John Searle - Knowledge (XXG)

1159:). By contrast, insofar as a fact is understood to relate to an institution (marriage, promises, commitments, etc.), which is to be understood as a system of constitutive rules, then what one should do can be understood as following from the institutional fact of what one has done; institutional fact, then, can be understood as opposed to the "brute facts" related to Hume's Law. For example, Searle believes that the promise of doing something means that one must do it, because by making the promise one participates in the constitutive rules that arrange the system of promise-making itself; a "shouldness" is implicit in the mere factual action of promising. Furthermore, he believes that this provides a desire-independent reason for an action – if one orders a drink at a bar, there is an obligation to pay for it even if one has no desire to do so. This argument, which he first made in his paper, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'" (1964), remains highly controversial, but Searle maintained that "the traditional metaphysical distinction between fact and value cannot be captured by the linguistic distinction between 'evaluative' and 'descriptive' because all such speech act notions are already normative". 715:. For example, the statement "John bought two candy bars" is satisfied if and only if it is true, i.e., John did buy two candy bars. By contrast, the command "John, buy two candy bars!" is satisfied if and only if John carries out the action of purchasing two candy bars. Searle refers to the first as having the "word-to-world" direction of fit, since the words are supposed to change to accurately represent the world, and the second as having the "world-to-word" direction of fit, since the world is supposed to change to match the words. There is also the double direction of fit, in which the relationship goes both ways, and the null or zero direction of fit, in which it goes neither way because the propositional content is presupposed, as in "I am sorry I ate John's candy bars." 1097:. Although their accounts of social reality are similar, there are important differences. Lawson emphasizes the notion of social totality whereas Searle prefers to refer to institutional facts. Furthermore, Searle believes that emergence implies causal reduction whereas Lawson argues that social totalities cannot be completely explained by the causal powers of their components. Searle also places language at the foundation of the construction of social reality, while Lawson believes that community formation necessarily precedes the development of language and, therefore, there must be the possibility for non-linguistic social structure formation. The debate is ongoing and takes place additionally through regular meetings of the Centre for Social Ontology at the 988:" argument, which purports to prove the falsity of strong AI. A person is in a room with two slits, and they have a book and some scratch paper. This person does not know any Chinese. Someone outside the room slides some Chinese characters in through the first slit; the person in the room follows the instructions in the book, transcribing the characters as instructed onto the scratch paper, and slides the resulting sheet out by the second slit. To people outside the room, it appears that the room speaks Chinese – they have slid Chinese statements into one slit and got valid responses in English – yet the 'room' does not understand a word of Chinese. This suggests, according to Searle, that no computer can ever understand Chinese or English, because, as the 509:. The rental board refused to consider Searle's petition and Searle filed suit, charging a violation of due process. In 1990, in what came to be known as the "Searle Decision", the California Supreme Court upheld Searle's argument in part and Berkeley changed its rent-control policy, leading to large rent-increases between 1991 and 1994. Searle was reported to see the issue as one of fundamental rights, being quoted as saying "The treatment of landlords in Berkeley is comparable to the treatment of blacks in the South... our rights have been massively violated and we are here to correct that injustice." The court described the debate as a "morass of political invective, ad hominem attack, and policy argument". 793:

the board will not suddenly disintegrate, that their opponent will not magically turn into a grapefruit, and so on indefinitely. As most of these possibilities will not have occurred to either player, Searle thinks the Background is itself unconscious as well as nonintentional. To have a Background is to have a set of brain structures that generate appropriate intentional states (if the fire alarm does go off, say). "Those brain structures enable me to activate the system of intentionality and to make it function, but the capacities realized in the brain structures do not themselves consist in intentional states."

1136:, them to do that thing. Therefore, in any decision situation, people experience a gap between reasons and actions. For example, when a person decides to vote, they may determine that they care most about economic policy and that they prefer candidate Jones's economic policy, but they must also make an effort to actually cast a vote. Similarly, every time a smoker who feels guilty about their action lights a cigarette, they are aware that they are succumbing to their craving, and not merely acting automatically as they do when they exhale. This gap makes people think they have 828:'s purported view that a statement can be disjoined from the original intentionality of its author, for example when no longer connected to the original author, while still being able to produce meaning. Searle maintained that even if one was to see a written statement with no knowledge of authorship it would still be impossible to escape the question of intentionality, because "a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the (intentional) speech act". For Searle, ascribing intentionality to a statement was a basic requirement for attributing it any meaning at all. 1064:, like the score of a baseball game. Aiming at an explanation of social phenomena in terms of Anscombe's notion, he argues that society can be explained in terms of institutional facts, and institutional facts arise out of collective intentionality through constitutive rules with the logical form "X counts as Y in C". Thus, for instance, filling out a ballot counts as a vote in a polling place, getting so many votes counts as a victory in an election, getting a victory counts as being elected president in the presidential race, etc. 1021:, and that these positions are the real targets of his critique. Functionalists argue that consciousness can be defined as a set of informational processes inside the brain. It follows that anything that carries out the same informational processes as a human is also conscious. Thus, if humans wrote a computer program that was conscious, they could run that computer program on, say, a system of ping-pong balls and beer cups and the system would be equally conscious, because it was running the same information processes. 413: 1163:

which would lead to calculating the cheapest way to get there, Searle would argue that people balance the desire of Paris against the desire to save money to determine which one they value more. Hence, he believes that rationality is not a system of rules, but more of an adverb. Certain behaviors are seen as rational, no matter what their source, and a system of rules derives from finding patterns in what is considered rational.

4173: 285: 1075:'s theories of social facts, social institutions, collective representations, and the like. Searle's ideas are thus open to the same criticisms as Durkheim's. Searle responded that Durkheim's work was worse than he had originally believed and, admitting he had not read much of Durkheim's work, said: "Because Durkheim's account seemed so impoverished I did not read any further in his work." 1117:(2001), Searle argues that standard notions of rationality are badly flawed. According to what he calls the Classical Model, rationality is seen as something like a train track: a person moves onto it at one point with their beliefs and desires, and then the rules of rationality compel them all the way to a conclusion. Searle doubts that this picture of rationality holds generally. 4183: 52: 1079:, however, responded to Searle's response to Gross and argued point by point against the allegations that Searle makes against Durkheim, essentially upholding Gross's argument that Searle's work bears a great resemblance to Durkheim's. Lukes attributes Searle's miscomprehension of Durkheim's work to the fact that Searle had never read Durkheim. 1356: 931:" is "epistemically subjective", whereas "McKinley is higher than Everest" is "epistemically objective". In other words, the latter statement is evaluable, in fact, falsifiable, by an understood ('background') criterion for mountain height, like "the summit is so many meters above sea level". No such criteria exist for prettiness. 660:, who maintained that sentence meaning consists in sets of regulative rules requiring the speaker to perform the illocutionary act indicated by the sentence and that such acts involve the utterance of a sentence which (a) indicates that one performs the act; (b) means what one says; and (c) addresses an audience in the vicinity. 1370: 792:

To give an example, two chess players might be engaged in a bitter struggle at the board, but they share all sorts of Background presuppositions: that they will take turns to move, that no one else will intervene, that they are both playing to the same rules, that the fire alarm will not go off, that

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Thus, when someone is asked to "cut the cake," they know to use a knife and when someone is asked to "cut the grass," they know to use a lawnmower (and not vice versa), even though the request did not mention this. Beginning with the possibility of reversing these two, an endless series of sceptical,

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Third, Searle argues that much of rational deliberation involves adjusting patterns of desires, which are often inconsistent, to decide between outcomes, not the other way around. While in the Classical Model one would start from viewing a desire to go to Paris as a greater factor than saving money,

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Searle extended his inquiries into observer-relative phenomena by trying to understand social reality. Searle begins by arguing collective intentionality (e.g., "we are going for a walk") is a distinct form of intentionality, not simply reducible to individual intentionality (e.g., "I am going for a

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It seems to Searle that Hume and Nietzsche were probably the first philosophers to appreciate, respectively, the centrality and radical contingency of the Background. "Nietzsche saw, with anxiety, that the Background does not have to be the way it is." Searle also thinks that a Background appears in

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as his employers. It also claims that Jennifer Hudin, the director of the John Searle Center for Social Ontology, where the complainant had been employed as an assistant to Searle, has stated that Searle "has had sexual relationships with his students and others in the past in exchange for academic,

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and...several radical polemicists... Stylistically, the attacks are interestingly similar. Both rely heavily on insinuation and innuendo, and both display a hatred --one might almost say terror-- of close analysis and dissection of argument." He asserts that "My wife was threatened that I (and other

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reported: "A new lawsuit alleges that university officials failed to properly respond to complaints that John Searle ... sexually assaulted his ... research associate last July and cut her pay when she rejected his advances." The case brought to light several earlier complaints against Searle, on

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Searle argues that this is impossible, since consciousness is a physical property, like digestion or fire. No matter how good a simulation of digestion is built on the computer, it will not digest anything; no matter how well it simulates fire, nothing will get burnt. By contrast, informational

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or not is an open question, but considers its absence highly unappealing because it makes the feeling of freedom of will an epiphenomenon, which is highly unlikely from the evolutionary point of view given its biological cost. He also says, "All rational activity presupposes free will".

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underdetermination of what is said by the literal meaning..." emphasizes Searle. The Background fills the gap, being the capacity always to have a suitable interpretation to hand. "I just take a huge metaphysics for granted," he says. Searle sometimes supplements his reference to the

958:, because it allows epistemically objective judgments like "That object is a pocket calculator" to pick out agent-relative features of objects, and such features are, on his terms, ontologically subjective, unlike, say, "That object is made mostly of plastic". 1154:

Second, Searle believes that people can rationally do things that do not result from their own desires. It is widely believed that one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", i.e., that facts about how the world is can never tell a person what they should do

1189:, Searle argued, in his 1977 essay "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida," that Derrida's apparent rejection of Austin was unwarranted. Searle later refused to let his 1977 reply to be printed along with Derrida's papers in the 1988 collection 847:(1992). He argues that, starting with behaviorism, an early but influential scientific view, succeeded by many later accounts that Searle also dismisses, much of modern philosophy has tried to deny the existence of consciousness, with little success. In 534:

the use of foreign territory from which to stage their attacks. Finally, he alluded to the long-term nature of the conflict and blamed the attacks on the lack of American resolve to deal forcefully with America's enemies over the past several decades.

768:, which, according to him, has been the source of much philosophical discussion ("though I have been arguing for this thesis for almost twenty years," Searle writes, "many people whose opinions I respect still disagree with me about it"). He calls 992:

suggests, being able to 'translate' Chinese into English does not entail 'understanding' either Chinese or English: all that the person in the thought experiment, and hence a computer, is able to do is to execute certain syntactic manipulations.

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and thus cannot cause consciousness. There is no physical law, Searle insists, that can see the equivalence between a personal computer, a series of ping-pong balls and beer cans, and a pipe-and-water system all implementing the same program.

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A consequence of biological naturalism is that if humans want to create a conscious being, they will have to duplicate whatever physical processes the brain goes through to cause consciousness. Searle thereby means to contradict what he calls

1124:. He points out that its axioms require that anyone who valued a quarter and their life would, at some odds, bet their life for a quarter. Searle insists he would never take such a bet and believes that this stance is perfectly rational. 760:

or symbolize over, things, properties and states of affairs in the external world. Causal covariance, about-ness and the like are not enough: maps, for instance, only have a 'derived' intentionality, a mere after-image of the real thing.

1029:: observers pick out certain patterns in the world and consider them information processes, but information processes are not things-in-the-world themselves. Since they do not exist at a physical level, Searle argues, they cannot have 2994:." Another proposal has been to give machines the same standardized tests of science and other disciplines that schoolchildren take. A so far insuperable stumbling block to artificial intelligence is an incapacity for reliable 1127:

Most of his attack is directed against the common conception of rationality, which he believes is badly flawed. First, he argues that reason does not cause an individual to do anything, because having sufficient reason

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subjective, i.e., can only exist as subjective experience. For example, although it might be subjective or objective in the epistemic sense, a doctor's note that a patient suffers from back pain is an epistemically

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approved a recommendation that Searle have his emeritus status revoked, after a determination that he had violated university policies against sexual harassment and retaliation between July and September 2016.

516:, Searle wrote an article arguing that the attacks were a particular event in a long-term struggle against forces that are intractably opposed to the United States, and signaled support for a more aggressive 4846: 696:... each indicate the same propositional content (Sam smoking habitually) but differ in the illocutionary force indicated (respectively, a statement, a question, a command and an expression of desire). 7174: 7159: 725:

Searle's speech-act theory has been challenged by several thinkers in various ways. Collections of articles referring to Searle's account are found in Burkhardt 1990 and Lepore / van Gulick 1991.

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The lawsuit, filed in a California court on March 21, 2017, alleged sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination and assault and battery and sought damages both from Searle and from the

2905: 482:. In 1969, while serving as chairman of the Academic Freedom Committee of the Academic Senate of the University of California, he supported the university in its dispute with students over the 365:. Following what came to be known as the California Supreme Court's "Searle Decision" of 1990, Berkeley changed its rent control policy, leading to large rent increases between 1991 and 1994. 879:: that, on one hand, the world consists of nothing but objective particles in fields of force, but that yet, on the other hand, consciousness is clearly a subjective first-person experience. 7149: 2446: 1050:(1995), Searle addresses the mystery of how social constructs like "baseball" or "money" can exist in a world consisting only of physical particles in fields of force. Adapting an idea by 675:

of devices indicating further illocutionary act types. Among concepts presented in the book is the distinction between the "illocutionary force" and the "propositional content" of an

338:. He began teaching at UC Berkeley in 1959, and was Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Language and Professor of the Graduate School at the 2990:." One such test, a "Construction Challenge", would test perception and physical action -—"two important elements of intelligent behavior that were entirely absent from the original 1195:— in which a new text by Derrida attacked Searle's positions on the topic. In the 1990s, Searle elaborated on why he did not consider Derrida's approach to be legitimate philosophy. 1843: 6875: 1920: 772:

the set of abilities, capacities, tendencies, and dispositions that humans have that are not themselves intentional states but that generate appropriate such states on demand.

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On June 19, 2019, following campus disciplinary proceedings by Berkeley's Office for the Prevention of Harassment and Discrimination (OPHD), University of California President

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Searle says simply that both are true: consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain. (A view which he suggests might be called

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In the late 1980s, Searle, along with other landlords, petitioned Berkeley's rental board to raise the limits on how much he could charge tenants under the city's 1980

7219: 4219: 2833:– Cescon, E., & Nunes, D. P. (2015). A questão do livre-arbítrio em John R. Searle: uma contraposição do naturalismo biológico ao fisicalismo e ao funcionalismo. 679:. Searle does not precisely define the former as such, but rather introduces several possible illocutionary forces by example. According to Searle, the sentences... 2947: 671:. There he provides an analysis of what he considers the prototypical illocutionary act of promising and offers sets of semantical rules intended to represent the 562:

monetary or other benefits". After news of the lawsuit became public, several previous allegations of sexual harassment and assault by Searle were also revealed.

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claim: it counts as a medical diagnosis only because the existence of back pain is "an objective fact of medical science". The pain itself, however, is

342:, until June 2019, when his status as professor emeritus was revoked because he was found to have violated the university's sexual harassment policies. 3002:, often in multiple ways." A prominent example is known as the "pronoun disambiguation problem": a machine has no way of determining to whom or what a 7199: 707:, illocutionary acts are characterised by having "conditions of satisfaction", an idea adopted from Strawson's 1971 paper "Meaning and Truth", and a " 2882: 7124: 4798: 5715: 5041: 558: 450:

Searle was the Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Language and Professor of the Graduate School at the

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the reality". His view that the epistemic and ontological senses of objective/subjective are cleanly separable is crucial to his self-proclaimed

745:, which is central to Searle's "Philosophy of Mind". (Searle is at pains to emphasize that 'intentionality', the capacity of mental states to be 851:, he parodies several alternative theories of consciousness by replacing their accounts of intentionality with comparable accounts of the hand: 7214: 2872: 494: 2859: 7194: 5675: 4186: 3342: 2900: 2571: 2232: 2207: 2174: 2149: 2033: 1525: 1302: 971: 471: 2849: 2406: 4212: 463: 436: 346: 102: 3025: 1810: 749:

worldly objects, is not to be confused with 'intensionality', the referential opacity of contexts that fail tests for 'extensionality'.)

7164: 5402: 981:", defined by the assumption that as soon as a certain kind of software is running on a computer, a conscious being is thereby created. 863:), or "For a system to have a hand is just for it to be in a certain computer state with the right sorts of inputs and outputs" (manual 855:

No one would think of saying, for example, "Having a hand is just being disposed to certain sorts of behavior such as grasping" (manual

5710: 3383: 1977: 5972: 5397: 3302: 1218: 1098: 1014: 860: 789:, one's network of other beliefs, desires, and other intentional states necessary for any particular intentional state to make sense. 451: 339: 7154: 7129: 3128: 3097: 2931: 2773: 2006: 506: 362: 1761: 493:(1971), Searle investigates the causes behind the campus protests of the era. In it he declares, "I have been attacked by both the 2479:

Hofstadter, D., 1981, 'Reflections on Searle', in Hofstadter and Dennett (eds.), The Mind's I, New York: Basic Books, pp. 373–382.

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walk with him and I think he thinks he is going for a walk with me and he thinks I think I am going for a walk with him and...")

357:, where he held his first faculty positions. Later, at UC Berkeley, he became the first tenured professor to join the 1964–1965 5741: 5031: 4205: 1580: 1950: 7134: 5584: 5517: 5011: 4876: 4113: 3071: 3039: 757: 381: 6835: 6346: 5705: 5532: 5184: 5091: 4757: 4536: 4498: 4448: 3807: 3287: 1404: 900:, who he claims insist that discussing subjectivity is unscientific because science presupposes objectivity, are making a 145: 7239: 6905: 6774: 5350: 5124: 5006: 4906: 4176: 3688: 3610: 3327: 3121: 2983: 1333: 640:(the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules) – with his own thesis that such acts are constituted by the 583: 401: 4697: 6207: 5700: 5060: 4747: 3103: 1844:"Lawsuit alleges that a UC Berkeley professor sexually assaulted his researcher and cut her pay when she rejected him" 1399: 32: 483: 2347: 1547: 7088: 6351: 5734: 5449: 5439: 4886: 4626: 4506: 4237: 3388: 3282: 1210: 520: 1172: 934:

Beyond this distinction, Searle thinks there are certain phenomena, including all conscious experiences, that are

821: 454:; even though he retired in 2014, he continued teaching until 2016. In June 2019, the emeritus title was revoked. 6975: 6925: 5855: 5679: 5599: 5324: 5254: 5244: 4971: 4571: 4478: 4318: 3990: 3767: 3180: 3051: 2831:

The issue of free will in John R. Searle: a contrast of biological naturalism to physicalism and to functionalism

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objective, i.e., whose truth can be discovered and evaluated by any interested party, but are not necessarily

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Building upon his views about intentionality, Searle presents a view concerning consciousness in his book

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Searle has five honorary-doctorate degrees from four countries and is an honorary visiting professor at

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functionalism), or "Saying that a system has hands is just adopting a certain stance toward it" (the

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This article is about the American philosopher. For the American businessman and philanthropist, see

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Many sociologists, however, do not see Searle's contributions to social theory as very significant.

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tests of artificial-intelligence efficacy are needed because, "just as there is no single test of

2427: 722:(1985, with Daniel Vanderveken), Searle prominently uses the notion of the "illocutionary point". 7015: 6674: 6639: 6549: 6076: 5909: 5860: 5687: 5562: 5412: 5083: 4826: 4722: 4717: 4641: 4616: 4418: 4403: 4368: 4064: 3782: 3739: 3708: 3698: 3658: 3516: 3496: 3357: 3317: 3312: 3237: 2941: 2532: 2403: 994: 989: 950:

Searle goes on to affirm that "where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance

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anti-real or science-fiction interpretations could be imagined. "I wish to say that there is a

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Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle

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J.M.P.R. Cohen, & M. and E. Pollack. Cambridge, Mass.: . MIT Press: pp. 401–416.

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Searle, "Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization" (2010) p. 48-62

526:. He called for the realization that the United States is in a more-or-less permanent 284: 7103: 7070: 6779: 6764: 6754: 6739: 6689: 6644: 6604: 6539: 6534: 6504: 6371: 6311: 6253: 5977: 5791: 5649: 5574: 5527: 5444: 5434: 5339: 5294: 5289: 5264: 5239: 5229: 5209: 5134: 4996: 4611: 4516: 4511: 4473: 4393: 4373: 4348: 4313: 4154: 4123: 4118: 4010: 4005: 3985: 3975: 3941: 3911: 3906: 3837: 3832: 3762: 3754: 3731: 3638: 3585: 3476: 3441: 3403: 3332: 3232: 3201: 2893:

John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions

2707:"Workshop on Critical Issues in Social Ontology.—The Cambridge Social Ontology Group" 2632:

Searle, John R. (December 1, 2016). "The Limits of Emergence: Reply to Tony Lawson".

2491:, "What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument", in M.; Preston, J., 2316: 1394: 1156: 1010: 928: 649: 499: 1609: 1584: 6749: 6744: 6719: 6649: 6584: 6544: 6514: 6509: 6421: 6411: 6301: 6036: 6031: 6019: 5940: 5926: 5850: 5604: 5594: 5589: 5552: 5502: 5299: 5279: 5269: 5199: 5119: 4737: 4732: 4687: 4646: 4556: 4458: 4413: 4408: 4378: 4363: 4358: 4043: 3959: 3827: 3772: 3721: 3668: 3663: 3623: 3570: 3539: 3534: 3506: 3466: 3393: 3277: 3170: 2987: 2919: 1659: 1324: 1182: 1076: 985: 978: 967: 859:), or "Hands can be defined entirely in terms of their causes and effects" (manual 799: 397: 259: 168:

Problems arising in the theory of meaning out of the notions of sense and reference

3068: 3036: 2558:, Theory and Decision Library, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 191–202, 1788: 1727: 1120:

Searle briefly critiques one particular set of these rules: those of mathematical

1093:

In recent years, Searle's main interlocutor on issues of social ontology has been

797:

the ideas of other modern thinkers: as the river-bed/substratum of Wittgenstein's

2556:

Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology

2301:

Gerald Graff. 1988. Summary of Reiterating the differences. in Derrida, Jacques.

2048:

Although Searle does not mention earlier uses of the concept, it originates from

2023: 1515: 1205: 7030: 6825: 6799: 6794: 6594: 6579: 6446: 6426: 6406: 6258: 6233: 6192: 6053: 5962: 5952: 5914: 5872: 5835: 5801: 5670: 5644: 5454: 5367: 5344: 5319: 5274: 5204: 5179: 5154: 5149: 4981: 4946: 4866: 4692: 4423: 4308: 4293: 4128: 4095: 4090: 4038: 4000: 3995: 3980: 3949: 3863: 3643: 3633: 3580: 3565: 3501: 3165: 2991: 2965: 2563: 1191: 1094: 904:. Perhaps the goal of science is to establish and validate statements which are 856: 628: 619: 389: 385: 323: 197: 187: 183: 7035: 6995: 6564: 6554: 6431: 6361: 6248: 6217: 6197: 6141: 6136: 6091: 5986: 5507: 5429: 5329: 5249: 5219: 5174: 4986: 4777: 4621: 4576: 4453: 4428: 4353: 4288: 3847: 3716: 3653: 3648: 3347: 3064:

of an interview with John Searle on language, writing, mind, and consciousness

2551: 1424: 1351: 1068: 1055: 653: 645: 615: 255: 2692: 2653: 2618: 2515:"Gross – Comment On Searle | PDF | Émile Durkheim | Sociology" 1715: 1686: 7075: 7025: 6789: 6664: 6391: 6162: 6086: 5993: 5967: 5887: 5579: 5512: 5476: 5139: 5104: 5018: 4727: 4667: 4546: 4526: 4278: 4273: 4253: 3421: 3292: 3098:

The Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies video interview with John Searle

2999: 2936: 1141: 676: 531: 475: 429: 361:. In the late 1980s, Searle challenged the restrictions of Berkeley's 1980 1762:"Letters to the Editor. Category: Features from The Berkeley Daily Planet" 530:

with these forces. Moreover, a probable course of action would be to deny

51: 7000: 6476: 6202: 6172: 6131: 6126: 5892: 5867: 4991: 4682: 4303: 4263: 4197: 90: 614:

Searle's early work, which did much to establish his reputation, was on

6238: 6101: 5882: 5840: 5823: 5522: 4702: 4258: 3026:

John Searle on mind, matter, consciousness and his theory of perception

3016: 3003: 2744: 2684: 2645: 2610: 1007:

criticize Searle's view of AI, particularly the Chinese room argument.

667:, Searle sets out to combine all these elements to give his account of 353:". He received all his university degrees, BA, MA, and DPhil, from the 3113: 2533:"Searle – Reply To Gross | PDF | Émile Durkheim | Mind" 7020: 6111: 6081: 5933: 5845: 5776: 5639: 5052: 4782: 2862:(1990) Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association 703:(1983) and which differs in important ways from the one suggested in 396:, helped establish his reputation. His notable concepts include the " 161: 86: 5726: 2292:, Glyph 2 (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977 p. 202 1321:

The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere Is Reshaping Human Reality

618:. He attempted to synthesize ideas from many colleagues – including 2812:

Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement

447:, where he obtained all his university degrees, BA, MA, and DPhil. 6121: 6116: 6096: 5904: 5284: 4268: 2950:

Illocutionary Acts—Austin's Account and What Searle Made Out of It

2049: 1013:

argues that Searle's "Strong AI" is really just another name for

6106: 5614: 5542: 2959:

How to Make the Concepts Clear: Searle's Discussion with Derrida

5730: 5056: 4847:

An Essay Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language

4201: 3117: 2669:"Some Critical Issues in Social Ontology: Reply to John Searle" 3109:

Figure/Ground interview with John Searle. November 19th, 2012.

527: 2488: 1224:

The Campus War: A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony

491:

The Campus War: A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony

1310:

Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization

1230:

Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts

1181:, in his 1972 paper "Signature Event Context," responded to 311: 2447:"Thinking Machines: The Search for Artificial Intelligence" 737:(1983), Searle applies the principles of his account(s) of 2891:(ed.) and L. Moss (ed.) "Searle and Smith: A Dialogue" in 1548:"Searle Found to Have Violated Sexual Harassment Policies" 2968:, "Am I Human?: Researchers need new ways to distinguish 2845:

Papers on the History of Speech Act Theory by Barry Smith

2351:

by Daniel C. Dennett, reply by John R. Searle, The

1272:

Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World

1978:"Earlier Complaints on Professor Accused of Harassment" 1610:"President Bush Awards 2004 National Humanities Medals" 699:

According to a later account, which Searle presents in

6876:

The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

2924:

Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind and Language

2144:. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. p. 131. 1337:, vol. LXI, no. 15 (October 9, 2014), pp. 52–55. 308: 7175:

Members of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts

7160:

Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

875:

Searle argues that philosophy has been trapped by a

314: 6988: 6817: 6485: 6277: 6226: 6155: 6069: 6062: 6002: 5764: 5663: 5490: 5360: 5090: 4959: 4808: 4660: 4497: 4244: 4142: 4104: 4078: 4052: 4024: 3968: 3940: 3877: 3856: 3795: 3753: 3730: 3707: 3609: 3553: 3515: 3459: 3412: 3366: 3270: 3220: 3194: 3158: 3151: 2550:Lukes, Steven (2007), Tsohatzidis, Savas L. (ed.), 1999:

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

1206:

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

756:is exclusively mental, being the power of minds to 466:, Searle became the secretary of "Students against 277: 249: 213: 203: 193: 175: 160: 144: 134: 124: 112: 98: 65: 42: 2800:John Searle and the Construction of Social Reality 2191: 1660:"John Searle | Biography, Philosophy, & Facts" 1242:Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures 1236:Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 1054:in "On Brute Facts", Searle distinguishes between 947:: it is only experienced by the person having it. 735:Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 3069:Searle on the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley 3006:in a sentence—such as "he", "she" or "it"—refers. 2911:. 2007 Jul–Nov;101(4–6):169–78. Epub 2008 Jan 19. 2835:Cognitio-Estudos: revista eletrônica de filosofia 2790:(Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick, eds.; 1991) 1749:Searle v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd. 1450:Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception 1341:Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception 7150:American consciousness researchers and theorists 2978:, vol. 316, no. 3 (March 2017), pp. 58–63. 2323:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 833:described Searle's view as "anti-intentionalist" 2290:Reiterating the Différences: A Reply to Derrida 1101:and the Cambridge Social Ontology Group at the 2986:prowess, there cannot be one ultimate test of 2885:Annu. Rev. Neurosci. (2000) 23:557–78. Review. 2865:"Collective Intentions and Actions" (1990) in 23:. For the American minister and educator, see 5742: 5068: 4213: 3129: 1682: 1680: 1541: 1539: 1537: 1329:Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies 1298:(summary of work in philosophy of mind; 2004) 8: 5984: 5938: 5924: 2050:Alexander Sesonske's article "Performatives" 1481:"Introduction: John Searle in Czech Context" 1303:Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays 1140:. Searle thinks that whether one really has 554:which Berkeley allegedly had failed to act. 543:In March 2017, Searle became the subject of 349:, Searle was secretary of "Students against 2074:Lepore, Ernest / van Gulick, Robert (eds): 2022:John R. Searle, Daniel Vanderveken (1985). 1944: 1942: 1789:"Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?" 1315:"What Your Computer Can't Know" (review of 1250:(John Searle & Daniel Vanderveken 1985) 7230:University of California, Berkeley faculty 6066: 5749: 5735: 5727: 5075: 5061: 5053: 4937:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 4220: 4206: 4198: 3727: 3512: 3409: 3155: 3136: 3122: 3114: 2673:Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2634:Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2599:Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 1716:http://www.ditext.com/searle/campus/4.html 1687:http://www.ditext.com/searle/campus/1.html 1517:Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers 435:Searle began his college education at the 50: 39: 3093:Webcast of Philosophy of Society lectures 2428:"Conversation with John Searle, p.4 of 6" 1575: 1573: 2806:Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts 2493:Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument 2169:. London: Orion Books Ltd. p. 108. 764:Searle also introduces a technical term 498:members of the administration) would be 428:; his mother, Hester Beck Searle, was a 411: 7220:American philosophers of social science 2321:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2126:"Literary Theory and Its Discontents", 1452:, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 15. 1441: 559:Regents of the University of California 470:". McCarthy at that time served as the 7235:University of Wisconsin–Madison alumni 1604: 1602: 495:House Un-American Activities Committee 326:widely noted for contributions to the 5676:Philosophy of artificial intelligence 2348:The Myth of the Computer: An Exchange 1323:, Oxford University Press, 2014; and 1060:, like the height of a mountain, and 972:philosophy of artificial intelligence 322:; born July 31, 1932) is an American 7: 7210:American philosophers of mathematics 7185:National Humanities Medal recipients 3083:"Our shared condition—consciousness" 2948:Doerge (2006), Friedrich Christoph: 1949:Baker, Katie J.M. (March 23, 2017). 1787:Korngold, Gerald (January 1, 1998). 1509: 1507: 1505: 896:Searle has argued that critics like 416:John Searle speaking at Google, 2015 7225:American philosophers of technology 7140:Artificial intelligence researchers 2926:(2007), Columbia University Press, 2227:. Mass, US: MIT Press. p. 58. 1894:Baker, Katie J.M. (April 7, 2017). 711:", an idea adopted from Austin and 27:. For the Australian educator, see 7250:21st-century American male writers 7245:20th-century American male writers 7120:21st-century American philosophers 7115:20th-century American philosophers 2952:. Tuebingen: Tuebingen University. 2860:"Is the Brain a Digital Computer?" 2249:The Construction of Social Reality 2142:The Construction of Social Reality 2025:Foundations of Illocutionary Logic 1868:Fraley, Malaika (March 23, 2017). 1842:Watanabe, Tessa (March 23, 2017). 1558:from the original on June 21, 2019 1546:Weinberg, Justin (June 21, 2019). 1514:Shook, John R. (January 1, 2005). 1410:List of Jean Nicod Prize laureates 1331:, Oxford University Press, 2014), 1260:The Construction of Social Reality 1248:Foundations of Illocutionary Logic 1099:University of California, Berkeley 1048:The Construction of Social Reality 720:Foundations of Illocutionary Logic 452:University of California, Berkeley 439:. In his junior year, he became a 340:University of California, Berkeley 14: 7205:American philosophers of language 2942:Interview with Léo Peruzzo Júnior 2854:The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2667:Lawson, Tony (December 1, 2016). 2593:Lawson, Tony (December 1, 2016). 2415:The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1751:(1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1253 729:Intentionality and the background 692:Would that Sam smoked habitually! 420:Searle's father, G.W. Searle, an 7200:American philosophers of culture 6946:The Closing of the American Mind 6866:Civilization and Its Discontents 6846:A Vindication of Natural Society 4181: 4172: 4171: 1368: 1354: 402:"strong" artificial intelligence 380:. In 2010 he was elected to the 304: 283: 16:American philosopher (born 1932) 7125:Alumni of Christ Church, Oxford 2998:. "irtually every sentence is 2764:John Searle in Thomas Mautner, 2745:How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' 2198:. Mass, US: MIT Press. p. 2078:. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1991. 1966:Contains facsimile of the suit. 1520:. A&C Black. p. 2175. 1274:(summary of earlier work; 1998) 984:In 1980, Searle presented the " 822:his debate with Jacques Derrida 464:University of Wisconsin–Madison 437:University of Wisconsin–Madison 347:University of Wisconsin–Madison 248: 103:University of Wisconsin–Madison 4877:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 3384:Analytic–synthetic distinction 2808:(Savas Tsohatzidis, ed.; 2007) 2028:. Cambridge University Press. 2001:. Cambridge University Press. 1976:Tate, Emily (April 10, 2017). 644:. He also drew on the work of 462:While an undergraduate at the 382:American Philosophical Society 299:American English pronunciation 1: 7215:American philosophers of mind 6836:Oration on the Dignity of Man 5533:Hard problem of consciousness 4758:Principle of compositionality 2937:The Storm Over the University 2879:, Vol. 60, No.1, Spring 1993. 2261:Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969). 1405:List of American philosophers 589:In 2000, Searle received the 368:In 2000, Searle received the 7195:Ordinary language philosophy 6906:The Society of the Spectacle 4907:Philosophical Investigations 2873:The Problem of Consciousness 2856:.3, pp. 417–424. (1980) 2850:"Minds, Brains and Programs" 2404:"Minds, Brains and Programs" 2379:The Mystery of Consciousness 2366:The Mystery of Consciousness 2335:The Mystery of Consciousness 1334:The New York Review of Books 1266:The Mystery of Consciousness 1226:(political commentary; 1971) 584:East China Normal University 507:rent-stabilization ordinance 363:rent stabilization ordinance 4748:Modality (natural language) 2867:Intentions in Communication 2788:John Searle and His Critics 2564:10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2_9 2392:The Rediscovery of the Mind 2277:The Rediscovery of the Mind 2194:The Rediscovery of the Mind 2115:The Rediscovery of the Mind 2076:John Searle and his Critics 1400:Language/action perspective 1254:The Rediscovery of the Mind 845:The Rediscovery of the Mind 629:How To Do Things with Words 345:As an undergraduate at the 204:Other notable students 33:John Serle (disambiguation) 7266: 7165:Jean Nicod Prize laureates 4887:Language, Truth, and Logic 4627:Theological noncognitivism 4512:Contrast theory of meaning 4507:Causal theory of reference 4238:Index of language articles 3283:Causal theory of reference 3074:February 24, 2022, at the 3037:Conversations with History 2495:, Oxford University Press. 2457:(2): 14–23. Archived from 2265:. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 2167:Mind, Language and Society 1296:Mind: A Brief Introduction 1292:(lecture collection; 2004) 1284:Consciousness and Language 1244:(lecture collection; 1984) 1211:Cambridge University Press 1170: 1147: 1086: 965: 686:Does Sam smoke habitually? 539:Sexual assault allegations 18: 7084: 6976:Intellectuals and Society 6926:The Culture of Narcissism 5696: 5255:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 5245:David Lewis (philosopher) 5027: 4972:Philosophy of information 4572:Mediated reference theory 4235: 4167: 3042:October 12, 2009, at the 3031:Conversations with Searle 2432:globetrotter.berkeley.edu 2279:(1992), p.177 and endnote 2065:. Berlin / New York 1990. 1463:"Humboldt Research Award" 1390:Collective intentionality 1268:(review collection; 1997) 595:National Humanities Medal 384:. Searle's early work on 374:National Humanities Medal 282: 273: 120: 49: 7155:American epistemologists 7130:American Rhodes Scholars 6966:The Malaise of Modernity 6916:The History of Sexuality 6015:Catholic social teaching 4897:Two Dogmas of Empiricism 3343:Scientific structuralism 2972:from the natural kind", 2957:Koblizek (2012), Tomas: 2796:(Barry Smith, ed.; 2003) 2766:Dictionary of Philosophy 2755::1 (January 1964), 43–58 2749:The Philosophical Review 2734:by John R. Searle (2003) 2552:"Searle versus Durkheim" 2353:New York Review of Books 2061:Burkhardt, Armin (ed.), 1290:Freedom and Neurobiology 1286:(essay collection; 2002) 1232:(essay collection; 1979) 945:ontologically subjective 892:Ontological subjectivity 824:, Searle argued against 741:to the investigation of 502:or violently attacked." 31:. For other people, see 7180:American metaphysicians 7145:Communication theorists 7046:Philosophy of education 5383:Eliminative materialism 4698:Use–mention distinction 4542:Direct reference theory 2970:artificial intelligence 2711:www.csog.econ.cam.ac.uk 2445:Roberts, Jacob (2016). 2417:.3, pp. 417–424. (1980) 1997:John R. Searle (1969). 1664:Encyclopedia Britannica 1581:"Jean-Nicod 2000 Prize" 1103:University of Cambridge 962:Artificial intelligence 574:Awards and recognitions 129:Contemporary philosophy 5985: 5939: 5925: 5635:Propositional attitude 5630:Problem of other minds 5538:Hypostatic abstraction 4632:Theory of descriptions 4567:Linguistic determinism 4229:Philosophy of language 3399:Reflective equilibrium 2315:Jacob, Pierre (2019). 1467:www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de 1150:Fact-value distinction 689:Sam, smoke habitually! 683:Sam smokes habitually. 599:Mind & Brain Prize 417: 378:Mind & Brain Prize 328:philosophy of language 223:Philosophy of language 7135:Analytic philosophers 7051:Philosophy of history 7041:Philosophy of culture 6936:A Conflict of Visions 5706:Philosophers category 5610:Mental representation 5373:Biological naturalism 5260:Maurice Merleau-Ponty 5235:Frank Cameron Jackson 4743:Mental representation 4678:Linguistic relativity 4562:Inquisitive semantics 4070:Nicholas Wolterstorff 3525:David Malet Armstrong 3046:series. Available in 2732:Rationality in Action 2489:Harnad, Stevan (2001) 2355:, June 24, 1982 Issue 2225:Rationality in Action 2223:Searle, John (2001). 2190:Searle, John (1992). 2165:Searle, John (1999). 2140:Searle, John (1995). 1766:Berkeley Daily Planet 1703:socrates.berkeley.edu 1587:on September 23, 2015 1278:Rationality in Action 1173:Searle–Derrida debate 1167:Searle–Derrida debate 1148:Further information: 1115:Rationality in Action 1087:Further information: 956:biological naturalism 885:biological naturalism 831:In 2023 Pierre Jacob 415: 264:Biological naturalism 107:Christ Church, Oxford 58:Christ Church, Oxford 7056:Political philosophy 6856:Democracy in America 5388:Emergent materialism 4927:Naming and Necessity 4837:De Arte Combinatoria 4636:Definite description 4597:Semantic externalism 3085:, Searle's May 2013 2713:. September 19, 2014 2128:New Literary History 1639:search.amphilsoc.org 1635:"APS Member History" 1083:Searle–Lawson debate 785:with the concept of 580:Tsing Hua University 514:September 11 attacks 480:Free Speech Movement 445:University of Oxford 426:AT&T Corporation 359:Free Speech Movement 355:University of Oxford 256:Indirect speech acts 7240:Writers from Denver 6896:One-Dimensional Man 5585:Language of thought 5335:Ludwig Wittgenstein 5165:Patricia Churchland 4977:Philosophical logic 4967:Analytic philosophy 4773:Sense and reference 4652:Verification theory 4607:Situation semantics 3892:Patricia Churchland 3823:Christine Korsgaard 3709:Logical positivists 3601:Ludwig Wittgenstein 3378:paradox of analysis 3145:Analytic philosophy 2975:Scientific American 2895:(2003), Blackwell, 2820:(Joshua Rust; 2009) 2814:(Bo Mou, ed.; 2008) 2802:(Joshua Rust; 2006) 1793:Nebraska Law Review 1768:. December 14, 2004 1385:American philosophy 1138:freedom of the will 1062:institutional facts 634:Ludwig Wittgenstein 597:; and in 2006, the 422:electrical engineer 400:" argument against 394:Ludwig Wittgenstein 376:; and in 2006, the 25:John Preston Searle 7016:Cultural pessimism 7011:Cultural criticism 5910:National character 5413:Neurophenomenology 5084:Philosophy of mind 4827:Port-Royal Grammar 4723:Family resemblance 4642:Theory of language 4617:Supposition theory 4065:William Lane Craig 3783:Friedrich Waismann 3740:Carl Gustav Hempel 3699:Timothy Williamson 3659:Alasdair MacIntyre 3517:Australian realism 3497:Russ Shafer-Landau 3358:Analytical Thomism 3313:Logical positivism 2685:10.1111/jtsb.12129 2646:10.1111/jtsb.12125 2611:10.1111/jtsb.12126 2461:on August 19, 2018 2409:2001-02-21 at the 1052:Elizabeth Anscombe 995:Douglas Hofstadter 990:thought experiment 739:illocutionary acts 713:Elizabeth Anscombe 673:linguistic meaning 669:illocutionary acts 605:Philosophical work 512:Shortly after the 424:, was employed by 418: 332:philosophy of mind 294:John Rogers Searle 228:Philosophy of mind 139:Western philosophy 70:John Rogers Searle 21:John Gideon Searle 7097: 7096: 6813: 6812: 5958:Spontaneous order 5948:Social alienation 5797:Cultural heritage 5758:Social philosophy 5724: 5723: 5620:Mind–body problem 5518:Cognitive closure 5482:Substance dualism 5100:G. E. M. Anscombe 5050: 5049: 4552:Dynamic semantics 4195: 4194: 4163: 4162: 3879:Pittsburgh School 3869:Peter van Inwagen 3803:Roderick Chisholm 3791: 3790: 3684:Richard Swinburne 3619:G. E. M. Anscombe 3455: 3454: 3353:Analytic theology 3328:Ordinary language 3266: 3265: 2906:Dualism revisited 2901:978-1-4051-1258-1 2573:978-1-4020-6104-2 2234:978-0-262-19463-1 2209:978-0-262-19321-4 2176:978-0-75380-921-1 2151:978-0-14-023590-6 2035:978-0-521-26324-5 1848:Los Angeles Times 1527:978-1-84371-037-0 1415:Performative turn 1362:Philosophy portal 1187:illocutionary act 1185:'s theory of the 1027:observer-relative 927:is prettier than 915:Searle calls any 663:In his 1969 book 642:rules of language 624:illocutionary act 550:Los Angeles Times 547:allegations. The 336:social philosophy 302: 291: 290: 194:Doctoral students 176:Academic advisors 7257: 7061:Social criticism 6981: 6971: 6961: 6951: 6941: 6931: 6921: 6911: 6901: 6891: 6881: 6871: 6861: 6851: 6841: 6831: 6067: 6049:Frankfurt School 6027:Communitarianism 5990: 5944: 5930: 5751: 5744: 5737: 5728: 5472:Representational 5467:Property dualism 5460:Type physicalism 5425:New mysterianism 5393:Epiphenomenalism 5215:Martin Heidegger 5077: 5070: 5063: 5054: 5012:Formal semantics 4960:Related articles 4952: 4942: 4932: 4922: 4912: 4902: 4892: 4882: 4872: 4862: 4852: 4842: 4832: 4822: 4592:Relevance theory 4587:Phallogocentrism 4222: 4215: 4208: 4199: 4185: 4184: 4175: 4174: 4114:Nancy Cartwright 3955:Nicholas Rescher 3932:Bas van Fraassen 3922:Nicholas Rescher 3745:Hans Reichenbach 3728: 3694:Bernard Williams 3591:Bertrand Russell 3513: 3447:Rigid designator 3410: 3156: 3152:Related articles 3138: 3131: 3124: 3115: 2776: 2768:(Penguin 1996). 2762: 2756: 2741: 2735: 2729: 2723: 2722: 2720: 2718: 2703: 2697: 2696: 2664: 2658: 2657: 2629: 2623: 2622: 2590: 2584: 2583: 2582: 2580: 2547: 2541: 2540: 2529: 2523: 2522: 2511: 2505: 2502: 2496: 2486: 2480: 2477: 2471: 2470: 2468: 2466: 2442: 2436: 2435: 2424: 2418: 2401: 2395: 2388: 2382: 2375: 2369: 2362: 2356: 2344: 2338: 2337:(1997) p. 95-131 2331: 2325: 2324: 2317:"Intentionality" 2312: 2306: 2299: 2293: 2286: 2280: 2273: 2267: 2266: 2258: 2252: 2245: 2239: 2238: 2220: 2214: 2213: 2197: 2187: 2181: 2180: 2162: 2156: 2155: 2137: 2131: 2124: 2118: 2107: 2101: 2094: 2088: 2085: 2079: 2072: 2066: 2059: 2053: 2046: 2040: 2039: 2019: 2013: 2012: 1994: 1988: 1987: 1983:Inside Higher Ed 1973: 1967: 1965: 1963: 1961: 1946: 1937: 1936: 1934: 1932: 1927:. March 23, 2017 1917: 1911: 1910: 1908: 1906: 1891: 1885: 1884: 1882: 1880: 1865: 1859: 1858: 1856: 1854: 1839: 1833: 1832: 1830: 1828: 1822: 1816:. Archived from 1815: 1807: 1801: 1800: 1784: 1778: 1777: 1775: 1773: 1758: 1752: 1745: 1739: 1738: 1736: 1734: 1728:"The Campus War" 1724: 1718: 1713: 1707: 1706: 1695: 1689: 1684: 1675: 1674: 1672: 1670: 1656: 1650: 1649: 1647: 1645: 1631: 1625: 1624: 1622: 1620: 1606: 1597: 1596: 1594: 1592: 1583:. Archived from 1577: 1568: 1567: 1565: 1563: 1543: 1532: 1531: 1511: 1500: 1499: 1497: 1495: 1485: 1477: 1471: 1470: 1459: 1453: 1448:John R. Searle, 1446: 1430:Unconscious mind 1420:Practical reason 1378: 1376:Biography portal 1373: 1372: 1371: 1364: 1359: 1358: 1357: 1019:computationalism 709:direction of fit 591:Jean Nicod Prize 567:Janet Napolitano 388:, influenced by 370:Jean Nicod Prize 321: 320: 317: 316: 313: 310: 297: 287: 268:Direction of fit 208:William Hirstein 83: 79: 77: 54: 40: 7265: 7264: 7260: 7259: 7258: 7256: 7255: 7254: 7100: 7099: 7098: 7093: 7080: 7006:Critical theory 6984: 6979: 6969: 6959: 6949: 6939: 6929: 6919: 6909: 6899: 6889: 6879: 6869: 6859: 6849: 6839: 6829: 6809: 6487: 6481: 6279: 6273: 6222: 6151: 6058: 6010:Budapest School 5998: 5787:Cosmopolitanism 5760: 5755: 5725: 5720: 5692: 5659: 5605:Mental property 5498:Abstract object 5486: 5356: 5310:Wilfrid Sellars 5185:Donald Davidson 5170:Paul Churchland 5130:George Berkeley 5086: 5081: 5051: 5046: 5023: 5002:School of Names 4955: 4950: 4940: 4930: 4920: 4917:Of Grammatology 4910: 4900: 4890: 4880: 4870: 4860: 4850: 4840: 4830: 4820: 4804: 4656: 4602:Semantic holism 4582:Non-cognitivism 4522:Conventionalism 4493: 4240: 4231: 4226: 4196: 4191: 4182: 4159: 4150:Jan Łukasiewicz 4138: 4106:Stanford School 4100: 4086:Paul Feyerabend 4074: 4060:Alvin Plantinga 4048: 4034:James F. Conant 4020: 3964: 3936: 3927:Wilfrid Sellars 3917:Alexander Pruss 3897:Paul Churchland 3873: 3852: 3808:Donald Davidson 3787: 3749: 3726: 3703: 3629:Michael Dummett 3605: 3596:Frank P. Ramsey 3549: 3511: 3487:Jaakko Hintikka 3472:Keith Donnellan 3451: 3408: 3362: 3323:Neurophilosophy 3308:Logical atomism 3262: 3216: 3190: 3147: 3142: 3076:Wayback Machine 3044:Wayback Machine 3013: 2909:J Physiol Paris 2877:Social Research 2827: 2825:Further reading 2784: 2779: 2763: 2759: 2742: 2738: 2730: 2726: 2716: 2714: 2705: 2704: 2700: 2666: 2665: 2661: 2631: 2630: 2626: 2592: 2591: 2587: 2578: 2576: 2574: 2549: 2548: 2544: 2531: 2530: 2526: 2513: 2512: 2508: 2503: 2499: 2487: 2483: 2478: 2474: 2464: 2462: 2444: 2443: 2439: 2426: 2425: 2421: 2411:Wayback Machine 2402: 2398: 2389: 2385: 2376: 2372: 2363: 2359: 2345: 2341: 2332: 2328: 2314: 2313: 2309: 2300: 2296: 2287: 2283: 2274: 2270: 2260: 2259: 2255: 2246: 2242: 2235: 2222: 2221: 2217: 2210: 2189: 2188: 2184: 2177: 2164: 2163: 2159: 2152: 2139: 2138: 2134: 2125: 2121: 2108: 2104: 2095: 2091: 2086: 2082: 2073: 2069: 2060: 2056: 2047: 2043: 2036: 2021: 2020: 2016: 2009: 1996: 1995: 1991: 1975: 1974: 1970: 1959: 1957: 1948: 1947: 1940: 1930: 1928: 1919: 1918: 1914: 1904: 1902: 1893: 1892: 1888: 1878: 1876: 1867: 1866: 1862: 1852: 1850: 1841: 1840: 1836: 1826: 1824: 1823:on May 15, 2008 1820: 1813: 1809: 1808: 1804: 1786: 1785: 1781: 1771: 1769: 1760: 1759: 1755: 1746: 1742: 1732: 1730: 1726: 1725: 1721: 1714: 1710: 1697: 1696: 1692: 1685: 1678: 1668: 1666: 1658: 1657: 1653: 1643: 1641: 1633: 1632: 1628: 1618: 1616: 1608: 1607: 1600: 1590: 1588: 1579: 1578: 1571: 1561: 1559: 1545: 1544: 1535: 1528: 1513: 1512: 1503: 1493: 1491: 1483: 1479: 1478: 1474: 1461: 1460: 1456: 1447: 1443: 1439: 1434: 1374: 1369: 1367: 1360: 1355: 1353: 1350: 1317:Luciano Floridi 1201: 1179:Jacques Derrida 1175: 1169: 1152: 1132:, but does not 1122:decision theory 1111: 1091: 1089:Social ontology 1085: 1040: 1031:causal efficacy 974: 964: 894: 877:false dichotomy 841: 809:Pierre Bourdieu 731: 612: 607: 593:; in 2004, the 576: 541: 521:interventionist 518:neoconservative 468:Joseph McCarthy 460: 410: 372:; in 2004, the 351:Joseph McCarthy 307: 303: 266: 262: 258: 252: 245: 216: 153: 105: 99:Alma mater 94: 84: 81: 75: 73: 72: 71: 61: 45: 36: 17: 12: 11: 5: 7263: 7261: 7253: 7252: 7247: 7242: 7237: 7232: 7227: 7222: 7217: 7212: 7207: 7202: 7197: 7192: 7187: 7182: 7177: 7172: 7167: 7162: 7157: 7152: 7147: 7142: 7137: 7132: 7127: 7122: 7117: 7112: 7102: 7101: 7095: 7094: 7092: 7091: 7085: 7082: 7081: 7079: 7078: 7073: 7068: 7066:Social science 7063: 7058: 7053: 7048: 7043: 7038: 7033: 7028: 7023: 7018: 7013: 7008: 7003: 6998: 6992: 6990: 6986: 6985: 6983: 6982: 6972: 6962: 6956:Gender Trouble 6952: 6942: 6932: 6922: 6912: 6902: 6892: 6886:The Second Sex 6882: 6872: 6862: 6852: 6842: 6832: 6821: 6819: 6815: 6814: 6811: 6810: 6808: 6807: 6802: 6797: 6792: 6787: 6782: 6777: 6772: 6767: 6762: 6757: 6752: 6747: 6742: 6737: 6732: 6727: 6722: 6717: 6712: 6707: 6702: 6697: 6692: 6687: 6682: 6677: 6672: 6667: 6662: 6657: 6652: 6647: 6642: 6637: 6632: 6627: 6622: 6617: 6612: 6607: 6602: 6597: 6592: 6587: 6582: 6577: 6572: 6567: 6562: 6557: 6552: 6547: 6542: 6537: 6532: 6527: 6522: 6517: 6512: 6507: 6502: 6497: 6491: 6489: 6483: 6482: 6480: 6479: 6474: 6469: 6464: 6459: 6454: 6449: 6444: 6439: 6434: 6429: 6424: 6419: 6414: 6409: 6404: 6399: 6394: 6389: 6384: 6379: 6374: 6369: 6364: 6359: 6354: 6349: 6344: 6339: 6334: 6329: 6324: 6319: 6314: 6309: 6304: 6299: 6294: 6289: 6283: 6281: 6275: 6274: 6272: 6271: 6266: 6261: 6256: 6251: 6246: 6241: 6236: 6230: 6228: 6224: 6223: 6221: 6220: 6215: 6210: 6205: 6200: 6195: 6190: 6185: 6180: 6175: 6170: 6165: 6159: 6157: 6153: 6152: 6150: 6149: 6144: 6139: 6134: 6129: 6124: 6119: 6114: 6109: 6104: 6099: 6094: 6089: 6084: 6079: 6073: 6071: 6064: 6060: 6059: 6057: 6056: 6051: 6046: 6045: 6044: 6034: 6029: 6024: 6023: 6022: 6012: 6006: 6004: 6000: 5999: 5997: 5996: 5991: 5982: 5981: 5980: 5970: 5965: 5960: 5955: 5950: 5945: 5936: 5931: 5922: 5917: 5912: 5907: 5902: 5901: 5900: 5890: 5885: 5880: 5878:Invisible hand 5875: 5870: 5865: 5864: 5863: 5853: 5848: 5843: 5838: 5833: 5832: 5831: 5821: 5820: 5819: 5814: 5809: 5799: 5794: 5789: 5784: 5779: 5774: 5768: 5766: 5762: 5761: 5756: 5754: 5753: 5746: 5739: 5731: 5722: 5721: 5719: 5718: 5713: 5708: 5703: 5697: 5694: 5693: 5691: 5690: 5673: 5667: 5665: 5661: 5660: 5658: 5657: 5652: 5647: 5642: 5637: 5632: 5627: 5622: 5617: 5612: 5607: 5602: 5600:Mental process 5597: 5592: 5587: 5582: 5577: 5572: 5570:Intentionality 5567: 5566: 5565: 5560: 5550: 5545: 5540: 5535: 5530: 5525: 5520: 5515: 5510: 5505: 5500: 5494: 5492: 5488: 5487: 5485: 5484: 5479: 5474: 5469: 5464: 5463: 5462: 5452: 5447: 5442: 5437: 5432: 5427: 5422: 5420:Neutral monism 5417: 5416: 5415: 5405: 5403:Interactionism 5400: 5395: 5390: 5385: 5380: 5375: 5370: 5364: 5362: 5358: 5357: 5355: 5354: 5347: 5342: 5337: 5332: 5327: 5322: 5317: 5315:Baruch Spinoza 5312: 5307: 5302: 5297: 5292: 5287: 5282: 5277: 5272: 5267: 5262: 5257: 5252: 5247: 5242: 5237: 5232: 5227: 5225:Edmund Husserl 5222: 5217: 5212: 5207: 5202: 5197: 5195:René Descartes 5192: 5190:Daniel Dennett 5187: 5182: 5177: 5172: 5167: 5162: 5160:David Chalmers 5157: 5152: 5147: 5145:Franz Brentano 5142: 5137: 5132: 5127: 5125:Alexander Bain 5122: 5117: 5115:Thomas Aquinas 5112: 5107: 5102: 5096: 5094: 5088: 5087: 5082: 5080: 5079: 5072: 5065: 5057: 5048: 5047: 5045: 5044: 5039: 5034: 5028: 5025: 5024: 5022: 5021: 5016: 5015: 5014: 5004: 4999: 4994: 4989: 4984: 4979: 4974: 4969: 4963: 4961: 4957: 4956: 4954: 4953: 4943: 4933: 4923: 4913: 4903: 4893: 4883: 4873: 4863: 4853: 4843: 4833: 4823: 4812: 4810: 4806: 4805: 4803: 4802: 4795: 4790: 4785: 4780: 4775: 4770: 4765: 4760: 4755: 4753:Presupposition 4750: 4745: 4740: 4735: 4730: 4725: 4720: 4715: 4710: 4705: 4700: 4695: 4690: 4685: 4680: 4675: 4670: 4664: 4662: 4658: 4657: 4655: 4654: 4649: 4644: 4639: 4629: 4624: 4619: 4614: 4609: 4604: 4599: 4594: 4589: 4584: 4579: 4574: 4569: 4564: 4559: 4554: 4549: 4544: 4539: 4534: 4532:Deconstruction 4529: 4524: 4519: 4514: 4509: 4503: 4501: 4495: 4494: 4492: 4491: 4486: 4481: 4476: 4471: 4466: 4461: 4456: 4451: 4446: 4441: 4436: 4431: 4426: 4421: 4416: 4411: 4406: 4401: 4396: 4391: 4386: 4381: 4376: 4371: 4366: 4361: 4356: 4351: 4346: 4341: 4336: 4331: 4326: 4321: 4316: 4311: 4306: 4301: 4296: 4291: 4286: 4281: 4276: 4271: 4266: 4261: 4256: 4250: 4248: 4242: 4241: 4236: 4233: 4232: 4227: 4225: 4224: 4217: 4210: 4202: 4193: 4192: 4190: 4189: 4179: 4168: 4165: 4164: 4161: 4160: 4158: 4157: 4152: 4146: 4144: 4140: 4139: 4137: 4136: 4134:Patrick Suppes 4131: 4126: 4121: 4116: 4110: 4108: 4102: 4101: 4099: 4098: 4093: 4088: 4082: 4080: 4076: 4075: 4073: 4072: 4067: 4062: 4056: 4054: 4050: 4049: 4047: 4046: 4041: 4036: 4030: 4028: 4022: 4021: 4019: 4018: 4016:Michael Walzer 4013: 4008: 4003: 3998: 3993: 3988: 3983: 3978: 3972: 3970: 3966: 3965: 3963: 3962: 3957: 3952: 3946: 3944: 3938: 3937: 3935: 3934: 3929: 3924: 3919: 3914: 3909: 3904: 3902:Adolf Grünbaum 3899: 3894: 3889: 3887:Robert Brandom 3883: 3881: 3875: 3874: 3872: 3871: 3866: 3860: 3858: 3854: 3853: 3851: 3850: 3845: 3843:W. V. O. Quine 3840: 3835: 3830: 3825: 3820: 3818:Nelson Goodman 3815: 3813:Daniel Dennett 3810: 3805: 3799: 3797: 3793: 3792: 3789: 3788: 3786: 3785: 3780: 3778:Moritz Schlick 3775: 3770: 3765: 3759: 3757: 3751: 3750: 3748: 3747: 3742: 3736: 3734: 3725: 3724: 3719: 3713: 3711: 3705: 3704: 3702: 3701: 3696: 3691: 3689:Charles Taylor 3686: 3681: 3679:P. F. Strawson 3676: 3671: 3666: 3661: 3656: 3651: 3646: 3641: 3636: 3631: 3626: 3621: 3615: 3613: 3607: 3606: 3604: 3603: 3598: 3593: 3588: 3583: 3578: 3576:Norman Malcolm 3573: 3568: 3563: 3557: 3555: 3551: 3550: 3548: 3547: 3545:J. J. C. Smart 3542: 3537: 3532: 3530:David Chalmers 3527: 3521: 3519: 3510: 3509: 3504: 3499: 3494: 3492:Giuseppe Peano 3489: 3484: 3482:Edmund Gettier 3479: 3474: 3469: 3463: 3461: 3457: 3456: 3453: 3452: 3450: 3449: 3444: 3439: 3437:Possible world 3434: 3429: 3424: 3418: 3416: 3407: 3406: 3401: 3396: 3391: 3389:Counterfactual 3386: 3381: 3370: 3368: 3364: 3363: 3361: 3360: 3355: 3350: 3345: 3340: 3335: 3330: 3325: 3320: 3315: 3310: 3305: 3300: 3295: 3290: 3285: 3280: 3274: 3272: 3268: 3267: 3264: 3263: 3261: 3260: 3255: 3250: 3248:Paraconsistent 3245: 3240: 3235: 3230: 3224: 3222: 3218: 3217: 3215: 3214: 3209: 3204: 3198: 3196: 3192: 3191: 3189: 3188: 3183: 3178: 3173: 3168: 3162: 3160: 3159:Areas of focus 3153: 3149: 3148: 3143: 3141: 3140: 3133: 3126: 3118: 3112: 3111: 3106: 3101: 3095: 3090: 3079: 3065: 3055: 3033: 3028: 3023: 3012: 3011:External links 3009: 3008: 3007: 2996:disambiguation 2963: 2954: 2945: 2939: 2934: 2912: 2903: 2886: 2880: 2870: 2863: 2857: 2847: 2842: 2826: 2823: 2822: 2821: 2815: 2809: 2803: 2797: 2791: 2783: 2780: 2778: 2777: 2757: 2743:John Searle, " 2736: 2724: 2698: 2679:(4): 426–437. 2659: 2640:(4): 400–412. 2624: 2605:(4): 359–399. 2585: 2572: 2542: 2524: 2506: 2497: 2481: 2472: 2437: 2419: 2396: 2383: 2377:Searle, J.R.: 2370: 2364:Searle, J.R.: 2357: 2339: 2326: 2307: 2294: 2281: 2268: 2253: 2240: 2233: 2215: 2208: 2182: 2175: 2157: 2150: 2132: 2119: 2111:Intentionality 2102: 2098:Intentionality 2089: 2080: 2067: 2054: 2041: 2034: 2014: 2007: 1989: 1968: 1938: 1925:East Bay Times 1912: 1886: 1874:East Bay Times 1860: 1834: 1802: 1779: 1753: 1740: 1719: 1708: 1690: 1676: 1651: 1626: 1598: 1569: 1533: 1526: 1501: 1472: 1454: 1440: 1438: 1435: 1433: 1432: 1427: 1422: 1417: 1412: 1407: 1402: 1397: 1392: 1387: 1381: 1380: 1379: 1365: 1349: 1346: 1345: 1344: 1338: 1313: 1307: 1299: 1293: 1287: 1281: 1275: 1269: 1263: 1257: 1251: 1245: 1239: 1233: 1227: 1221: 1219:978-0521096263 1200: 1197: 1171:Main article: 1168: 1165: 1110: 1107: 1084: 1081: 1073:Émile Durkheim 1039: 1038:Social reality 1036: 1025:processes are 1001:in their book 999:Daniel Dennett 963: 960: 919:epistemically 917:value judgment 902:category error 898:Daniel Dennett 893: 890: 873: 872: 865:Turing machine 849:Intentionality 840: 837: 766:the Background 754:intentionality 743:intentionality 730: 727: 701:Intentionality 694: 693: 690: 687: 684: 658:William Alston 638:G.C.J. Midgley 611: 608: 606: 603: 575: 572: 545:sexual assault 540: 537: 524:foreign policy 472:junior senator 459: 456: 441:Rhodes Scholar 409: 406: 289: 288: 280: 279: 275: 274: 271: 270: 253: 250: 247: 246: 244: 243: 241:Social reality 233:Intentionality 230: 225: 219: 217: 215:Main interests 214: 211: 210: 205: 201: 200: 195: 191: 190: 180:Peter Strawson 177: 173: 172: 164: 158: 157: 155:Direct realism 148: 142: 141: 136: 132: 131: 126: 122: 121: 118: 117: 114: 110: 109: 100: 96: 95: 85: 69: 67: 63: 62: 55: 47: 46: 43: 29:John W. Searle 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 7262: 7251: 7248: 7246: 7243: 7241: 7238: 7236: 7233: 7231: 7228: 7226: 7223: 7221: 7218: 7216: 7213: 7211: 7208: 7206: 7203: 7201: 7198: 7196: 7193: 7191: 7188: 7186: 7183: 7181: 7178: 7176: 7173: 7171: 7170:Living people 7168: 7166: 7163: 7161: 7158: 7156: 7153: 7151: 7148: 7146: 7143: 7141: 7138: 7136: 7133: 7131: 7128: 7126: 7123: 7121: 7118: 7116: 7113: 7111: 7108: 7107: 7105: 7090: 7087: 7086: 7083: 7077: 7074: 7072: 7071:Social theory 7069: 7067: 7064: 7062: 7059: 7057: 7054: 7052: 7049: 7047: 7044: 7042: 7039: 7037: 7034: 7032: 7029: 7027: 7024: 7022: 7019: 7017: 7014: 7012: 7009: 7007: 7004: 7002: 6999: 6997: 6994: 6993: 6991: 6987: 6978: 6977: 6973: 6968: 6967: 6963: 6958: 6957: 6953: 6948: 6947: 6943: 6938: 6937: 6933: 6928: 6927: 6923: 6918: 6917: 6913: 6908: 6907: 6903: 6898: 6897: 6893: 6888: 6887: 6883: 6878: 6877: 6873: 6868: 6867: 6863: 6858: 6857: 6853: 6848: 6847: 6843: 6838: 6837: 6833: 6828: 6827: 6823: 6822: 6820: 6816: 6806: 6803: 6801: 6798: 6796: 6793: 6791: 6788: 6786: 6783: 6781: 6778: 6776: 6773: 6771: 6768: 6766: 6763: 6761: 6758: 6756: 6753: 6751: 6748: 6746: 6743: 6741: 6738: 6736: 6733: 6731: 6728: 6726: 6725:Radhakrishnan 6723: 6721: 6718: 6716: 6713: 6711: 6708: 6706: 6703: 6701: 6698: 6696: 6693: 6691: 6688: 6686: 6683: 6681: 6678: 6676: 6673: 6671: 6668: 6666: 6663: 6661: 6658: 6656: 6653: 6651: 6648: 6646: 6643: 6641: 6638: 6636: 6633: 6631: 6628: 6626: 6623: 6621: 6618: 6616: 6613: 6611: 6608: 6606: 6603: 6601: 6598: 6596: 6593: 6591: 6588: 6586: 6583: 6581: 6578: 6576: 6573: 6571: 6568: 6566: 6563: 6561: 6558: 6556: 6553: 6551: 6548: 6546: 6543: 6541: 6538: 6536: 6533: 6531: 6528: 6526: 6523: 6521: 6518: 6516: 6513: 6511: 6508: 6506: 6503: 6501: 6498: 6496: 6493: 6492: 6490: 6486:20th and 21st 6484: 6478: 6475: 6473: 6470: 6468: 6465: 6463: 6460: 6458: 6455: 6453: 6450: 6448: 6445: 6443: 6440: 6438: 6435: 6433: 6430: 6428: 6425: 6423: 6420: 6418: 6415: 6413: 6410: 6408: 6405: 6403: 6400: 6398: 6395: 6393: 6390: 6388: 6385: 6383: 6380: 6378: 6375: 6373: 6370: 6368: 6365: 6363: 6360: 6358: 6355: 6353: 6350: 6348: 6345: 6343: 6340: 6338: 6335: 6333: 6330: 6328: 6325: 6323: 6320: 6318: 6315: 6313: 6310: 6308: 6305: 6303: 6300: 6298: 6295: 6293: 6290: 6288: 6285: 6284: 6282: 6278:18th and 19th 6276: 6270: 6267: 6265: 6262: 6260: 6257: 6255: 6252: 6250: 6247: 6245: 6242: 6240: 6237: 6235: 6232: 6231: 6229: 6225: 6219: 6216: 6214: 6211: 6209: 6206: 6204: 6201: 6199: 6196: 6194: 6191: 6189: 6186: 6184: 6181: 6179: 6176: 6174: 6171: 6169: 6166: 6164: 6161: 6160: 6158: 6154: 6148: 6145: 6143: 6140: 6138: 6135: 6133: 6130: 6128: 6125: 6123: 6120: 6118: 6115: 6113: 6110: 6108: 6105: 6103: 6100: 6098: 6095: 6093: 6090: 6088: 6085: 6083: 6080: 6078: 6075: 6074: 6072: 6068: 6065: 6061: 6055: 6052: 6050: 6047: 6043: 6040: 6039: 6038: 6035: 6033: 6030: 6028: 6025: 6021: 6018: 6017: 6016: 6013: 6011: 6008: 6007: 6005: 6001: 5995: 5992: 5989: 5988: 5983: 5979: 5976: 5975: 5974: 5971: 5969: 5966: 5964: 5961: 5959: 5956: 5954: 5951: 5949: 5946: 5943: 5942: 5937: 5935: 5932: 5929: 5928: 5923: 5921: 5918: 5916: 5913: 5911: 5908: 5906: 5903: 5899: 5896: 5895: 5894: 5891: 5889: 5886: 5884: 5881: 5879: 5876: 5874: 5871: 5869: 5866: 5862: 5859: 5858: 5857: 5854: 5852: 5849: 5847: 5844: 5842: 5839: 5837: 5834: 5830: 5827: 5826: 5825: 5822: 5818: 5815: 5813: 5810: 5808: 5805: 5804: 5803: 5800: 5798: 5795: 5793: 5790: 5788: 5785: 5783: 5780: 5778: 5775: 5773: 5770: 5769: 5767: 5763: 5759: 5752: 5747: 5745: 5740: 5738: 5733: 5732: 5729: 5717: 5714: 5712: 5709: 5707: 5704: 5702: 5699: 5698: 5695: 5689: 5685: 5681: 5677: 5674: 5672: 5669: 5668: 5666: 5662: 5656: 5653: 5651: 5650:Understanding 5648: 5646: 5643: 5641: 5638: 5636: 5633: 5631: 5628: 5626: 5623: 5621: 5618: 5616: 5613: 5611: 5608: 5606: 5603: 5601: 5598: 5596: 5593: 5591: 5588: 5586: 5583: 5581: 5578: 5576: 5575:Introspection 5573: 5571: 5568: 5564: 5561: 5559: 5556: 5555: 5554: 5551: 5549: 5546: 5544: 5541: 5539: 5536: 5534: 5531: 5529: 5528:Consciousness 5526: 5524: 5521: 5519: 5516: 5514: 5511: 5509: 5506: 5504: 5501: 5499: 5496: 5495: 5493: 5489: 5483: 5480: 5478: 5475: 5473: 5470: 5468: 5465: 5461: 5458: 5457: 5456: 5453: 5451: 5450:Phenomenology 5448: 5446: 5445:Phenomenalism 5443: 5441: 5438: 5436: 5435:Occasionalism 5433: 5431: 5428: 5426: 5423: 5421: 5418: 5414: 5411: 5410: 5409: 5408:Naïve realism 5406: 5404: 5401: 5399: 5398:Functionalism 5396: 5394: 5391: 5389: 5386: 5384: 5381: 5379: 5376: 5374: 5371: 5369: 5366: 5365: 5363: 5359: 5353: 5352: 5348: 5346: 5343: 5341: 5340:Stephen Yablo 5338: 5336: 5333: 5331: 5328: 5326: 5323: 5321: 5318: 5316: 5313: 5311: 5308: 5306: 5303: 5301: 5298: 5296: 5295:Richard Rorty 5293: 5291: 5290:Hilary Putnam 5288: 5286: 5283: 5281: 5278: 5276: 5273: 5271: 5268: 5266: 5265:Marvin Minsky 5263: 5261: 5258: 5256: 5253: 5251: 5248: 5246: 5243: 5241: 5240:Immanuel Kant 5238: 5236: 5233: 5231: 5230:William James 5228: 5226: 5223: 5221: 5218: 5216: 5213: 5211: 5208: 5206: 5203: 5201: 5198: 5196: 5193: 5191: 5188: 5186: 5183: 5181: 5178: 5176: 5173: 5171: 5168: 5166: 5163: 5161: 5158: 5156: 5153: 5151: 5148: 5146: 5143: 5141: 5138: 5136: 5135:Henri Bergson 5133: 5131: 5128: 5126: 5123: 5121: 5118: 5116: 5113: 5111: 5108: 5106: 5103: 5101: 5098: 5097: 5095: 5093: 5089: 5085: 5078: 5073: 5071: 5066: 5064: 5059: 5058: 5055: 5043: 5040: 5038: 5035: 5033: 5030: 5029: 5026: 5020: 5017: 5013: 5010: 5009: 5008: 5005: 5003: 5000: 4998: 4997:Scholasticism 4995: 4993: 4990: 4988: 4985: 4983: 4980: 4978: 4975: 4973: 4970: 4968: 4965: 4964: 4962: 4958: 4949: 4948: 4944: 4939: 4938: 4934: 4929: 4928: 4924: 4919: 4918: 4914: 4909: 4908: 4904: 4899: 4898: 4894: 4889: 4888: 4884: 4879: 4878: 4874: 4868: 4864: 4859: 4858: 4854: 4849: 4848: 4844: 4839: 4838: 4834: 4829: 4828: 4824: 4819: 4818: 4814: 4813: 4811: 4807: 4801: 4800: 4796: 4794: 4791: 4789: 4786: 4784: 4781: 4779: 4776: 4774: 4771: 4769: 4766: 4764: 4761: 4759: 4756: 4754: 4751: 4749: 4746: 4744: 4741: 4739: 4736: 4734: 4731: 4729: 4726: 4724: 4721: 4719: 4716: 4714: 4711: 4709: 4706: 4704: 4701: 4699: 4696: 4694: 4691: 4689: 4686: 4684: 4681: 4679: 4676: 4674: 4671: 4669: 4666: 4665: 4663: 4659: 4653: 4650: 4648: 4645: 4643: 4640: 4637: 4633: 4630: 4628: 4625: 4623: 4620: 4618: 4615: 4613: 4612:Structuralism 4610: 4608: 4605: 4603: 4600: 4598: 4595: 4593: 4590: 4588: 4585: 4583: 4580: 4578: 4575: 4573: 4570: 4568: 4565: 4563: 4560: 4558: 4555: 4553: 4550: 4548: 4545: 4543: 4540: 4538: 4537:Descriptivism 4535: 4533: 4530: 4528: 4525: 4523: 4520: 4518: 4517:Contrastivism 4515: 4513: 4510: 4508: 4505: 4504: 4502: 4500: 4496: 4490: 4487: 4485: 4482: 4480: 4477: 4475: 4472: 4470: 4467: 4465: 4462: 4460: 4457: 4455: 4452: 4450: 4447: 4445: 4442: 4440: 4437: 4435: 4432: 4430: 4427: 4425: 4422: 4420: 4417: 4415: 4412: 4410: 4407: 4405: 4402: 4400: 4397: 4395: 4392: 4390: 4387: 4385: 4382: 4380: 4377: 4375: 4372: 4370: 4367: 4365: 4362: 4360: 4357: 4355: 4352: 4350: 4347: 4345: 4342: 4340: 4337: 4335: 4332: 4330: 4327: 4325: 4322: 4320: 4317: 4315: 4312: 4310: 4307: 4305: 4302: 4300: 4297: 4295: 4292: 4290: 4287: 4285: 4282: 4280: 4277: 4275: 4272: 4270: 4267: 4265: 4262: 4260: 4257: 4255: 4252: 4251: 4249: 4247: 4243: 4239: 4234: 4230: 4223: 4218: 4216: 4211: 4209: 4204: 4203: 4200: 4188: 4180: 4178: 4170: 4169: 4166: 4156: 4155:Alfred Tarski 4153: 4151: 4148: 4147: 4145: 4141: 4135: 4132: 4130: 4127: 4125: 4124:Peter Galison 4122: 4120: 4117: 4115: 4112: 4111: 4109: 4107: 4103: 4097: 4094: 4092: 4089: 4087: 4084: 4083: 4081: 4077: 4071: 4068: 4066: 4063: 4061: 4058: 4057: 4055: 4051: 4045: 4042: 4040: 4037: 4035: 4032: 4031: 4029: 4027: 4023: 4017: 4014: 4012: 4011:Nathan Salmon 4009: 4007: 4006:Richard Rorty 4004: 4002: 3999: 3997: 3994: 3992: 3989: 3987: 3984: 3982: 3979: 3977: 3976:Alonzo Church 3974: 3973: 3971: 3967: 3961: 3958: 3956: 3953: 3951: 3948: 3947: 3945: 3943: 3939: 3933: 3930: 3928: 3925: 3923: 3920: 3918: 3915: 3913: 3912:Ruth Millikan 3910: 3908: 3907:John McDowell 3905: 3903: 3900: 3898: 3895: 3893: 3890: 3888: 3885: 3884: 3882: 3880: 3876: 3870: 3867: 3865: 3862: 3861: 3859: 3855: 3849: 3846: 3844: 3841: 3839: 3838:Hilary Putnam 3836: 3834: 3833:Robert Nozick 3831: 3829: 3826: 3824: 3821: 3819: 3816: 3814: 3811: 3809: 3806: 3804: 3801: 3800: 3798: 3794: 3784: 3781: 3779: 3776: 3774: 3771: 3769: 3766: 3764: 3763:Rudolf Carnap 3761: 3760: 3758: 3756: 3755:Vienna Circle 3752: 3746: 3743: 3741: 3738: 3737: 3735: 3733: 3732:Berlin Circle 3729: 3723: 3720: 3718: 3715: 3714: 3712: 3710: 3706: 3700: 3697: 3695: 3692: 3690: 3687: 3685: 3682: 3680: 3677: 3675: 3672: 3670: 3667: 3665: 3662: 3660: 3657: 3655: 3652: 3650: 3647: 3645: 3642: 3640: 3639:Philippa Foot 3637: 3635: 3632: 3630: 3627: 3625: 3622: 3620: 3617: 3616: 3614: 3612: 3608: 3602: 3599: 3597: 3594: 3592: 3589: 3587: 3586:Graham Priest 3584: 3582: 3579: 3577: 3574: 3572: 3569: 3567: 3566:Charlie Broad 3564: 3562: 3559: 3558: 3556: 3552: 3546: 3543: 3541: 3538: 3536: 3533: 3531: 3528: 3526: 3523: 3522: 3520: 3518: 3514: 3508: 3505: 3503: 3500: 3498: 3495: 3493: 3490: 3488: 3485: 3483: 3480: 3478: 3477:Gottlob Frege 3475: 3473: 3470: 3468: 3465: 3464: 3462: 3458: 3448: 3445: 3443: 3440: 3438: 3435: 3433: 3430: 3428: 3425: 3423: 3420: 3419: 3417: 3415: 3411: 3405: 3404:Supervenience 3402: 3400: 3397: 3395: 3392: 3390: 3387: 3385: 3382: 3379: 3375: 3372: 3371: 3369: 3365: 3359: 3356: 3354: 3351: 3349: 3346: 3344: 3341: 3339: 3336: 3334: 3331: 3329: 3326: 3324: 3321: 3319: 3316: 3314: 3311: 3309: 3306: 3304: 3303:Functionalism 3301: 3299: 3296: 3294: 3291: 3289: 3288:Descriptivism 3286: 3284: 3281: 3279: 3276: 3275: 3273: 3269: 3259: 3256: 3254: 3253:Philosophical 3251: 3249: 3246: 3244: 3243:Non-classical 3241: 3239: 3236: 3234: 3231: 3229: 3226: 3225: 3223: 3219: 3213: 3210: 3208: 3205: 3203: 3200: 3199: 3197: 3193: 3187: 3184: 3182: 3179: 3177: 3174: 3172: 3169: 3167: 3164: 3163: 3161: 3157: 3154: 3150: 3146: 3139: 3134: 3132: 3127: 3125: 3120: 3119: 3116: 3110: 3107: 3105: 3102: 3099: 3096: 3094: 3091: 3088: 3084: 3080: 3077: 3073: 3070: 3066: 3063: 3059: 3056: 3053: 3049: 3045: 3041: 3038: 3035:Interview in 3034: 3032: 3029: 3027: 3024: 3022: 3018: 3015: 3014: 3010: 3005: 3001: 2997: 2993: 2989: 2985: 2981: 2977: 2976: 2971: 2967: 2964: 2962: 2960: 2955: 2953: 2951: 2946: 2943: 2940: 2938: 2935: 2933: 2932:0-231-14044-4 2929: 2925: 2922:, J. Searle, 2921: 2917: 2913: 2910: 2907: 2904: 2902: 2898: 2894: 2890: 2887: 2884: 2883:Consciousness 2881: 2878: 2874: 2871: 2868: 2864: 2861: 2858: 2855: 2851: 2848: 2846: 2843: 2841:(2), 179–190. 2840: 2836: 2832: 2829: 2828: 2824: 2819: 2816: 2813: 2810: 2807: 2804: 2801: 2798: 2795: 2792: 2789: 2786: 2785: 2781: 2775: 2774:0-14-051250-0 2771: 2767: 2761: 2758: 2754: 2750: 2746: 2740: 2737: 2733: 2728: 2725: 2712: 2708: 2702: 2699: 2694: 2690: 2686: 2682: 2678: 2674: 2670: 2663: 2660: 2655: 2651: 2647: 2643: 2639: 2635: 2628: 2625: 2620: 2616: 2612: 2608: 2604: 2600: 2596: 2589: 2586: 2575: 2569: 2565: 2561: 2557: 2553: 2546: 2543: 2538: 2534: 2528: 2525: 2520: 2516: 2510: 2507: 2501: 2498: 2494: 2490: 2485: 2482: 2476: 2473: 2460: 2456: 2452: 2451:Distillations 2448: 2441: 2438: 2433: 2429: 2423: 2420: 2416: 2412: 2408: 2405: 2400: 2397: 2393: 2387: 2384: 2380: 2374: 2371: 2367: 2361: 2358: 2354: 2350: 2349: 2343: 2340: 2336: 2333:Searle, J R: 2330: 2327: 2322: 2318: 2311: 2308: 2304: 2298: 2295: 2291: 2288:John Searle, 2285: 2282: 2278: 2272: 2269: 2264: 2257: 2254: 2251:(1995), p.132 2250: 2244: 2241: 2236: 2230: 2226: 2219: 2216: 2211: 2205: 2201: 2196: 2195: 2186: 2183: 2178: 2172: 2168: 2161: 2158: 2153: 2147: 2143: 2136: 2133: 2129: 2123: 2120: 2116: 2112: 2106: 2103: 2099: 2093: 2090: 2084: 2081: 2077: 2071: 2068: 2064: 2058: 2055: 2051: 2045: 2042: 2037: 2031: 2027: 2026: 2018: 2015: 2010: 2008:9780521096263 2004: 2000: 1993: 1990: 1985: 1984: 1979: 1972: 1969: 1956: 1952: 1945: 1943: 1939: 1926: 1922: 1916: 1913: 1901: 1897: 1890: 1887: 1875: 1871: 1864: 1861: 1849: 1845: 1838: 1835: 1819: 1812: 1806: 1803: 1798: 1794: 1790: 1783: 1780: 1767: 1763: 1757: 1754: 1750: 1744: 1741: 1729: 1723: 1720: 1717: 1712: 1709: 1704: 1700: 1694: 1691: 1688: 1683: 1681: 1677: 1665: 1661: 1655: 1652: 1640: 1636: 1630: 1627: 1615: 1611: 1605: 1603: 1599: 1586: 1582: 1576: 1574: 1570: 1557: 1553: 1549: 1542: 1540: 1538: 1534: 1529: 1523: 1519: 1518: 1510: 1508: 1506: 1502: 1489: 1482: 1476: 1473: 1468: 1464: 1458: 1455: 1451: 1445: 1442: 1436: 1431: 1428: 1426: 1423: 1421: 1418: 1416: 1413: 1411: 1408: 1406: 1403: 1401: 1398: 1396: 1395:Consciousness 1393: 1391: 1388: 1386: 1383: 1382: 1377: 1366: 1363: 1352: 1347: 1342: 1339: 1336: 1335: 1330: 1326: 1322: 1318: 1314: 1311: 1308: 1305: 1304: 1300: 1297: 1294: 1291: 1288: 1285: 1282: 1279: 1276: 1273: 1270: 1267: 1264: 1261: 1258: 1255: 1252: 1249: 1246: 1243: 1240: 1237: 1234: 1231: 1228: 1225: 1222: 1220: 1216: 1212: 1208: 1207: 1203: 1202: 1198: 1196: 1194: 1193: 1188: 1184: 1180: 1174: 1166: 1164: 1160: 1158: 1151: 1146: 1143: 1139: 1135: 1131: 1125: 1123: 1118: 1116: 1108: 1106: 1104: 1100: 1096: 1090: 1082: 1080: 1078: 1074: 1070: 1065: 1063: 1059: 1058: 1053: 1049: 1044: 1037: 1035: 1032: 1028: 1022: 1020: 1016: 1015:functionalism 1012: 1011:Stevan Harnad 1008: 1006: 1005: 1000: 996: 991: 987: 982: 980: 973: 969: 961: 959: 957: 953: 948: 946: 942: 937: 936:ontologically 932: 930: 926: 922: 918: 913: 911: 910:ontologically 907: 906:epistemically 903: 899: 891: 889: 887: 886: 880: 878: 870: 869:manual stance 866: 862: 861:functionalism 858: 854: 853: 852: 850: 846: 839:Consciousness 838: 836: 834: 829: 827: 823: 818: 816: 815: 810: 806: 802: 801: 794: 790: 788: 784: 779: 773: 771: 767: 762: 759: 755: 750: 748: 744: 740: 736: 728: 726: 723: 721: 716: 714: 710: 706: 702: 697: 691: 688: 685: 682: 681: 680: 678: 674: 670: 666: 661: 659: 655: 651: 650:P.F. Strawson 647: 643: 639: 635: 631: 630: 625: 621: 617: 609: 604: 602: 600: 596: 592: 587: 585: 581: 573: 571: 568: 563: 560: 555: 552: 551: 546: 538: 536: 533: 529: 525: 522: 519: 515: 510: 508: 503: 501: 496: 492: 487: 485: 484:People's Park 481: 477: 473: 469: 465: 457: 455: 453: 448: 446: 442: 438: 433: 431: 427: 423: 414: 407: 405: 403: 399: 395: 391: 387: 383: 379: 375: 371: 366: 364: 360: 356: 352: 348: 343: 341: 337: 333: 329: 325: 319: 300: 295: 286: 281: 276: 272: 269: 265: 261: 257: 254: 251:Notable ideas 242: 238: 234: 231: 229: 226: 224: 221: 220: 218: 212: 209: 206: 202: 199: 196: 192: 189: 185: 181: 178: 174: 170: 169: 165: 163: 159: 156: 152: 149: 147: 143: 140: 137: 133: 130: 127: 123: 119: 116:Dagmar Searle 115: 111: 108: 104: 101: 97: 92: 88: 82:(age 92) 80:July 31, 1932 68: 64: 59: 53: 48: 41: 38: 34: 30: 26: 22: 6974: 6964: 6954: 6944: 6934: 6924: 6914: 6904: 6894: 6884: 6874: 6864: 6854: 6844: 6834: 6824: 6244:Guicciardini 6227:Early modern 6063:Philosophers 6037:Conservatism 6032:Confucianism 6020:Distributism 5953:Social norms 5941:Sittlichkeit 5927:Ressentiment 5873:Institutions 5851:Human nature 5686: / 5682: / 5678: / 5595:Mental image 5590:Mental event 5553:Intelligence 5503:Chinese room 5349: 5304: 5300:Gilbert Ryle 5280:Derek Parfit 5270:Thomas Nagel 5200:Fred Dretske 5120:J. L. Austin 5092:Philosophers 4945: 4935: 4925: 4915: 4905: 4895: 4885: 4875: 4855: 4845: 4835: 4825: 4815: 4797: 4738:Metalanguage 4733:Logical form 4688:Truth-bearer 4647:Unilalianism 4557:Expressivism 4483: 4384:Wittgenstein 4329:von Humboldt 4246:Philosophers 4044:Cora Diamond 3960:Morton White 3828:Thomas Nagel 3773:Otto Neurath 3722:Ernest Nagel 3673: 3669:Gilbert Ryle 3664:Derek Parfit 3624:J. L. Austin 3571:Casimir Lewy 3540:Peter Singer 3535:J. L. Mackie 3507:Barry Stroud 3467:Noam Chomsky 3460:Philosophers 3394:Natural kind 3278:Anti-realism 3238:Mathematical 3212:Performative 3171:Epistemology 2988:intelligence 2979: 2973: 2958: 2949: 2923: 2914:M. Bennett, 2908: 2892: 2876: 2866: 2853: 2838: 2834: 2817: 2811: 2805: 2799: 2793: 2787: 2765: 2760: 2752: 2748: 2739: 2731: 2727: 2715:. Retrieved 2710: 2701: 2676: 2672: 2662: 2637: 2633: 2627: 2602: 2598: 2588: 2577:, retrieved 2555: 2545: 2536: 2527: 2518: 2509: 2500: 2492: 2484: 2475: 2463:. Retrieved 2459:the original 2454: 2450: 2440: 2431: 2422: 2414: 2399: 2391: 2386: 2381:(1997) p.112 2378: 2373: 2368:(1997) p.122 2365: 2360: 2346: 2342: 2334: 2329: 2320: 2310: 2303:Limited Inc. 2302: 2297: 2289: 2284: 2276: 2271: 2263:On Certainty 2262: 2256: 2248: 2243: 2224: 2218: 2193: 2185: 2166: 2160: 2141: 2135: 2127: 2122: 2117:(1992) ch. 8 2114: 2110: 2105: 2097: 2092: 2083: 2075: 2070: 2062: 2057: 2044: 2024: 2017: 1998: 1992: 1981: 1971: 1958:. Retrieved 1955:BuzzFeedNews 1954: 1931:February 24, 1929:. Retrieved 1924: 1915: 1903:. Retrieved 1900:BuzzFeedNews 1899: 1889: 1877:. Retrieved 1873: 1863: 1851:. Retrieved 1847: 1837: 1825:. Retrieved 1818:the original 1811:"Terror.doc" 1805: 1796: 1792: 1782: 1770:. Retrieved 1765: 1756: 1748: 1743: 1731:. Retrieved 1722: 1711: 1702: 1693: 1667:. Retrieved 1663: 1654: 1642:. Retrieved 1638: 1629: 1617:. Retrieved 1613: 1589:. Retrieved 1585:the original 1560:. Retrieved 1551: 1516: 1492:. Retrieved 1487: 1475: 1466: 1457: 1449: 1444: 1340: 1332: 1328: 1325:Nick Bostrom 1320: 1309: 1301: 1295: 1289: 1283: 1277: 1271: 1265: 1259: 1253: 1247: 1241: 1235: 1229: 1223: 1204: 1199:Bibliography 1190: 1183:J. L. 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