423:, holds that Congress cannot delegate law-making authority to other branches of government. Rehnquist offered three rationales for the application of the non-delegation doctrine. First, ensure Congress makes social policy, not agencies; delegation should only be used when the policy is highly technical or the ground too large to be covered. Second, agencies of the delegated authority require an “intelligible principle” to exercise discretion which was lacking in this case. Third, the intelligible principle must provide judges with a measuring stick for judicial review.
141:
24:
388:, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity…”. At issue in the case, is the Secretary's interpretation of "extent feasible" to mean that if a material is unsafe he must “set an exposure limit at the lowest technologically feasible level that will not impair the viability of the industries regulated.”
405:
In its reasoning, the Court noted it would be unreasonable to
Congress intended to give the Secretary “unprecedented power over American industry.” Such a delegation of power would likely be unconstitutional. The Court also cited the legislative history of the act, which suggested that Congress meant
383:
being the agency responsible for carrying out this authority). According to
Section 3(8), standards created by the secretary must be “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.” Section 6(b)(5) of the statute sets the principle for creating
343:
by setting the exposure limit "at the lowest technologically feasible level that will not impair the viability of the industries regulated." OSHA selected that standard because it believed that (1) it could not determine a safe exposure level and that (2) the authorizing statute did not require it
431:
Most scholars have said that the interpretation of the statute ignored a foundational principle of statutory interpretation. Generally, specific language governs general language. In this case, the court read the more general provision of
Section 3(8) as governing the specific process specified in
396:
The Court held the
Secretary applied the act inappropriately. To comply with the statute, the secretary must determine 1) that a health risk of a substance exists at a particular threshold and 2) Decide whether to issue the most protective standard, or issue a standard that weighs the costs and
207:
The
Secretary applied the act inappropriately. In order to comply with the statute, the secretary must determine 1) that a health risk of a substance exists at a particular threshold and 2) Decide whether to issue the most protective standard, or issue a standard that weighs the costs and
435:
The case also marks the current state of affairs for the non-delegation doctrine. When the court is faced with a provision that appears to be an impermissible delegation of the authority, it will use tools of statutory interpretation to try to narrow the delegation of power.
355:
was the respondent. A plurality on the Court, led by
Justice Stevens, wrote that the authorizing statute did indeed require OSHA to demonstrate a significant risk of harm (albeit not with mathematical certainty) in order to justify setting a particular exposure level.
418:
argued that the section 6(b)(5) of the statute, which set forth the "extent feasible" principle, should be struck down on the basis of the non-delegation doctrine. The non-delegation doctrine, which has been recognized by the
Supreme Court since the era of
401:
when workers were exposed at 1 part per million. Data only suggested the chemical was unsafe at 10 parts per million. Thus, the secretary had failed the first step of interpreting the statute, that is, finding that the substance posed a risk at that level.
45:
519:
359:
Perhaps more important than the specific holding of the case, the Court noted in dicta that if the government's interpretation of the authorizing statute had been correct, it might violate the
564:
544:
458:
182:
96:
68:
75:
524:
380:
336:
82:
514:
64:
539:
559:
549:
469:
89:
372:
332:
145:
115:
534:
376:
49:
352:
348:
34:
53:
38:
397:
benefits. Here, the secretary failed to first determine that a health risk of substance existed for the chemical
529:
496:
360:
231:
363:. This line of reasoning may represent the "high-water mark" of recent attempts to revive the doctrine.
462:
174:
554:
379:
to promulgate standards to ensure safe and healthful working conditions for the Nation's workers (the
384:
the safety regulations, directing the
Secretary to “set the standard which most adequately assures,
263:
415:
275:
267:
251:
478:
223:
487:
255:
239:
508:
420:
292:
Stevens, joined by Burger, Stewart; Powell (parts I, II, III-A, III-B, III-C, III-E)
406:
to address major workplace hazards, not hazards with low statistical likelihoods.
345:
177:
243:
23:
340:
193:
189:
164:
Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, et al.
398:
140:
17:
65:"Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute"
455:
Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute
324:
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute
134:
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute
520:
United States Supreme Court cases of the Burger Court
381:
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
312:
304:
296:
288:
283:
212:
201:
169:
159:
152:
133:
331:), 448 U.S. 607 (1980), was a case decided by the
565:United States nondelegation doctrine case law
545:Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8:
335:. This case represented a challenge to the
316:Marshall, joined by Brennan, White, Blackmun
52:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
130:
375:of 1970 delegated broad authority to the
116:Learn how and when to remove this message
525:United States administrative case law
128:1980 United States Supreme Court case
7:
50:adding citations to reliable sources
373:Occupational Safety and Health Act
333:Supreme Court of the United States
146:Supreme Court of the United States
14:
515:United States Supreme Court cases
465:607 (1980) is available from:
139:
22:
540:1980 in United States case law
351:served as the petitioner; the
344:to quantify such a level. The
1:
560:United States labor case law
550:American Petroleum Institute
353:American Petroleum Institute
349:Industrial Union Department
581:
414:In a famous concurrence,
217:
206:
138:
535:1980 in the environment
427:Subsequent developments
339:practice of regulating
153:Argued October 10, 1979
421:Chief Justice Marshall
386:to the extent feasible
361:nondelegation doctrine
232:William J. Brennan Jr.
392:Opinion of the Court
188:100 S. Ct. 2844; 65
155:Decided July 2, 1980
46:improve this article
497:Library of Congress
327:(also known as the
264:Lewis F. Powell Jr.
410:Concurring opinion
377:Secretary of Labor
228:Associate Justices
432:Section 6(b)(5).
416:Justice Rehnquist
320:
319:
268:William Rehnquist
252:Thurgood Marshall
126:
125:
118:
100:
572:
501:
495:
492:
486:
483:
477:
474:
468:
224:Warren E. Burger
213:Court membership
196:55; 10 ELR 20489
143:
142:
131:
121:
114:
110:
107:
101:
99:
58:
26:
18:
580:
579:
575:
574:
573:
571:
570:
569:
530:Chemical safety
505:
504:
499:
493:
490:
484:
481:
475:
472:
466:
450:
445:
439:
429:
412:
394:
369:
276:John P. Stevens
266:
254:
242:
197:
154:
148:
129:
122:
111:
105:
102:
59:
57:
43:
27:
12:
11:
5:
578:
576:
568:
567:
562:
557:
552:
547:
542:
537:
532:
527:
522:
517:
507:
506:
503:
502:
449:
448:External links
446:
444:
441:
428:
425:
411:
408:
393:
390:
368:
365:
318:
317:
314:
310:
309:
306:
302:
301:
298:
294:
293:
290:
286:
285:
281:
280:
279:
278:
256:Harry Blackmun
240:Potter Stewart
229:
226:
221:
215:
214:
210:
209:
204:
203:
199:
198:
187:
171:
167:
166:
161:
160:Full case name
157:
156:
150:
149:
144:
136:
135:
127:
124:
123:
30:
28:
21:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
577:
566:
563:
561:
558:
556:
553:
551:
548:
546:
543:
541:
538:
536:
533:
531:
528:
526:
523:
521:
518:
516:
513:
512:
510:
498:
489:
480:
471:
470:CourtListener
464:
460:
456:
452:
451:
447:
442:
440:
437:
433:
426:
424:
422:
417:
409:
407:
403:
400:
391:
389:
387:
382:
378:
374:
366:
364:
362:
357:
354:
350:
347:
342:
338:
334:
330:
326:
325:
315:
311:
307:
303:
299:
295:
291:
287:
284:Case opinions
282:
277:
273:
269:
265:
261:
257:
253:
249:
245:
241:
237:
233:
230:
227:
225:
222:
220:Chief Justice
219:
218:
216:
211:
205:
200:
195:
191:
185:
184:
179:
176:
172:
168:
165:
162:
158:
151:
147:
137:
132:
120:
117:
109:
98:
95:
91:
88:
84:
81:
77:
74:
70:
67: –
66:
62:
61:Find sources:
55:
51:
47:
41:
40:
36:
31:This article
29:
25:
20:
19:
16:
454:
438:
434:
430:
413:
404:
395:
385:
370:
358:
329:Benzene Case
328:
323:
322:
321:
271:
259:
247:
235:
181:
163:
112:
103:
93:
86:
79:
72:
60:
44:Please help
32:
15:
341:carcinogens
305:Concurrence
297:Concurrence
244:Byron White
192:1010; 1980
509:Categories
443:References
367:Background
194:U.S. LEXIS
106:April 2024
76:newspapers
308:Rehnquist
289:Plurality
208:benefits.
190:L. Ed. 2d
170:Citations
33:does not
453:Text of
555:AFL–CIO
479:Findlaw
399:benzene
313:Dissent
202:Holding
90:scholar
54:removed
39:sources
500:
494:
491:
488:Justia
485:
482:
476:
473:
467:
300:Powell
274:
272:·
270:
262:
260:·
258:
250:
248:·
246:
238:
236:·
234:
92:
85:
78:
71:
63:
461:
97:JSTOR
83:books
463:U.S.
371:The
337:OSHA
183:more
175:U.S.
173:448
69:news
37:any
35:cite
459:448
346:AFL
178:607
48:by
511::
457:,
186:)
180:(
119:)
113:(
108:)
104:(
94:·
87:·
80:·
73:·
56:.
42:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
