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signalman, and it is clear that this had become a routine method of working, relying on assumptions about the running of other trains. Normally the express passenger train would have passed
Kirtlebridge well before the goods train required to shunt. On this occasion the delay to it earlier in its journey meant that the unsafe working led to tragedy.
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The coaching stock of the period consisted of a strong underframe surmounted by a relatively light body framework. In the event of collision, it frequently happened that the underframe of one vehicle overrode the underframe of the preceding vehicle and slid along it, destroying the body of the latter
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Tyler's contemporary report gives the consist as "a break-van, a composite, a third-class, a composite, a third-class, and a composite carriages, two empty carriage-trucks, an empty horse-box, a family saloon carriage, a composite, a third-class, and a composite carriages, a break-van, a composite, a
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It is evident that there was no safe system of work in force. The signalman operated his main line signals independently of the operation of the siding and crossover points. The station master, named Corrie, was nominally responsible for the shunting arrangements, but he seems to have limited this to
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The goods train had left
Carlisle at 06:55 and made calls at Floriston, Gretna and Kirkpatrick stations, arriving at Kirtlebridge at 07:55. At Gretna the driver had been informed that the following passenger train had not left Carlisle at 07:27. On arrival at Kirtlebridge, the train crossed to the up
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At this time the
Railway Inspectorate section of the Board of Trade were pursuing a policy of urging the railway companies to fit interlocking and the block system on their lines; Tyler repeated this insistence in his report. Proper interlocking would have prevented the clearing of the main signals
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During these shunting operations, the goods-engine driver took his instructions from the goods guard, but the latter was acting principally on his own responsibility. The only communication, according to the guard, that passed between him and any person at the station was shortly after his arrival,
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It made its journey in the ordinary way and passed
Kirtlebridge distant signal at "clear" but on rounding the right-hand curve past an overbridge, the fireman of the leading engine saw the wagons of the goods train partly obstructing the line ahead. He thought he said to the driver, "Pull up!" but
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in
Dumfriesshire. An express passenger train ran into a goods train that was shunting; 11 people lost their lives immediately, and one further person succumbed later. The cause was a failure to communicate between the station master in charge of the shunting operation, and the signalman. There was
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In 1872 modern notions of a safe system of work did not exist, and the management of the
Caledonian Railway evidently thought it adequate to rely on the common sense of the local staff. The station master set about ordering shunting movements fouling the main lines without any liaison with the
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The accommodation was very cramped and full, and the engine now drew 17 wagons from the siding to make space, and then propelled them forward on the up line and partly through the crossover towards the down line so that the rear of the movement would clear the up line siding points. It was the
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South of the station there were sidings on both sides of the main line, and a crossover, but these points were not controlled by the signalbox, being operated by ground levers, and not interlocked, nor protected by the home signal. The block system was not in operation, and communication with
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At 07:55 on 2 October 1872 a down goods train arrived at the station and started shunting operations; there were several wagons to be dropped off and collected from sidings both sides of the main line. The work was under the control of the
Station Master, and he authorised the operation of a
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The signalman on duty in the cabin at the north of the station saw the goods train arrive at 7.55, and immediately set his home and distant-signals to danger to protect it. He noticed that this train was shunted from the down to the up line, but it was done without any communication with
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line and detached a brake van and three wagons, and left them on the running line. The engine and part train returned to the down line and entered the down sidings, dropping two wagons there. It then returned to the up line and recoupled the detached wagons, and entered the up siding.
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The signal box was located to the north of the passenger platforms, and controlled the junction with the Solway line. The down main line home signal was at the converging junction there, and there was a down main line distant signal 700 yards (640 m) on the approach side.
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The leading engine came to rest across the up line, and was turned so as to face south. Its tender mounted the platform, and the second engine came to rest in its proper alignment. The rails were "torn away" by the first engine and the coaching vehicles were considerably
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There were several sidings in the Solway part of the station, controlled from the signal box, but the sidings in the main line were located south of the station and were not operated from the signal box; moreover they were on the approach side of the home signal.
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The passenger train was the 06:00 from
Carlisle, the continuation of the 21:00 from London Euston. Due to an unrelated accident south of Carlisle, it was running late and left Carlisle at 07:50. It consisted of two tender engines and 18 trailing vehicles.
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main line to
Glasgow and Edinburgh. North of the passenger platforms there was a trailing (in the northbound direction) junction from the Solway Junction Railway, and a signalbox controlled the junction; the points there were interlocked with the signals.
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316:(i.e. manslaughter), although he was reported to have been released on bail by 7 October. The inspector of permanent way, Gilmour, was then sought by the police on a charge of murder allegedly committed at Shotts the day before the accident.
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The crossover was between 338 and 273 yards (309 and 250 m) south of the signal box, and the home signal 100 yards (90 m) south of it, so that an approaching train running up to the home signal would pass the location of the
160:
A magazine graphic of the scene after the collision; the view is looking south and the relevant sidings are not shown properly; the signal box is behind the artist and the Solway
Junction line and platforms are off the frame to the
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at 07:50. It consisted of 18 vehicles pulled by two locomotives. Running at about 40 mph (65 km/h) under clear signals, the passenger train ran into wagons of the goods train that were fouling the down line.
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Although the electric telegraph system of signalling had been installed on the Solway line, there was no block system on the main line and the signalman had no means of communicating with other main line signalboxes.
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when the crossover was open; a block system would have given the signalman the means of ascertaining the approach of trains, and the means of refusing the approach if his station was blocked by shunting operations.
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The site of the collision was clearly a scene of death and injury. "A large staff of medical men were telegraphed for" and a doctor and a nurse on the train did much to alleviate immediate suffering.
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intention to move the last (southernmost) wagon by hand into the up siding. At this moment the down express passenger train approached and struck the middle wagons of the seventeen being propelled.
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directing what wagons were to be taken on rather than working with the signalman. He was apparently oblivious of the need to consider the approaching express train. Tyler commented:
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The line may be considered to run south to north at Kirtlebridge, the down direction being northwards. Down sidings were on the west of the line and up sidings on the east.
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Of the fatalities, several persons died instantly, but many of the injured died "within an hour of the accident, or on their being taken out of the débris".
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The Times newspaper also demanded the introduction of improved couplings and buffing gear between the coaches so as to reduce the risk of telescoping.
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reported that the engine driver and ten passengers were killed, and fifteen injured. One further person died of injuries after Tyler made his report.
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the train was running at 40 mph (65 km/h) and the train was only a short distance from the obstruction; the collision followed inevitably.
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The Times newspaper, 3 October 1872, London; the booking office clock was stopped at this time, apparently by the concussion of the collision.
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when the station-master asked him what he was shunting for, and he replied, "The 6.00 a.m. passenger train from Carlisle".
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and causing serious injury to any occupants. The process is referred to as "telescoping".
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not full interlocking of the points, and the block system of signalling was not in use.
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third-class, and a composite carriages, and a break-van." (Tyler's spelling retained.)
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An express passenger train had left London at 21:00 the previous evening, and it left
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Kirtlebridge station was nearly 17 miles (27 km) north of Carlisle, on the
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indicates railway accidents and incidents resulting in at least 20 fatalities
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crossover that gave the goods train access to cross the main line.
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The signalman did not have a clear view of the siding connections.
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The location was very close to the point where the present-day
391:, 1982 (4th edition), David & Charles, Newton Abbot,
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The Illustrated London News (periodical), 12 October 1827
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The station master Corrie was arrested and charged with
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to the Secretary of the Board of Trade, 4 October 1872
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Railway accidents and incidents in the United Kingdom
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Accidents and incidents involving Caledonian Railway
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1112:1872 disasters in the United Kingdom
420:The Times newspaper, 7 October 1872.
387:L T C Rolt and Geoffrey Kichenside,
408:The Times newspaper, 3 October 1872
200:The collision took place at 08:13.
1092:Transport in Dumfries and Galloway
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487:List of UK rail accidents by year
307:Glasgow and South Western Railway
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174:adjacent locations was limited.
184:Kirtlebridge collision location
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1077:Train collisions in Scotland
138:Kirtlebridge railway station
305:Train working was over the
273:Kirtlebridge collision plan
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1082:Railway accidents in 1872
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822:Kildwick & Crosshills
1097:History of Dumfriesshire
498:Official accident report
134:Kirtlebridge rail crash
21:Kirtlebridge rail crash
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136:took place in 1872 at
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1107:October 1872 events
878:Wennington Junction
813:Shipton-on-Cherwell
217:The passenger train
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872:Burscough Junction
444:Unitary Authority.
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265:The system of work
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167:Caledonian Railway
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148:crosses the line.
97:Caledonian Railway
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314:culpable homicide
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70:55.050°N 3.212°W
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1012:Potters Bar
994:Welshampton
964:Llantrisant
922:(Jun 1889)
907:(Sep 1887)
892:(Jul 1884)
854:(Dec 1879)
815:(Dec 1874)
806:(Sep 1874)
733:Maesycwmmer
726:(Aug 1868)
700:Staplehurst
675:(Aug 1861)
542:Before 1850
536:, 1815–1899
354:H. W. Tyler
239:Henry Tyler
152:Description
146:A74(M) road
73: /
49:Coordinates
1071:Categories
1038:(May 1899)
1032:(Oct 1898)
1026:(Sep 1898)
1020:(Mar 1898)
1014:(Mar 1898)
1008:(Nov 1897)
1002:(Oct 1897)
996:(Jun 1897)
990:(Feb 1897)
984:(Apr 1896)
978:(Nov 1895)
972:(Dec 1894)
966:(Aug 1893)
960:(Nov 1892)
954:(Jun 1892)
948:(May 1891)
942:(Nov 1890)
916:(Mar 1889)
901:(Jan 1885)
886:(Nov 1882)
884:Inverythan
880:(Aug 1880)
874:(Jan 1880)
852:Tay Bridge
848:(Mar 1877)
842:(Nov 1876)
836:(Aug 1876)
830:(Jan 1876)
824:(Aug 1875)
800:(Jan 1874)
794:(Dec 1873)
788:(Aug 1873)
782:(Oct 1872)
776:(Dec 1870)
770:(Dec 1870)
764:(Sep 1870)
758:(Jun 1870)
741:(Dec 1869)
735:(Jun 1869)
720:(Jun 1867)
718:Warrington
714:(Feb 1867)
708:(Jun 1866)
702:(Jun 1865)
696:(Jun 1865)
690:(Oct 1862)
688:Winchburgh
684:(Sep 1861)
669:(Jun 1861)
663:(Nov 1860)
661:Atherstone
657:(Sep 1860)
640:(Aug 1858)
634:(Jun 1857)
628:(Sep 1855)
622:(Oct 1853)
616:(Jun 1852)
610:(Apr 1851)
593:(May 1847)
591:Dee Bridge
587:(Oct 1845)
581:(Dec 1841)
575:(Aug 1840)
569:(Aug 1838)
563:(Dec 1836)
557:(Sep 1830)
551:(Jul 1815)
454:crossover.
327:References
232:telescoped
110:Statistics
58:55°03′00″N
1058:1900–1999
1006:Menheniot
1000:Penistone
988:Menheniot
914:Penistone
905:Hexthorpe
899:Penistone
890:Penistone
792:Menheniot
768:Stairfoot
655:Helmshore
638:Round Oak
585:Penistone
61:3°12′43″W
1018:St Johns
976:St Neots
970:Chelford
834:Radstock
774:Hatfield
762:Tamworth
724:Abergele
632:Lewisham
620:Straffan
561:Wetheral
555:Parkside
482:See also
352:Captain
89:Scotland
39:Location
982:Snowdon
846:Morpeth
712:Yanwath
667:Wootton
614:Burnley
86:Country
26:Details
958:Thirsk
920:Armagh
840:Heeley
804:Thorpe
756:Newark
694:Rednal
573:Howden
567:Harrow
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358:Report
161:right.
123:Deaths
115:Trains
933:1890s
865:1880s
786:Wigan
749:1870s
648:1860s
601:1850s
428:Notes
102:Cause
393:ISBN
289:him.
132:The
94:Line
31:Date
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356:,
335:^
126:12
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526:e
519:t
512:v
118:2
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