375:. It has been argued that desire is the more fundamental notion and that preferences are to be defined in terms of desires. For this to work, desire has to be understood as involving a degree or intensity. Given this assumption, a preference can be defined as a comparison of two desires. That Nadia prefers tea over coffee, for example, just means that her desire for tea is stronger than her desire for coffee. One argument for this approach is due to considerations of parsimony: a great number of preferences can be derived from a very small number of desires. One objection to this theory is that our introspective access is much more immediate in cases of preferences than in cases of desires. So it is usually much easier for us to know which of two options we prefer than to know the degree with which we desire a particular object. This consideration has been used to suggest that maybe preference, and not desire, is the more fundamental notion.
387:, the term can be used to describe when a company pays a specific creditor or group of creditors. From doing this, that creditor(s) is made better off, than other creditors. After paying the 'preferred creditor', the company seeks to go into formal insolvency like an administration or liquidation. There must be a desire to make the creditor better off, for them to be a preference. If the preference is proven, legal action can occur. It is a wrongful act of trading. Disqualification is a risk. Preference arises within the context of the principle maintaining that one of the main objectives in the winding up of an insolvent company is to ensure the equal treatment of creditors. The rules on preferences allow paying up their creditors as insolvency looms, but that it must prove that the transaction is a result of ordinary commercial considerations. Also, under the English
158:. The first axiom of transitivity refers to consistency between preferences, such that if x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z, then x has to be preferred to z. The second axiom of completeness describes that a relationship must exist between two options, such that x must be preferred to y or y must be preferred to x, or is indifferent between them. For example, if I prefer sugar to honey and honey to sweetener then I must prefer sugar to sweetener to satisfy transitivity and I must have a preference between the items to satisfy completeness. Under the axiom of completeness, an individual cannot lack a preference between any two options.
189:, then he is maximizing the expected value of a utility function. In utility theory, preference relates to decision makers' attitudes towards rewards and hazards. The specific varieties are classified into three categories: 1) risk-averse, that is, equal gains and losses, with investors participating when the loss probability is less than 50%; 2) the risk-taking kind, which is the polar opposite of type 1); 3) Relatively risk-neutral, in the sense that the introduction of risk has no clear association with the decision maker's choice.
162:
391:, if a creditor was proven to have forced the company to pay, the resulting payment would not be considered a preference since it would not constitute unfairness. It is the decision to give a preference, rather than the giving of the preference pursuant to that decision, which must be influenced by the desire to produce the effect of the preference. For these purposes, therefore, the relevant time is the date of the decision, not the date of giving the preference.
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97:, even unconsciously. Consequently, preference can be affected by a person's surroundings and upbringing in terms of geographical location, cultural background, religious beliefs, and education. These factors are found to affect preference as repeated exposure to a certain idea or concept correlates with a positive preference.
149:
Consumer preference, or consumers' preference for particular brands over identical products and services, is an important notion in the psychological influence of consumption. Consumer preferences have three properties: completeness, transitivity and non-satiation. For a preference to be rational, it
309:
Individual preferences can be represented as an indifference curve given the underlying assumptions. Indifference curves graphically depict all product combinations that yield the same amount of usefulness. Indifference curves allow us to graphically define and rank all possible combinations of two
370:
are two closely related notions: they are both conative states that determine our behavior. The difference between the two is that desires are directed at one object while preferences concern a comparison between two alternatives, of which one is preferred to the other. The focus on preferences
92:
process. The term is also used to mean evaluative judgment in the sense of liking or disliking an object, as in
Scherer (2005), which is the most typical definition employed in psychology. It does not mean that a preference is necessarily stable over time. Preference can be notably modified by
342:
In psychology, risk preference is occasionally characterised as the proclivity to engage in a behaviour or activity that is advantageous but may involve some potential loss, such as substance abuse or criminal action that may bring significant bodily and mental harm to the individual.
173:. This is because the axioms allow for preferences to be ordered into one equivalent ordering with no preference cycles. Maximising utility does not imply maximise happiness, rather it is an optimisation of the available options based on an individual's preferences. The so-called
281:
describes an alternative approach to predicting human behaviour by using psychological theory which explores deviations from rational preferences and the standard economic model. It also recognises that rational preferences and choices are limited by
346:
In economics, risk preference refers to a proclivity to engage in behaviours or activities that entail greater variance returns, regardless of whether they be gains or losses, and are frequently associated with monetary rewards involving lotteries.
350:
There are two different traditions of measuring preference for risk, the revealed and stated preference traditions, which coexist in psychology, and to some extent in economics as well.
69:. The difference between the two is that desires are directed at one object while preferences concern a comparison between two alternatives, of which one is preferred to the other.
511:
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1338:"The Decision Making Individual Differences Inventory and guidelines for the study of individual differences in judgment and decision-making research"
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Risk preference evaluated from stated preferences emerges as a concept with significant temporal stability, but revealed preference measures do not.
146:, where individuals make decisions based on rational preferences which are aligned with their self-interests in order to achieve an optimal outcome.
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The mathematical foundations of most common types of preferences — that are representable by quadratic or additive functions — laid down by
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are rules of thumb such as elimination by aspects which are used to make decisions rather than maximising the
88:, preferences refer to an individual's attitude towards a set of objects, typically reflected in an explicit
274:
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If preferences are both transitive and complete, the relationship between preference can be described by a
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57:. For example, someone prefers A over B if they would rather choose A than B. Preferences are central to
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278:
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to develop methods for their elicitation. In particular, additive and quadratic preference functions in
1008:
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76:, the term is used to determine which outstanding obligation the insolvent party has to settle first.
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to provide observable evidence in relation to people's actions. These actions can be described by
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Risk tolerance is a critical component of personal financial planning, that is, risk preference.
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also violate the assumption of rational preferences by causing individuals to act irrationally.
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refers to the set of assumptions related to ordering some alternatives, based on the degree of
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use preference relation for decision-making. As connative states, they are closely related to
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in 1944, explains that so long as an agent's preferences over risky options follow a set of
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variables can be constructed from interviews, where questions are aimed at tracing totally
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argue that it provides a normative model for people to adjust and optimise their actions.
89:
58:
243:
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692:"Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences"
332:
Risk preference is defined as how much risk a person is prepared to accept based on the
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Greater transitivity indicates that the indifference curves do not overlap.
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Empirical evidence has shown that the usage of rational preferences (and
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A propensity for diversity causes indifference curves to curve inward.
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coordinate planes without referring to cardinal utility estimates.
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This article is about the psychological term. For other uses, see
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is a technical term usually used in relation to choosing between
1302:, vol. 12, Bingley: Emerald (MCB UP ), pp. 41–196,
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Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on 'Preferences'
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Corporate
Finance Law: Principles and Policy, Second Edition
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738:"The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review"
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Case, Karl (2008). "A Response to Guerrien and Benicourt".
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because of this relation to behavior. Some methods such as
824:"Why and Under What Conditions Does Loss Aversion Emerge?"
135:
they provide. The concept of preferences is used in post-
1758:(white paper from International Communications Research)
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Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science
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OUI – Institute for Policy Analysis Working Paper Series
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If more is better, the indifference curve dips downward.
908:. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 16–26.
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Charness, Gary; Gneezy, Uri; Imas, Alex (March 2013).
246:
226:
206:
1637:"What Is A Preference Under The Insolvency Act 1986"
1439:"Experimental methods: Eliciting risk preferences"
1294:Harrison, Glenn W.; Rutström, E. Elisabet (2008),
371:instead of desires is very common in the field of
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232:
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165:An example of transitive and complete preferences.
1664:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 368.
906:Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences,1959
527:"Affective and Cognitive Factors in Preferences"
1716:"Green v Ireland [2011] EWHC 1305 (Ch)"
1616:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1443:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
525:Zajonc, Robert B.; Markus, Hazel (1982-09-01).
1693:. Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 111.
8:
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723:Utility Maximization, Choice and Preferences
445:Lichtenstein, S.; & Slovic, P. (2006).
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1470:"Risk Preference: A View from Psychology"
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449:. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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801:. London: Academic Press. p. 137.
725:(2 ed.). Springer. pp. 17–52.
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313:The graph's three main points are:
93:decision-making processes, such as
27:To like one thing more than another
1300:Research in Experimental Economics
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1400:(8–9). Cambridge, MA: 1787–1794.
1296:"Risk Aversion in the Laboratory"
1239:Steinberg, Laurence (July 2013).
1099:A Course in Behavioural Economics
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1474:Journal of Economic Perspectives
1387:"How are Preferences Revealed?"
828:Japanese Psychological Research
822:Nagaya, Kazuhisa (2021-10-15).
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302:such as reference points and
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413:(in artificial intelligence)
336:or pleasure of the outcome.
1662:Company Law, Fourth Edition
1394:Journal of Public Economics
1245:Nature Reviews Neuroscience
696:Games and Economic Behavior
150:must satisfy the axioms of
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1660:Hannigan, Brenda (2015).
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1532:Schulz, Armin W. (2015).
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