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93:. It contrasts passive and active points of view in how humanity interacts with the world, relying either on a subjective perspective that reflects a point of view or an objective perspective that takes a more detached perspective. Nagel describes the objective perspective as the "view from nowhere", one where the only valuable ideas are ones derived independently.
58:. List also argues that the vertiginous question implies a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness, where no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims ā namely, āfirst-person realismā, ānon-solipsismā, ānon-fragmentationā, and āone worldā ā but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent.
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that denies the existence of any inherent self, and argues that the sense of self is illusory. The answer to the vertiginous question according to open individualism is that all experiences are "liveā, but the illusion of separateness caused by the physical brain and memories causes it to feel like,
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A simple response is that this question reduces to "Why are Hellie's experiences live from Hellie's perspective," which is trivial to answer. However Hellie argues, through a parable, that this response leaves something out. His parable describes two situations, one reflecting a broad global
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view of the self. Tim S. Roberts refers to the question of why a particular organism out of all the organisms that happen to exist happens to be you as the "Even Harder
Problem of Consciousness".
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view from the perspective of a single subject. The former seems to align better with the simple response above, but the latter seems a better description of consciousness.
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from each person's psychological perspective, that their experiences are the only ones live. It is closely related to the concept of
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Hellie, Benj. Against egalitarianism. Preprint of article in
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view of the world and everyone's phenomenal features, and one describing an
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asks why, of all the subjects of experience out there,
211:"The first-personal argument against physicalism"
471:Benj Hellie's page at the University of Toronto.
182:Hellie, Benj (2013). "Against egalitarianism".
387:Minds and Bodies: Philosophers and Their Ideas
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296:On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects
258:On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects
233:"A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness"
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294:"Are You Special? A Review of Caspar Hare's
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338:. Princeton University Press.
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389:. Oxford University Press.
143:Problem of mental causation
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335:Dream, Death, and the Self
260:by Hare, Caspar - Review"
138:Metaphysical subjectivism
305:The Philosophical Review
231:List, Christian (2023).
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108:in Buddhist philosophy.
608:Concepts in metaphysics
332:Valberg, J. J. (2007).
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163:Typeātoken distinction
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318:2015-03-13
169:References
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158:Solipsism
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184:Analysis
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267:Ethics
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