87:– it is easy to manipulate. For example, suppose there are two issues, the ideal distribution of Alice is (80%, 20%), and the average of the ideal distributions of the other voters is (60%, 40%). Then Alice would be better off if she reports that her ideal distribution is (100%, 0%), since this will pull the average distribution closer to her ideal distribution.
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If all voters try to manipulate simultaneously, the computed average may be substantially different than the "real" average: in a two-issue setting with true average close to (50%, 50%), the computed average may vary by up to 20 percentage points when there are many voters, and the effect can be more
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and interdependent preferences. For uniformly distributed information, the average report dominates the median report from a utilitarian perspective, when the set of admissible reports is designed optimally. For general distributions, the results still hold when there are many agents.
74:: if one voter increases his allocation to one issue while all other allocations remain the same, then the collective allocation to this issue strictly increases; moreover, the rate of increase is the same for all voters (that is, it depends only on the issue).
31:(e.g. the allocation of a budget among different issues), and each of the voters reports his ideal distribution. This is a special case of
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Renault and
Trannoy study the combined use of the average rule and the majority rule, and their effect on minority protection.
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68:: if an issue receives 0 in all individual distributions, then it receives 0 in the collective distribution.
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Intrilligator proved that the average rule is the unique rule that satisfies the following three axioms:
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gives different weights to different voters (for example, based on their level of expertise).
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of all individual ideal distributions. The average rule was first studied formally by
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discards some of the extreme bids, and returns the average of the remaining bids.
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298:"Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example"
43:. This rule and its variants are commonly used in economics and sports.
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214:"Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms"
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An important disadvantage of the average rule is that it is not
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256:"Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule"
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Strict and equal sensitivity to individual allocations
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to it so that it can be listed with similar articles.
35:. It is a simple aggregation rule, that returns the
91:extreme when the true average is more lopsided.
62:distributions, the rule returns a distribution.
121:Rosar compares the average voting rule to the
296:Renault, Régis; Trannoy, Alain (2011-12-01).
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254:Renault, Regis; Trannoy, Alain (May 2005).
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16:Voting system for participatory budgeting
164:"A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice"
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359:needs additional or more specific
162:Intriligator, M. D. (1973-10-01).
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260:Journal of Public Economic Theory
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272:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00200.x
125:, when the voters have diverse
168:The Review of Economic Studies
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212:Rosar, Frank (2015-09-01).
140:Budget-proposal aggregation
33:budget-proposal aggregation
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218:Journal of Economic Theory
315:10.1007/s13209-011-0077-0
230:10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.010
406:Participatory budgeting
27:when the decision is a
101:weighted average rule
41:Michael Intrilligator
25:group decision-making
108:trimmed average rule
66:Unanimity for losers
127:private information
21:average voting rule
123:median voting rule
401:Electoral systems
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372:adding categories
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47:Characterization
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380:November 2023
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85:strategyproof
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56:Completeness:
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79:Manipulation
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29:distribution
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117:Other rules
395:Categories
361:categories
146:References
58:for every
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238:0022-0531
224:: 15–65.
188:0034-6527
368:help out
134:See also
95:Variants
366:Please
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302:SERIEs
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192:JSTOR
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60:n
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