503:
660:
404:
583:
541:
558:
461:
430:
705:
609:
146:
363:
300:
634:
469:
amendments. However, on 27 July, the informateurs refused to reopen the agreement, insisting that CDA must decide. A majority was willing to accept the agreement and resolve any remaining disputes under the guidance of a formateur. Twelve members, including loyalists, publicly expressed unwillingness to follow Van Agt. Only on 30 July did the parliamentary group agree to a letter stating their readiness to form a government, provided the defense section was removed from the agreement. Regarding the socio-economic section, they believed advice should be sought during the formation phase from the president of the
696:. After adjustments, the proposal was accepted by D'66 ministers, but CDA ministers remained opposed. The CDA would only agree if the labor movement did not make wage demands that would nullify the employment policy's tax increase, which was unacceptable to the PvdA. In the evening of 4 November, the ministers reached a compromise, agreeing to review the labor movement's response in a year, with a wage measure not ruled out. The informateurs then submitted their final report, and on behalf of the cabinet, Van Agt requested permission from the queen to resume office.
396:
would get
Interior Affairs (combined with the Deputy Prime Ministership), CRM, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, Housing and Spatial Planning. As a sixth option, they could choose between Transport and Water Management or Public Health and Environmental Hygiene, with the other going to D'66. D'66 was displeased, as was PvdA. The combination of Interior Affairs with the Deputy Prime Ministership seemed to leave no room for Den Uyl, who had never shown interest in Interior Affairs. Terlouw was particularly dismayed about Defense and preferred Foreign Affairs for
532:, advocating for cooperation with PvdA, openly criticized Van Agt's behavior and the parliamentary group. On 19 August, the CDA parliamentary group voted. Twelve out of 47 members voted for the agreement, even without Van Agt. Sixteen members, including Lubbers, voted against only to prevent Van Agt from resigning. This revealed a majority did indeed support forming a government with PvdA and D'66. Consequently, the formateurs felt compelled to relinquish their mandate.
175:
1501:
17:
392:
unacceptable, although they aimed to prevent another failure like in 1977 due to Van Agt's position. D'66 also opposed Van Agt, hoping to propose
Terlouw as a 'bridge' between CDA and PvdA. However, the CDA party council confirmed on 20 June its commitment to Van Agt's candidacy. The informateurs thus continually postponed the Prime Minister question.
574:'qualitative factors'. On the other hand, Den Uyl had to accept that a funding plan was required for his employment plans. Lubbers managed to persuade Van Agt, along with Van der Stee, to agree to the accord, although both were not enthusiastic. De Gaay Fortman subsequently drafted a final report recommending Van Agt be appointed as formateur.
452:. This led to consternation within the CDA, perceiving it as a defeat for Van Agt. D'66 was furious as well, as the position allocated to Terlouw in Economic Affairs was reduced. As a compromise for Education, a PvdA minister was proposed. Two CDA state secretaries were added as 'watchdogs,' which Den Uyl found unacceptable and postponed.
417:
reluctantly agreed to Van Agt as prime minister, viewed by PvdA as betrayal. Faced with this decision, the PvdA parliamentary group ultimately agreed to Van Agt as prime minister, although eleven members voted against. PvdA then needed to secure more gains in the coalition agreement, obtain better portfolios, and include
137:(1973–1977), but deteriorated further during the 1977 formation and Den Uyl's opposition to the cabinet. Their characters played a significant role in this animosity. The Catholic Van Agt took a relativistic approach to politics, which was not appreciated by Den Uyl, who came from a Calvinist background.
687:
The three parties approached the mending process optimistically. The blame game was kept internal, and little was disclosed about the discussions. The financially prudent informateurs presented a proposal in early
November to finance the employment plan with one billion through a temporary solidarity
527:
On 17 August, the formateurs sought to present the conclusions to the parliamentary groups. Den Uyl and
Terlouw indicated their support. Van Agt refused, stating he would resign if a significant portion of his parliamentary group voted in favor. The parliamentary group board asked Van Agt to moderate
416:
attempted a breakthrough by persuading
Zijlstra to accept the premiership. However, Zijlstra declined for personal reasons and due to substantive objections to the agreement. Not even Klompé and Beatrix could persuade him. Subsequently, CDA informed Den Uyl and Terlouw of the attempt. On 6 July, D'66
395:
Meanwhile, the informateurs proposed a distribution of portfolios. Both CDA and PvdA would receive six ministerial positions, while D'66 would receive three. In addition to the Prime
Ministership, CDA would hold Education, Justice, Development Cooperation, Finance, and Agriculture and Fisheries. PvdA
161:
ruled out this combination. Van Agt was potentially willing to govern with the PvdA, even under Den Uyl's leadership. Similarly, the PvdA declared the same. The party feared a repeat of 1977 and moderated its polarization strategy. Hopes for a left-wing majority government vanished when D'66 excluded
650:
increase was rejected by
Finance Minister Van der Stee and Economic Affairs Minister Terlouw. Due to disagreement, the government statement was postponed by a week. Efforts were made to find a compromise, but in the night from 15 to 16 October, the PvdA ministers voted against Van Agt's final offer.
616:
On 10 September, the actual constitutive consultation took place. There, the PvdA ministers confirmed in a letter written by Van Thijn during his formation attempt that they would cooperate with the deployment of cruise missiles but subsequently resign. On 11 September, the cabinet was sworn in. Due
573:
Relations improved between De Gaay
Fortman and Van Agt when De Gaay Fortman personally visited him at home. They made progress on remaining points of contention. Lubbers was willing to abandon the specific budget cut of 4.5 billion guilders, suggesting the cabinet later determine the amount based on
566:
coalition with the PvdA. Lubbers was subsequently appointed parliamentary leader, although Van Agt had recommended De Koning. The parliamentary group board stated in a press release that Van Agt should still become prime minister. Behind the scenes, Van Agt, along with
Steenkamp and Finance Minister
553:
as suitable for the profile. Terlouw also supported a CDA informateur and mentioned De Gaay
Fortman. State Minister Ruppert had also mentioned his name. When the queen suggested De Gaay Fortman, Van Agt, after a moment's thought, said he would not oppose it. Den Uyl preferred a PvdA member alongside
437:
On 10 July, Van Thijn was appointed as informateur. After a two-day interlude, negotiations resumed. Several points of contention still needed to be worked out, such as nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, minimum income, and housing. Education, in particular, proved problematic. CDA and PvdA had agreed
604:
as the PvdA congress still had to approve the participation of PvdA ministers. During the consultation, Van Agt wanted PvdA ministers to state they could not block a positive decision on deploying cruise missiles, which the PvdA refused to discuss again. Despite many 'points of contention' from the
391:
The informateurs simultaneously asked the parties who should become prime minister. Naturally, CDA proposed Van Agt for the position. There were voices within the party suggesting replacing Van Agt, for instance with Lubbers, to salvage relations with PvdA if Den Uyl resigned. For PvdA, Van Agt was
667:
Immediately after the rupture, the ministers expressed a desire to mend the rift. Lubbers wanted to take on the task of formation himself, but the CDA wanted to avoid giving the impression that, after their significant role in the formation, they were determined to revive the cabinet at all costs.
270:
The big winner of these elections was D'66, which increased its seats from eight to seventeen. The 'big three' parties CDA, PvdA, and VVD all lost seats. CDA went from 49 to 48 seats, PvdA from 53 to 44, and VVD from 28 to 26. As a result of the losses by CDA and VVD, the coalition government lost
645:
was scheduled for 17 October. Den Uyl immediately began with his employment plans, quickly clashing with other ministers from both CDA and D'66. According to them, his plans did not conform to the coalition agreement and threatened others' budgets. What followed were proposals on 8 October for an
565:
Upon hearing this, Van Agt called in sick and informed Bukman that he would step down as parliamentary leader and negotiator. He found his position as negotiator untenable due to the parliamentary group's stance and also criticized the queen's approach for choosing a CDA member clearly favoring a
523:
On 12 August, Van Agt demanded an additional budget cut of 4.5 billion guilders for 1982, resulting from policies of the outgoing cabinet. Den Uyl and Terlouw were again furious, as the implementation of cuts was left to the cabinet. Subsequent discussions deteriorated, and according to several
493:
Despite the CDA's letter, the informateurs drafted their final report and presented it as a definitive agreement. Van Agt strongly objected, but the parliamentary group still wished to proceed. However, on the same day, the D'66 parliamentary group also distanced themselves from the agreement,
370:
The informateurs were tasked with exploring which cabinet could "rely on the broadest possible support in the legislature." They quickly realized that the only possibility for this was a coalition of CDA, PvdA, and D'66. They began substantive negotiations to draft a governing program. Despite
445:
On 20 July, negotiators and informateurs convened for a decisive session. As a solution proposed by Van Thijn, Den Uyl was appointed Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, project minister for employment, integrative minister for the socio-economic sector, and additionally responsible for
468:
The following day, the parliamentary groups of D'66 and PvdA agreed to the negotiation results. The CDA parliamentary group found the agreement unacceptable, feeling too many crucial positions were conceded. Van Agt barely defended the outcome. Subsequently, the parliamentary group proposed
411:
After the release of the agreement, Van Agt proposed on 1 July what he termed "the big leap forward." The agreement would be accepted without changes if the parties agreed to him as prime minister. This proposal was rejected by Terlouw and Den Uyl. On 3 July, Van Agt and CDA chairman
605:
left wing of the PvdA not being achieved, an overwhelming majority of the party congress voted in favor of participating in the cabinet. The congress decided, however, that PvdA ministers should resign if the cabinet proceeded with the deployment of cruise missiles.
548:
On 20 August, Beatrix consulted again with her regular advisers and parliamentary leaders. Van Agt recommended appointing 'an authoritative member of the C.D.A.', adding that they should not have expressed a preference for a coalition yet. He mentioned Steenkamp and
358:
should again become prime minister. On 30 May, Beatrix appointed Lubbers and De Koning as informateurs. According to a parliamentary group staffer, their selection resulted from lobbying by Lubbers with other party leaders and Ministers of State.
520:(CDA) for this role. They were tasked with forming a cabinet based on the informateurs' final report, practically excluding new negotiations. They began working on ministerial appointments and made a proposal on 11 August.
554:
a CDA informateur, while Van Wiegel believed the sitting cabinet's resignation should be rejected as long as D'66 blocked cooperation with CDA and VVD. That same evening, Beatrix appointed De Gaay Fortman as informateur.
166:(CPN). On the other hand, the "Staphorst variant" was mentioned, where CDA and VVD would seek support from small right-wing Christian parties, although Van Agt remarked that "we cannot govern the country that way".
599:
to keep journalists at bay. Assembling the ministerial team proceeded smoothly, comprising political 'heavyweights'. On 8 September, the "pre-constitutive deliberation" took place, which could not be called a
594:
Van Agt was appointed as formateur on 2 September and had to proceed "based on the conclusions of informateur Prof. De Gaay Fortman". This meant no renegotiation of the program. He conducted his work from
668:
Furthermore, they believed that the PvdA had caused the break and thus should provide an informateur. Therefore, the three parties advised in that direction. Therefore, on 17 October, PvdA economists
1081:
659:
608:
582:
557:
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145:
403:
362:
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371:
differences, the first draft coalition agreement was presented on 25 June. It proposed redirecting 4 billion guilders by 1985. The cabinet would temporarily refrain from deploying
1074:
1525:
1504:
1067:
383:. Van Agt described the agreement as "the same policy as the previous cabinet, with a touch of PvdA added." This drew criticism from D'66 and his own party.
107:(D'66). When this failed in the final stages, a coalition of CDA and VVD was quickly formed. The collaboration divided the CDA, where some MPs, known as the
92:
1401:
334:. Den Uyl, Terlouw, and Wiegel believed one CDA informateur was sufficient. Beatrix, who ascended to the throne in 1980, also sought advice from her
157:
caused a certain apathy. Van Agt sought support for continuation of policies and preferred a coalition of CDA, VVD, and D'66. However, D'66's leader
1494:
315:
sought advice in the days following the elections from her regular advisors and the parliamentary leaders. Van Agt proposed appointing two CDA
1476:
1471:
1451:
1226:
328:
421:, who had opposed accepting Van Agt, as an informateur. Initially, Van Agt refused this last point, but eventually agreed under pressure.
1033:
633:
484:
280:
185:
163:
1406:
1050:
1000:
689:
529:
119:
1141:
1530:
1489:
272:
245:
284:
1306:
1301:
1146:
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1441:
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1391:
1361:
1316:
1311:
1241:
1236:
1216:
1211:
1191:
1106:
1032:
Ramakers, Jan (2016). "'Een kabinet dat er nooit had mogen komen'". In Van Baalen, Carla; Van Kessel, Alexander (eds.).
96:
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1136:
642:
477:
265:
88:
61:
49:
41:
506:
Formateurs Kremers (front left) and Van Thijn (front right) receive Van Agt, Den Uyl, Terlouw (rear left to right).
331:
312:
100:
53:
1426:
1421:
1416:
1411:
1381:
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1116:
1111:
1101:
1535:
601:
439:
276:
255:
235:
201:
712:
Even thereafter, the new cabinet faced challenges. It fell on May 29, 1982, barely six months into its term.
1090:
33:
514:
397:
45:
677:
646:
additional five billion in spending, while 4.25 billion needed to be cut. Den Uyl's proposal to let the
622:
511:
470:
304:
112:
84:
78:
25:
510:
Despite D'66 objections, Beatrix aimed to appoint formateurs. On 4 August, she appointed Van Thijn and
487:
129:, who were both party leaders again, were good. However, the relations between Van Agt and PvdA leader
1042:
992:
442:, but both claimed the department. Den Uyl also claimed Finance, and Terlouw desired Foreign Affairs.
347:
115:
the cabinet. Despite the narrow majority and the loyalists, the cabinet managed to finish its term.
669:
108:
99:. During that formation, attempts were initially made for a coalition with the largest party, the
673:
154:
133:
had been strained for a long time. This was already the case when Van Agt was a minister in the
1046:
996:
567:
335:
174:
407:
From left to right: informateur De Koning, Den Uyl, informateur Lubbers, Van Agt and Terlouw.
448:
550:
494:
disagreeing with the informateurs' assertion that the remaining issues had been resolved.
433:
Press conference with informateurs Van Thijn, Lubbers, and De Koning (from left to right).
134:
343:
681:
647:
473:
372:
355:
320:
1519:
684:
was also approached but declined for fear of binding DNB to the coalition agreement.
517:
376:
122:
319:
due to the political complexity and urgency. He considered appointing Senate member
178:
Seat distribution of the newly elected Second Chamber during the cabinet formation.
618:
418:
380:
351:
324:
153:
The campaign was rather tepid. Financial and socio-economic problems following the
130:
104:
57:
21:
16:
480:
413:
339:
316:
158:
126:
37:
1059:
663:
Van Agt (center) with informateurs Halberstadt (left) and De Galan (right).
338:, a practice usually reserved for impasses later in the formation process.
596:
587:
288:
693:
651:
On 16 October, the ministers offered their resignations to the queen.
490:, all prominent CDA members. Den Uyl again found this unacceptable.
703:
658:
632:
607:
581:
556:
539:
501:
459:
428:
402:
361:
298:
173:
144:
15:
446:
Antillean Affairs. His role was termed a 'super minister' in the
1063:
637:
Van Agt during the debate on the cabinet crisis on 19 October.
612:
The PvdA congress during the votes on the coalition agreement.
586:
Formateur Van Agt in discussion with Den Uyl on the steps of
570:, drafted a socio-economic program for Lubbers to negotiate.
354:(former PvdA), whom Beatrix visited, advised that CDA member
763:
761:
708:
Van Agt reads the government statement on 16 November 1981.
561:
Lubbers as negotiator opposite informateur De Gaay Fortman.
149:
Den Uyl and Van Agt in debate during the election campaign.
934:
932:
366:
Informateurs Lubbers and De Koning at a press conference.
287:(participating as Right-wing People's Party in 1981) and
350:(ARP) advocated for a coalition of PvdA, CDA, and D'66.
544:
Informateur De Gaay Fortman giving a press conference.
464:
Van Agt at the parliamentary group meeting on 28 July.
524:
present, it nearly resulted in physical altercation.
83:
The elections followed at the end of the term of the
375:and await the outcome of negotiations between the
987:Van Baalen, Carla; Van Kessel, Alexander (2012).
44:. The formation led to the inauguration of the
28:, shortly after the queen sworn in the cabinet.
24:of the Van Agt II cabinet and Queen Beatrix at
425:Informateurs Lubbers, De Koning, and Van Thijn
95:(VVD). The cabinet was formed in 1977 after a
1075:
8:
676:were appointed as informateurs. Director of
60:(D'66). The cabinet fell shortly before the
1082:
1068:
1060:
307:on 1 June 1981 for the formation process.
271:its majority. Other winners included the
64:, but was patched up within three weeks.
1015:
974:
962:
950:
938:
923:
911:
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887:
875:
863:
851:
839:
827:
815:
803:
791:
779:
767:
752:
740:
728:
93:People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
1495:List of Dutch (in)formateurs and scouts
721:
97:record-long coalition formation process
989:De kabinetsformatie in vijftig stappen
655:Informateurs De Galan and Halberstadt
621:could not take place on the steps of
7:
1526:Cabinet formation in the Netherlands
329:Minister for Development Cooperation
485:Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
295:Informateurs Lubbers and De Koning
164:Communist Party of the Netherlands
14:
530:Wilhelm Friedrich de Gaay Fortman
48:on 11 September, composed of the
1500:
1499:
1490:List of Dutch cabinet formations
498:Formateurs Kremers and Van Thijn
323:along with parliamentary leader
42:general election of 26 May 1981
125:and VVD Deputy Prime Minister
1:
688:levy. This idea stemmed from
625:and had to be moved indoors.
528:his stance. Former Minister
291:disappeared from the House.
1035:Kabinetsformaties 1977-2012
536:Informateur De Gaay Fortman
478:Social and Economic Council
266:1981 Dutch general election
89:Christian Democratic Appeal
50:Christian Democratic Appeal
1552:
483:, and the director of the
456:Parliamentary group caucus
387:Selecting a Prime Minister
275:(new with two seats), the
263:
118:The relations between CDA
76:
1485:
1097:
602:constitutive deliberation
303:Queen Beatrix arrives at
1091:Dutch cabinet formations
515:Commissioner of the King
1531:1981 in the Netherlands
1041:(in Dutch). Amsterdam:
709:
664:
638:
613:
591:
562:
545:
507:
465:
434:
408:
398:Laurens Jan Brinkhorst
367:
308:
279:(gained two), and the
261:
150:
46:second Van Agt cabinet
29:
707:
678:De Nederlandsche Bank
662:
636:
623:Paleis Huis ten Bosch
611:
585:
560:
543:
505:
471:De Nederlandsche Bank
463:
432:
406:
365:
305:Lange Voorhout Palace
302:
177:
162:cooperation with the
148:
113:supply and confidence
87:, a coalition of the
85:first Van Agt cabinet
79:First Van Agt cabinet
26:Paleis Huis ten Bosch
19:
643:government statement
590:on 3 September 1981.
438:on the PvdA-desired
62:government statement
1045:. pp. 81–114.
1018:, pp. 109–110.
977:, pp. 108–109.
965:, pp. 107–108.
926:, pp. 102–103.
914:, pp. 100–102.
902:, pp. 99–101.
710:
674:Victor Halberstadt
665:
639:
614:
592:
563:
546:
508:
476:, chairman of the
466:
435:
409:
368:
336:Ministers of State
309:
283:(gained one). The
262:
151:
111:, merely provided
30:
1513:
1512:
890:, pp. 98–99.
854:, pp. 95–96.
842:, pp. 93–95.
830:, pp. 92–93.
794:, pp. 90–92.
770:, pp. 87–88.
755:, pp. 84–86.
731:, pp. 81–83.
578:Formateur Van Agt
568:Fons van der Stee
488:Cees van den Beld
141:Election campaign
73:Van Agt I Cabinet
34:cabinet formation
1543:
1536:1981 in politics
1503:
1502:
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1077:
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449:Haagsche Courant
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170:Election results
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657:
631:
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551:Willem Scholten
538:
500:
458:
427:
389:
373:cruise missiles
348:Marinus Ruppert
297:
268:
260:
259:
251:
249:
241:
239:
231:
229:
225:
223:
219:
217:
216: D'66 (17)
213:
211:
207:
205:
197:
195:
194: PvdA (44)
191:
189:
181:
172:
155:1979 oil crisis
143:
135:Den Uyl cabinet
103:, the CDA, and
81:
75:
70:
12:
11:
5:
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995:. p. 72.
979:
967:
955:
953:, p. 105.
943:
941:, p. 106.
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682:Wim Duisenberg
656:
653:
648:budget deficit
630:
629:Cabinet Crisis
627:
579:
576:
537:
534:
499:
496:
474:Jelle Zijlstra
457:
454:
426:
423:
388:
385:
356:Jelle Zijlstra
321:Piet Steenkamp
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1407:Sep–Nov 1982
1402:May–Jun 1982
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1307:May–Jun 1945
1147:May–Jun 1866
1142:Jan–Feb 1866
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325:Ruud Lubbers
317:informateurs
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105:Democrats 66
101:Labour Party
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58:Democrats 66
56:(PvdA), and
54:Labour Party
31:
22:bordes scene
481:Jan de Pous
414:Piet Bukman
346:(CDA), and
340:Jaap Burger
159:Jan Terlouw
127:Hans Wiegel
52:(CDA), the
38:Netherlands
1520:Categories
1026:References
68:Background
1477:2023–2024
1472:2021–2022
1452:2006–2007
1387:1972–1973
1352:1960–1961
1262:1925–1926
1252:1923–1924
1227:1907–1908
1157:1870–1871
1137:1861–1862
716:Citations
700:Aftermath
692:chairman
1505:Category
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597:Catshuis
588:Catshuis
379:and the
342:(PvdA),
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289:DS'70
1467:2017
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1102:1848
1047:ISBN
1043:Boom
997:ISBN
993:Boom
672:and
641:The
20:The
690:FNV
327:or
281:CPN
277:PSP
273:RPF
258:(3)
256:SGP
248:(1)
246:RPF
238:(1)
236:GPV
204:(3)
202:PSP
188:(3)
186:CPN
1522::
931:^
760:^
400:.
32:A
1083:e
1076:t
1069:v
1055:.
1005:.
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