845:, considered the assertion of absolute certainty a barrier to inquiry, and in 1901 defined truth as follows: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth." In other words, any unqualified assertion is likely to be at least a little wrong or, if right, still right for not entirely the right reasons. Therefore, one is more veracious by being Socratic, including recognition of one's own ignorance and knowing one may be proved wrong. This is the case, even though in practical matters one sometimes must act, if one is to act at all, with a decision and complete confidence.
652:. In common sense usage, an idea can not only be more justified or less justified but it can also be partially justified (Smith's boss told him X) and partially unjustified (Smith's boss is a liar). Gettier's cases involve propositions that were true, believed, but which had weak justification. In case 1, the premise that the testimony of Smith's boss is "strong evidence" is rejected. The case itself depends on the boss being either wrong or deceitful (Jones did not get the job) and therefore unreliable. In case 2, Smith again has accepted a questionable idea (Jones owns a Ford) with unspecified justification. Without justification, both cases do not undermine the JTB account of knowledge.
720:) came true in this one case. This theory is challenged by the difficulty of giving a principled explanation of how an appropriate causal relationship differs from an inappropriate one (without the circular response of saying that the appropriate sort of causal relationship is the knowledge-producing one); or retreating to a position in which justified true belief is weakly defined as the consensus of learned opinion. The latter would be useful, but not as useful nor desirable as the unchanging definitions of scientific concepts such as momentum. Thus, adopting a causal response to the Gettier problem usually requires one to adopt (as Goldman gladly does) some form of
49:(JTB) account of knowledge. The JTB account holds that knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief; if all three conditions (justification, truth, and belief) are met of a given claim, then we have knowledge of that claim. In his 1963 three-page paper titled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Gettier attempts to illustrate by means of two counterexamples that there are cases where individuals can have a justified, true belief regarding a claim but still fail to know it because the reasons for the belief, while justified, turn out to be false. Thus, Gettier claims to have shown that the JTB account is inadequate because it does not account for all of the
1012:
who makes the knowledge-claim of some proposition p and the information available to the evaluator of this knowledge-claim (even if the evaluator is the same person in a later time). A Gettierian counterexample arises when the justification given by the person who makes the knowledge-claim cannot be accepted by the knowledge evaluator because it does not fit with his wider informational setting. For instance, in the case of the fake barn the evaluator knows that a superficial inspection from someone who does not know the peculiar circumstances involved isn't a justification acceptable as making the proposition p (that it is a real barn) true.
370:. The interesting issue that arises is then of how to know which premises are in reality false or true when deriving a conclusion, because as in the Gettier cases, one sees that premises can be very reasonable to believe and be likely true, but unknown to the believer there are confounding factors and extra information that may have been missed while concluding something. The question that arises is therefore to what extent would one have to be able to go about attempting to "prove" all premises in the argument before solidifying a conclusion.
1067:
putative beliefs in Case I and Case II are not really justified (even though it seems to Smith that they are), because his beliefs are not lined up with the world in the right way, or that it is possible to show that it is invalid to assert that "Smith" has any significant "particular" belief at all, in terms of JTB or otherwise. Such accounts, of course, face the same burden as causalist responses to
Gettier: they have to explain what sort of relationship between the world and the believer counts as a justificatory relationship.
420:
875:
conjunction of some of the properties that accompany it (in particular, truth and justification). Of course, the introduction of irreducible primitives into a philosophical theory is always problematical (some would say a sign of desperation), and such anti-reductionist accounts are unlikely to please those who have other reasons to hold fast to the method behind JTB+G accounts.
622:) for knowledge. A proper account of knowledge, according to this type of view, will contain some fourth condition (JTB + ?). With the fourth condition in place, Gettier counterexamples (and other similar counterexamples) will not work, and we will have an adequate set of criteria that are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge.
1024:
definition of knowledge in which the believer's evidence does not logically necessitate the belief. Since in most cases the believer's evidence does not necessitate a belief, Kirkham embraces skepticism about knowledge; but he notes that a belief can still be rational even if it is not an item of knowledge. (See also:
1091:
suggested that traditional intuitions about
Gettier cases might vary cross-culturally. However, subsequent studies have consistently failed to replicate these results, instead finding that participants from different cultures do share the traditional intuition. More recent studies have been providing
1011:
gives a diagnosis that leads to a dialogical solution to
Gettier's problem. The problem always arises when the given justification has nothing to do with what really makes the proposition true. Now, he notes that in such cases there is always a mismatch between the information available to the person
853:
The difficulties involved in producing a viable fourth condition have led to claims that attempting to repair the JTB account is a deficient strategy. For example, one might argue that what the
Gettier problem shows is not the need for a fourth independent condition in addition to the original three,
324:
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i)
1036:
One might respond to
Gettier by finding a way to avoid his conclusion(s) in the first place. However, it can hardly be argued that knowledge is justified true belief if there are cases that are justified true belief without being knowledge; thus, those who want to avoid Gettier's conclusions have to
607:
This response affirms the JTB account of knowledge, but rejects
Gettier cases. Typically, the proponent of this response rejects Gettier cases because, they say, Gettier cases involve insufficient levels of justification. Knowledge actually requires higher levels of justification than Gettier cases
294:
Gettier's paper used counterexamples to argue that there are cases of beliefs that are both true and justified—therefore satisfying all three conditions for knowledge on the JTB account—but that do not appear to be genuine cases of knowledge. Therefore, Gettier argued, his counterexamples show that
911:
Nozick's definition is intended to preserve
Goldman's intuition that Gettier cases should be ruled out by disacknowledging "accidentally" true justified beliefs, but without risking the potentially onerous consequences of building a causal requirement into the analysis. This tactic though, invites
520:
After arranging to meet with Mark for help with homework, Luke arrives at the appointed time and place. Walking into Mark's office Luke clearly sees Mark at his desk; Luke immediately forms the belief "Mark is in the room. He can help me with my logic homework". Luke is justified in his belief; he
190:
According to the inherited lore of the epistemological tribe, the JTB account enjoyed the status of epistemological orthodoxy until 1963, when it was shattered by Edmund
Gettier... Of course, there is an interesting historical irony here: it isn't easy to find many really explicit statements of a
1052:
or, demonstrate a case in which it is possible to circumvent surrender to the exemplar by eliminating any necessity for it to be considered that JTB apply in just those areas that
Gettier has rendered obscure, without thereby lessening the force of JTB to apply in those cases where it actually is
1023:
has proposed that it is best to start with a definition of knowledge so strong that giving a counterexample to it is logically impossible. Whether it can be weakened without becoming subject to a counterexample should then be checked. He concludes that there will always be a counterexample to any
655:
Other epistemologists accept
Gettier's conclusion. Their responses to the Gettier problem, therefore, consist of trying to find alternative analyses of knowledge. They have struggled to discover and agree upon as a beginning any single notion of truth, or belief, or justifying which is wholly and
571:
This will generate an example of a belief that is sufficiently justified (on some analysis of knowledge) to be knowledge, which is true, and which is intuitively not an example of knowledge. In other words, Gettier cases can be generated for any analysis of knowledge that involves a justification
382:
asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field.
516:
The "no false premises" (or "no false lemmas") solution which was proposed early in the discussion has been criticized, as more general Gettier-style problems were then constructed or contrived in which the justified true belief is said to not seem to be the result of a chain of reasoning from a
346:) that "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", even though Smith has no information whatsoever about the location of Brown. In fact, Jones does not own a Ford, but by sheer coincidence, Brown really is in Barcelona. Again, Smith had a belief that was true and justified, but not knowledge.
135:
A fire has just been lit to roast some meat. The fire hasn’t started sending up any smoke, but the smell of the meat has attracted a cloud of insects. From a distance, an observer sees the dark swarm above the horizon and mistakes it for smoke. "There’s a fire burning at that spot," the distant
1066:
account on which "justification" is understood in such a way that whether or not a belief is "justified" depends not just on the internal state of the believer, but also on how that internal state is related to the outside world. Externalist accounts typically are constructed such that Smith's
162:
Russell's case, called the stopped clock case, goes as follows: Alice sees a clock that reads two o'clock and believes that the time is two o'clock. It is, in fact, two o'clock. There's a problem, however: unknown to Alice, the clock she's looking at stopped twelve hours ago. Alice thus has an
1057:
that Smith has a certain belief and that his belief is true, it seems that in order to propose (1), one must argue that Gettier, (or, that is, the writer responsible for the particular form of words on this present occasion known as case (1), and who makes assertion's about Smith's "putative"
60:
Responses to Gettier's paper have been numerous. Some reject Gettier's examples as inadequate justification, while others seek to adjust the JTB account of knowledge and blunt the force of these counterexamples. Gettier problems have even found their way into sociological experiments in which
874:
that is, as embodying a sort of epistemological "tie" between a truth and a belief. The JTB account is then criticized for trying to get and encapsulate the factivity of knowledge "on the cheap", as it were, or via a circular argument, by replacing an irreducible notion of factivity with the
633:
One response, therefore, is that in none of the above cases was the belief justified because it is impossible to justify anything that is not true. Conversely, the fact that a proposition turns out to be untrue is proof that it was not sufficiently justified in the first place. Under this
1070:
Those who accept (2) are by far in the minority in analytic philosophy; generally, those who are willing to accept it are those who have independent reasons to say that more things count as knowledge than the intuitions that led to the JTB account would acknowledge. Chief among these is
317:
Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would, in the end, be selected and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
401:
with the example). In this one, a man is driving in the countryside, and sees what looks exactly like a barn. Accordingly, he thinks that he is seeing a barn. In fact, that is what he is doing. But what he does not know is that the neighborhood generally consists of many fake barns —
329:
that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in his pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the
752:—which is to say that a justified true belief counts as knowledge if and only if it is also the case that there is no further truth that, had the subject known it, would have defeated her present justification for the belief. (Thus, for example, Smith's justification for
656:
obviously accepted. Truth, belief, and justifying have not yet been satisfactorily defined, so that JTB (justified true belief) may be defined satisfactorily is still problematical, on account or otherwise of Gettier's examples. Gettier, for many years a professor at the
145:
A desert traveller is searching for water. He sees, in the valley ahead, a shimmering blue expanse. Unfortunately, it’s a mirage. But fortunately, when he reaches the spot where there appeared to be water, there actually is water, hidden under a rock. Did the traveller
959:, which describes a certain locality containing a number of fake barns or facades of barns. In the midst of these fake barns is one real barn, which is painted red. There is one more piece of crucial information for this example - the fake barns cannot be painted red.
628:
This response also accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases. However, instead of invoking a fourth condition, it seeks to replace Justification itself for some other third condition (?TB) (or remove it entirely) that will make counterexamples
541:
that "Mark is in the room" was inferred from any premises at all, let alone any false ones, nor led to significant conclusions on its own; Luke did not seem to be reasoning about anything; "Mark is in the room" seems to have been part of what he
982:
According to Nozick's view this fulfills all four premises. Therefore, this is knowledge, since Jones couldn't have been wrong, since the fake barns cannot be painted red. This is a troubling account however, since it seems the first statement
756:
that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is his justified belief that Jones will get the job, combined with his justified belief that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. But if Smith had known the truth that Jones will
970:
Though Jones has gotten lucky, he could have just as easily been deceived and not have known it. Therefore, it doesn't fulfill premise 4, for if Jones saw a fake barn he wouldn't have any idea it was a fake barn. So this is not knowledge.
179:
and Joseph Cruz have stated that the Gettier problem has "fundamentally altered the character of contemporary epistemology" and has become "a central problem of epistemology since it poses a clear barrier to analyzing knowledge".
314:
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
854:
but rather that the attempt to build up an account of knowledge by conjoining a set of independent conditions was misguided from the outset. Those who have adopted this approach generally argue that epistemological terms like
592:
moves the discussion into the field of epistemology. Here, the sound (true) arguments ascribed to Smith then need also to be valid (believed) and convincing (justified) if they are to issue in the real-world discussion about
558:
shows that any analysis of knowledge in terms of true belief and some other element of justification that is independent from truth, will be liable to Gettier cases. She offers a formula for generating Gettier cases:
828:
From a pragmatic viewpoint of the kind often ascribed to James, defining on a particular occasion whether a particular belief can rightly be said to be both true and justified is seen as no more than an exercise in
154:
Various theories of knowledge, including some of the proposals that emerged in Western philosophy after Gettier in 1963, were debated by Indo-Tibetan epistemologists before and after Dharmottara. In particular,
321:
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.
634:
interpretation, the JTB definition of knowledge survives. This shifts the problem to a definition of justification, rather than knowledge. Another view is that justification and non-justification are not in
536:
It is argued that it seems as though Luke does not "know" that Mark is in the room, even though it is claimed he has a justified true belief that Mark is in the room, but it is not nearly so clear that the
302:, and secondly that this applies coherently to Smith's putative "belief". That is, that if Smith is justified in believing P, and Smith realizes that the truth of P entails the truth of Q, then Smith would
56:
The terms "Gettier problem", "Gettier case", or even the adjective "Gettiered", are sometimes used to describe any case in the field of epistemology that purports to repudiate the JTB account of knowledge.
712:
be able to "correctly reconstruct" (mentally) that causal chain. Goldman's analysis would rule out Gettier cases in that Smith's beliefs are not caused by the truths of those beliefs; it is merely
163:
accidentally true, justified belief. Russell provides an answer of his own to the problem. Edmund Gettier's formulation of the problem was important as it coincided with the rise of the sort of
688:
condition—a "no-Gettier-problem" condition—which, when added to the conditions of justification, truth, and belief, will yield a set of separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.
780:(1842–1910). In Peirce's view, the truth is nominally defined as a sign's correspondence to its object and pragmatically defined as the ideal final opinion to which sufficient investigation
716:
that Smith's beliefs in the Gettier cases happen to be true, or that the prediction made by Smith: "The winner of the job will have 10 coins", on the basis of his putative belief, (see also
298:
Gettier's case is based on two counterexamples to the JTB analysis, both involving a fictional character named Smith. Each relies on two claims. Firstly, that justification is preserved by
362:) from justified false beliefs that "Jones will get the job" (in case I), and that "Jones owns a Ford" (in case II). This led some early responses to Gettier to conclude that the
406:. Since, if he had been looking at one of them, he would have been unable to tell the difference, his "knowledge" that he was looking at a barn would seem to be poorly founded.
3053:
2113:
Machery, Edouard; Stich, Stephen; Rose, David; Chatterjee, Amita; Karasawa, Kaori; Struchiner, Noel; Sirker, Smita; Usui, Naoki; Hashimoto, Takaaki (August 2015).
533:. Luke's belief that Mark is in the room is true (he is in the room, under his desk) and justified (Mark's hologram is giving the appearance of Mark hard at work).
2357:
684:
The most common direction for this sort of response to take is what might be called a "JTB + G" analysis: that is, an analysis based on finding some
638:. Instead, justification is a matter of degree, with an idea being more or less justified. This account of justification is supported by philosophers such as
525:
Mark that Luke saw, but rather a hologram, perfect in every respect, giving the appearance of Mark diligently grading papers at his desk. Nevertheless, Mark
554:
The main idea behind Gettier's examples is that the justification for the belief is flawed or incorrect, but the belief turns out to be true by sheer luck.
325:(e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not
3099:
648:
568:(3) amend the example again, adding another element of chance such that the belief is true, but which leaves the element of justification unchanged;
3063:
1712:
2448:
295:
the JTB account of knowledge is false, and thus that a different conceptual analysis is needed to correctly track what we mean by "knowledge".
2260:
2187:
1865:
1693:
1466:
1435:
1407:
1379:
1347:
390:
is "The Pyromaniac", in which a struck match lights not for the reasons the pyromaniac imagines but because of some unknown "Q radiation".
191:
JTB analysis of knowledge prior to Gettier. It is almost as if a distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it.
215:
The JTB account of knowledge is the claim that knowledge can be conceptually analyzed as justified true belief, which is to say that the
2418:
2404:
2393:
2381:
657:
220:
2872:
916:
Smith would not have had his belief if it had been false. The most promising answer seems to be that it is because Smith's belief was
2197:
3094:
3089:
2843:
2720:
1283:
1253:
503:
708:
the subject to have that belief (in the appropriate way); and for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, the subject must
1683:
1037:
find some way to defuse Gettier's counterexamples. In order to do so, within the parameters of the particular counter-example or
437:
3084:
1766:
1092:
evidence for the opposite hypothesis, that people from a variety of different cultures have similar intuitions in these cases.
358:), the justified true belief came about, if Smith's purported claims are disputable, as the result of entailment (but see also
1797:
Peirce, C.S. (1898), "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life", Lecture 1 of the Cambridge (MA) Conferences Lectures, published in
565:(2) amend the example, making the element of justification strong enough for knowledge, but the belief false by sheer chance;
484:
2983:
1924:"Funding Models for Collaborative Information Resources and Repositories: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Experience"
927:) prompted a revision, which resulted in the alteration of (3) and (4) to limit themselves to the same method (i.e. vision):
441:
456:
1300:
85:. Gettier himself was not actually the first to raise the problem named after him; its existence was acknowledged by both
2922:
1101:
725:
463:
2917:
2823:
2733:
172:
912:
the riposte that Nozick's account merely hides the problem and does not solve it, for it leaves open the question of
219:
of sentences such as "Smith knows that it rained today" can be given with the following set of conditions, which are
2441:
2152:
355:
339:
1963:
Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen (Spring–Fall 2001). "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions".
430:
3058:
2859:
2851:
2748:
2593:
1177:
470:
3020:
2932:
2828:
2793:
2553:
343:
50:
2000:"No cross-cultural differences in the Gettier car case intuition: A replication study of Weinberg et al. 2001"
1762:
Peirce, C. S. (1899), "F.R.L." [First Rule of Logic], unpaginated manuscript, c. 1899, CP 1.135–140.
3000:
2833:
2709:
2643:
2465:
1088:
894:
or truth-tracking account. Nozick's formulation posits that proposition p is an instance of knowledge when:
855:
452:
363:
264:
164:
20:
342:, has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of
2947:
2867:
2046:
1204:
773:
69:
The question of what constitutes "knowledge" is as old as philosophy itself. Early instances are found in
3048:
3025:
3005:
2887:
2758:
2698:
2434:
1669:
1339:
The Concealed Art of The Soul: Theories of Self and Practices of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology
1079:, who hold that all true belief, including both Gettier's cases and lucky guesses, counts as knowledge.
962:
Jones is driving along the highway, looks up and happens to see the real barn, and so forms the belief:
282:
81:
46:
38:
1708:
2957:
2942:
2573:
2248:
1128:
1072:
359:
70:
2051:
199:
accept that some philosophers before Gettier have advanced a JTB account of knowledge, specifically
3035:
3030:
3010:
2912:
2897:
2892:
2693:
838:
572:
criterion and a truth criterion, which are highly correlated but have some degree of independence.
61:
researchers have studied intuitive responses to Gettier cases from people of varying demographics.
2276:
Lehrer, Keith; Paxson, Thomas Jr. (24 April 1969). "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief".
2688:
2478:
2338:
2309:
2301:
2220:
2064:
2037:
Seyedsayamdost, Hamid (2014). "On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication".
2019:
1980:
1784:
1651:
1643:
1604:
1557:
1549:
1514:
1191:
One use of the Gettier cases has been to test cross-cultural differences on epistemic intuitions.
753:
1782:
Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin. ed.,
796:
for all of us, and guided us expeditiously through our semihospitable world. Peirce argued that
2937:
2518:
2293:
2256:
2183:
1945:
1861:
1689:
1596:
1462:
1431:
1403:
1395:
1375:
1343:
1337:
1279:
1273:
1249:
669:
635:
581:
379:
366:
could be easily adjusted, so that knowledge was justified true belief that does not depend on
110:
1905:
1883:
1243:
477:
3015:
2967:
2902:
2788:
2653:
2628:
2588:
2503:
2330:
2285:
2212:
2126:
2095:
2056:
2011:
1972:
1935:
1831:
1635:
1588:
1541:
1506:
1363:
1315:
1140:
1076:
403:
90:
704:
condition: a subject's belief is justified, for Goldman, only if the truth of a belief has
2773:
2768:
2663:
2618:
2498:
2372:
2265:
2228:
2193:
1909:
1887:
1770:
1716:
1454:
1423:
1398:; McGrew, Lydia (2007). "Chapter 1: Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem".
1333:
1269:
1020:
834:
661:
639:
555:
183:
176:
86:
2376:
2216:
306:
be justified in believing Q. Gettier calls these counterexamples "Case I" and "Case II":
955:
has pointed out that this view remains problematic and uses a counterexample called the
156:
2683:
2678:
2668:
2578:
2543:
2533:
2508:
2483:
2473:
1239:
1124:
1008:
665:
238:
168:
42:
3078:
2798:
2738:
2703:
2638:
2613:
2608:
2568:
2538:
2313:
2238:
2099:
2068:
2023:
1849:
1655:
1608:
1561:
1368:
887:
785:
777:
717:
697:
645:
530:
394:
367:
106:
2362:
1984:
1976:
1763:
1742:
2882:
2813:
2658:
2528:
2513:
2457:
2224:
1819:
1319:
886:
developed an account of knowledge which he called "conclusive reasons", revived by
883:
741:
736:
614:
This response accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases, and affirms that JTB is
387:
30:
2334:
1854:
1532:
Goldman, Alvin I. (18 November 1976). "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge".
2962:
2818:
2808:
2753:
2728:
2673:
2648:
2633:
2603:
2583:
2558:
2488:
1063:
1025:
952:
842:
797:
721:
419:
200:
124:
102:
98:
45:, Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases") challenge the long-held
1735:
1576:
920:
by the truth of what he believes; but that puts us back in the causalist camp.
404:
barn facades designed to look exactly like real barns when viewed from the road
2972:
2952:
2803:
2778:
2743:
2598:
2563:
2548:
2523:
2493:
2366:
1835:
1592:
1164:
1144:
769:
650:
642:
398:
299:
204:
34:
2297:
2153:"Subjective and Objective Justification in the Solution of Gettier's Problem"
1949:
1940:
1923:
1805:, Ketner (ed., intro.) and Putnam (intro., commentary), 105–22, reprinted in
1600:
1275:
Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations
2927:
1038:
863:
2084:"Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology"
286:(210a). This account of knowledge is what Gettier subjected to criticism.
2783:
2389:
859:
761:
get the job, that would have defeated the justification for his belief.)
383:
Hence, X has a justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field.
2342:
2060:
2015:
2763:
2305:
2131:
2114:
1727:
See p. 481 in Peirce, C. S. (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", The
1647:
1553:
1518:
150:, as he stood on the hilltop hallucinating, that there was water ahead?
1370:
Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education
2877:
1623:
1497:
Skyrms, Brian (22 June 1967). "The Explication of 'X knows that p'".
1211:(Summer 2018 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1179:
A Systematic Review of Studies Using Gettier-Type Thought Experiments
878:
830:
2289:
2083:
1999:
1639:
1545:
1510:
879:
Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking
280:, though Plato argued against this very account of knowledge in the
159:
in the 14th century advanced a detailed causal theory of knowledge.
2977:
2623:
2413:
792:
in the way of belief, and a belief was true if in the long run it
277:
2399:
1045:
Gettier's cases are not really cases of justified true belief, or
600:
Responses to Gettier problems have fallen into three categories:
974:
An alternate example is if Jones looks up and forms the belief:
739:
and Thomas Paxson (1969) proposed another response, by adding a
171:
and others, and was used as a justification for a shift towards
75:
2430:
2426:
2178:
Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter D. Klein (eds.),
1899:
For a precise formulation of Fogelin's view, see Claudio Costa
1624:"Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems"
413:
866:, etc. should be analyzed in terms of a primitive notion of
2321:
Swain, Marshall (January 1974). "Epistemic Defeasibility".
837:
whether that belief led to fruitful outcomes is a fruitful
1685:
Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism
1400:
Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason
1058:
beliefs), goes wrong because he has the wrong notion of
1048:
Gettier's cases really are cases of knowledge after all,
93:, the latter of which discussed the problem in his book
2180:
Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem
1902:
Lines of Thought: Rethinking Philosophical Assumptions
378:
In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field",
16:
Philosophical problem about what constitutes knowledge
2198:"On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem"
1900:
1880:
1430:(2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
350:
False premises and generalized Gettier-style problems
1301:"Gettier and Factivity in Indo-Tibetan Epistemology"
1203:
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018).
745:
to the JTB analysis. On their account, knowledge is
2993:
2842:
2719:
2464:
870:rather than vice versa. Knowledge is understood as
680:
The fourth condition (JTB + G) approaches
584:, but the introduction by Gettier of terms such as
529:in the room; he is crouched under his desk reading
444:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1853:
1367:
2255:, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 2016.
562:(1) start with a case of justified false belief;
393:A different perspective on the issue is given by
2268:, "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?"
97:. In fact, the problem has been known since the
1449:
1447:
1005:Pyrronian Reflexions on Truth and Justification
991:; however by Nozick's view the first belief is
354:In both of Gettier's actual examples (see also
188:
143:
133:
521:clearly sees Mark at his desk. In fact, it is
410:Objections to the "no false premises" approach
2442:
1342:. Oxford University Press. pp. 132–138.
1119:
1117:
923:Criticisms and counter examples (notably the
800:could be cleaned up by a pragmatic approach.
772:was developed as a philosophical doctrine by
580:The Gettier problem is formally a problem in
140:that there is a fire burning in the distance?
8:
907:if p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p
289:
2182:, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 2017.
2449:
2435:
2427:
2329:(1). University of Illinois Press: 15–25.
2160:L&PS - Logic and Philosophy of Science
1799:Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
1747:Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
1234:
1232:
1230:
1228:
1226:
2130:
2050:
1939:
1749:v. 5 paragraphs 438–463, see 438, and in
1670:Theory of Knowledge - The Gettier Problem
504:Learn how and when to remove this message
2088:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
700:(1967), who suggested the addition of a
397:in the "fake barns" scenario (crediting
211:Knowledge as justified true belief (JTB)
37:problem concerning the understanding of
1801:v. 1, paragraphs 616–48 in part and in
1785:Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
1278:. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. p. 292.
1248:. Oxford University Press. p. 58.
1209:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1113:
995:knowledge and the second is knowledge.
732:Lehrer–Paxson's defeasibility condition
731:
1053:crucial. Then, though Gettier's cases
904:if p were true, S would believe that p
820:of those effects is the whole of your
290:Gettier's two original counterexamples
276:The JTB account was first credited to
1922:Zalta, Edward; Nodelman, Uri (2010).
1577:"Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?"
1165:"Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"
1129:"Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"
1062:Such an argument often depends on an
999:Robert Fogelin's perspectival account
517:justified false belief. For example:
95:Human knowledge: Its scope and limits
41:. Attributed to American philosopher
7:
1751:Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings
1245:Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction
1041:, they must then either accept that
998:
442:adding citations to reliable sources
131:, gives the following two examples:
2419:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2405:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2394:Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
2382:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
658:University of Massachusetts Amherst
626:Justification replacement response:
338:Smith, it is claimed by the hidden
2241:: "A Causal Theory of Knowing" in
2217:10.1023/B:SYNT.0000047709.27594.c4
1824:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
1822:(May 1971). "Conclusive reasons".
1788:, vol. 2. Reprinted, CP 5.565–573.
1428:Contemporary Theories of Knowledge
14:
3100:Thought experiments in philosophy
2253:Knowledge and the Gettier Problem
2082:Nagel, Jennifer (November 2012).
1803:Reasoning and the Logic of Things
1003:In the first chapter of his book
804:Consider what effects that might
660:later also was interested in the
186:rejects the historical analysis:
136:observer says. Does the observer
2414:"Safety Condition for Knowledge"
2323:American Philosophical Quarterly
2100:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00634.x
1998:Kim, Minsun; Yuan, Yuan (2015).
1087:Some early work in the field of
1032:Attempts to dissolve the problem
605:Affirmations of the JTB account:
418:
2245:v. 64 (1967), pp. 357–372.
1928:Information Standards Quarterly
1881:Oxford, Oxford University Press
1688:, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
429:needs additional citations for
116:Dharmottara, in his commentary
2873:Analytic–synthetic distinction
1320:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.493.x
1182:(Thesis). University of Denver
788:model of truth was that which
101:, and both Indian philosopher
1:
1977:10.5840/philtopics2001291/217
1575:Levin, Michael (2006-07-05).
1207:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
784:lead sooner or later. James'
696:One such response is that of
691:
550:Constructing Gettier problems
117:
2335:10.4324/9780415249126-P012-1
1860:. Harvard University Press.
1402:. Routledge. pp. 7–34.
1374:. Chicago: Scott, Foresman.
1102:Knowledge-first epistemology
1016:Richard Kirkham's skepticism
808:have practical bearings you
2918:Internalism and externalism
2377:"The Analysis of Knowledge"
1628:The Philosophical Quarterly
1482:Chisholm, Roderick (1966).
1461:. Oxford University Press.
1459:Warrant: The Current Debate
1205:"The Analysis of Knowledge"
1176:Popiel, Maximilian (2016).
849:Revisions of JTB approaches
668:, a Finnish philosopher at
612:Fourth condition responses:
175:theories of justification.
3118:
1856:Philosophical Explanations
1015:
356:counterfactual conditional
129:Ascertainment of Knowledge
113:presented examples of it.
53:conditions for knowledge.
18:
3044:
2749:Evolutionary epistemology
2278:The Journal of Philosophy
2243:The Journal of Philosophy
2115:"Gettier Across Cultures"
1836:10.1080/00048407112341001
1622:Zagzebski, Linda (1994).
1593:10.1007/s10670-005-5470-2
1534:The Journal of Philosophy
1499:The Journal of Philosophy
1299:Stoltz, Jonathan (2007).
957:Fake Barn Country example
223:for knowledge to obtain:
3095:Definitions of knowledge
3090:Concepts in epistemology
3021:Philosophy of perception
2824:Representational realism
2794:Naturalized epistemology
1941:10.3789/isqv22n4.2010.04
1769:January 6, 2012, at the
1731:, vol. 15, pp. 481–499,
1682:Paul Boghossian (2007),
344:disjunction introduction
221:necessary and sufficient
195:Despite this, Plantinga
165:philosophical naturalism
51:necessary and sufficient
3001:Outline of epistemology
2834:Transcendental idealism
1733:Google Book Search Beta
1426:; Cruz, Joseph (1999).
1308:Philosophical Quarterly
1145:10.1093/analys/23.6.121
1089:experimental philosophy
948:wouldn't believe that p
742:defeasibility condition
692:Goldman's causal theory
374:The generalized problem
364:definition of knowledge
3085:Philosophical problems
2948:Problem of other minds
1699:, Chapter 7, p 95–101.
890:as what he called the
826:
193:
152:
142:
3026:Philosophy of science
3006:Faith and rationality
2888:Descriptive knowledge
2759:Feminist epistemology
2699:Nicholas Wolterstorff
1083:Experimental research
1073:epistemic minimalists
987:can be inferred from
944:if p weren't true, S
802:
750:justified true belief
595:justified true belief
47:justified true belief
39:descriptive knowledge
2958:Procedural knowledge
2943:Problem of induction
2249:Stephen Hetherington
2151:Alai, Mario (2011).
1965:Philosophical Topics
1807:The Essential Peirce
1270:Dreyfus, Georges B.J
941:would believe that p
841:. Peirce emphasized
833:, but being able to
816:to have. Then, your
812:the objects of your
674:Knowledge and Belief
576:Responses to Gettier
438:improve this article
386:Another scenario by
360:material conditional
21:Münchhausen trilemma
3036:Virtue epistemology
3031:Social epistemology
3011:Formal epistemology
2898:Epistemic injustice
2893:Exploratory thought
2694:Ludwig Wittgenstein
2358:Text of the article
2061:10.1017/epi.2014.27
2016:10.1017/epi.2015.17
1912:, CSP, 2014, ch. 5.
1484:Theory of Knowledge
233:that a proposition
2689:Timothy Williamson
2479:Augustine of Hippo
2132:10.1111/nous.12110
1908:2013-07-13 at the
1886:2013-07-13 at the
1715:2007-02-07 at the
1125:Gettier, Edmund L.
937:if p were true, S
267:in believing that
29:, in the field of
3072:
3071:
2938:Privileged access
2574:Søren Kierkegaard
2400:"Gettier problem"
2261:978-1-107-14956-4
2188:978-0-198-72455-1
1867:978-0-674-66479-1
1695:978-0-19-923041-9
1468:978-0-19-507862-6
1437:978-0-8476-8936-1
1409:978-0-415-77067-5
1381:978-0-226-73668-6
1364:Scheffler, Israel
1349:978-0-19-920241-6
978:I see a red barn.
934:S believes that p
901:S believes that p
670:Boston University
636:binary opposition
582:first-order logic
539:perceptual belief
514:
513:
506:
488:
453:"Gettier problem"
380:Roderick Chisholm
71:Plato's dialogues
3107:
3016:Metaepistemology
2994:Related articles
2968:Regress argument
2903:Epistemic virtue
2654:Bertrand Russell
2629:Duncan Pritchard
2589:Hilary Kornblith
2504:Laurence BonJour
2451:
2444:
2437:
2428:
2423:
2409:
2386:
2373:Zalta, Edward N.
2346:
2317:
2271:
2244:
2235:
2233:
2227:. Archived from
2202:
2194:Floridi, Luciano
2175:
2173:
2171:
2157:
2137:
2136:
2134:
2110:
2104:
2103:
2079:
2073:
2072:
2054:
2034:
2028:
2027:
1995:
1989:
1988:
1971:(1–2): 429–460.
1960:
1954:
1953:
1943:
1919:
1913:
1897:
1891:
1878:
1872:
1871:
1859:
1846:
1840:
1839:
1816:
1810:
1795:
1789:
1780:
1774:
1760:
1754:
1740:Internet Archive
1725:
1719:
1706:
1700:
1698:
1679:
1673:
1666:
1660:
1659:
1619:
1613:
1612:
1572:
1566:
1565:
1529:
1523:
1522:
1494:
1488:
1487:
1479:
1473:
1472:
1455:Plantinga, Alvin
1451:
1442:
1441:
1424:Pollock, John L.
1420:
1414:
1413:
1392:
1386:
1385:
1373:
1360:
1354:
1353:
1334:Ganeri, Jonardon
1330:
1324:
1323:
1314:(228): 394–415.
1305:
1296:
1290:
1289:
1266:
1260:
1259:
1236:
1221:
1220:
1218:
1216:
1200:
1194:
1193:
1188:
1187:
1173:
1167:
1162:
1156:
1155:
1153:
1151:
1121:
1077:Crispin Sartwell
989:I see a red barn
946:(using method M)
672:, who published
509:
502:
498:
495:
489:
487:
446:
422:
414:
122:
119:
91:Bertrand Russell
33:, is a landmark
3117:
3116:
3110:
3109:
3108:
3106:
3105:
3104:
3075:
3074:
3073:
3068:
3040:
2989:
2908:Gettier problem
2838:
2769:Foundationalism
2715:
2664:Wilfrid Sellars
2619:Alvin Plantinga
2499:George Berkeley
2466:Epistemologists
2460:
2455:
2412:
2398:
2390:Gettier problem
2371:
2363:Gettier problem
2354:
2349:
2320:
2290:10.2307/2024435
2275:
2269:
2266:Richard Kirkham
2242:
2231:
2200:
2192:
2169:
2167:
2155:
2150:
2146:
2144:Further reading
2141:
2140:
2112:
2111:
2107:
2081:
2080:
2076:
2052:10.1.1.697.8000
2036:
2035:
2031:
1997:
1996:
1992:
1962:
1961:
1957:
1921:
1920:
1916:
1910:Wayback Machine
1898:
1894:
1888:Wayback Machine
1879:
1875:
1868:
1848:
1847:
1843:
1818:
1817:
1813:
1796:
1792:
1781:
1777:
1771:Wayback Machine
1761:
1757:
1745:. Reprinted in
1726:
1722:
1717:Wayback Machine
1707:
1703:
1696:
1681:
1680:
1676:
1667:
1663:
1640:10.2307/2220147
1621:
1620:
1616:
1574:
1573:
1569:
1546:10.2307/2025679
1540:(20): 771–791.
1531:
1530:
1526:
1511:10.2307/2024269
1505:(12): 373–389.
1496:
1495:
1491:
1481:
1480:
1476:
1469:
1453:
1452:
1445:
1438:
1422:
1421:
1417:
1410:
1396:McGrew, Timothy
1394:
1393:
1389:
1382:
1362:
1361:
1357:
1350:
1332:
1331:
1327:
1303:
1298:
1297:
1293:
1286:
1268:
1267:
1263:
1256:
1240:Nagel, Jennifer
1238:
1237:
1224:
1214:
1212:
1202:
1201:
1197:
1185:
1183:
1175:
1174:
1170:
1163:
1159:
1149:
1147:
1127:(1 June 1963).
1123:
1122:
1115:
1110:
1098:
1085:
1034:
1021:Richard Kirkham
1018:
1001:
881:
851:
824:of the object.
786:epistemological
767:
734:
694:
682:
662:epistemic logic
640:Paul Boghossian
578:
556:Linda Zagzebski
552:
534:
510:
499:
493:
490:
447:
445:
435:
423:
412:
376:
352:
347:
336:
331:
312:
292:
274:
270:
262:
256:
252:
246:
236:
229:
213:
184:Alvin Plantinga
177:John L. Pollock
120:
111:Peter of Mantua
87:Alexius Meinong
67:
27:Gettier problem
23:
17:
12:
11:
5:
3115:
3114:
3111:
3103:
3102:
3097:
3092:
3087:
3077:
3076:
3070:
3069:
3067:
3066:
3061:
3056:
3051:
3045:
3042:
3041:
3039:
3038:
3033:
3028:
3023:
3018:
3013:
3008:
3003:
2997:
2995:
2991:
2990:
2988:
2987:
2980:
2975:
2970:
2965:
2960:
2955:
2950:
2945:
2940:
2935:
2930:
2925:
2920:
2915:
2910:
2905:
2900:
2895:
2890:
2885:
2880:
2875:
2870:
2865:
2857:
2848:
2846:
2840:
2839:
2837:
2836:
2831:
2826:
2821:
2816:
2811:
2806:
2801:
2796:
2791:
2786:
2781:
2776:
2771:
2766:
2761:
2756:
2751:
2746:
2741:
2736:
2734:Constructivism
2731:
2725:
2723:
2717:
2716:
2714:
2713:
2706:
2701:
2696:
2691:
2686:
2684:Baruch Spinoza
2681:
2679:P. F. Strawson
2676:
2671:
2669:Susanna Siegel
2666:
2661:
2656:
2651:
2646:
2644:W. V. O. Quine
2641:
2636:
2631:
2626:
2621:
2616:
2611:
2606:
2601:
2596:
2591:
2586:
2581:
2576:
2571:
2566:
2561:
2556:
2551:
2546:
2544:Nelson Goodman
2541:
2536:
2534:Edmund Gettier
2531:
2526:
2521:
2519:René Descartes
2516:
2511:
2509:Gilles Deleuze
2506:
2501:
2496:
2491:
2486:
2484:William Alston
2481:
2476:
2474:Thomas Aquinas
2470:
2468:
2462:
2461:
2456:
2454:
2453:
2446:
2439:
2431:
2425:
2424:
2410:
2396:
2387:
2369:
2360:
2353:
2352:External links
2350:
2348:
2347:
2318:
2284:(8): 225–237.
2273:
2263:
2246:
2236:
2234:on 2007-09-26.
2190:
2176:
2147:
2145:
2142:
2139:
2138:
2125:(3): 645–664.
2105:
2094:(3): 495–527.
2074:
2029:
2010:(3): 355–361.
1990:
1955:
1914:
1892:
1873:
1866:
1850:Nozick, Robert
1841:
1811:
1809:, v. 2, 27–41.
1790:
1775:
1755:
1753:, pp. 203–226)
1720:
1701:
1694:
1674:
1661:
1634:(174): 65–73.
1614:
1587:(3): 381–392.
1567:
1524:
1489:
1474:
1467:
1443:
1436:
1415:
1408:
1387:
1380:
1355:
1348:
1325:
1291:
1284:
1261:
1254:
1222:
1195:
1168:
1157:
1139:(6): 121–123.
1112:
1111:
1109:
1106:
1105:
1104:
1097:
1094:
1084:
1081:
1060:justification.
1050:
1049:
1046:
1033:
1030:
1017:
1014:
1009:Robert Fogelin
1000:
997:
980:
979:
968:
967:
950:
949:
942:
935:
932:
909:
908:
905:
902:
899:
880:
877:
850:
847:
766:
763:
733:
730:
693:
690:
681:
678:
631:
630:
623:
609:
577:
574:
551:
548:
519:
512:
511:
426:
424:
417:
411:
408:
375:
372:
368:false premises
351:
348:
337:
335:
332:
313:
311:
308:
291:
288:
273:
272:
268:
260:
258:
254:
253:believes that
250:
248:
244:
239:if and only if
234:
227:
225:
212:
209:
169:W. V. O. Quine
79:(97a–98b) and
66:
63:
43:Edmund Gettier
15:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3113:
3112:
3101:
3098:
3096:
3093:
3091:
3088:
3086:
3083:
3082:
3080:
3065:
3062:
3060:
3057:
3055:
3052:
3050:
3047:
3046:
3043:
3037:
3034:
3032:
3029:
3027:
3024:
3022:
3019:
3017:
3014:
3012:
3009:
3007:
3004:
3002:
2999:
2998:
2996:
2992:
2986:
2985:
2981:
2979:
2976:
2974:
2971:
2969:
2966:
2964:
2961:
2959:
2956:
2954:
2951:
2949:
2946:
2944:
2941:
2939:
2936:
2934:
2931:
2929:
2926:
2924:
2923:Justification
2921:
2919:
2916:
2914:
2911:
2909:
2906:
2904:
2901:
2899:
2896:
2894:
2891:
2889:
2886:
2884:
2881:
2879:
2876:
2874:
2871:
2869:
2866:
2864:
2862:
2858:
2856:
2854:
2850:
2849:
2847:
2845:
2841:
2835:
2832:
2830:
2827:
2825:
2822:
2820:
2817:
2815:
2812:
2810:
2807:
2805:
2802:
2800:
2799:Phenomenalism
2797:
2795:
2792:
2790:
2789:Naïve realism
2787:
2785:
2782:
2780:
2777:
2775:
2772:
2770:
2767:
2765:
2762:
2760:
2757:
2755:
2752:
2750:
2747:
2745:
2742:
2740:
2739:Contextualism
2737:
2735:
2732:
2730:
2727:
2726:
2724:
2722:
2718:
2712:
2711:
2707:
2705:
2704:Vienna Circle
2702:
2700:
2697:
2695:
2692:
2690:
2687:
2685:
2682:
2680:
2677:
2675:
2672:
2670:
2667:
2665:
2662:
2660:
2657:
2655:
2652:
2650:
2647:
2645:
2642:
2640:
2639:Hilary Putnam
2637:
2635:
2632:
2630:
2627:
2625:
2622:
2620:
2617:
2615:
2614:Robert Nozick
2612:
2610:
2609:John McDowell
2607:
2605:
2602:
2600:
2597:
2595:
2592:
2590:
2587:
2585:
2582:
2580:
2577:
2575:
2572:
2570:
2569:Immanuel Kant
2567:
2565:
2562:
2560:
2557:
2555:
2552:
2550:
2547:
2545:
2542:
2540:
2539:Alvin Goldman
2537:
2535:
2532:
2530:
2527:
2525:
2522:
2520:
2517:
2515:
2512:
2510:
2507:
2505:
2502:
2500:
2497:
2495:
2492:
2490:
2487:
2485:
2482:
2480:
2477:
2475:
2472:
2471:
2469:
2467:
2463:
2459:
2452:
2447:
2445:
2440:
2438:
2433:
2432:
2429:
2421:
2420:
2415:
2411:
2407:
2406:
2401:
2397:
2395:
2391:
2388:
2384:
2383:
2378:
2374:
2370:
2368:
2364:
2361:
2359:
2356:
2355:
2351:
2344:
2340:
2336:
2332:
2328:
2324:
2319:
2315:
2311:
2307:
2303:
2299:
2295:
2291:
2287:
2283:
2279:
2274:
2267:
2264:
2262:
2258:
2254:
2250:
2247:
2240:
2239:Alvin Goldman
2237:
2230:
2226:
2222:
2218:
2214:
2210:
2206:
2199:
2195:
2191:
2189:
2185:
2181:
2177:
2165:
2161:
2154:
2149:
2148:
2143:
2133:
2128:
2124:
2120:
2116:
2109:
2106:
2101:
2097:
2093:
2089:
2085:
2078:
2075:
2070:
2066:
2062:
2058:
2053:
2048:
2045:(1): 95–116.
2044:
2040:
2033:
2030:
2025:
2021:
2017:
2013:
2009:
2005:
2001:
1994:
1991:
1986:
1982:
1978:
1974:
1970:
1966:
1959:
1956:
1951:
1947:
1942:
1937:
1933:
1929:
1925:
1918:
1915:
1911:
1907:
1904:
1903:
1896:
1893:
1889:
1885:
1882:
1877:
1874:
1869:
1863:
1858:
1857:
1851:
1845:
1842:
1837:
1833:
1829:
1825:
1821:
1820:Dretske, Fred
1815:
1812:
1808:
1804:
1800:
1794:
1791:
1787:
1786:
1779:
1776:
1772:
1768:
1765:
1759:
1756:
1752:
1748:
1744:
1741:
1737:
1734:
1730:
1724:
1721:
1718:
1714:
1710:
1705:
1702:
1697:
1691:
1687:
1686:
1678:
1675:
1671:
1668:James Pryor.
1665:
1662:
1657:
1653:
1649:
1645:
1641:
1637:
1633:
1629:
1625:
1618:
1615:
1610:
1606:
1602:
1598:
1594:
1590:
1586:
1582:
1578:
1571:
1568:
1563:
1559:
1555:
1551:
1547:
1543:
1539:
1535:
1528:
1525:
1520:
1516:
1512:
1508:
1504:
1500:
1493:
1490:
1486:. p. 23.
1485:
1478:
1475:
1470:
1464:
1460:
1456:
1450:
1448:
1444:
1439:
1433:
1429:
1425:
1419:
1416:
1411:
1405:
1401:
1397:
1391:
1388:
1383:
1377:
1372:
1371:
1365:
1359:
1356:
1351:
1345:
1341:
1340:
1335:
1329:
1326:
1321:
1317:
1313:
1309:
1302:
1295:
1292:
1287:
1285:9780791430972
1281:
1277:
1276:
1271:
1265:
1262:
1257:
1255:9780199661268
1251:
1247:
1246:
1241:
1235:
1233:
1231:
1229:
1227:
1223:
1210:
1206:
1199:
1196:
1192:
1181:
1180:
1172:
1169:
1166:
1161:
1158:
1146:
1142:
1138:
1134:
1130:
1126:
1120:
1118:
1114:
1107:
1103:
1100:
1099:
1095:
1093:
1090:
1082:
1080:
1078:
1074:
1068:
1065:
1061:
1056:
1047:
1044:
1043:
1042:
1040:
1031:
1029:
1027:
1022:
1013:
1010:
1006:
996:
994:
990:
986:
977:
976:
975:
972:
966:I see a barn.
965:
964:
963:
960:
958:
954:
947:
943:
940:
936:
933:
930:
929:
928:
926:
921:
919:
915:
906:
903:
900:
897:
896:
895:
893:
889:
888:Robert Nozick
885:
876:
873:
869:
865:
861:
857:
856:justification
848:
846:
844:
840:
836:
832:
825:
823:
819:
815:
811:
807:
801:
799:
795:
791:
787:
783:
779:
778:William James
775:
771:
764:
762:
760:
755:
751:
749:
744:
743:
738:
729:
727:
726:justification
723:
719:
715:
711:
707:
703:
699:
698:Alvin Goldman
689:
687:
679:
677:
675:
671:
667:
663:
659:
653:
651:
649:
647:
646:Stephen Hicks
643:
641:
637:
627:
624:
621:
617:
613:
610:
606:
603:
602:
601:
598:
596:
591:
587:
583:
575:
573:
569:
566:
563:
560:
557:
549:
547:
545:
544:seemed to see
540:
532:
528:
524:
518:
508:
505:
497:
486:
483:
479:
476:
472:
469:
465:
462:
458:
455: –
454:
450:
449:Find sources:
443:
439:
433:
432:
427:This article
425:
421:
416:
415:
409:
407:
405:
400:
396:
395:Alvin Goldman
391:
389:
384:
381:
373:
371:
369:
365:
361:
357:
349:
345:
341:
333:
328:
323:
319:
309:
307:
305:
301:
296:
287:
285:
284:
279:
266:
259:
249:
243:
242:
240:
232:
224:
222:
218:
210:
208:
206:
202:
198:
192:
187:
185:
181:
178:
174:
170:
166:
160:
158:
151:
149:
141:
139:
132:
130:
126:
121: 770 AD
114:
112:
108:
104:
100:
96:
92:
88:
84:
83:
78:
77:
72:
64:
62:
58:
54:
52:
48:
44:
40:
36:
35:philosophical
32:
28:
22:
2982:
2907:
2883:Common sense
2861:A posteriori
2860:
2852:
2814:Reductionism
2708:
2659:Gilbert Ryle
2529:Fred Dretske
2514:Keith DeRose
2458:Epistemology
2417:
2403:
2380:
2326:
2322:
2281:
2277:
2252:
2229:the original
2211:(1): 61–79.
2208:
2204:
2179:
2168:. Retrieved
2166:(1): 493–501
2163:
2159:
2122:
2118:
2108:
2091:
2087:
2077:
2042:
2038:
2032:
2007:
2003:
1993:
1968:
1964:
1958:
1931:
1927:
1917:
1901:
1895:
1876:
1855:
1844:
1827:
1823:
1814:
1806:
1802:
1798:
1793:
1783:
1778:
1758:
1750:
1746:
1739:
1732:
1728:
1723:
1704:
1684:
1677:
1664:
1631:
1627:
1617:
1584:
1580:
1570:
1537:
1533:
1527:
1502:
1498:
1492:
1483:
1477:
1458:
1427:
1418:
1399:
1390:
1369:
1358:
1338:
1328:
1311:
1307:
1294:
1274:
1264:
1244:
1213:. Retrieved
1208:
1198:
1190:
1184:. Retrieved
1178:
1171:
1160:
1148:. Retrieved
1136:
1132:
1086:
1069:
1059:
1054:
1051:
1035:
1019:
1004:
1002:
992:
988:
985:I see a barn
984:
981:
973:
969:
961:
956:
951:
945:
938:
925:Grandma case
924:
922:
917:
913:
910:
891:
884:Fred Dretske
882:
871:
867:
852:
827:
821:
817:
813:
809:
805:
803:
793:
789:
781:
768:
758:
747:
746:
740:
737:Keith Lehrer
735:
713:
709:
705:
701:
695:
685:
683:
673:
654:
632:
625:
619:
615:
611:
604:
599:
594:
589:
585:
579:
570:
567:
564:
561:
553:
543:
538:
535:
526:
522:
515:
500:
494:October 2021
491:
481:
474:
467:
460:
448:
436:Please help
431:verification
428:
392:
388:Brian Skyrms
385:
377:
353:
340:interlocutor
326:
320:
316:
303:
297:
293:
281:
275:
257:is true, and
247:is true, and
230:
216:
214:
196:
194:
189:
182:
167:promoted by
161:
153:
147:
144:
137:
134:
128:
115:
94:
80:
74:
68:
59:
55:
31:epistemology
26:
24:
2963:Proposition
2933:Objectivity
2819:Reliabilism
2809:Rationalism
2754:Fallibilism
2729:Coherentism
2674:Ernest Sosa
2649:Thomas Reid
2634:James Pryor
2604:G. E. Moore
2594:David Lewis
2584:Saul Kripke
2579:Peter Klein
2559:Susan Haack
2489:Robert Audi
2272:, 93, 1984.
2170:13 November
1830:(1): 1–22.
1709:Philosopher
1215:23 February
1064:externalist
1026:fallibilism
953:Saul Kripke
892:subjunctive
843:fallibilism
806:conceivably
798:metaphysics
722:reliabilism
201:C. I. Lewis
173:externalist
125:Dharmakirti
103:Dharmottara
99:Middle Ages
3079:Categories
3064:Discussion
3054:Task Force
2973:Simplicity
2953:Perception
2829:Skepticism
2804:Positivism
2779:Infinitism
2744:Empiricism
2599:John Locke
2564:David Hume
2554:Anil Gupta
2549:Paul Grice
2524:John Dewey
2494:A. J. Ayer
2367:PhilPapers
1711:umass.edu
1581:Erkenntnis
1186:2020-12-25
1108:References
868:knowledge,
839:enterprise
822:conception
818:conception
814:conception
774:C.S.Peirce
770:Pragmatism
765:Pragmatism
748:undefeated
714:accidental
620:sufficient
464:newspapers
399:Carl Ginet
300:entailment
283:Theaetetus
226:A subject
205:A. J. Ayer
107:scholastic
82:Theaetetus
73:, notably
19:See also:
2928:Knowledge
2913:Induction
2863:knowledge
2855:knowledge
2314:141673516
2298:0022-362X
2069:146363660
2047:CiteSeerX
2024:145552371
1950:1041-0031
1934:(4): 15.
1672:(archive)
1656:170535616
1609:121760269
1601:0165-0106
1562:163160027
1055:stipulate
939:(using M)
931:p is true
898:p is true
864:certainty
754:believing
676:in 1962.
629:obsolete.
618:(but not
616:necessary
265:justified
109:logician
3049:Category
2868:Analysis
2853:A priori
2844:Concepts
2784:Innatism
2721:Theories
2343:20009512
2205:Synthese
2196:(2004).
2039:Episteme
2004:Episteme
1985:17885700
1906:Archived
1884:Archived
1852:(1981).
1767:Archived
1713:Archived
1457:(1992).
1366:(1965).
1336:(2007).
1272:(1997).
1242:(2014).
1133:Analysis
1096:See also
1039:exemplar
872:factive,
860:evidence
831:pedantry
810:conceive
718:bundling
666:Hintikka
608:involve.
586:believes
237:is true
2984:more...
2764:Fideism
2710:more...
2392:at the
2375:(ed.).
2306:2024435
2225:9602099
1648:2220147
1554:2025679
1519:2024269
1150:5 April
835:discern
478:scholar
334:Case II
271:is true
217:meaning
157:Gaṅgeśa
65:History
2878:Belief
2774:Holism
2341:
2312:
2304:
2296:
2259:
2223:
2186:
2067:
2049:
2022:
1983:
1948:
1890:, 1994
1864:
1764:Eprint
1743:Eprint
1736:Eprint
1729:Monist
1692:
1654:
1646:
1607:
1599:
1560:
1552:
1517:
1465:
1434:
1406:
1378:
1346:
1282:
1252:
918:caused
794:worked
724:about
706:caused
702:causal
686:fourth
480:
473:
466:
459:
451:
310:Case I
3059:Stubs
2978:Truth
2624:Plato
2339:JSTOR
2310:S2CID
2302:JSTOR
2232:(PDF)
2221:S2CID
2201:(PDF)
2156:(PDF)
2065:S2CID
2020:S2CID
1981:S2CID
1652:S2CID
1644:JSTOR
1605:S2CID
1558:S2CID
1550:JSTOR
1515:JSTOR
1304:(PDF)
790:works
782:would
590:knows
531:Frege
485:JSTOR
471:books
278:Plato
231:knows
2294:ISSN
2270:Mind
2257:ISBN
2184:ISBN
2172:2019
2119:Noûs
1946:ISSN
1862:ISBN
1690:ISBN
1597:ISSN
1463:ISBN
1432:ISBN
1404:ISBN
1376:ISBN
1344:ISBN
1280:ISBN
1250:ISBN
1217:2019
1152:2018
776:and
710:also
644:and
588:and
457:news
330:job.
327:know
304:also
203:and
197:does
148:know
138:know
105:and
89:and
76:Meno
25:The
2365:at
2331:doi
2286:doi
2213:doi
2209:142
2127:doi
2096:doi
2057:doi
2012:doi
1973:doi
1936:doi
1832:doi
1636:doi
1589:doi
1542:doi
1507:doi
1316:doi
1141:doi
993:not
914:why
759:not
664:of
523:not
440:by
263:is
127:'s
123:on
3081::
2416:.
2402:.
2379:.
2337:.
2327:II
2325:.
2308:.
2300:.
2292:.
2282:66
2280:.
2251:,
2219:.
2207:.
2203:.
2164:IX
2162:.
2158:.
2123:51
2121:.
2117:.
2092:85
2090:.
2086:.
2063:.
2055:.
2043:12
2041:.
2018:.
2008:12
2006:.
2002:.
1979:.
1969:29
1967:.
1944:.
1932:22
1930:.
1926:.
1828:49
1826:.
1738:,
1650:.
1642:.
1632:44
1630:.
1626:.
1603:.
1595:.
1585:64
1583:.
1579:.
1556:.
1548:.
1538:73
1536:.
1513:.
1503:64
1501:.
1446:^
1312:57
1310:.
1306:.
1225:^
1189:.
1137:23
1135:.
1131:.
1116:^
1075:,
1028:)
1007:,
862:,
858:,
728:.
597:.
546:.
527:is
255:P
241::
207:.
118:c.
2450:e
2443:t
2436:v
2422:.
2408:.
2385:.
2345:.
2333::
2316:.
2288::
2215::
2174:.
2135:.
2129::
2102:.
2098::
2071:.
2059::
2026:.
2014::
1987:.
1975::
1952:.
1938::
1870:.
1838:.
1834::
1773:.
1658:.
1638::
1611:.
1591::
1564:.
1544::
1521:.
1509::
1471:.
1440:.
1412:.
1384:.
1352:.
1322:.
1318::
1288:.
1258:.
1219:.
1154:.
1143::
507:)
501:(
496:)
492:(
482:·
475:·
468:·
461:·
434:.
269:P
261:S
251:S
245:P
235:P
228:S
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.