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262:, with a range of about 30 kilometres (19 mi). Unlike the early-warning Freya, Würzburgs were accurate (and complex) tracking radars. One was locked onto the night fighter as soon as it entered the cell and as soon as the Freya picked up a target the second Würzburg locked onto it. All position reports were sent to the Himmelbett control centre thereby allowing controllers in the Himmelbett centre to get continual readings of the positions of both planes.
351:". When they dropped strips of foil from "lead" bombers, the German radar operators saw what appeared to be a stream entering their box, each packet of chaff appearing to be a bomber on their displays. Night fighters were then sent to attack this stream, only to find empty space. Just as the fighters reached the false stream, the "real" stream appeared hundreds of miles away, too far to be attacked. The first time this was used was during
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same time a massive building program started to add hundreds of Würzburgs to the system, although the infrastructure needed was extensive. The boxes were initially the radius of the Würzburg radars, about 22 miles (35 km), but more powerful radar later on made the boxes up to 100 miles (160 km) across. Eventually, the line of boxes was several deep, especially around larger towns and the
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302:, Bomber Command reorganized their attacks into streams of bombers – the so-called bomber stream, carefully positioned so the stream flew down the middle of a single cell. Data provided to the British scientists allowed them to calculate that the bomber stream would overwhelm the six potential interceptions per hour that the German night fighters could manage in a
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359:) and proved spectacularly effective. The German radar operators eventually learned to spot the lead bombers at the edge of the windowing, making it less effective. The British had held back from introducing Window for over a year lest the technique be adopted by the Germans and used against British cities.
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Although the success rate of the line dropped, the network of radars and plotting stations continued to prove their worth. Now when a raid started, night fighters from any base within range were directed into the stream, where it was hoped they would be able to find aircraft with their radar. At the
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bombers flying into
Germany or France had to cross the line at some point, at which time the Freya radar operators directed the master searchlight to illuminate the plane. Once this had happened other manually controlled searchlights also picked up the plane, and the night fighters were directed to
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The first version of the Line consisted of a series of radar stations with overlapping coverage, layered three deep from
Denmark to the middle of France, each covering a zone about 32 kilometres (20 mi) long (north-south) and 20 kilometres (12 mi) wide (east-west). Each control centre was
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defenses. In response, the
Germans converted their ground radar into a radar network which would follow the path of the British bombers, while a controller directed the night fighters into the stream. Measure and counter-measure continued until October 1944, when German defenses were no longer able
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exerted no discipline on how pilots were to get their aircraft to the target. There was an air of amateurism and individuality to the pilots of Bomber
Command. Each pilot was on his own as to his flight path to the target, altitude to be flown and time of arrival. Thus bombing attacks would go on
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system was added to the aircraft, allowing them to detect aircraft once the operators had directed them into the area, making searchlights largely redundant. The battle stations were known as "Kammhuber's opera houses" and procedures developed in 1942 were used until the end of the war.
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radio navigation in 1942 allowed the RAF bombers to fly by a common route and at the same speed to and from the target, each aircraft being allotted a height band and a time slot in a bomber stream to minimize the risk of collision. The first use of the bomber stream was the
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zone. It was then a matter of calculating the statistical loss from collisions against the statistical loss from night fighters to calculate how close the bombers should fly to minimise RAF losses. The introduction of
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A Jägerleitoffizier directed the German night-fighter to a visual interception with the RAF bomber using radio. Operations were manually coordinated using an "Auswertetisch" (the precursor of a "
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sporadically for four or five hours, and there was no concentration in the bombing. The boxes of the
Kammhuber Line were well set up to deal with the broad approach paths of individual bombers.
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with a range of about 100 kilometres (62 mi), a "master searchlight" directed by the radar, and a number of manually directed
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against
Cologne on the night of 30/31 May 1942. This tactic was extremely effective, leading to fighting between Kammhuber and
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The
British were ready for this development, and as soon as the rates started to improve – for the Germans – they introduced "
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spread through the cell. Each cell was also assigned one primary and one backup night fighter. The fighter used was usually a
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tactics. However, the RAF analyzed the German system and developed a counter-measure. On the night of 30/31 May 1942 in its
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British intelligence soon discovered the nature of the
Kammhuber Line and started studying ways to defeat it. At the time
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One other element was long-range nightfighters operating against the German nightfighters, using a system called "
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Aerial operations and battles of World War II involving
Germany
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A more sophisticated method for blinding the German radar was "
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system established in western Europe in July 1940 by Colonel
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supporting Bomber Command with electronic countermeasures.
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agent and passed-on to the British in 1942. The 'belt' and
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guided to the attacking bombers by the illumination of
46:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
409:List of World War II electronic warfare equipment
251:intercept the illuminated bomber. Demands by the
176:The Line proved very effective against initial
503:. New York, NY: William Morrow & Company.
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478:Nachtjagd, Defenders of the Reich 1940–1943
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258:Later versions of the Himmelbett added two
184:, Bomber Command introduced the use of the
587:World War II strategic bombing of Germany
106:Learn how and when to remove this message
577:Research and development in Nazi Germany
567:History of telecommunications in Germany
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355:(a week-long bombing campaign against
279:Lichtenstein airborne intercept radar
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44:adding citations to reliable sources
562:German World War II defensive lines
456:RAF Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
208:(canopy bed) zone, consisting of a
582:Telecommunications in World War II
331:within the bomber stream dropping
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182:1,000 plane raid against Cologne
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31:needs additional citations for
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230:ground-controlled interception
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480:. Barnsley, South Yorkshire:
499:Middlebrook, Martin (1974).
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142:was the name given by the
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314:first 1,000 bomber raid
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383:de Havilland Mosquito
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122:A map of part of the
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273:device known as the
228:. This technique of
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40:improve this article
482:Pen and Sword Books
399:Battle of the Beams
379:Bristol Beaufighter
462:on 5 November 2011
353:Operation Gomorrah
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292:RAF Bomber Command
178:RAF Bomber Command
165:and an associated
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134:'boxes' are shown
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491:978-1-4738-4986-0
387:No. 100 Group RAF
298:At the urging of
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532:. Coronet.
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342:Ruhr valley
300:R. V. Jones
210:Freya radar
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199:Description
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404:Flak tower
304:Himmelbett
240:, termed;
206:Himmelbett
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572:Luftwaffe
415:Footnotes
329:Lancaster
191:Luftwaffe
528:(1981).
393:See also
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364:Mandrel
357:Hamburg
267:Seeburg
234:Bf 109s
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