistaken inference
167:empiricist outlook
150:Relations of ideas
138:relations of ideas
94:philosophy of mind
2002:978-0-19-170856-5
1136:Lorkowski, C. M.
1104:"Possible Worlds"
546:empirical outlook
532:Personal identity
415:normative reasons
375:intrinsic desires
251:about causation.
103:empirical outlook
80:. It states that
16:(Redirected from
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2358:
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2312:
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2069:
2063:
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2052:
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2013:
2007:
2006:
1986:
1977:
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1974:
1972:
1956:
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1916:
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1875:
1869:
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1805:
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1570:Oxford Reference
1562:
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1525:
1524:
1514:
1508:
1507:
1491:
1485:
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1474:
1468:
1467:
1450:(7): 1779–1798.
1435:
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1418:
1409:
1408:
1398:
1392:
1391:
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1387:
1371:
1365:
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1325:
1323:
1321:
1305:
1299:
1298:
1274:
1253:
1252:
1240:
1227:
1226:
1216:
1195:
1194:
1162:
1153:
1152:
1150:
1148:
1133:
1124:
1123:
1121:
1119:
1099:
1093:
1092:
1086:
1084:10.7275/15160020
1068:
1062:
1061:
1059:
1057:
1043:
1037:
1036:
1034:
1032:
1012:
1006:
1005:
995:
989:
988:
983:. Archived from
966:
957:
951:
950:
948:
946:
936:"Laws of Nature"
934:Swartz, Norman.
931:
925:
924:
918:
916:10.7275/15160020
900:
894:
893:
887:
885:10.7275/15160020
869:
863:
862:
834:
825:
824:
814:
805:
804:
802:
800:
773:
764:
763:
761:
759:
744:
731:
730:
706:
700:
699:
697:
695:
679:
673:
672:
670:
668:
653:
647:
646:
644:
642:
626:
578:diachronic unity
520:ought-statements
507:ought-statements
499:ought-statements
491:ought-statements
479:ought-statements
462:ought-statements
450:ought-statements
350:practical reason
344:Practical reason
338:in the right way
295:acts of the will
261:Theory of action
255:Theory of action
245:reductive aspect
205:necessitarianism
86:ought-statements
66:practical reason
21:
2425:
2424:
2420:
2419:
2418:
2416:
2415:
2414:
2365:
2364:
2363:
2362:
2352:
2350:
2340:
2339:
2335:
2325:
2323:
2314:
2313:
2309:
2297:
2296:
2289:
2271:
2270:
2261:
2243:
2242:
2231:
2221:
2219:
2213:"Bundle theory"
2211:
2210:
2203:
2191:
2190:
2181:
2171:
2169:
2159:
2158:
2154:
2144:
2142:
2135:"Moral Realism"
2132:
2131:
2127:
2115:
2114:
2110:
2098:
2097:
2093:
2083:
2081:
2071:
2070:
2066:
2054:
2053:
2049:
2015:
2014:
2010:
2003:
1988:
1987:
1980:
1970:
1968:
1958:
1957:
1948:
1938:
1936:
1928:Pollock, Ryan.
1927:
1926:
1919:
1896:10.2307/2215415
1877:
1876:
1872:
1838:
1837:
1833:
1807:
1806:
1802:
1792:
1790:
1780:
1779:
1775:
1765:
1763:
1754:
1753:
1749:
1739:
1737:
1727:
1726:
1722:
1710:
1709:
1705:
1693:
1692:
1688:
1662:
1661:
1650:
1640:
1638:
1628:
1627:
1623:
1589:
1588:
1584:
1574:
1572:
1564:
1563:
1559:
1533:
1532:
1528:
1516:
1515:
1511:
1493:
1492:
1488:
1476:
1475:
1471:
1437:
1436:
1432:
1420:
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1412:
1400:
1399:
1395:
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1383:
1373:
1372:
1368:
1334:
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1319:
1317:
1307:
1306:
1302:
1276:
1275:
1256:
1242:
1241:
1230:
1218:
1217:
1198:
1164:
1163:
1156:
1146:
1144:
1135:
1134:
1127:
1117:
1115:
1101:
1100:
1096:
1070:
1069:
1065:
1055:
1053:
1045:
1044:
1040:
1030:
1028:
1014:
1013:
1009:
997:
996:
992:
987:on Jul 8, 2022.
964:
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928:
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747:Fieser, James.
746:
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734:
708:
707:
703:
693:
691:
681:
680:
676:
666:
664:
656:Fieser, James.
655:
654:
650:
640:
638:
628:
627:
614:
609:
534:
528:
495:Prescriptivists
475:non-cognitivism
434:
346:
302:Donald Davidson
263:
257:
213:possible worlds
158:Matters of fact
142:matters of fact
121:
115:
35:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
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2287:
2259:
2229:
2201:
2179:
2152:
2125:
2108:
2091:
2064:
2047:
2028:(3): 439–466.
2008:
2001:
1978:
1946:
1917:
1870:
1851:(2): 163–177.
1831:
1820:(2): 222–266.
1800:
1773:
1747:
1720:
1703:
1686:
1675:(4): 247–271.
1648:
1621:
1582:
1557:
1526:
1509:
1486:
1469:
1430:
1410:
1393:
1366:
1347:(3): 867–886.
1327:
1300:
1254:
1228:
1196:
1154:
1125:
1094:
1063:
1038:
1007:
990:
975:(4): 267–274.
952:
926:
895:
864:
849:(3): 595–637.
826:
806:
765:
732:
701:
674:
648:
611:
610:
608:
605:
560:but must mean
542:René Descartes
527:
524:
433:
430:
345:
342:
256:
253:
209:laws of nature
117:Main article:
114:
111:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2422:
2411:
2408:
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2403:
2401:
2398:
2396:
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2386:
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2376:
2373:
2372:
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2348:
2344:
2337:
2334:
2322:
2318:
2311:
2308:
2303:
2302:
2294:
2292:
2288:
2284:(2): 159–165.
2283:
2279:
2275:
2268:
2266:
2264:
2260:
2255:
2251:
2247:
2240:
2238:
2236:
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2214:
2208:
2206:
2202:
2197:
2196:
2188:
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2167:
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2156:
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2140:
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2027:
2023:
2019:
2012:
2009:
2004:
1998:
1994:
1993:
1985:
1983:
1979:
1966:
1962:
1955:
1953:
1951:
1947:
1935:
1931:
1924:
1922:
1918:
1913:
1909:
1905:
1901:
1897:
1893:
1889:
1885:
1881:
1874:
1871:
1866:
1862:
1858:
1854:
1850:
1846:
1842:
1835:
1832:
1827:
1823:
1819:
1815:
1811:
1804:
1801:
1788:
1784:
1777:
1774:
1762:
1758:
1751:
1748:
1735:
1731:
1724:
1721:
1716:
1715:
1707:
1704:
1699:
1698:
1690:
1687:
1682:
1678:
1674:
1670:
1666:
1659:
1657:
1655:
1653:
1649:
1636:
1632:
1625:
1622:
1617:
1613:
1609:
1605:
1601:
1597:
1593:
1586:
1583:
1571:
1567:
1561:
1558:
1553:
1549:
1545:
1541:
1537:
1530:
1527:
1522:
1521:
1513:
1510:
1506:(1): 149–166.
1505:
1501:
1497:
1490:
1487:
1482:
1481:
1473:
1470:
1465:
1461:
1457:
1453:
1449:
1445:
1441:
1434:
1431:
1426:
1425:
1417:
1415:
1411:
1406:
1405:
1397:
1394:
1381:
1377:
1370:
1367:
1362:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1346:
1342:
1338:
1331:
1328:
1315:
1311:
1304:
1301:
1296:
1292:
1288:
1284:
1280:
1273:
1271:
1269:
1267:
1265:
1263:
1261:
1259:
1255:
1250:
1246:
1239:
1237:
1235:
1233:
1229:
1224:
1223:
1215:
1213:
1211:
1209:
1207:
1205:
1203:
1201:
1197:
1192:
1188:
1184:
1180:
1177:(1): 96–102.
1176:
1172:
1168:
1161:
1159:
1155:
1143:
1139:
1132:
1130:
1126:
1113:
1109:
1105:
1098:
1095:
1090:
1085:
1080:
1076:
1075:
1067:
1064:
1052:
1048:
1042:
1039:
1026:
1022:
1018:
1017:"David Lewis"
1011:
1008:
1003:
1002:
994:
991:
986:
982:
978:
974:
970:
963:
956:
953:
941:
937:
930:
927:
922:
917:
912:
908:
907:
899:
896:
891:
886:
881:
877:
876:
868:
865:
860:
856:
852:
848:
844:
840:
833:
831:
827:
822:
821:
813:
811:
807:
795:
791:
788:(1): 99–114.
787:
783:
779:
772:
770:
766:
754:
750:
743:
741:
739:
737:
733:
728:
724:
720:
716:
712:
705:
702:
689:
685:
678:
675:
663:
659:
658:"Hume, David"
652:
649:
636:
632:
625:
623:
621:
619:
617:
613:
606:
604:
602:
598:
597:
592:
588:
583:
579:
575:
570:
567:
563:
559:
555:
551:
547:
543:
539:
538:bundle theory
533:
525:
523:
521:
517:
516:anti-realists
513:
508:
504:
500:
496:
492:
488:
487:is-statements
484:
480:
476:
472:
467:
463:
460:do not imply
459:
458:is-statements
455:
451:
447:
446:is-statements
443:
439:
431:
429:
427:
422:
420:
416:
412:
411:
405:
399:
397:
392:
389:
385:
381:
377:
376:
372:are based on
371:
367:
363:
359:
355:
351:
343:
341:
339:
334:
330:
326:
322:
318:
313:
311:
307:
303:
298:
296:
291:
287:
282:
278:
277:mere behavior
274:
270:
269:
262:
254:
252:
250:
246:
242:
238:
233:
230:
226:
222:
218:
214:
210:
206:
203:
199:
194:
192:
188:
187:Hume's dictum
184:
180:
179:Hume's dictum
175:
172:
168:
163:
159:
155:
151:
147:
143:
139:
135:
134:necessitating
131:
127:
126:
120:
112:
110:
108:
104:
99:
98:bundle theory
95:
91:
87:
83:
82:is-statements
79:
75:
71:
67:
63:
59:
55:
51:
47:
43:
39:
33:
19:
2351:. Retrieved
2346:
2336:
2324:. Retrieved
2320:
2310:
2300:
2281:
2277:
2253:
2249:
2220:. Retrieved
2216:
2198:. Routledge.
2194:
2170:. Retrieved
2165:
2155:
2143:. Retrieved
2138:
2128:
2122:. Macmillan.
2118:
2111:
2105:. Macmillan.
2101:
2094:
2082:. Retrieved
2077:
2067:
2061:. Routledge.
2057:
2050:
2025:
2021:
2011:
1991:
1969:. Retrieved
1964:
1937:. Retrieved
1933:
1890:(1): 78–88.
1887:
1883:
1873:
1848:
1844:
1834:
1817:
1813:
1803:
1791:. Retrieved
1786:
1776:
1764:. Retrieved
1760:
1750:
1738:. Retrieved
1733:
1723:
1713:
1706:
1696:
1689:
1672:
1668:
1639:. Retrieved
1634:
1624:
1599:
1595:
1585:
1573:. Retrieved
1569:
1560:
1543:
1539:
1529:
1519:
1512:
1503:
1499:
1489:
1479:
1472:
1447:
1443:
1433:
1427:. Routledge.
1423:
1403:
1396:
1384:. Retrieved
1379:
1369:
1344:
1340:
1330:
1318:. Retrieved
1313:
1303:
1289:(1): 30–45.
1286:
1282:
1248:
1221:
1174:
1170:
1145:. Retrieved
1141:
1116:. Retrieved
1107:
1097:
1073:
1066:
1054:. Retrieved
1050:
1041:
1029:. Retrieved
1020:
1010:
1000:
993:
985:the original
972:
968:
955:
943:. Retrieved
939:
929:
905:
898:
874:
867:
846:
842:
819:
797:. Retrieved
785:
781:
756:. Retrieved
752:
718:
714:
704:
692:. Retrieved
687:
677:
665:. Retrieved
661:
651:
639:. Retrieved
634:
631:"David Hume"
600:
594:
581:
573:
571:
561:
557:
535:
519:
506:
498:
490:
486:
482:
478:
461:
457:
449:
445:
435:
423:
414:
408:
403:
400:
393:
387:
383:
373:
369:
365:
361:
357:
353:
347:
337:
332:
328:
324:
320:
316:
314:
299:
289:
285:
276:
272:
266:Theories of
265:
264:
244:
240:
236:
234:
220:
195:
190:
186:
176:
157:
149:
141:
137:
133:
123:
122:
107:metaphysical
85:
81:
69:
61:
53:
49:
37:
36:
2084:10 December
1602:: 177–188.
1546:: 251–291.
1341:Philosophia
1167:"Humeanism"
1118:28 November
945:28 November
721:(1): 3–65.
587:resemblance
566:ontological
471:cognitivism
404:externalist
396:rationality
281:intentional
217:David Lewis
202:nomological
198:metaphysics
146:Hume's fork
2400:Metaethics
2390:Empiricism
2385:David Hume
2369:Categories
2256:(1): 7–19.
607:References
530:See also:
503:Emotivists
454:evaluative
438:metaethics
432:Metaethics
259:See also:
90:evaluative
74:metaethics
42:David Hume
2410:Reasoning
2375:Humeanism
2042:170556071
1904:0029-4624
1865:0966-8373
1616:149862676
1464:170959501
1361:144779235
1191:232344144
591:causality
550:epistemic
483:truth-apt
317:causation
229:supervene
171:skeptical
125:Causality
38:Humeanism
1631:"Desire"
1245:"Action"
1112:Archived
1089:Archived
1025:Archived
969:Analysis
921:Archived
890:Archived
859:Archived
554:semantic
512:realists
426:morality
183:essences
154:a priori
32:Humanism
1912:2215415
1386:1 March
582:bundles
440:is the
333:wayward
329:deviant
325:wayward
310:desires
306:beliefs
273:actions
249:realist
76:is the
2353:20 May
2326:20 May
2222:20 May
2172:21 May
2145:21 May
2040:
1999:
1971:21 May
1939:21 May
1910:
1902:
1863:
1793:19 May
1766:19 May
1740:19 May
1641:18 May
1614:
1575:18 May
1462:
1359:
1320:18 May
1189:
1147:15 May
1056:15 May
1031:15 May
799:16 May
758:16 May
694:16 May
667:21 May
641:16 May
497:treat
321:caused
290:Agency
268:action
130:events
58:action
18:Humean
2038:S2CID
1908:JSTOR
1612:S2CID
1460:S2CID
1357:S2CID
1187:S2CID
965:(PDF)
574:unity
384:Means
362:means
354:means
286:agent
2355:2021
2328:2021
2224:2021
2174:2021
2147:2021
2086:2020
1997:ISBN
1973:2021
1941:2021
1900:ISSN
1884:Noûs
1861:ISSN
1814:Noûs
1795:2021
1768:2021
1742:2021
1643:2021
1577:2021
1388:2021
1322:2021
1283:Noûs
1149:2021
1120:2020
1058:2021
1033:2021
947:2020
801:2021
760:2021
696:2021
669:2021
643:2021
589:and
481:are
473:and
370:Ends
366:ends
364:and
358:ends
308:and
2030:doi
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