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Everett Hall

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260:), because he took preference of one or the other to be a function of acceptance of the view's basic categories, an attitude he called "categorial commitment". We are all, he claimed, trapped within a "categorio-centric predicament", since we cannot step outside of all categorial frameworks to determine which is best from some preferable outside footing. All we can do is try to determine which is most consonant with both common sense and modern science (which he denied were in irresolvable conflict). Cognizers do this, in his view, by examining what Hall called "the grammar of common sense", which he contrasted with individual common-sense beliefs such as those (like "Here are two hands") included in 162:, he argued that perceptual errors and hallucinations can be explained by various properties being present in a manner other than exemplification. Such "ascriptions" of sensuous properties give evidence, but never provide certainty that the represented properties are also exemplified. This "intentional realism" in his view made the sense-data theory unnecessary. His views on perception are akin to later representationists such as 264:'s famous list. It was Hall's view that any philosophical position that conflicts too deeply or frequently with those features of common sense that are reflected in the basic grammatical forms that natural languages can take will be implausible not only to non-philosophers, but to philosophers as well when they are not actively engaging in revisionary metaphysics. 227:. That is, just as "Snow is white" is true if, and only if snow is white, Jones being saved is called for, if and only if "it were good that Jones be saved." His views regarding what may be named and what can only be "shown" by the grammar of one's language was heavily influenced by 38: 217:
that values are non-natural properties. In his view, values are neither properties nor relations: they are unnameable "ought-to-be-exemplifieds". A's being F is good
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according to which values as well as physical objects and properties are much as generally understood by common sense. He was thus in the tradition of 18th-century
154:, claiming that some neurological events simply have a "mental dimension." His was, however, a property-dualistic version of identity theory, since he took 533: 513: 194:
provides a reasonable foundation for human knowledge only if certain (perceptual) experiences provide their own inherent evidence was a precursor to the
256:, Hall held that there could be neither empirical nor deductive proofs of the superiority of one basic philosophy over another (say, of realism over 518: 465: 407: 186:. Hall's denial that the commonsense worldview must eventually be supplanted by a "scientific image" foreshadows positions later taken by 84:(he was Department Chairman at the last two schools and was Kenan Professor at North Carolina). He also held visiting appointments at 523: 508: 89: 56:
and his notion of what he called the "categorial" primacy of certain assertions. Hall received his A.B. and M.A. degrees from
528: 269: 233: 109: 81: 159: 103: 150:. In spite of his claimed adherence to common sense and the "grammar" of ordinary language, Hall was an advocate of 115: 97: 241:
that maximizes "implementable free choices" as well as a complaint that the purely negative liberties supported by
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are insufficient for contemporary society. This position is set forth in his 1943 paper "An Ethics for Today".
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Hall's meta-ethical views were similarly characterized by the belief that emotions, also being intentional (in
85: 242: 65: 53: 503: 498: 143: 49: 261: 223:"it were good" that A be F. He held that values are in this way akin to semantic dimensions, like 363: 332: 77: 61: 461: 403: 31: 64:(in 1929). Between 1929 and his death in 1960, he taught at the following universities: the 436: 324: 238: 151: 93: 57: 278: 224: 179: 440: 380: 253: 219: 206: 195: 187: 175: 163: 155: 492: 257: 167: 139: 121: 228: 210: 171: 455: 397: 214: 199: 191: 147: 120:(1961). After his death a number of his papers were collected by his colleague, 96:. Hall was the author of four books as well as numerous papers. The books are 17: 277:
in Hall's honor which contained papers by, among others, his former colleague
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This article is about the philosopher. For the chemist, see
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Sellars, "The Intentional Realism of Everett Hall" (1966)
301:, John R. Shook, ed. (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005) p 1007 209:'s sense), provide evidence of the presence of various 313:"The Adequacy of a Neurological Theory of Perception" 399:What is Value?: An Essay in Philosophical Analysis 429:The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 237:. His normative ethics involved support for a 213:in the world. However, Hall did not agree with 138:Hall's philosophy was a linguistic variant of 457:Philosophical Systems, a Categorical Analysis 8: 299:Dictionary Of Modern American Philosophers 52:, known for his advocacy of common-sense 48:(April 24, 1901 – June 17, 1960) was an 317:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 290: 297:"Hall, Everett Wesley (1901-60)", in 281:and his former student Romane Clark. 7: 534:20th-century American philosophers 441:10.1111/j.1536-7150.1943.tb01123.x 25: 514:American philosophers of language 90:University of Southern California 460:. University of Chicago Press. 383:Our Knowledge of Fact and Value 174:, and "color realists" such as 117:Our Knowledge of Fact and Value 105:Modern Science and Human Values 270:Southern Journal of Philosophy 234:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1: 519:American philosophers of mind 454:Hall, Everett Wesley (1960). 82:University of North Carolina 245:at least since the time of 550: 350:Natsoulas, Thomas (1977). 158:to be irreducible. In the 29: 524:Cornell University alumni 423:Hall, Everett W. (1943). 396:Hall, Everett W. (2000). 352:"On Perceptual Aboutness" 311:Hall, Everett W. (1959). 152:mind-body identity theory 509:American epistemologists 86:Northwestern University 42: 529:Analytic philosophers 425:"An ethics for Today" 243:Natural Rights theory 111:Philosophical Systems 66:University of Chicago 60:, and his Ph.D. from 40: 402:. Psychology Press. 160:theory of perception 50:American philosopher 27:American philosopher 127:Categorial Analysis 46:Everett Wesley Hall 182:, Alex Byrne, and 78:University of Iowa 62:Cornell University 43: 467:978-0-226-31321-4 409:978-0-415-22539-7 124:and published as 32:Everett Joel Hall 16:(Redirected from 541: 483: 478: 472: 471: 451: 445: 444: 420: 414: 413: 393: 387: 378: 372: 371: 347: 341: 340: 308: 302: 295: 239:consequentialism 190:. His view that 144:Scottish realist 94:Kyoto University 58:Lawrence College 21: 549: 548: 544: 543: 542: 540: 539: 538: 489: 488: 487: 486: 479: 475: 468: 453: 452: 448: 422: 421: 417: 410: 395: 394: 390: 379: 375: 349: 348: 344: 329:10.2307/2104956 310: 309: 305: 296: 292: 287: 279:Wilfrid Sellars 220:if, and only if 180:D. M. Armstrong 136: 35: 28: 23: 22: 18:Everett W. Hall 15: 12: 11: 5: 547: 545: 537: 536: 531: 526: 521: 516: 511: 506: 501: 491: 490: 485: 484: 473: 466: 446: 435:(4): 433–452. 415: 408: 388: 373: 342: 303: 289: 288: 286: 283: 254:metaphilosophy 207:Franz Brentano 196:Foundherentism 188:Amie Thomasson 176:J. J. C. Smart 164:Gilbert Harman 156:Intentionality 135: 132: 26: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 546: 535: 532: 530: 527: 525: 522: 520: 517: 515: 512: 510: 507: 505: 502: 500: 497: 496: 494: 482: 477: 474: 469: 463: 459: 458: 450: 447: 442: 438: 434: 430: 426: 419: 416: 411: 405: 401: 400: 392: 389: 386: 384: 377: 374: 369: 365: 361: 357: 353: 346: 343: 338: 334: 330: 326: 322: 318: 314: 307: 304: 300: 294: 291: 284: 282: 280: 276: 272: 271: 267:In 1966, The 265: 263: 259: 258:phenomenalism 255: 250: 248: 244: 240: 236: 235: 230: 226: 222: 221: 216: 212: 208: 203: 201: 197: 193: 189: 185: 181: 177: 173: 169: 168:William Lycan 165: 161: 157: 153: 149: 145: 141: 140:naive realism 133: 131: 129: 128: 123: 119: 118: 113: 112: 107: 106: 101: 100: 99:What is Value 95: 91: 87: 83: 79: 75: 71: 67: 63: 59: 55: 51: 47: 39: 33: 19: 476: 456: 449: 432: 428: 418: 398: 391: 382: 376: 362:(1): 75–97. 359: 355: 345: 323:(1): 75–84. 320: 316: 306: 298: 293: 274: 273:published a 268: 266: 251: 232: 229:Wittgenstein 218: 204: 172:Fred Dretske 137: 126: 116: 114:(1960), and 110: 104: 98: 45: 44: 41:Everett Hall 504:1960 deaths 499:1901 births 356:Behaviorism 275:festschrift 215:G. E. Moore 200:Susan Haack 192:Coherentism 184:Michael Tye 148:Thomas Reid 122:E. M. Adams 493:Categories 285:References 247:John Locke 134:Philosophy 80:, and the 70:Ohio State 262:G.E.Moore 368:27758886 130:(1964). 108:(1956), 102:(1952), 74:Stanford 337:2104956 54:realism 464:  406:  385:(1961) 381:Hall, 366:  335:  211:values 92:, and 88:, the 76:, the 364:JSTOR 333:JSTOR 225:truth 462:ISBN 404:ISBN 170:and 437:doi 325:doi 252:In 231:'s 198:of 495:: 431:. 427:. 358:. 354:. 331:. 321:20 319:. 315:. 202:. 178:, 166:, 146:, 72:, 68:, 470:. 443:. 439:: 433:2 412:. 370:. 360:5 339:. 327:: 34:. 20:)

Index

Everett W. Hall
Everett Joel Hall

American philosopher
realism
Lawrence College
Cornell University
University of Chicago
Ohio State
Stanford
University of Iowa
University of North Carolina
Northwestern University
University of Southern California
Kyoto University
What is Value
Modern Science and Human Values
Philosophical Systems
Our Knowledge of Fact and Value
E. M. Adams
Categorial Analysis
naive realism
Scottish realist
Thomas Reid
mind-body identity theory
Intentionality
theory of perception
Gilbert Harman
William Lycan
Fred Dretske

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