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attack. Intelligence can be harvested in several ways. Collaborators and sympathizers usually provide a steady flow of useful information. If working clandestinely, guerrilla operatives may disguise their membership in the insurgent operation and use deception to ferret out needed data. Employment or enrollment as a student may be undertaken near the target zone, community organizations may be infiltrated, and even romantic relationships struck up in intelligence gathering. Public sources of information are also invaluable to the guerrilla, from the flight schedules of targeted airlines, to public announcements of visiting foreign dignitaries, to US Army Field
Manuals. Modern computer access via the World Wide Web makes harvesting and collation of such data relatively easy. The use of on the spot reconnaissance is integral to operational planning. Operatives will "case" or analyze a location or potential target in depth- cataloging routes of entry and exit, building structures, the location of phones and communication lines, the presence of security personnel, and a myriad of other factors. Finally, intelligence is concerned with political factors such as the occurrence of an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy morale.
1151:
lifeline of the guerrilla movement. In the early stages of the
Vietnam War, American officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-controlled 'fortified hamlets' were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerrillas, who 'often used them for supply and rest havens.'" Popular mass support in a confined local area or country, however, is not always strictly necessary. Guerrilla and revolutionary groups can still operate by using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security, and diplomatic cover. The Al Qaeda organization is an example of the latter type, drawing sympathizers and support primarily from the wide-ranging Muslim world, even after American attacks eliminated the umbrella of a friendly Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
1121:
guerrilla force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers and still allow escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of such attacks is only military but also political in aiming to demoralize target populations or governments or by goading an overreaction that forces the population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Examples range from chopping off limbs in various internal
African rebellions to the suicide bombings of Palestine and Sri Lanka to sophisticated maneuvers by Viet Cong and NVA forces against military bases and formations.
1182:
destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys; wherever possible, the guerrilla must live off the land or draw support from the civil population in which it is embedded. In that sense, "the people" become the guerrilla's supply base. The financing of terrorist or guerrilla activities ranges from direct individual contributions (voluntary or non-voluntary) to the actual operation of business enterprises by insurgent operatives to bank robberies and kidnappings to the complex financial networks that are based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation used by modern jihadist/
1272:. Guerrillas, however, have successfully operated in urban settings, such as in Argentina and Cyprus. In both cases, guerrillas rely on a friendly population to provide supplies and intelligence. Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas, rather than melting into the mountains and jungles, blend into the population and also depend on a support base among the people. Rooting guerrillas out of both types of areas can be difficult.
591:
1326:
most communist units, including mobile NVA regulars using guerrilla tactics, spent only a few days per month fighting. While they might be forced into an unwanted battle by an enemy sweep, most of the time was spent in training, intelligence gathering, political and civic infiltration, propaganda indoctrination, construction of fortifications, or foraging for supplies and food. The large numbers of such groups striking at different times, however, gave the war its "around-the-clock" quality.
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terrorist or revolutionary operatives. Withdrawal is usually accomplished using a variety of different routes and methods and may include quickly the scouring of the area for loose weapons, the cleaning-up of evidence, and the disguising as peaceful civilians. In the case of suicide operations, withdrawal considerations by successful attackers are moot, but such activity as eliminating traces of evidence and hiding materials and supplies must still be done.
1322:
runs" are usually conducted to work out problems and details. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area, a pattern typical of VC/NVA and other "people's war" operations. Individual suicide bomb attacks offer another pattern, typically involving only the individual bomber and his support team, but they too are spread or metered out based on prevailing capabilities and political winds.
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equipment, services and combat support. When LIC threatens friends and allies, the aim of security assistance is to ensure that their military institutions can provide security for their citizens and government. ... The United States will also employ combat operations in exceptional circumstances when it cannot protect its national interests by other means. When a US response is called for, it must be in accordance with the principles of
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local opponents to make concessions or garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials, and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law, particularly if the sponsoring regime is successful in concealing its support and in claiming plausible deniability for attacks that are by operatives based in its territory.
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is a common feature of modern guerrilla conflicts, with civilians attempting to mollify both sides. At times, a civil population may be the main targets of guerrilla attacks, as in
Palestinian operations against Israeli civilians. Such tactics may backfire and cause the civil population to withdraw its support or to back countervailing forces against the guerrillas.
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but that may or may not result in sufficient support from affected civilians. Other factors, including ethnic and religious hatreds, can make a simple national liberation claim untenable. Whatever the exact mix of persuasion or coercion used by guerrillas, relationships with civil populations are one of the most important factors in their success or failure.
1387:. There must be a clear political counter-vision, which can overshadow, match, or neutralize the guerrilla vision. That can range from granting political autonomy to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be integrated approach, involving political, social, and economic and media influence measures.
1284:
The VC and NVA made extensive use of such international sanctuaries during their conflict, and the complex of trails, way-stations and bases snaking through Laos and
Cambodia (the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail) was the logistical lifeline that sustained their forces in South Vietnam. Another case in point
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Terror is used to focus international attention on the guerrilla cause, liquidate opposition leaders, extort cash from targets, intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers and potential defectors in line. The widespread use of terror by guerrillas and their opponents
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An apathetic or hostile population makes life difficult for guerrillas, and strenuous attempts are usually made to gain their support. They may involve not only persuasion but also a calculated policy of intimidation. Guerrilla forces may characterize a variety of operations as a liberation struggle,
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An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, which divides the conflict area into sectors and assigns priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the
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may wish to bear. Against a local regime, guerrillas may make governance impossible by terror strikes and sabotage or even a combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle. Those tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy and raising the morale of the guerrillas. In many
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Since they can choose when and where to strike, guerrillas usually have the tactical initiative and the element of surprise. The planning for an operation may take weeks, months, or even years with a constant series of cancelations and restarts, as the situation changes. Careful rehearsals and "dry
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Such aid should be limited to material and technical support and small cadres of specialists. Unless that is done, the foreign helper may find itself "taking over" the local war and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities. Such a
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in
Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups. Strict control must be kept over specialist units to prevent the emergence of violent vigilante-style reprisal squads that undermine the government's program. Mass forces include village self-defence groups and citizen militias organized for local defence
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The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, which may indeed be what the guerrilla seeks to create a crisis in the civilian morale. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a state of emergency. Civil
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Foreign support in the form of soldiers, weapons, sanctuary, or statements of sympathy for guerrillas is not strictly necessary, but it can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory. Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international attention, putting pressure on
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Guerrillas typically operate with a smaller logistical footprint than to conventional formations, but their logistical activities can be elaborately organized. A primary consideration is to avoid depending on fixed bases and depots, which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and
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The widely distributed and influential work of Sir Robert
Thompson, counter-insurgency expert in Malaysia, offers several such guidelines. Thompson's underlying assumption is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of law and better governance. Numerous other regimes, however, give such
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Whatever approach is used, the guerrilla holds the initiative and can prolong his survival by varying the intensity of combat. Attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to years. During the interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply, and plan. During the
Vietnam War,
1038:
Guerrilla organization can range from small local rebel groups with a few dozen participants to tens of thousands of fighters, deploying from tiny cells to formations of regimental strength. In most cases, there is a leadership aiming for a clear political objective. The organization is typically
900:
Low-intensity warfare's main opponent is the guerrilla, or irregular fighter. This opponent may be state sponsored, or private non-state actors driven by religious or other ideology in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. Modern guerrilla warfare at its fullest elaboration is an integrated process,
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Relationships with civil populations are influenced by whether the guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly population is of immense importance to guerrillas, providing shelter, supplies, financing, intelligence, and recruits. The "base of the people" is thus the key
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Guerrilla operations typically include a variety of attacks on transportation routes, individual groups of police or military, installations and structures, economic enterprises, and targeted civilians. Attacking in small groups and using camouflage and often captured weapons of that enemy, the
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undertook policing and counter-insurgency, primarily against suspected republicans. This included the internment without trial of anyone accused of being, or supporting, Republicans. Investigations also revealed significant collusion between
British state forces and loyalist paramilitaries, and
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by both the police and loyalist gangs given free rein to attack these protesters. On its face, it had a religious dimension although despite use of the terms 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' to refer to the two warring sides, it was not a religious conflict. For most, these were mostly just terms of
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Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened to aggressively locate, pursue, and fix insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents, who must be kept on the run
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Permanent and semi-permanent bases form part of the guerrilla logistical structure, which are usually located in remote areas or in cross-border sanctuaries that are sheltered by friendly regimes. They can be quite elaborate, such as in the tough VC/NVA fortified base camps and tunnel complexes
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For successful operations, surprise must be achieved by guerrillas. If the operation has been betrayed or compromised, it is usually called off immediately. Intelligence is also extremely important, and detailed knowledge of the target's dispositions, weaponry, and morale is gathered before any
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Action also must be taken at a lower level to resolve legitimate grievances. It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side simply to declare guerrillas "terrorists" and to pursue a harsh liquidation strategy. Brute force, however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean
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Guerrillas must plan carefully for withdrawal once an operation has been completed or if it is going badly. The withdrawal phase is sometimes regarded as the most important part of a planned action, as getting entangled in a lengthy struggle with superior forces is usually fatal to insurgent,
237:
economies. ... US policy recognizes that indirect, rather than direct, applications of US military power are the most appropriate and cost-effective ways to achieve national goals in a LIC environment. The principal US military instrument in LIC is security assistance in the form of training,
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against
British forces as well as a bombing campaign against infrastructural, commercial and political targets. Loyalists attacked occasionally republicans/nationalists, but focused primarily on the wider Catholic community in what they described as retaliation. At times, there were bouts of
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Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, ranging from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents or even bogus
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encountered by US forces during the Vietnam War. Their importance can be seen by the hard fighting sometimes engaged in by communist forces to protect those sites. However, when it became clear that defense was untenable, communist units typically withdrew without sentiment.
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If police action is not sufficient to stop insurgents, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups that can be controlled by combined civic-military
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liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint and cleave to orderly procedures. Clear steps must be taken to curb brutality and retaliation by the security or "freelance" forces.
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As the name suggests, in comparison with conventional operations the armed forces involved operate at a greatly reduced tempo, with fewer soldiers, a reduced range of tactical equipment and limited scope to operate in a military manner. For example, the use of
1799:
Barzilai, L; Harats, M; Wiser, I; Weissman, O; Domniz, N; Glassberg, E; Stavrou, D; Zilinsky, I; Winkler, E; Hiak, J (2015). "Characteristics of Improvised Explosive Device Trauma Casualties in the Gaza Strip and Other Combat Regions: The Israeli Experience".
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675:(with the stated, but sometimes unstated, purpose of weakening the opposition and independence movements), human rights organizations and national governments outside of Burma question the veracity of, and sometimes outright refute, these claims.
1301:. In the post-Vietnam era, al-Qaeda also made effective use of remote territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and execute its operations. That foreign sanctuary eventually broke down with American attacks against the
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closely followed the Maoist three-stage approach but with greater emphasis on flexible shifting between mobile and guerrilla warfare, and opportunities for a spontaneous "general uprising" of the masses, in conjunction with guerrilla forces.
671:), which has actively pursued independence since January 1949. While allegedly limited and low-intensity in that the territories occupied in force by central government forces are returned (as they cannot be held permanently as yet) at the
708:) have, over time, continued to ravage the areas in dispute and contribute greatly to the poor conditions in those regions as well as the various human rights violations that have occurred (and in some cases are still occurring) there.
768:. In total, throughout the war, hundreds of thousands of people (up to 700,000) served in the ranks of the Polish underground, and even every sixth Pole helped polish partizants but partizantes did not have more than 50,000 firearms.
687:
have also engaged in limited military offensives (analogous to Burma's "annual dry season offensives") against various armed opposition and independence movements, which have often escalated into full-scale warfare, particularly in
577:." If the conflict progresses, possibly into armed clashes, the role develops with the addition of the identification and removal of the armed groups – but again, at a low level, in communities rather than throughout entire cities.
2143:
756:" which helped thousands of Jews save their lives. When the Red Army entered Poland in 1944, the Poles wanted to support them in the fight against the Germans, but the Soviets betrayed them, even though during
752:. Besides, the "Polish underground" destroyed hundreds of German transports of military supplies throughout the war. In Poland there was also a secret order and many non-military resistance organizations like "
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considerations short shrift, and their counterguerrilla operations have involved mass murder, genocide, starvation as well as the massive spread of terror, torture and execution. The totalitarian regimes of
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sizes or even form conventional units. Based on their level of sophistication and organization, they can shift between all those modes as the situation demands, as guerrilla warfare is flexible, not static.
259:
as "low-intensity warfare." However, this terminology has become obsolete due to the intricate nature of multidimensional warfare and the mass impact of contemporary terrorist attacks, such as the
2153:
1347:
The low-intensity fighter or guerrilla can be difficult to beat, but certain principles of counter-insurgency warfare are well known since the 1950s and 1960s and have been successfully applied.
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Mao's theory of people's war divides warfare into three phases. In the first phase, the guerrillas gain the support of the population by attacking the machinery of government and distributing
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Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance, "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the
1657:
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of military attacks. The most fully elaborated guerrilla warfare structure was seen by the Chinese and Vietnamese communists during the revolutionary wars of East and Southeast Asia.
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are classic examples, as are the lesser but comparable measures of dictatorships fighting "dirty wars" in South America. Elements of Thompson's moderate approach are adapted here:
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capabilities. Guerrillas can operate as small, scattered bands of raiders, but they can also work side by side with regular forces or combine for far-ranging mobile operations in
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capitulation, but sincere steps, such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, or collecting taxes honestly can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.
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and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from
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213:. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the
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and vital institutions. In the third phase, conventional fighting is used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and take control of the country. Mao's seminal work
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to protest, among other factors, disenfranchisement, abuses of power such as discrimination in the housing and job markets perpetuated by the ruling governments in the
620:
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717:
945:, undermining an authority by long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign or local regime, as demonstrated by the
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grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere while priority areas are cleared and held.
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A simplified example of this more sophisticated organizational type, which was used by revolutionary forces during the Vietnam War, is shown below.
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Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting, which was indeed the case with the definitive operations of Mao and Giap, and the
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1975:
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966:, United States. Guerrilla tactics and strategy are summarized below and are discussed extensively in standard reference works such as
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identity. A key issue was the status of Northern Ireland. Unionists and loyalists, who descended from colonists who arrived during the
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conflict, fuelled by historical events and longstanding oppression by the UK's military and security services. By the mid-1960s, the
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cases, guerrilla tactics allow a small force to hold off a much larger and better equipped enemy for a long time, as in Russia's
2087:
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Propaganda leaflets are often used in low-intensity operations to demoralize opponents; these U.S. leaflets were dropped on the
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803:
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79:
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999:, has been widely distributed and applied, nowhere more successfully than in Vietnam, under the military leader and theorist
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526:
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organizations), although less numerous than the German army, organized a strong resistance movement; in the years 1941-44 a
870:; and political activists. The security forces of the Republic of Ireland played a smaller role. Republicans carried out a
165:) is a military conflict, usually localised, between two or more state or non-state groups which is below the intensity of
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2305:
760:, the partisans significantly accelerated the Russian attack, the Russians arrested or killed thousands of members of the
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The term can be used to describe conflicts where at least one or both of the opposing parties operate along such lines.
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949:. A guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a colonial presence above what the foreign
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2474:
2416:
847:
68:
1994:
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1074:
728:, strong propaganda aimed at isolating resistance movements, and support to domestic friendly forces (such as the
663:(Burma) has regularly conducted limited low-intensity military campaigns against the independence movement of the
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46:
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is essential to an efficient basis of LIC operation instructions. Electronic and signal gathering intelligence,
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and domestic law. These principles affirm the inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective
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Winning Hearts and Minds in a Civil War: Governance, Leadership Change, and Support for Violent Groups in Iraq
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1635:
Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World
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in low intensity conflicts. The majority of casualties in low intensity conflicts tend to be resulting from
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Low-intensity operations consist of the deployment and use of soldiers in situations other than war. For
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Quick air support, by helicopters and fixed-wing assets, is integral to countering low-intensity threats.
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Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003–09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response
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347:, is often relegated to transport and surveillance, or used only by the dominant side of conflict in
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forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with its policies or objectives.
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in an area of southeast Burma (roughly corresponding to a Burmese administrative region called the
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871:
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A wide-ranging gathering of Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) related topics
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Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82nd Airborne at Firebase Shkin, Afghanistan
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sectarian tit-for-tat violence, as well as feuds within and between paramilitary groups. The
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structured into political and military wings, sometimes allowing the political leadership
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In Poland from 1939 to 1945 there was a strong partisan movement. Partisan forces (mainly
480:, proves largely ineffective against low-intensity opponents. LIC generally requires more
198:
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successful action was carried out against the expulsion of Poles from the Zamość region
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565:, much of an army's work is "soft" – working in conjunction with civil authorities in
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1945:"Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam", Robert Thompson
1422:"liberation" or sympathizer groups to help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
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1887:"Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare", Bard E. O'Neill
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The main participants in the Troubles were republican paramilitaries such as the
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823:, leave the United Kingdom and reunite with the 26 counties that had formed the
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1658:"Assad 'dropped 13,000 illegal barrel bombs on Syria in 2016', watchdog says"
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used by low-intensity fighters for storage, shelter, withdrawal, and defence.
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primarily took the form of small unit engagements and unconventional warfare.
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367:, whether it has progressed to armed struggle or is in an early stage of
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constantly by aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, etc.
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A viable competing vision that comprehensively mobilizes popular support
1016:
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1959:
1706:"Evolving Medical Strategies for Low Intensity Conflicts – A Necessity"
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991:. In the second phase, escalating attacks are made on the government's
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German occupation of Western Europe during World War II, notably the
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477:
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and republicans, who were mostly Irish Catholics, wanted to end the
305:. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed.
1618:
Field Manual 100-20: Military Operations in Low0Intensity Conflict
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1128:
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720:, shared many aspects with more recent cases of LIC, such as the "
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and wanted Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom.
811:, displacing all but a handful of native clans and farmers, were
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often conduct low-intensity operations against states, often in
363:. The role of the armed forces is dependent on the stage of the
225:... successful LIC operations, consistent with US interests and
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Mikulaschek, Christoph, Saurabh Pant, and Beza Tesfaye. 2020. "
1931:
Encyclopædia Britannica, 14ed, "guerrilla Warfare" pp. 460–464
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Guerrilla warfare: the main challenge to low-intensity warfare
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29:
2020:
Land Operations, Volume III, Counter Revolutionary Operations
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Low-intensity counter operations or counter-guerrilla warfare
2724:
Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World
1907:
Inside the VC and the NVA, Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg
1704:
Dheer, Ajay; Jaiprakash; Sharma, HK; Singh, Jasdeep (2003).
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Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units.
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in 1971 against Pakistan, which led to the independence of
229:, can advance US international goals such as the growth of
197:... a political-military confrontation between contending
149:
during the 1980s; like many low-intensity conflicts, the
27:
Military conflict below the intensity of conventional war
1828:"CAIN: Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay"
217:, but contain regional and global security implications.
294:
1562:. Montgomery: Air University Press. pp. 223–236.
1444:
Foreign assistance must be limited and carefully used.
1447:
scenario occurred with the United States in Vietnam.
2590:
2542:
2467:
2415:
2408:
2319:
2258:
2251:
2175:
2168:
1842:"CAIN: Key Events of the Northern Ireland Conflict"
1031:entities, produced by the United States during the
60:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1919:"Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations"
1587:. Durban: Butterworths Publishers. pp. 6–11.
1460:, these operations are usually conducted against
850:(UDA); British state security forces such as the
1917:Coll, Steve; Glasser, Susan B. (7 August 2005).
880:furthermore loyalist paramilitaries such as the
612:but its sources remain unclear because it lacks
351:such as a government forces against insurgents.
1859:
1857:
1855:
1853:
1851:
1753:
1751:
1560:Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges
223:
195:
2108:
1941:
1939:
1937:
1903:
1901:
1899:
1897:
1895:
1893:
1883:
1881:
802:. When these peaceful protests were met with
8:
842:(INLA); loyalist paramilitaries such as the
764:, nor did the Soviets also help support the
255:Boaz Ganor notes that scholars once labeled
2683:North Korea and weapons of mass destruction
1760:"Injury patterns in low intensity conflict"
1405:Big unit action may sometimes be necessary.
1232:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
1088:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
529:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
437:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
2412:
2255:
2172:
2115:
2101:
2093:
1606:
1604:
1775:
1731:
1317:Guerrilla initiative and combat intensity
1252:Learn how and when to remove this message
1133:One of the ingenious tunnel complexes in
1108:Learn how and when to remove this message
643:Learn how and when to remove this message
549:Learn how and when to remove this message
457:Learn how and when to remove this message
321:Learn how and when to remove this message
189:Low-intensity conflict is defined by the
120:Learn how and when to remove this message
2480:Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present)
1638:. Columbia University Press. p. 4.
383:and sometimes government forces such as
2188:Operation Enduring Freedom participants
1550:
1391:Reasonable concessions where necessary.
1146:Relationships with the civil population
1585:Borderstrike! South Africa into Angola
905:, organization, specialist skills and
798:and its devolved subsidiary, known as
788:Northern Ireland civil rights movement
359:are often not used when LIC occurs in
2717:Targeted Killing in International Law
2598:Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse
2054:American Journal of Political Science
1289:guerrillas, who fought alongside the
7:
2763:
1230:adding citations to reliable sources
1086:adding citations to reliable sources
527:adding citations to reliable sources
435:adding citations to reliable sources
58:adding citations to reliable sources
2794:Operations involving special forces
1921:– via www.washingtonpost.com.
1509:Grey-zone (international relations)
866:, and lesser known groups like the
724:" stage early on, establishment of
1711:Medical Journal Armed Forces India
1519:Military operations other than war
487:methods of information retrieval.
25:
2648:Enhanced interrogation techniques
2444:Georgia Sustainment and Stability
2332:al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
832:Provisional Irish Republican Army
696:, but also until recently in the
573:, counter-organizing, so-called "
379:are commonly used by insurgents,
169:. It involves the state's use of
2762:
2753:
2752:
2623:Combatant Status Review Tribunal
2572:President's Surveillance Program
2567:Military Commissions Act of 2009
2562:Military Commissions Act of 2006
2515:Insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
2490:Moro conflict in the Philippines
2485:Insurgency in the North Caucasus
1202:
1058:
1027:Organizational structure of pro-
884:included serving members of the
589:
499:
407:
275:
145:operation against insurgents in
34:
2439:Georgia Train and Equip Program
1419:Systematic intelligence effort.
1276:Foreign support and sanctuaries
925:Guerrilla tactics are based on
233:, democratic institutions, and
45:needs additional citations for
2628:Criticism of the war on terror
2582:Terrorist Surveillance Program
2387:Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
2140:War in Afghanistan (2001-2021)
1029:Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
840:Irish National Liberation Army
1:
2663:Guantanamo Bay detention camp
2306:Mahmoud Mohamed Ahmed Bahaziq
1764:Indian Journal of Anaesthesia
1724:10.1016/S0377-1237(03)80047-3
2638:Killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri
2530:al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen
1995:Resources in other libraries
901:complete with sophisticated
393:improvised explosive devices
377:Improvised explosive devices
2789:Military operations by type
2706:State Sponsors of Terrorism
2577:Protect America Act of 2007
1873:People's War, People's Army
1005:People's War, People's Army
736:German occupation of Poland
712:German occupation of France
301:the claims made and adding
2815:
2643:Killing of Osama bin Laden
2520:War in Somalia (2006–2009)
2475:Operation Active Endeavour
1677:Smith, Andrew (May 2011).
1583:Steenkamp, Willem (1983).
1426:Methodical clear and hold.
1363:by U.S. forces during the
848:Ulster Defence Association
700:. These military actions (
2748:
2510:Terrorism in Saudi Arabia
2459:Drone strikes in Pakistan
2352:Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami
2130:
2068:The Transformation of War
1990:Resources in your library
1499:Fourth-generation warfare
1464:and are given terms like
1295:Bangladesh Liberation War
1125:Surprise and intelligence
890:Royal Ulster Constabulary
856:Royal Ulster Constabulary
706:Second Sudanese Civil War
357:multiple rocket launchers
2730:Unitary executive theory
2070:. The Free Press, 1991.
1954:G.V. Brandolini (2002).
1478:Violent non-state actors
1452:Low-intensity operations
978:Three-phase Maoist model
962:fought in the swamps of
762:Polish Underground State
702:First Sudanese Civil War
598:This section includes a
567:psychological operations
251:Relations with terrorism
151:South African Border War
69:"Low-intensity conflict"
2658:Extraordinary rendition
2653:Extrajudicial prisoners
2036:The Sling and the Stone
1956:Low-intensity conflicts
1558:Blank, Stephen (1991).
1539:Violent non-state actor
886:Ulster Defense Regiment
877:British security forces
860:Ulster Defense Regiment
778:The conflict, known as
627:more precise citations.
561:In the first stages of
2693:Operation Eagle Assist
2613:Clash of Civilizations
2160:Symbolism of terrorism
2058:doi:10.1111/ajps.12527
2038:, Zenith Press, 2004.
1981:Low-intensity conflict
1613:Department of the Army
1368:
1339:
1138:
1035:
1020:
844:Ulster Volunteer Force
782:, was a sectarian and
470:Intelligence gathering
248:
221:The manual also says:
219:
159:low-intensity conflict
154:
18:Low intensity conflict
2688:Operation Noble Eagle
2525:2007 Lebanon conflict
1358:
1337:
1132:
1041:plausible deniability
1026:
1019:
827:following partition.
673:end of the offensives
246:against armed attack.
141:paratroops conduct a
137:
2505:Operation Linda Nchi
2449:OEF – Horn of Africa
2362:Islamic Courts Union
2311:Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
2135:September 11 attacks
2018:British Army (ed.).
1758:Saraswat, V (2009).
1632:Ganor, Boaz (2015).
1621:, GlobalSecurity.org
1311:September 11 attacks
1226:improve this section
1082:improve this section
997:On Guerrilla Warfare
972:On Guerrilla Warfare
821:Partition of Ireland
718:occupation of France
523:improve this section
431:improve this section
261:September 11 attacks
180:Official definitions
54:improve this article
2064:van Creveld, Martin
2034:Hammes, Thomas X..
1644:10.7312/gano17212.5
1615:(5 December 1990),
1050:Types of operations
960:Second Seminole War
868:Force Research Unit
825:Republic of Ireland
784:ethno-nationalistic
683:The governments of
2735:Unlawful combatant
2668:Iranian Revolution
2454:OEF – Trans Sahara
2429:War in Afghanistan
2286:Jalaluddin Haqqani
2281:Sirajuddin Haqqani
2207:Iraqi Armed Forces
2006:War in the Shadows
1666:. 11 January 2017.
1466:counter-insurgency
1369:
1351:Classic guidelines
1340:
1139:
1036:
1021:
956:Second Chechen War
872:guerrilla campaign
817:Irish nationalists
813:Ulster Protestants
726:puppet governments
600:list of references
349:asymmetric warfare
286:possibly contains
209:to the use of the
155:
143:search and destroy
2776:
2775:
2673:Islamic terrorism
2538:
2537:
2434:OEF – Philippines
2404:
2403:
2400:
2399:
2357:Hizbul Mujahideen
2198:Northern Alliance
2025:Buffaloe, David.
1976:Library resources
1663:Independent.co.uk
1529:Political warfare
1514:Irregular warfare
1504:Guerrilla warfare
1398:Economy of force.
1361:Ho Chi Minh Trail
1262:
1261:
1254:
1118:
1117:
1110:
983:Mao/Giap approach
809:Ulster Plantation
790:began organizing
758:Operation Tempest
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288:original research
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16:(Redirected from
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2766:
2765:
2756:
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2711:Targeted killing
2500:Iraqi insurgency
2420:Enduring Freedom
2413:
2372:Jemaah Islamiyah
2367:Jaish-e-Mohammed
2256:
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2117:
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2004:Asprey, Robert.
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773:Northern Ireland
722:Hearts and minds
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2633:CIA black sites
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2377:Lashkar-e-Taiba
2315:
2276:Anwar al-Awlaki
2271:Hamza bin Laden
2266:Osama bin Laden
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1494:Divide and rule
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1808:(8): 209–14.
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1159:Use of terror
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240:international
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71: –
70:
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65:Find sources:
59:
55:
49:
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43:This article
41:
37:
32:
31:
19:
2722:
2715:
2698:
2603:Axis of evil
2419:
2291:Anas Haqqani
2169:Participants
2067:
2053:
2035:
2026:
2019:
2005:
1980:
1955:
1950:
1927:
1912:
1872:
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1794:
1770:(6): 672–7.
1767:
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1683:. Lulu.com.
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1482:insurgencies
1474:peacekeeping
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1432:
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1397:
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1384:
1370:
1346:
1324:
1320:
1287:Mukti Bahini
1283:
1279:
1263:
1248:
1239:
1224:Please help
1212:
1188:
1180:
1171:
1162:
1153:
1149:
1140:
1119:
1104:
1095:
1080:Please help
1068:
1045:
1037:
1012:Organization
1004:
996:
986:
971:
927:intelligence
924:
899:
852:British Army
829:
780:The Troubles
777:
739:
732:in France).
715:
682:
665:Karen people
659:
639:
630:
619:Please help
611:
563:insurrection
560:
545:
536:
521:Please help
509:
481:
468:
453:
444:
429:Please help
417:
399:Intelligence
385:barrel bombs
365:insurrection
337:
317:
308:
285:
254:
244:self-defense
224:
220:
211:armed forces
196:
188:
175:
162:
158:
156:
131:
116:
107:
97:
90:
83:
76:
64:
52:Please help
47:verification
44:
2550:Patriot Act
2301:Hafiz Saeed
2259:Individuals
2238:Philippines
2193:Afghanistan
2176:Operational
1718:(2): 96–9.
1365:Vietnam War
1291:Indian Army
1270:Afghanistan
1033:Vietnam War
947:Vietnam War
669:Kayin State
625:introducing
235:free market
215:Third World
2783:Categories
2701:photograph
2347:Boko Haram
2342:Al-Shabaab
2337:Abu Sayyaf
2154:Withdrawal
2144:Withdrawal
1545:References
1470:subversion
1343:Principles
1309:after the
1299:Bangladesh
1266:mujahadeen
1168:Withdrawal
989:propaganda
907:propaganda
846:(UVF) and
838:) and the
571:propaganda
389:small arms
369:propaganda
295:improve it
207:subversion
80:newspapers
2417:Operation
2409:Conflicts
1412:Mobility.
1213:does not
1177:Logistics
1069:does not
1003:. Giap's
943:espionage
935:deception
919:battalion
690:the south
510:does not
418:does not
353:Artillery
341:air power
311:June 2011
299:verifying
257:terrorism
2758:Category
2678:Islamism
2618:Cold War
2543:Policies
2495:Iraq War
2327:al-Qaeda
2320:Factions
2243:Ethiopia
2218:Pakistan
2150:Iraq War
1814:26284374
1786:20640095
1742:27407476
1524:New Wars
1488:See also
1307:al-Qaeda
993:military
958:and the
939:sabotage
903:doctrine
800:Stormont
581:Examples
482:hands-on
381:militias
373:protests
171:military
2768:Commons
2591:Related
2382:Taliban
2252:Targets
2022:, 1969.
1962:, 16 p.
1960:Bergamo
1777:2900077
1733:4923775
1468:, anti-
1408:action.
1303:Taliban
1285:is the
1234:removed
1219:sources
1194:Terrain
1135:Vietnam
1090:removed
1075:sources
964:Florida
915:platoon
858:(RUC),
661:Myanmar
621:improve
531:removed
516:sources
439:removed
424:sources
334:Weapons
293:Please
231:freedom
191:US Army
147:Namibia
94:scholar
2558:(2002)
2552:(2001)
2074:
2042:
2012:
1978:about
1812:
1802:Wounds
1784:
1774:
1740:
1730:
1687:
1591:
1566:
1472:, and
1458:states
1378:Hitler
1374:Stalin
941:, and
931:ambush
754:Zegota
730:Milice
694:Darfur
491:Stages
485:HUMINT
478:SIGINT
199:states
96:
89:
82:
75:
67:
2468:Other
1184:jihad
951:power
911:squad
685:Sudan
679:Sudan
656:Burma
606:, or
474:ELINT
101:JSTOR
87:books
2740:CAGE
2213:NATO
2203:Iraq
2183:ISAF
2072:ISBN
2040:ISBN
2010:ISBN
1810:PMID
1782:PMID
1738:PMID
1685:ISBN
1589:ISBN
1564:ISBN
1376:and
1305:and
1217:any
1215:cite
1073:any
1071:cite
888:and
744:and
704:and
698:east
692:and
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476:and
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420:cite
391:and
371:and
355:and
227:laws
193:as:
73:news
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1772:PMC
1728:PMC
1720:doi
1640:doi
1268:of
1228:by
1084:by
970:'s
968:Mao
917:or
864:MI5
836:IRA
746:BCh
525:by
433:by
297:by
163:LIC
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