312:
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148:'s task is to design the game form in such a way that when each player plays their best response (i.e. behaves strategically), the resulting equilibrium implements the desired social choice function.
286:
144:
The social choice function represents the desired outcome or goal of the game, such as maximizing social welfare or achieving a fair allocation of resources. The
43:
that govern a game and determine its outcome based on each player's choices. A game form differs from a game in that it does not stipulate the
384:
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when the actions consist of providing information about beliefs or preferences, in which case it is called a
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and maps them to both a winner and a set of payments by the bidders.
89:
184:
849:
366:
169:"Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes"
119:
to act in a particular way through an appropriate choice of
68:—which describes all the possible moves a player can make—
226:"Mechanism Design in the Presence of a Pre-Existing Game"
327:
88:
is a game form mapping a message space consisting of
92:
to a winning candidate (the outcome). Similarly, an
1368:
1327:
1109:
1053:
835:
737:
644:
502:
401:
248:"Mechanism design with a restricted action space"
224:Roth, Benjamin N.; Shorrer, Ran I. (March 2015).
246:Blumrosen, Liad; Feldman, Michal (2013-11-01).
133:. This approach is widely used in the study of
378:
347:
8:
287:"Game Theory with Engineering Applications"
385:
371:
363:
354:
340:
76:. The action space is also often called a
192:
103:Often, a game form is a set of rules or
156:
7:
308:
306:
241:
239:
162:
160:
123:. Then, the game form is called an
434:First-player and second-player win
326:. You can help Knowledge (XXG) by
53:, a game form can be defined as a
14:
541:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
310:
299:from the original on 2024-06-29.
96:is a game form that takes each
551:Evolutionarily stable strategy
1:
479:Simultaneous action selection
1411:List of games in game theory
591:Quantal response equilibrium
581:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
516:Bayes correlated equilibrium
1462:Economics and finance stubs
880:Optional prisoner's dilemma
611:Self-confirming equilibrium
252:Games and Economic Behavior
107:designed to implement some
47:or payoffs for each agent.
1478:
1345:Principal variation search
1061:Aumann's agreement theorem
724:Strategy-stealing argument
636:Trembling hand equilibrium
566:Markov perfect equilibrium
561:Mertens-stable equilibrium
305:
1381:Combinatorial game theory
1040:Princess and monster game
596:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
521:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
264:10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.005
1396:Evolutionary game theory
1129:Antoine Augustin Cournot
1015:Guess 2/3 of the average
812:Strictly determined game
606:Satisfaction equilibrium
424:Escalation of commitment
1401:Glossary of game theory
1000:Stackelberg competition
626:Strong Nash equilibrium
167:Gibbard, Allan (1978).
1426:Tragedy of the commons
1406:List of game theorists
1386:Confrontation analysis
1096:Sprague–Grundy theorem
616:Sequential equilibrium
536:Correlated equilibrium
322:-related article is a
113:social choice function
23:and related fields, a
1199:Jean-François Mertens
1457:Social choice theory
1328:Search optimizations
1204:Jennifer Tour Chayes
1091:Revelation principle
1086:Purification theorem
1025:Nash bargaining game
990:Bertrand competition
975:El Farol Bar problem
940:Electronic mail game
905:Lewis signaling game
449:Hierarchy of beliefs
1376:Bounded rationality
995:Cournot competition
945:Rock paper scissors
920:Battle of the sexes
910:Volunteer's dilemma
782:Perfect information
709:Dominant strategies
546:Epsilon-equilibrium
429:Extensive-form game
16:Statistical concept
1355:Paranoid algorithm
1335:Alpha–beta pruning
1214:John Maynard Smith
1045:Rendezvous problem
885:Traveler's dilemma
875:Gift-exchange game
870:Prisoner's dilemma
787:Large Poisson game
754:Bargaining problem
659:Backward induction
631:Subgame perfection
586:Proper equilibrium
146:mechanism designer
84:. For example, an
1434:
1433:
1340:Aspiration window
1309:Suzanne Scotchmer
1264:Oskar Morgenstern
1159:Donald B. Gillies
1101:Zermelo's theorem
1030:Induction puzzles
985:Fair cake-cutting
960:Public goods game
890:Coordination game
764:Intransitive game
694:Forward induction
576:Pareto efficiency
556:Gibbs equilibrium
526:Berge equilibrium
474:Simultaneous game
335:
334:
139:electoral systems
115:), by motivating
1469:
1452:Mechanism design
1421:Topological game
1416:No-win situation
1314:Thomas Schelling
1294:Robert B. Wilson
1254:Merrill M. Flood
1224:John von Neumann
1134:Ariel Rubinstein
1119:Albert W. Tucker
970:War of attrition
930:Matching pennies
571:Nash equilibrium
494:Mechanism design
459:Normal-form game
414:Cooperative game
387:
380:
373:
364:
356:
349:
342:
314:
307:
301:
300:
298:
291:
282:
276:
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243:
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233:
221:
215:
214:
196:
164:
86:electoral system
82:direct mechanism
37:outcome function
1477:
1476:
1472:
1471:
1470:
1468:
1467:
1466:
1437:
1436:
1435:
1430:
1364:
1350:max^n algorithm
1323:
1319:William Vickrey
1279:Reinhard Selten
1234:Kenneth Binmore
1149:David K. Levine
1144:Daniel Kahneman
1111:
1105:
1081:Negamax theorem
1071:Minimax theorem
1049:
1010:Diner's dilemma
865:All-pay auction
831:
817:Stochastic game
769:Mean-field game
740:
733:
704:Markov strategy
640:
506:
498:
469:Sequential game
454:Information set
439:Game complexity
409:Congestion game
397:
391:
361:
360:
304:
296:
289:
285:Ozdaglar, Asu.
284:
283:
279:
245:
244:
237:
223:
222:
218:
185:10.2307/1914235
166:
165:
158:
154:
111:goal (called a
17:
12:
11:
5:
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1325:
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1316:
1311:
1306:
1301:
1296:
1291:
1286:
1284:Robert Axelrod
1281:
1276:
1271:
1266:
1261:
1259:Olga Bondareva
1256:
1251:
1249:Melvin Dresher
1246:
1241:
1239:Leonid Hurwicz
1236:
1231:
1226:
1221:
1216:
1211:
1206:
1201:
1196:
1191:
1186:
1181:
1176:
1174:Harold W. Kuhn
1171:
1166:
1164:Drew Fudenberg
1161:
1156:
1154:David M. Kreps
1151:
1146:
1141:
1139:Claude Shannon
1136:
1131:
1126:
1121:
1115:
1113:
1107:
1106:
1104:
1103:
1098:
1093:
1088:
1083:
1078:
1076:Nash's theorem
1073:
1068:
1063:
1057:
1055:
1051:
1050:
1048:
1047:
1042:
1037:
1032:
1027:
1022:
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1012:
1007:
1002:
997:
992:
987:
982:
977:
972:
967:
962:
957:
952:
947:
942:
937:
935:Ultimatum game
932:
927:
922:
917:
915:Dollar auction
912:
907:
902:
900:Centipede game
897:
892:
887:
882:
877:
872:
867:
862:
857:
855:Infinite chess
852:
847:
841:
839:
833:
832:
830:
829:
824:
822:Symmetric game
819:
814:
809:
807:Signaling game
804:
802:Screening game
799:
794:
792:Potential game
789:
784:
779:
771:
766:
761:
756:
751:
745:
743:
735:
734:
732:
731:
726:
721:
719:Mixed strategy
716:
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686:
681:
676:
671:
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656:
650:
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613:
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601:Risk dominance
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558:
553:
548:
543:
538:
533:
528:
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500:
499:
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496:
491:
486:
481:
476:
471:
466:
461:
456:
451:
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444:Graphical game
441:
436:
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405:
403:
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367:
359:
358:
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344:
336:
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332:
315:
303:
302:
277:
235:
216:
179:(3): 595–614.
155:
153:
150:
125:implementation
98:bidder's price
51:Mathematically
39:is the set of
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1474:
1463:
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1394:
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1374:
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1371:
1369:Miscellaneous
1367:
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1346:
1343:
1341:
1338:
1336:
1333:
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1330:
1326:
1320:
1317:
1315:
1312:
1310:
1307:
1305:
1304:Samuel Bowles
1302:
1300:
1299:Roger Myerson
1297:
1295:
1292:
1290:
1289:Robert Aumann
1287:
1285:
1282:
1280:
1277:
1275:
1272:
1270:
1267:
1265:
1262:
1260:
1257:
1255:
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1250:
1247:
1245:
1244:Lloyd Shapley
1242:
1240:
1237:
1235:
1232:
1230:
1229:Kenneth Arrow
1227:
1225:
1222:
1220:
1217:
1215:
1212:
1210:
1209:John Harsanyi
1207:
1205:
1202:
1200:
1197:
1195:
1192:
1190:
1187:
1185:
1182:
1180:
1179:Herbert Simon
1177:
1175:
1172:
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1160:
1157:
1155:
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1120:
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1038:
1036:
1033:
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1028:
1026:
1023:
1021:
1018:
1016:
1013:
1011:
1008:
1006:
1003:
1001:
998:
996:
993:
991:
988:
986:
983:
981:
980:Fair division
978:
976:
973:
971:
968:
966:
963:
961:
958:
956:
955:Dictator game
953:
951:
948:
946:
943:
941:
938:
936:
933:
931:
928:
926:
923:
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903:
901:
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871:
868:
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861:
858:
856:
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851:
848:
846:
843:
842:
840:
838:
834:
828:
827:Zero-sum game
825:
823:
820:
818:
815:
813:
810:
808:
805:
803:
800:
798:
797:Repeated game
795:
793:
790:
788:
785:
783:
780:
778:
776:
772:
770:
767:
765:
762:
760:
757:
755:
752:
750:
747:
746:
744:
742:
736:
730:
727:
725:
722:
720:
717:
715:
714:Pure strategy
712:
710:
707:
705:
702:
700:
697:
695:
692:
690:
687:
685:
682:
680:
679:De-escalation
677:
675:
672:
670:
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665:
662:
660:
657:
655:
652:
651:
649:
647:
643:
637:
634:
632:
629:
627:
624:
622:
621:Shapley value
619:
617:
614:
612:
609:
607:
604:
602:
599:
597:
594:
592:
589:
587:
584:
582:
579:
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572:
569:
567:
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562:
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557:
554:
552:
549:
547:
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537:
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532:
529:
527:
524:
522:
519:
517:
514:
513:
511:
509:
505:
501:
495:
492:
490:
489:Succinct game
487:
485:
482:
480:
477:
475:
472:
470:
467:
465:
462:
460:
457:
455:
452:
450:
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231:
230:Working Paper
227:
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126:
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118:
114:
110:
106:
101:
99:
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83:
79:
78:message space
75:
74:outcome space
71:
67:
64:
60:
56:
52:
48:
46:
42:
38:
34:
30:
26:
22:
1274:Peyton Young
1269:Paul Milgrom
1184:Hervé Moulin
1124:Amos Tversky
1066:Folk theorem
777:-player game
774:
699:Grim trigger
328:expanding it
317:
280:
255:
251:
229:
219:
194:10419/220562
176:
173:Econometrica
172:
143:
128:
124:
105:institutions
102:
81:
77:
73:
65:
62:
49:
36:
32:
28:
24:
18:
1447:Game theory
1391:Coopetition
1194:Jean Tirole
1189:John Conway
1169:Eric Maskin
965:Blotto game
950:Pirate game
759:Global game
729:Tit for tat
664:Bid shading
654:Appeasement
504:Equilibrium
484:Solved game
419:Determinacy
402:Definitions
395:game theory
258:: 424–443.
21:game theory
1441:Categories
1035:Trust game
1020:Kuhn poker
689:Escalation
684:Deterrence
674:Cheap talk
646:Strategies
464:Preference
393:Topics of
152:References
121:incentives
29:game frame
1219:John Nash
925:Stag hunt
669:Collusion
320:economics
272:0899-8256
203:0012-9682
130:mechanism
109:normative
45:utilities
25:game form
1360:Lazy SMP
1054:Theorems
1005:Deadlock
860:Checkers
741:of games
508:concepts
294:Archived
135:auctions
1112:figures
895:Chicken
749:Auction
739:Classes
211:1914235
94:auction
90:ballots
55:mapping
33:ruleset
270:
209:
201:
117:agents
63:action
57:going
850:Chess
837:Games
318:This
297:(PDF)
290:(PDF)
207:JSTOR
66:space
41:rules
35:, or
531:Core
324:stub
268:ISSN
199:ISSN
137:and
59:from
1110:Key
260:doi
189:hdl
181:doi
127:or
72:an
61:an
19:In
1443::
845:Go
292:.
266:.
256:82
254:.
250:.
238:^
228:.
205:.
197:.
187:.
177:46
175:.
171:.
159:^
141:.
70:to
31:,
27:,
775:n
386:e
379:t
372:v
355:e
348:t
341:v
330:.
274:.
262::
232:.
213:.
191::
183::
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.