750:
remaining requirements and effectively creates a distinction between the total formula's analytic and synthetic components. Specifically, for requirement 2: The conditional sentence does not make any information claim about the O-sentences in TC, it states only that "if" the variables in are satisfied by the relations, "then" the O-sentences will be true. This means that every O-sentence in TC that is logically implied by the sentence TC → TC is L-true (i.e., every O-sentence in AT is true or not-true: the metal expands or it does not; the chemical turns blue or it does not, etc.). Thus TC can be taken as the non-informative (i.e., non-factual) component of the statement, or A
293:, Carnap found the method he needed to take the next step, which was to substitute variables for each T-term, then to quantify existentially all T-terms in both T-sentences and C-rules. The resulting "Ramsey sentence" effectively eliminated the T-terms as such, while still providing an account of the theory's empirical content. The evolution of the formula proceeds thus:
801:
would call the entire "holistic" universe relating to any specified theory would require long and complicated renderings of TC → TC. Instead, it is to be taken as demonstrating logically that there is a way that science could formulate empirical, observational explications of theoretical concepts –
119:
characterized the difference linguistically, as the difference between the German verbs "kennen" (knowing as being acquainted with a thing – perception) and "erkennen" (knowing as understanding a thing – even if non-observable). This linguistic distinction may explain Carnap's decision to divide the
110:
naturally distinguish predicate terms on the basis of an observational categorization. As Carnap admitted, "The line separating observable from non-observable is highly arbitrary." For example, the predicate "hot" can be perceived by touching a hand to a lighted coal. But "hot" might take place at
589:
In this form, the Ramsey sentence captures the factual content of the theory. Though Ramsey believed this formulation was adequate to the needs of science, Carnap disagreed, with regard to a comprehensive reconstruction. In order to delineate a distinction between analytic and synthetic content,
749:
Carnap's solution is to make the two statements conditional. If there are some relations such that is satisfied when the variables are assigned some relations, then the relations assigned to those variables by the original theory will satisfy – or: TC → TC. This important move satisfies both
139:
The next step for Carnap was to connect these separate concepts by what he calls "correspondence rules" (C-rules), which are "mixed" sentences containing both T- and O-terms. Such a theory can be formulated as: T + C = df: the conjunction of T-postulates + the conjunction of C-rules – i.e.,
286:). Though this enabled Carnap to establish what it means for a theory to be "empirical," this sentence neither defines the T-terms explicitly nor draws any distinction between its analytic and its synthetic content, therefore it was not yet sufficient for Carnap's purposes.
789:. This is met by using two distinct processes in the formulation: drawing an empirical connection between the statement's factual content and the original theory (observational equivalence), and by requiring the analytic content to be observationally non-informative.
85:
not only exist and have meaning but are "useful" to the scientists who work with them. To accommodate such internal questions in a way that would justify their theoretical content empirically – and to do so while maintaining a distinction between
460:
128:"), those terms we are acquainted with (kennen) and will accept arbitrarily. Accordingly, the terms thus distinguished were incorporated into comparable sentence structures: T-terms into theoretical sentences (
73:
truths. Rather, they were meaningless "pseudo-questions without cognitive content,” asked from outside a language framework of science. Inside this framework, entities such as electrons or
677:(L-truth) of either statement, and the reconstruction FT has the same O-sentences as the theory itself, hence TC is observationally equivalent to TC : (i.e., for every O-sentence: O,
667:
584:
802:
and in that context the Ramsey and Carnap construct can be said to provide a formal justificatory distinction between scientific observation and metaphysical inquiry.
353:
732:
260:
358:
262:. This can be further expanded to include class terms such as for the class of all molecules, relations such as "betweenness," and predicates: e.g., TC ( t
1410:
835:
498:) is satisfied when the variables are assigned these relations. (This is equivalent to an interpretation as an appropriate model: there are relations
738:
does contain observational information (such-and-such a theoretical entity is observed to do such-and-such, or hold such-and-such a relation); and A
1731:
1507:
94:
propositions – Carnap set out to develop a systematized way to consolidate theory and empirical observation in a meaningful language formula.
57:. However, they should not be confused with Carnap sentences, which are neutral on whether there exists anything to which the term applies.
797:
Carnap's reconstruction as it is given here is not intended to be a literal method for formulating scientific propositions. To capture what
1003:
786:
26:
attempting to draw a line between science and metaphysics. A Ramsey sentence aims at rendering propositions containing non-observable
1691:
1675:
1531:
1683:
1071:
826:
attacked Carnap's initial assumptions by emphasizing the ambiguity that persists between observable and non-observable terms.
466:
Step 3 is the complete Ramsey sentence, expressed "TC," and to be read: "There are some (unspecified) relations such that TC (
69:
real?” and “Can you prove electrons are real?” were not legitimate questions, nor did they contain any great philosophical or
1929:
1547:
1755:
1091:
102:
Carnap began by differentiating observable things from non-observable things. Immediately, a problem arises: neither the
1539:
1425:
1137:
1739:
1571:
1388:
1934:
1699:
1595:
1579:
1563:
1363:
623:
1779:
1331:
1316:
1868:
1715:
1432:
1326:
1321:
996:
120:
vocabulary into two artificial categories: a vocabulary of non-observable ("theoretical") terms (hereafter "V
1842:
1555:
1358:
1336:
1081:
943:(Allegemeine Erkenntnislehre). Trans. Albert Blumberg. Open Court Publishing, Chicago/La Salle, IL. (2002).
673:
Requirement 1 is satisfied by TC in that the existential quantification of the T-terms does not change the
124:"): i.e., terms we know of but are not acquainted with (erkennen), and a vocabulary of observable terms ("V
1266:
1232:
1763:
1383:
1368:
1272:
91:
814:, who extended the requirements to include an "observationally non-creative" restriction on Carnap's A
1771:
1442:
1405:
1306:
1301:
1237:
1096:
87:
1910:
1747:
1195:
1178:
1132:
1122:
989:
617:
557:
1832:
971:
1822:
1623:
1499:
1373:
1294:
1258:
1066:
876:
811:
50:
976:
734:). As stated, however, requirements 2 and 3 remain unsatisfied. That is, taken individually, A
1797:
1638:
1613:
1489:
958:
338:
111:
such a microlevel (e.g., the theoretical "heat" generated by the production of proteins in a
1802:
1723:
1707:
1633:
1587:
1152:
1061:
868:
590:
Carnap thought the reconstructed sentence would have to satisfy three desired requirements:
107:
1817:
1812:
1348:
1183:
1157:
1101:
912:
290:
103:
951:
455:{\displaystyle \exists x_{1}\ldots \exists x_{n}TC(x_{1}\ldots x_{n},o_{1}\ldots o_{m})}
1479:
1420:
1253:
1188:
1173:
1076:
897:
Carnap, R. (1950) "Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology," in Paul Moser and Arnold Nat,
819:
116:
680:
143:
1923:
1658:
1653:
1628:
1437:
1378:
1289:
1217:
1147:
1142:
674:
54:
1513:
1311:
1242:
1202:
1030:
947:
798:
61:
Distinction between scientific (real) questions and metaphysical (pseudo-)questions
1837:
1827:
1807:
1227:
1207:
1117:
1040:
908:(esp. Parts III, and V), ed. Martin Gardner. Dover Publications, New York. 1995.
823:
70:
23:
1648:
1643:
1618:
1398:
1222:
1086:
1035:
1012:
115:
cell) that it is virtually non-observable (at present). Physicist-philosopher
112:
74:
1889:
1875:
1863:
1847:
1415:
1353:
1212:
1045:
911:
Carnap, R. (2000) "Theoretical
Concepts in Science," with introduction by
598:) component must be observationally equivalent to the original theory (TC).
1127:
66:
880:
925:
856:
1873:
1343:
872:
1882:
82:
774:
nothing more than a reformulation of the original theory, hence A
78:
1459:
985:
981:
785:
Carnap took as a fundamental requirement a respect for the
959:"Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism"
683:
626:
560:
361:
341:
316:
Step 2 (substitution of variables for T-terms): TC (x
146:
1856:
1790:
1667:
1606:
1523:
1470:
1282:
1251:
1166:
1110:
1054:
1023:
972:"Epistemic Structural Realism and Ramsey Sentences"
754:. Requirement 3 is satisfied by inference: given A
726:
661:
605:) component must be observationally uninformative.
578:
454:
347:
254:
22:are formal logical reconstructions of theoretical
297:Step 1 (empirical theory, assumed true): TC ( t
98:Distinction between observable and non-observable
1508:Fourth Great Debate in international relations
997:
662:{\displaystyle F_{T}+A_{T}\Leftrightarrow TC}
8:
1887:
1497:
1487:
1477:
1193:
917:Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
906:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
1467:
1456:
1020:
1004:
990:
982:
810:Among critics of the Ramsey formalism are
1411:Relationship between religion and science
836:Ramsey-style epistemic structural realism
703:
682:
644:
631:
625:
559:
443:
430:
417:
404:
385:
369:
360:
340:
240:
221:
208:
189:
170:
157:
145:
132:); O-terms into observational sentences (
49:Ramsey sentences were introduced by the
1732:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
932:Moser, P. K. and vander Nat, A. (2003)
847:
1087:Machian positivism (empirio-criticism)
16:Construct in the philosophy of science
7:
355:-quantification of the variables):
65:For Carnap, questions such as “Are
1364:Nomothetic–idiographic distinction
954:, Oxford University Press, p. 109.
742:does not necessarily follow from F
620:to the original theory – that is,
378:
362:
342:
34:) clear by substituting them with
14:
1692:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
1676:Materialism and Empirio-criticism
1532:The Course in Positive Philosophy
929:, eds. R. Creath and M. Friedman.
927:The Cambridge Companion to Carnap
857:"How to Define Theoretical Terms"
901:Oxford University Press. (2003).
1684:History and Class Consciousness
1548:Critical History of Philosophy
977:"Theoretical Terms in Science"
787:analytic–synthetic distinction
721:
700:
684:
650:
449:
397:
249:
246:
201:
195:
150:
147:
1:
1756:Knowledge and Human Interests
1092:Rankean historical positivism
579:{\displaystyle 1\leq i\leq m}
1874:
1540:A General View of Positivism
1740:Conjectures and Refutations
1572:The Logic of Modern Physics
1389:Deductive-nomological model
941:General Theory of Knowledge
1951:
1700:The Poverty of Historicism
1596:The Universe in a Nutshell
1580:Language, Truth, and Logic
1564:The Analysis of Sensations
1908:
1780:The Rhetoric of Economics
1466:
1461:Positivist-related debate
1455:
1019:
861:The Journal of Philosophy
1716:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
1433:Structural functionalism
1359:Naturalism in literature
348:{\displaystyle \exists }
77:, and relations such as
1843:Willard Van Orman Quine
1556:Idealism and Positivism
1148:Critique of metaphysics
1082:Sociological positivism
939:Schlick, Moritz (1918)
550:is assigned the value r
1888:
1857:Concepts in contention
1498:
1488:
1478:
1369:Objectivity in science
1267:Non-Euclidean geometry
1233:Methodological dualism
1194:
946:Hallvard Lillehammer,
728:
663:
580:
456:
349:
256:
38:(terms employed by an
1930:Philosophy of science
1764:The Poverty of Theory
1384:Philosophy of science
1273:Uncertainty principle
729:
664:
581:
546:) is satisfied when x
457:
350:
257:
30:(terms employed by a
1772:The Scientific Image
1443:Structuration theory
1406:Qualitative research
1307:Criticism of science
1302:Critical rationalism
1238:Problem of induction
855:David Lewis (1970).
681:
624:
618:logically equivalent
608:The combination of F
558:
359:
339:
144:
40:observation language
32:theoretical language
1748:One-Dimensional Man
1196:Geisteswissenschaft
1179:Confirmation holism
936:Oxford Univ. Press.
289:In the theories of
36:observational terms
1823:Hans-Georg Gadamer
1624:Alexander Bogdanov
1500:Positivismusstreit
1295:Post-behavioralism
1259:history of science
1111:Principal concepts
1067:Logical positivism
904:Carnap, R. (1966)
724:
659:
576:
452:
345:
252:
51:logical empiricist
44:empirical language
1935:Sentences by type
1917:
1916:
1904:
1903:
1900:
1899:
1798:Theodor W. Adorno
1614:Richard Avenarius
1490:Werturteilsstreit
1451:
1450:
1399:Sense-data theory
1097:Polish positivism
1072:Positivist school
957:Stathis Psillos,
28:theoretical terms
1942:
1893:
1879:
1803:Gaston Bachelard
1724:Truth and Method
1708:World Hypotheses
1588:The Two Cultures
1503:
1493:
1483:
1468:
1457:
1199:
1153:Unity of science
1062:Legal positivism
1021:
1006:
999:
992:
983:
885:
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852:
733:
731:
730:
727:{\displaystyle }
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708:
707:
668:
666:
665:
660:
649:
648:
636:
635:
585:
583:
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577:
461:
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409:
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374:
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261:
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255:{\displaystyle }
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226:
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213:
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194:
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175:
174:
162:
161:
108:English language
20:Ramsey sentences
1950:
1949:
1945:
1944:
1943:
1941:
1940:
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1920:
1919:
1918:
1913:
1896:
1852:
1818:Paul Feyerabend
1813:Wilhelm Dilthey
1786:
1663:
1602:
1519:
1462:
1447:
1394:Ramsey sentence
1349:Instrumentalism
1278:
1256:
1254:paradigm shifts
1247:
1184:Critical theory
1162:
1158:Verificationism
1106:
1102:Russian Machism
1050:
1015:
1010:
968:
952:Ramsey's legacy
934:Human Knowledge
913:Stathis Psillos
899:Human Knowledge
894:
889:
888:
873:10.2307/2023861
867:(13): 427–446.
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640:
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601:The analytic (A
597:
556:
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529:
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497:
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472:
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381:
365:
357:
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337:
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331:
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323:
319:
312:
308:
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300:
291:Frank P. Ramsey
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185:
166:
153:
142:
141:
127:
123:
100:
63:
17:
12:
11:
5:
1948:
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1932:
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1915:
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1646:
1641:
1639:Émile Durkheim
1636:
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1592:
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1480:Methodenstreit
1474:
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1421:Social science
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1391:
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1376:
1374:Operationalism
1371:
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1514:Science wars
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1312:Epistemology
1243:Reflectivism
1203:Hermeneutics
1055:Declinations
1031:Antihumanism
1024:Perspectives
948:D. H. Mellor
940:
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799:Pierre Duhem
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1869:Objectivity
1838:Karl Popper
1828:Thomas Kuhn
1808:Mario Bunge
1559:(1879–1884)
1494:(1909–1959)
1228:Metaphysics
1208:Historicism
1123:Demarcation
1118:Consilience
1041:Rationalism
892:Works cited
824:Carl Hempel
818:– and both
812:John Winnie
793:Application
134:O-sentences
130:T-sentences
75:sound waves
1924:Categories
1649:Ernst Mach
1644:Ernst Laas
1619:A. J. Ayer
1607:Proponents
1426:Philosophy
1223:Humanities
1167:Antitheses
1036:Empiricism
1013:Positivism
282:, . . ., o
270:, . . ., t
113:eukaryotic
1890:Verstehen
1876:Phronesis
1864:Knowledge
1848:Max Weber
1668:Criticism
1416:Sociology
1354:Modernism
1332:pluralism
1317:anarchism
1213:Historism
1133:Induction
1046:Scientism
806:Criticism
758:, infer F
716:⊨
701:⇔
694:⊨
651:⇔
571:≤
565:≤
437:…
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379:∃
376:…
363:∃
343:∃
234:∧
231:⋯
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215:∧
183:∧
180:⋯
177:∧
164:∧
92:synthetic
67:electrons
1911:Category
1327:nihilism
1322:idealism
1252:Related
1128:Evidence
950:(2005),
830:See also
616:must be
335:Step 3 (
106:nor the
88:analytic
1791:Critics
1516:(1990s)
1510:(1980s)
1504:(1960s)
1484:(1890s)
1337:realism
1269:(1830s)
1257:in the
961:, 2000.
881:2023861
328:. . . o
320:. . . x
309:. . . o
301:. . . t
1783:(1986)
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1599:(2001)
1591:(1959)
1583:(1936)
1575:(1927)
1567:(1886)
1551:(1869)
1543:(1848)
1535:(1830)
1471:Method
1344:Holism
1275:(1927)
879:
782:Ăł TC.
554:, and
537:. . .
521:. . .
505:. . .
489:. . .
473:. . .
104:German
1883:Truth
877:JSTOR
842:Notes
612:and A
83:force
922:(1).
822:and
305:, o
274:, o
90:and
81:and
79:mass
869:doi
778:Ă™ F
770:+ F
762:→ A
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324:, o
278:, o
266:, t
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719:O
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705:R
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669:.
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642:A
638:+
633:T
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574:m
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242:m
238:C
223:2
219:C
210:1
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202:(
199:+
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191:n
187:T
172:2
168:T
159:1
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126:O
122:T
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