242:. More generally, inner-sense and actualist views face the "targetless higher-order representation problem" in which there might be, e.g., a higher-order experience/thought about perceiving red without a corresponding first-order redness percept. One reply is that this is no more a problem for higher-order theories than for other neuroscientific theories of consciousness, which also involve many layers of processing that could theoretically be inconsistent.
208:
Higher-order theory can account for the distinction between unconscious and conscious brain processing. Both types of mental operations involve first-order manipulations, and according to higher-order theory, what makes cognition conscious is a higher-order observation of the first-order processing.
248:
points out that inner sense of or actualist HOTs about first-order percepts might greatly increase the computing power required to consciously process stimuli, for not only does one need to have a perception, but one then needs to have another (perhaps highly detailed) perception or thought about
257:
The "rock objection" notes that thinking about a rock does not cause the rock to "light up" with consciousness, so why does thinking about a first-order percept cause it to light up? Higher-order theorists reply that first-order states need to be mental states, which rocks are not.
98:(HOT). Phenomenal consciousness in particular corresponds to certain kinds of mental states (e.g., visual inputs) that are the subjects of HOTs. Rosenthal excludes the special case in which one learns about one's lower-order states by conscious deduction. For instance, if
237:
Scott
Sturgeon argues against inner-sense theory on the grounds that it could give rise to disorders in which, e.g., one has a first-order perception of red which mis-triggers a second-order sense of "looks orange". But we do not see any such disorders in
194:
defends a higher-order account of consciousness. He argues that consciousness consists in higher-order thoughts allowing one to monitor and correct errors and "that the brain systems that are required for consciousness and language are similar."
82:
One motivation for this approach is that it accounts for phenomenal consciousness absent beliefs or behaviors associated with those experiences—so that, e.g., someone could feel pain without necessarily exhibiting functional reactions to pain.
199:
like pain become conscious when "they enter into a specialized linguistic symbol-manipulation system, which is part of a higher-order thought system" that helps with, inter alia, "flexible planning of actions."
148:
An example of the second, "part-whole" self-representational theory is
Vincent Picciuto's "quotational theory of consciousness" in which consciousness consists of "mentally quoting" a first-order perception.
183:
Impairments to the prefrontal cortex may impair subjective reports without affecting task performance. If the prefrontal cortex were mainly serving an attentional role, performance should degrade along with
180:
Unconscious processing is quite powerful on its own, so it is not obvious that task performance requires consciousness. Higher-order views agree with this, unlike, e.g., global-workspace views.
110:
The dispositionalist mirrors the actualist view except that the first-order mental state need not actually be thought about—it only needs to be available to potentially be thought about.
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187:
Some interpretations of certain disorders of consciousness suggest that they operate by affecting the prefrontal cortex, where higher-order thoughts are assumed to take place.
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Higher-order theories originated in philosophy, but they have also gained some scientific defenders. Here are some examples of evidence supporting higher-order views:
113:
While actualist accounts would seem to require immense higher-order computation on all first-order percepts, dispositionalist accounts do not; they merely require
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terms, higher-order theory is motivated by the distinction between first-order information in early sensory regions versus higher-order representations in
66:, this version of higher-order theory proposes that phenomenal consciousness consists not in immediate sensations but in higher-level sensing of those
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content, which is in turn the target of a higher-order analog/non-conceptual intentional state, via the operations of a faculty of 'inner sense'.
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Reporting of conscious experience seems in some studies to occur serially following unconscious processing rather than in parallel with it.
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49:/representational accounts of consciousness which suggest that merely first-order mentality of certain sorts constitutes consciousness.
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Similar to a HOT view, this theory proposes that the brain "learns" when there exists a trustworthy lower-level representation.
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the first-order and higher-order states are part of the same whole, and the whole complex is what becomes conscious.
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is a foremost advocate of this view. It claims that a mental state is conscious when it is the subject of a
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the first-order and higher-order states are identical, with the same state serving two different roles, or
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of first-order information. Such availability could come from, e.g., global broadcasting as in the
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In this theory, higher-level processing determines that a first-order representation is reliable.
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could reveal one's unconscious motives, this would not suddenly make them conscious.
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Self-representational higher-order theories consider the higher-order state to be
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A phenomenally conscious mental state is a state with analog/non-conceptual
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Consciousness and Mental
Quotation: An intrinsic higher-order approach
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438:"Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness"
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of perceptual or quasi-perceptual contents, such as visual images.
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to its first-order state. This may be either because
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45:Higher-order theories are distinguished from other
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106:Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory
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233:Against inner-sense and actualist HOT views
125:Self-representational higher-order theories
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533:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
436:Hakwan Lau; David Rosenthal (Aug 2011).
370:"Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness"
329:"Higher-order theories of consciousness"
303:"Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness"
327:David Rosenthal; Josh Weisberg (2008).
266:
153:Higher-order statistical inference view
398:(PhD thesis). University of Maryland.
20:Higher-order theories of consciousness
1163:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
87:Actualist higher-order thought theory
7:
374:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
307:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
14:
301:Peter Carruthers (15 Aug 2011).
38:is thought to be a higher-order
58:Higher-order perception theory
30:or thoughts about first-order
1:
1020:Hard problem of consciousness
253:Against any higher-order view
445:Trends in Cognitive Sciences
493:. Oxford University Press.
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529:Carruthers, Peter (2000).
457:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009
394:Picciuto, Vincent (2014).
1183:
742:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
732:David Lewis (philosopher)
354:10.4249/scholarpedia.4407
161:Radical plasticity thesis
514:Sturgeon, Scott (2000).
489:Edmund T. Rolls (2005).
36:phenomenal consciousness
870:Eliminative materialism
169:Scientific perspectives
119:Global Workspace Theory
1122:Propositional attitude
1117:Problem of other minds
1025:Hypostatic abstraction
70:. Or put another way:
1193:Philosophers category
1097:Mental representation
860:Biological naturalism
747:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
722:Frank Cameron Jackson
875:Emergent materialism
518:. London: Routledge.
96:higher-order thought
1072:Language of thought
822:Ludwig Wittgenstein
652:Patricia Churchland
345:2008SchpJ...3.4407R
900:Neurophenomenology
571:Philosophy of mind
64:inner-sense theory
1211:
1210:
1107:Mind–body problem
1005:Cognitive closure
969:Substance dualism
587:G. E. M. Anscombe
500:978-0-19-857003-5
491:Emotion Explained
249:that perception.
222:parietal cortices
34:. In particular,
16:Scientific theory
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959:Representational
954:Property dualism
947:Type physicalism
912:New mysterianism
880:Epiphenomenalism
702:Martin Heidegger
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32:mental states
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1173: /
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1082:Mental image
1077:Mental event
1040:Intelligence
990:Chinese room
836:
787:Gilbert Ryle
767:Derek Parfit
757:Thomas Nagel
687:Fred Dretske
607:J. L. Austin
579:Philosophers
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377:. Retrieved
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333:Scholarpedia
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310:. Retrieved
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214:neuroscience
211:
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192:Edmund Rolls
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131:constitutive
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115:availability
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62:Also called
61:
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26:consists in
19:
18:
1167:information
1158:Metaphysics
1132:Tabula rasa
942:Physicalism
927:Parallelism
855:Behaviorism
812:Michael Tye
807:Alan Turing
792:John Searle
667:Dharmakirti
642:Tyler Burge
637:C. D. Broad
339:(5): 4407.
76:intentional
28:perceptions
1203:Task Force
1171:perception
1045:Artificial
995:Creativity
917:Nondualism
817:Vasubandhu
737:John Locke
707:David Hume
662:Andy Clark
405:1903/15231
262:References
228:Criticisms
218:prefrontal
204:Motivation
68:sensations
1067:Intuition
1000:Cognition
964:Solipsism
627:Ned Block
597:Armstrong
592:Aristotle
379:31 August
312:31 August
240:neurology
47:cognitive
1218:Category
1188:Category
1035:Identity
978:Concepts
848:Theories
832:Zhuangzi
762:Alva Noë
473:32235393
465:21737339
135:internal
1198:Project
1151:Related
1010:Concept
865:Dualism
838:more...
697:Goldman
341:Bibcode
1142:Zombie
1127:Qualia
497:
471:
463:
197:Qualia
1050:Human
772:Plato
692:Fodor
469:S2CID
441:(PDF)
53:Types
1175:self
1112:Pain
1102:Mind
1030:Idea
495:ISBN
461:PMID
381:2014
314:2014
220:and
453:doi
400:hdl
349:doi
212:In
133:or
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