343:. Then 'quantifier variance' combines the notion that the same object can have different names, so the quantifier may refer to the same thing even though different names are employed by it, and the notion that quantifier expressions can be formed in a variety of ways. Hirsch says this arbitrariness over what 'exists' is a quandary only due to Putnam's formulation, and it is resolved by turning things upside down and saying things that exist can have different names. In other words, Hirsch agrees with Quine that there is an overarching language that we can adapt to different situations. The Carnapian internal/external distinction in this view, as with the subclass/category distinction, is just a matter of language, and has nothing to do with 'reality'.
280:
numbers as values, then the question whether there are numbers becomes a subclass question...Even the question whether there are classes, or whether there are physical objects becomes a subclass question if our language uses a single style of variables to range over both sorts of entities. Whether the statement that there are physical objects and the statement that there are black swans should be put on the same side of the dichotomy, or on opposite sides, comes to depend upon the rather trivial consideration of whether we use one style of variables or two for physical objects and classes.
127:“To be sure, we have to face at this point an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities.”
140:“the decisive question is not the alleged ontological question of the existence of abstract entities but rather the question whether the rise of abstract linguistic forms or, in technical terms, the use of variables beyond those for things (or phenomenal data), is expedient and fruitful for the purposes for which semantical analyses are made, viz. the analysis, interpretation, clarification, or construction of languages of communication, especially
411:: that is, examination of criteria for what is fundamental and what relations exist between all entities and these fundamental ones. But "how can we discover what grounds what?...questions regarding not only what grounds what, but also what the grounding consists in, and how one may discover or discern grounding facts, seem to be part of an emerging set of relational research problems in metaphysics."
351:
between ‘’using’’ a term and ‘’mentioning’’ a term. As Price notes, Carnap holds that there is a mistake involved in "assimilating issues of the existence of numbers (say) and of the existence of physical objects...the distinctions in question are not grounded at the syntactical level." Price suggests a connection with Ryle's view of different functions of language:
25:
406:
upon those in the more fundamental one. While Carnap claims such decisions are pragmatic in nature, external questions with no philosophical importance, Schaffer suggests we avoid this formulation. Instead, we should go back to
Aristotle and look upon nature as hierarchical, and pursue philosophical
350:
a linguistic framework and those asked somehow before the adoption of a linguistic framework, the difference between questions about the construction and rules of a framework, and questions about the decision whether to use a framework. This distinction is called by
Thomasson and Price the difference
279:
It is evident that the question whether there are numbers will be a category question only with respect to languages which appropriate a separate style of variables for the exclusive purpose of referring to numbers. If our language refers to numbers through variables that also take classes other than
318:
A view close to Quine’s subclass/category description is called ‘’conceptual relativity’’. To describe conceptual relativity, Putnam points out that while the pages of a book are regarded as part of book when they are attached, they are things-in-themselves if they are detached. My nose is only part
385:
issue, the use/mention distinction still does not provide a sharp division between the issues of forming and conceptualizing a framework and deciding whether to adopt it: each informs the other. An example is the well-known tension between mathematicians and physicists, the one group very concerned
949:
It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'colored' or 'sexed'. They
319:
of an object, my person. On the other hand, is my nose the same as the collection of atoms or molecules forming it? This arbitrariness of language is called conceptual relativity, a matter of conventions. The point is made that if one wishes to refer only to 'pages', then books may not exist, and
255:
questions. What Quine meant by 'subclass' questions were questions like "what are so-and-so's?" where the answers are restricted to lie within a specific linguistic framework. On the other hand, 'category' questions were questions like "what are so-and-so's?" asked outside any specific language
390:
But the poor mathematician translates it into equations, and as the symbols do not mean anything to him he has no guide but precise mathematical rigor and care in the argument. The physicist, who knows more or less how the answer is going to come out, can sort of guess part way, and so go along
97:
introduced the idea of a 'linguistic framework' or a 'form of language' that uses a precise specification of the definitions of and the relations between ontological entities. The discussion of a proposition within a framework can take on a logical or an empirical (that is, factual) aspect. The
401:
One approach to selecting a framework is based upon an examination of the conceptual relations between entities in a framework, which entities are more 'fundamental'. One framework may then 'include' another because the entities in one framework apparently can be derived from or
113:“After the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic.”
915:
I take it for granted that the world and the things in it exist for the most part in complete independence of our knowledge or language. Our linguistic choices do not determine what exists, but determine what we are to mean by the words "what exists" and related
102:“If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question.”
306:. In other words, Quine's position is that "Carnap's main objection to metaphysics rests on an unsupported premise, namely the assumption that there is some sort of principled plurality in language which blocks Quine's move to homogenize the
323:
if one wishes to admit only to books. Thus, in this view, the
Carnapian multiplicity of possible linguistic frameworks proposes a variety of 'realities' and the prospect of choosing between them, a form of what is called
328:, or multiple realities. The notion of 'one reality' behind our everyday perceptions is common in everyday life, and some find it unsettling that what 'exists' might be a matter of what language one chooses to use.
98:
logical aspect concerns whether the proposition respects the definitions and rules set up in the framework. The empirical aspect concerns the application of the framework in some or another practical situation.
189:. Clearly the question of utility is not completely separable from the way a linguistic framework is organized. A more formal statement of the internal-external difference is provided by Myhill:
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rather rapidly. The mathematical rigor of great precision is not very useful in physics. But one should not criticize the mathematicians on this score...They are doing their own job.
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So we can switch back and forth from internal to external questions just by a shift of vocabulary. As
Thomasson puts it, if our language refers to 'things' we can ask of all the
950:
indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different senses in 'the tide is rising', 'hopes are rising', and 'the average age of death is rising'.
503:
The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association...
275:
Quine argued that there is always possible an overarching language that encompasses both types of question and the distinction between the two types is artificial.
205:
in order to obtain an answer; external otherwise, in particular if the question is part of a chain of reflections and discussions aimed at choosing between
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More recently, some philosophers have stressed that the real issue is not one of language as such, but the difference between questions asked
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The distinction between 'internal' and 'external' arguments is not as obvious as it might appear. For example, discussion of the
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suffice for practical engineering work like building and bridge design, even though the more 'fundamental' theory of the
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over questions of logic and rigor, and the other inclined to sacrifice a bit of rigor to explain observations.
310:." "What is to stop us treating all ontological issues as internal questions within a single grand framework?"
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Ryle's functional orientation attention – his attention to the question as to what a linguistic category
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Quine disputed Carnap's position from several points of view. His most famous criticism of Carnap was
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be a question about the utility of complex numbers: whether there is any practical advantage in using
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The utility of a linguistic framework constitutes issues that Carnap calls 'external' or 'pragmatic'.
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Although not supporting an entire lack of distinction like the subclass/category view of Quine, as a
298:; while if our language includes only 'numbers', we can ask only narrower questions like whether any
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From a very broad point of view, this issue is a particular example of forming and adopting a
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arises as follows: Quine supposes that a particular linguistic framework selects from a broad
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The Role of
Mathematics in Physical Sciences: Interdisciplinary and Philosophical Aspects
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The term 'ontological' pluralism does not cover the entire topic. A different aspect is
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For example see the discussion of the history of the mathematical justification of the
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of talk of beliefs and talk of tables; on the issue of what the two kinds of talk are
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Quantifier
Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology: Essays in Metaontology
872:
Quantifier
Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology: Essays in Metaontology
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403:
247:
Quine's approach to the internal-external division was to cast internal questions as
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is available. The more 'fundamental' model is, for such engineering, superfluous.
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228:, but this work is not directed at the internal-external distinction but at the
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236:. Quine's criticism of the internal-external distinction is found in his works
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725:
610:
Willard Van Orman Quine (October 1951). "On Carnap's views on ontology".
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214:
John R Myhill, Review of W. V. Quine: "On Carnap's Views on
Ontology"
532:
376:
Huw Price, Metaphysics after Carnap: The ghost who walks, p. 331
359:– will instead lead us to focus on the difference between the
565:
From a
Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-philosophical Essays
18:
973:
The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition)
1138:. Continuum International Publishing Group. pp. 14–45.
1052:. In Giovanni Boniolo; Paolo Budinich; Majda Trobok (eds.).
726:"Chapter 11: Metaphysics After Carnap: the Ghost Who Walks?"
1107:
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology
1105:. In David Chalmers; David Manley; Ryan Wasserman (eds.).
843:
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology
841:. In David Chalmers; David Manley; Ryan Wasserman (eds.).
733:
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology
731:. In David Chalmers; Ryan Wasserman; David Manley (eds.).
646:(2nd ed.). Harvard University Press. pp. 203ff.
1132:"Chapter 1: Research Problems and Methods in Metaphysics"
937:(2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press. p. 23.
567:(2nd ed.). Harvard University Press. pp. 20ff.
396:
Richard Feynman, The character of physical law, pp. 56–57
50:
46:
1050:"John von Neumann on mathematics and axiomatic physics"
82:
related to philosophy, and an external part concerning
42:
517:"Review: W. V. Quine, On Carnap's Views on Ontology"
149:
Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"
132:
Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"
118:
Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"
107:
Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"
1034:(Penguin reprint ed.). Penguin Books Limited.
285:
Willard Van Orman Quine, Carnap's views on ontology
787:"Chapter 7: Objectivity and conceptual relativity"
757:
256:where the answers are not so-restricted. The term
201:at the time of his asking, and is prepared to use
167:be an internal question framed in the language of
74:is a distinction used in philosophy to divide an
897:"Chapter 12: Ontology and alternative languages"
388:
353:
277:
191:
138:
125:
111:
100:
698:. In Stephan Blattie; Sandra LaPointe (eds.).
1076:Some caution is warranted here. For example,
1001:The prehistory of the theory of distributions
903:. Oxford University Press. pp. 220–250.
845:. Oxford University Press. pp. 130–156.
836:"Chapter 4: Carnap and ontological pluralism"
735:. Oxford University Press. pp. 320–346.
45:. Consider transferring direct quotations to
8:
868:"Chapter 5: Quantifier variance and realism"
696:"Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology"
268:, a particular or subclass of meanings, say
78:into two parts: an internal part concerning
874:. Oxford University Press. pp. 68–95.
686:
684:
682:
680:
678:
640:"Chapter 19: On Carnap's views on ontology"
232:brought up by Carnap in his work on logic:
1134:. In Robert Barnard; Neil Manson (eds.).
702:. Oxford University Press. Archived from
764:(2nd ed.). Open Court Publishing.
719:
717:
715:
713:
495:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
478:
341:there exists at least one such-and-such
193:"A question...is internal relative to
1136:The Continuum companion to metaphysics
967:Rescorla, Michael (January 13, 2011).
644:The ways of paradox: and other essays
561:"Chapter 2: Two dogmas of empiricism"
36:too many or overly lengthy quotations
7:
488:"Does ontology rest upon a mistake?"
367:, rather than that of what they are
251:questions and external questions as
1100:"Chapter 12: On what grounds what"
14:
667:Willard Van Orman Quine (1960) .
545:Quoted by Oswaldo Chateaubriand,
1176:Meaning (philosophy of language)
559:Willard Van Orman Quine (1980).
23:
834:Matti Eklund (April 17, 2008).
671:. University of Chicago Press.
421:Analytic–synthetic distinction
230:analytic–synthetic distinction
1:
1031:The Character of Physical Law
521:The Journal of Symbolic Logic
339:is just a function that says
238:On Carnap's views on Ontology
72:internal–external distinction
971:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
456:Ordinary language philosophy
431:Indeterminacy of translation
264:of meanings for a term, say
1109:. Oxford University Press.
1086:elementary particle physics
821:"Epistemological pluralism"
599:. Chicago University Press.
294:there are, are any of them
171:about the correct usage of
1192:
1098:Jonathan Schaffer (2009).
793:. MIT Press. p. 111.
791:Representation and Reality
815:epistemological pluralism
760:The many faces of realism
819:E. Brian Davies (2006).
226:Two dogmas of empiricism
219:
43:summarize the quotations
1166:Concepts in metaphysics
1130:Amie Thomasson (2012).
1078:Newton's laws of motion
638:W. V. O. Quine (1976).
593:Rudolf Carnap (1947) .
451:Model-dependent realism
337:'quantifier expression'
209:and some rival theory."
86:related to philosophy.
998:Jesper Lützen (1982).
785:Hilary Putnam (1991).
756:Hilary Putnam (1987).
515:John R Myhill (1955).
486:Stephen Yablo (1998).
399:
379:
308:existential quantifier
288:
217:
152:
137:
121:
110:
1048:Miklós Rédei (2005).
929:Gilbert Ryle (1946).
700:Ontology after Carnap
612:Philosophical Studies
596:Meaning and Necessity
461:Philosophical realism
335:. Loosely speaking a
326:ontological pluralism
234:Meaning and Necessity
197:if the asker accepts
581:this on-line version
467:Vertiginous question
142:languages of science
90:Linguistic framework
1004:. Springer-Verlag.
935:The concept of mind
895:Eli Hirsch (2011).
866:Eli Hirsch (2011).
333:quantifier variance
16:Concept in ontology
1026:Richard P. Feynman
724:Huw Price (2009).
624:10.1007/bf02199422
547:Quine and Ontology
436:Logical positivism
331:A related idea is
1145:978-1-4411-3022-8
931:"Descartes' myth"
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41:Please help
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501:: 229–261.
409:diagnostics
404:'supervene'
314:Later views
80:observation
1160:Categories
1063:1402031068
1046:Quoted by
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