93:, participants are asked to take the role of two criminals. In this situation, they are to pretend that they are a pair of criminals being interrogated by detectives in separate rooms. Both participants are being offered a deal and have two options. That is, the participant may remain silent or confess and implicate his or her partner. However, if both participants choose to remain silent, they will be set free. If both participants confess they will receive a moderate sentence. Conversely, if one participant remains silent while the other confesses, the person who confesses will receive a minimal sentence while the person who remained silent (and was implicated by their partner) will receive a maximum sentence. Thus, participants have to make the decision to cooperate with or compete with their partner.
181:: Competitors much like individualists strive to maximize their own outcomes, but in addition they seek to minimize others outcomes. disagreements and arguments are viewed as win-lose situations and competitors find satisfaction in forcing their ideas upon others. A competitor has the belief that each person should get the most they can in each situation and play to win every time. Those with competitive SVOs are more likely to find themselves in conflicts. Competitors cause cooperators to react with criticism to their abrasive styles. However, competitors rarely modify their behavior in response to these complaints because they are relatively unconcerned with maintaining interpersonal relations.
650:
between self and the other) is correlated with the degree of prosocial orientation. A functional magnetic resonance imaging study found that responses of Medial
Prefrontal Cortex - an area that is typically associated with social cognition- mirrored preferences over competitive, individualistic and cooperative allocations. Similar findings in this or neighboring areas (ventromedial and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) have been reported elsewhere.
175:: Members of this category are concerned only with their own outcomes. They make decisions based on what they think they will personally achieve, without concern for others' outcomes. They are focused only on their own outcomes and therefore do not get involved with other group members. They neither assist nor interfere. However their actions may indirectly impact other members of the group but such impact is not their goal.
595:
outcome for the self, a second option maximizes the sum of the outcomes for the self and the other (joint outcome), and the third option maximizes the relative gain (i.e. the difference between the outcome for the self and the outcome for the other). If a subject chooses an option indicating a particular SVO in at least six out of the nine items, the subject is categorized accordingly. That is, a subject is categorized as
209:
557:, i.e. a circle with a certain radius centered at the origin of the Cartesian plane. The vertical axis (y) measures the number of points or amount of money allocated to the other and the horizontal axis (x) measures the amount allocated to the self. Each pair of outcomes corresponds to two adjacent points on the circle. Adding up a subject's 24 choices yields a
28:) is a person's preference about how to allocate resources (e.g. money) between the self and another person. SVO corresponds to how much weight a person attaches to the welfare of others in relation to the own. Since people are assumed to vary in the weight they attach to other peoples' outcomes in relation to their own, SVO is an
883:. It is a challenge for future interdisciplinary research to combine the findings from different scientific disciplines and arrive at a unifying theory of SVO. Representing SVO in terms of a utility function and going beyond the construct's original conceptualization may facilitate the achievement of this ambitious goal.
97:
points or money. On the other hand, Option D is the competitive choice. If just one participants chooses option D, that participant will earn points or money while the other player will lose money. However, if both participant pick D, then both of them will lose money. In addition to displaying participant's
78:. As a simplifying assumption for analyzing strategic interactions, it was generally presumed that people only consider their own outcomes when making decisions in interdependent situations, rather than taking into account the interaction partners' outcomes as well. However, the study of human behavior in
649:
Some recent papers have explored whether Social Value
Orientation is somehow reflected on human brain activity. The first functional magnetic resonance imaging study of Social Value Orientation revealed that response of the amygdala to economic inequity (i.e., absolute value of reward difference
561:
with a certain length and angle. The length of the vector indicates the consistency of a subject's choice behavior, while the angle indicates that subject's SVO. Subjects are then categorized into one out of eight SVO categories according to their SVO angle, given a sufficiently consistent choice
594:
as suggested by
Messick and McClintock (1968). Concretely, the triple-dominance measure consists of nine items, each of which asks a subject to choose one out of three own-other-outcome allocations. The three options do have the same characteristics in each of the items. One option maximizes the
552:
The Ring measure was devised by Wim B. G. Liebrand in 1984 and is based on the geometric SVO framework proposed by
Griesinger and Livingston in 1973. In the Ring measure, subjects are asked to choose between 24 pairs of options that allocate money to the subject and the "other". The 24 pairs of
96:
When used in the lab, the dynamics of this situation are stimulated as participants play for points or for money. Participants are given one of two choices, labeled option C or D. Option C would be the cooperative choice and if both participants choose to be cooperative then they will both earn
692:
Furthermore, it has been shown that individualism is prevalent among very young children, and that the frequency of expressions of prosocial and competitive SVOs increases with age. Among adults, it has been shown repeatedly that prosocial SVOs are most frequently observed (up to 60 percent),
104:
From behavior in strategic situations it is not possible, though, to infer peoples' motives, i.e. the joint outcome they would choose if they alone could determine it. The reason is that behavior in a strategic situation is always a function of both peoples' preferences about joint outcomes
619:
motivational groups. The instrument consists of 6 primary and 9 secondary items. In each item of the paper-based version of the Slider measure, a subject has to indicate her most preferred own-other outcome allocation out of nine options. From a subject's choices in the primary items, the
632:
along a continuum of own-other payoff allocations in the items, allowing for a very precise assessment of a person's SVO. The secondary items can be used for differentiating between the motivations to maximize the joint outcome and to minimize the difference in outcomes
717:. However, the general concept underlying SVO is inherently interdisciplinary, and has been studied under different names in a variety of different scientific fields; it is the concept of distributive preferences. Originally, the SVO construct as conceptualized by the
143:
To give an example, consider two options, A and B. If you choose option A, you will receive $ 100, and another (unknown) person will receive $ 10. If you choose option B, you will receive $ 85, and the other (unknown) person will also receive $ 85. This is a
187:: Cooperators tend to maximize their own outcomes as well as other's outcomes. They prefer strategies that generate win-win situations. When dealing with other people they believe that it is better if everyone comes out even in a situation.
231:, and represent own-other payoff allocation options as coordinates on a circle centered at the origin of the plane. If a person chooses a particular own-other outcome allocation on the ring, that person's SVO can be represented by the
112:
In an attempt to assess peoples' preferences over joint outcomes alone, disentangled from their beliefs about the other persons' behavior, David M. Messick and
Charles G. McClintock in 1968 devised what has become known as the
874:
326:
would indicate a perfectly competitive (maximizing relative gain) SVO. This conceptualization indicates that SVO is a continuous construct, since there is an infinite number of possible SVOs, because angular degrees are
429:
193:: altruists are motivated to help other who are in need. Members of this category are low in self-interest. They willingly sacrifice their own outcomes in the hopes of helping others achieve gain.
562:
pattern. This measure allows for the detection of uncommon pathological SVOs, such as masochism, sadomasochism, or martyrdom, which would indicate that a subject attaches a negative weight (
148:. If a person chooses option B, we can infer that this person does not only consider the outcome for the self when making a decision, but also takes into account the outcome for the other.
879:
Several utility functions as representations of peoples' concerns for the welfare of others have been devised and used (for a very prominent example, see Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) in
140:. Since there is no other person making a decision that affects the joint outcome, there is no interdependence, and therefore a potential effect of beliefs on behavior is ruled out.
1123:
Haruno, M. & Frith, CD. (2010). Activity in the amygdala elicited by unfair divisions predicts social value orientation, Nature
Neuroscience, Volume 13, 2010, Pages 160-161.
324:
294:
1018:
Au, W.T.; Kwong, J.Y.Y. (2004). "Measurement and effects of social-value orientation in social dilemmas". In
Suleiman, R.; Budescu, D.; Fischer, I.; Messick, D. (eds.).
267:
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followed by individualistic SVOs (about 30-40 percent), and competitive SVOs (about 5-10 percent). Evidence also suggests that SVO is first and foremost determined by
486:
459:
205:) with which they could show that SVO is in principle not a categorical, but a continuous construct that allows for an infinite number of social value orientations.
580:
526:
506:
741:. For instance, a representation of SVO that includes the expression of a motivation to minimize differences between outcomes could be formalized as follows.
117:. Basically, any task where one decision maker can alone determine which one out of at least two own-other resource allocation options will be realized is a
1427:
746:
70:
The SVO construct has its history in the study of interdependent decision making, i.e. strategic interactions between two or more people. The advent of
334:
This advancement in the conceptualization of the SVO construct also clarified that SVO as originally conceptualized can be represented in terms of a
235:
of the line starting at the origin of the
Cartesian plane and intersecting the coordinates of the respective chosen own-other outcome allocation.
1674:
1446:
1371:
343:
164:. There are four categories within SVO. Individualistic and competitive SVOs are proself while cooperative and altruistic SVOs are
1251:
D’Attoma, John W; Volintiru, Clara; Malézieux, Antoine (25 January 2020). "Gender, Social Value
Orientation, and Tax Compliance".
904:
Forsyth, D.R. (2006). Conflict. In
Forsyth, D. R., Group Dynamics (5th Ed.) (P. 378-407) Belmont: CA, Wadsworth, Cengage Learning
32:
variable. The general concept underlying SVO has become widely studied in a variety of different scientific disciplines, such as
625:
1499:
Offerman, T.; Sonnemans J.; Schram A. (1996). "Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods".
1644:
710:
17:
238:
If, for instance, a person would choose the option on the circle that maximizes the own outcome, this would refer to an
983:"'The effect of social motives, communication and group size on behaviour in an n-person multi stage mixed motive game"
638:
1192:
Kuss, Katarina; Falk, Armin; Trautner, Peter; Montag, Christian; Weber, Bernd; Fliessbach, Klaus (24 February 2015).
733:. The original SVO concept can be extended, though, by representing peoples' distributive preferences in terms of
1669:
951:
Griesinger, D. W.; Livingston, J. W. (1973). "Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in experimental games".
982:
681:
1614:
74:
in the 1940s provided a formal language for describing and analyzing situations of interdependence based on
29:
488:
is the outcome for the other, and the parameters indicate the weight a person attaches to the own outcome (
1609:
1194:"Neuronal correlates of social decision making are influenced by social value orientationâ€"an fMRI study"
1035:"Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence"
729:. This particular motivation can also not be assessed with commonly used measures of SVO, except with the
726:
698:
536:
Several different measurement methods exist for assessing SVO. The basis for any of these measures is the
1534:
Radzicki, J. (1976). "Technique of conjoint measurement of subjective value of own and other's gains".
90:
83:
1135:"With you or against you: Social orientation dependent learning signals guide actions made for others"
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1629:
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634:
328:
299:
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1516:
1481:
1404:
1325:
272:
46:
917:
Messick, D. M.; McClintock, C. G. (1968). "Motivational Bases of Choice in Experimental Games".
245:
1428:"Commuting by car or public transportation? A social dilemma analysis of travel mode judgments"
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1215:
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136:, it is possible to infer that person's preferences over own-other resource allocations, i.e.
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1106:
1057:
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960:
926:
734:
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616:
615:
The Slider measure assess SVO on a continuous scale, rather than categorizing subjects into
335:
1554:
1603:
296:
would indicate a perfectly cooperative (maximizing joint outcomes) SVO, while an angle of
228:
1343:
McClintock, C.G.; Allison, S.T. (1989). "Social value orientation and helping behavior".
1091:
160:. But when people are also concerned with others' gains and losses, they are said to be
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However, in 1973 Griesinger and Livingston provided a geometric framework of SVO (the
79:
75:
1658:
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1329:
1151:
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541:
122:
1408:
1649:
1372:"From games to giving: Social value orientation predicts donations to noble causes"
1305:
869:{\displaystyle U_{(\pi _{s},\pi _{o})}=a*\pi _{s}+b*\pi _{o}-c*|\pi _{s}-\pi _{o}|}
553:
outcomes correspond to equally spaced adjacent own-other-payoff allocations on an
1034:
1598:
686:
658:
SVO has been shown to be predictive of important behavioral variables, such as:
71:
1053:
109:
their beliefs about the intentions and behavior of their interaction partners.
1624:
1477:
1462:"The impact of social value orientations on negotiator cognition and behavior"
1390:
1306:"Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis"
1110:
1321:
1282:
1219:
1210:
1160:
637:) among prosocial subjects. The SVO Slider Measure has been shown to be more
1573:
1264:
1001:
880:
738:
714:
641:
than previously used measures, and yields SVO scores on a continuous scale.
165:
126:
37:
33:
1447:
10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199605)26:3<373::aid-ejsp760>3.3.co;2-t
1237:
1178:
86:, revealed that some people do in fact appear to have concerns for others.
1071:
964:
582:) to the outcome for the self given the utility function described above.
676:
1520:
1273:
1033:
Van Lange, P.A.M.; Otten, W.; De Bruin, E.M.N.; Joireman, J.A. (1997).
132:
By observing which own-other resource allocation a person chooses in a
41:
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1062:
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232:
207:
1370:
Van Lange, P.A.M.; Bekkers, R.; Schuyt, T.; Van Vugt, M. (2007).
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The basic idea was to represent outcomes for the self (on the
156:
When people seek to maximize their gains, they are said to be
129:, where it is often implemented as a constant-sum situation).
101:, it also displays the dynamics of a mixed-motives situation.
590:
The triple-dominance measure is directly based on the use of
424:{\displaystyle U_{(\pi _{s},\pi _{o})}=a*\pi _{s}+b*\pi _{o}}
713:, but has also been studied in other disciplines, such as
269:, indicating a perfectly individualistic SVO. An angle of
1090:
Murphy, R.O.; Ackermann, K.A.; Handgraaf, M.J.J. (2011).
544:. The most commonly used SVO measures are the following.
725:, which is a distributive preference heavily studied in
1022:. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 71–98.
1020:
Contemporary psychological research on social dilemmas
1133:
Christopoulos, George I.; King-Casas, Brooks (2015).
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1555:"A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation"
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1304:Balliet, D.; Parks, C.; Joireman, J. (2009).
1259:(3). Oxford University Press (OUP): 265–284.
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8:
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1042:Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
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974:
1460:De Dreu, C.K.W.; Van Lange, P.A.M. (1995).
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44:under a multitude of different names (e.g.
1466:Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1310:Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
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919:Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
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645:Neuroscience and Social Value Orientation
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1606:and his Social Values Orientation Theory
1099:Journal of Judgment and Decision Making
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701:plays a minor role in SVO development.
1435:European Journal of Social Psychology
990:European Journal of Social Psychology
7:
1345:Journal of Applied Social Psychology
1198:Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience
1092:"Measuring social value orientation"
721:did not include preferences such as
626:online version of the Slider measure
1379:Basic and Applied Social Psychology
1357:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1989.tb00060.x
624:can be computed. There is also an
14:
540:, i.e. a set of non-constant-sum
508:) and the outcome for the other (
1553:Fehr, E.; Schmidt, K.M. (1999).
1152:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.09.011
709:The SVO construct is rooted in
1562:Quarterly Journal of Economics
862:
834:
781:
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378:
352:
1:
1536:Polish Psychological Bulletin
461:is the outcome for the self,
931:10.1016/0022-1031(68)90046-2
319:{\displaystyle -45^{\circ }}
223:) and for the other (on the
981:Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984).
289:{\displaystyle 45^{\circ }}
173:Individualistic orientation
121:(also often referred to as
52:other-regarding preferences
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1675:Social psychology concepts
1204:. Frontiers Media SA: 40.
1054:10.1037/0022-3514.73.4.733
262:{\displaystyle 0^{\circ }}
1478:10.1177/01461672952111006
1426:; Meertens, R.M. (1996).
1391:10.1080/01973530701665223
1111:10.1017/S1930297500004204
682:proenvironmental behavior
538:decomposed game technique
115:decomposed game technique
99:social value orientations
1322:10.1177/1368430209105040
1211:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00040
1145:. Elsevier BV: 326–335.
665:cooperative behavior in
586:Triple-Dominance Measure
481:{\displaystyle \pi _{o}}
454:{\displaystyle \pi _{s}}
138:social value orientation
82:situations, such as the
22:social value orientation
1615:Experimental psychology
1574:10.1162/003355399556151
1253:CESifo Economic Studies
1002:10.1002/ejsp.2420140302
185:Cooperative orientation
179:Competitive orientation
56:welfare tradeoff ratios
1610:Experimental economics
870:
727:experimental economics
699:genetic predisposition
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522:
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338:of the following form
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191:Altruistic orientation
1265:10.1093/cesifo/ifz016
965:10.1002/bs.3830180305
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628:, where subjects can
597:cooperative/prosocial
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66:Historical background
30:individual difference
1630:Rokeach Value Survey
1501:The Economic Journal
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737:, as is standard in
705:Broader perspectives
687:negotiation behavior
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723:inequality aversion
635:inequality aversion
559:motivational vector
1640:Social preferences
953:Behavioral Science
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731:SVO Slider Measure
719:SVO ring framework
572:
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91:Prisoner's dilemma
84:prisoner's dilemma
47:social preferences
1645:Social psychology
1472:(11): 1178–1188.
1424:Van Lange, P.A.M.
735:utility functions
711:social psychology
677:donation behavior
575:{\displaystyle a}
521:{\displaystyle b}
501:{\displaystyle a}
152:Conceptualization
18:social psychology
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1670:Moral psychology
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1507:(437): 817–845.
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215:: The SVO ring
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134:decomposed game
119:decomposed game
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11:
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1568:(3): 817–868.
1545:
1526:
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1452:
1441:(3): 373–395.
1422:Van Vugt, M.;
1414:
1385:(4): 375–384.
1362:
1351:(4): 353–362.
1335:
1316:(4): 533–547.
1296:
1243:
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1125:
1116:
1105:(8): 771–781.
1077:
1048:(4): 733–746.
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1007:
996:(3): 239–264.
970:
959:(3): 173–188.
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654:Stylized facts
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611:Slider Measure
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371:
367:
362:
358:
354:
350:
313:
309:
305:
283:
279:
256:
252:
195:
194:
188:
182:
176:
153:
150:
80:social dilemma
76:utility theory
67:
64:
60:social motives
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1687:
1676:
1673:
1671:
1668:
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1597:
1596:
1592:
1583:
1579:
1575:
1571:
1567:
1563:
1556:
1549:
1546:
1542:(3): 179–186.
1541:
1537:
1530:
1527:
1522:
1518:
1514:
1510:
1506:
1502:
1495:
1492:
1487:
1483:
1479:
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1471:
1467:
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1429:
1425:
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1410:
1406:
1401:
1396:
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1388:
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1373:
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1358:
1354:
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1336:
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1315:
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1300:
1297:
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1266:
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1258:
1254:
1247:
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1230:
1225:
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1217:
1212:
1207:
1203:
1199:
1195:
1188:
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1180:
1176:
1171:
1166:
1162:
1158:
1153:
1148:
1144:
1140:
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1120:
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1100:
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984:
977:
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966:
962:
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947:
945:
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941:
937:
932:
928:
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920:
913:
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899:
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893:
886:
884:
882:
877:
856:
852:
848:
843:
839:
830:
827:
824:
819:
815:
811:
808:
805:
800:
796:
792:
789:
786:
776:
772:
768:
763:
759:
751:
742:
740:
736:
732:
728:
724:
720:
716:
712:
704:
702:
700:
696:
695:socialization
688:
685:
683:
680:
678:
675:
673:
670:
668:
664:
661:
660:
659:
653:
651:
644:
642:
640:
636:
631:
627:
623:
618:
610:
608:
606:
602:
598:
593:
585:
583:
569:
560:
556:
547:
545:
543:
539:
531:
529:
515:
495:
473:
469:
446:
442:
432:
416:
412:
408:
405:
402:
397:
393:
389:
386:
383:
373:
369:
365:
360:
356:
348:
339:
337:
332:
330:
311:
307:
303:
281:
277:
254:
250:
241:
236:
234:
230:
226:
222:
214:
210:
206:
204:
200:
192:
189:
186:
183:
180:
177:
174:
171:
170:
169:
167:
163:
159:
151:
149:
147:
141:
139:
135:
130:
128:
124:
123:dictator game
120:
116:
110:
108:
102:
100:
94:
92:
87:
85:
81:
77:
73:
65:
63:
61:
57:
53:
49:
48:
43:
39:
35:
31:
27:
23:
19:
1650:Value system
1565:
1561:
1548:
1539:
1535:
1529:
1504:
1500:
1494:
1469:
1465:
1455:
1438:
1434:
1417:
1382:
1378:
1365:
1348:
1344:
1338:
1313:
1309:
1299:
1256:
1252:
1246:
1201:
1197:
1187:
1142:
1138:
1128:
1119:
1102:
1098:
1045:
1041:
1028:
1019:
993:
989:
956:
952:
922:
918:
878:
743:
730:
718:
708:
691:
657:
648:
629:
621:
614:
604:
600:
596:
591:
589:
558:
554:
551:
548:Ring Measure
537:
535:
433:
340:
333:
239:
237:
224:
220:
218:
212:
202:
198:
196:
190:
184:
178:
172:
161:
157:
155:
145:
142:
137:
133:
131:
118:
114:
111:
106:
103:
98:
95:
88:
69:
59:
55:
51:
45:
25:
21:
15:
1665:Game theory
1599:Cooperation
1274:10871/39813
697:, and that
605:competitive
532:Measurement
72:Game theory
1659:Categories
1625:Motivation
1582:10535/6398
1400:1871/17099
1139:NeuroImage
1063:1871/17714
887:References
329:continuous
1486:220683297
1330:141846910
1283:1610-241X
1220:1662-5153
1161:1053-8119
881:economics
853:π
849:−
840:π
831:∗
825:−
816:π
812:∗
797:π
793:∗
773:π
760:π
739:economics
715:economics
622:SVO angle
470:π
443:π
413:π
409:∗
394:π
390:∗
370:π
357:π
312:∘
304:−
282:∘
255:∘
240:SVO angle
166:prosocial
162:prosocial
127:economics
62:, etc.).
38:sociology
34:economics
1593:See also
1409:18146956
1238:25759643
1179:25224998
925:: 1–25.
639:reliable
555:SVO ring
213:Figure 1
203:Figure 1
199:SVO ring
1521:2235360
1291:3338701
1229:4338788
1170:4751040
1072:9325591
617:nominal
227:) on a
158:proself
89:In the
42:biology
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434:where
225:y-axis
221:x-axis
201:, see
40:, and
1558:(PDF)
1517:JSTOR
1482:S2CID
1431:(PDF)
1405:S2CID
1375:(PDF)
1326:S2CID
1095:(PDF)
1038:(PDF)
986:(PDF)
630:slide
603:, or
233:angle
1287:SSRN
1279:ISSN
1234:PMID
1216:ISSN
1175:PMID
1157:ISSN
1068:PMID
1578:hdl
1570:doi
1566:114
1509:doi
1505:106
1474:doi
1443:doi
1395:hdl
1387:doi
1353:doi
1318:doi
1269:hdl
1261:doi
1224:PMC
1206:doi
1165:PMC
1147:doi
1143:104
1107:doi
1058:hdl
1050:doi
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927:doi
528:).
242:of
107:and
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