Physicalism - Knowledge (XXG)

717:. Given that everything concrete is physical, and that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality, it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an 'inference to the best explanation'... Micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, for as things stand realistic physicalists can conjecture that only some types of ultimates are intrinsically experiential. But they must allow that panpsychism may be true, and the big step has already been taken with micropsychism, the admission that at least some ultimates must be experiential. 'And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us' I think that the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are experiential would look like the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are spatio-temporal (on the assumption that spacetime is indeed a fundamental feature of reality). I would bet a lot against there being such radical heterogeneity at the very bottom of things. In fact (to disagree with my earlier self) it is hard to see why this view would not count as a form of dualism... So now I can say that physicalism, i.e. real physicalism, entails panexperientialism or panpsychism. All physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy, I trow, is an experience-involving phenomenon. This sounded crazy to me for a long time, but I am quite used to it, now that I know that there is no alternative short of 'substance dualism'... Real physicalism, realistic physicalism, entails panpsychism, and whatever problems are raised by this fact are problems a real physicalist must face. 228:(or panprotopsychism) from physicalism. Further, Restrepo argues that this conception of the physical makes core non-physical entities of non-physicalist metaphysics, like God, Cartesian souls and abstract numbers, physical, and thus either false or trivially true: "God is non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as the thing that created the universe. Supposing emergentism is true, non-physical emergent properties are non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as non-linear effects of certain arrangements of matter. The immaterial Cartesian soul is non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as one of the things that interact causally with certain particles (coincident with the pineal gland). The Platonic number eight is non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable as the number of planets orbiting the Sun". 740:, i.e. why a given individual exists as that individual and not as someone else, and the existence of first-personal facts, is evidence against physicalist theories of consciousness and against other third-personal metaphysical pictures, including standard versions of dualism. List also argues that the vertiginous question implies a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness, where no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims – namely, "first-person realism", "non-solipsism", "non-fragmentation", and "one world" – but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. 476:, in which all substances are "physical", but physical objects may have mental properties as well as physical properties. Token physicalism is not however equivalent to supervenience physicalism. First, token physicalism does not imply supervenience physicalism because the former does not rule out the possibility of non-supervenient properties (provided that they are associated only with physical particulars). Second, supervenience physicalism does not imply token physicalism, for the former allows supervenient objects (such as a "nation", or "soul") that are not equal to any physical object. 505:, the possibility that a psychological process (say) could be instantiated by many different neurological processes (even non-neurological processes, in the case of machine or alien intelligence). For in this case, the neurological terms translating a psychological term must be disjunctions over the possible instantiations, and it is argued that no physical law can use these disjunctions as terms. Type physicalism was the original target of the multiple realizability argument, and it is not clear that token physicalism is susceptible to objections from multiple realizability. 176:. Since any change in a combination of properties must consist of a change in at least one component property, we see that the combination does indeed supervene on the individual properties. The point of this extension is that physicalists usually suppose the existence of various abstract concepts which are non-physical in the ordinary sense of the word; so physicalism cannot be defined in a way that denies the existence of these abstractions. Also, physicalism defined in terms of supervenience does not entail that all properties in the actual world are 192:

metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about". Likewise, the object-based conception claims that "a property is physical if and only if: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents".

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items and invoking the notion of a general kind of stuff. It is true that there is a sense in which this makes my use of the term vacuous, for, relative to our universe, 'physical stuff' is now equivalent to 'real and concrete stuff', and cannot be anything to do with the term 'physical' that is used to mark out a position in what is usually taken to be a substantive debate about the ultimate nature of concrete reality (physicalism vs immaterialism vs dualism vs pluralism vs…). But that is fine by me. If it's back to Carnap, so be it.

401:(3) seems able to handle both the epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem and the blockers problem. With regard to the former, (3) gives the correct result that a purely physical world is one at which physicalism is true, since worlds in which there is some extra stuff are positive duplicates of a purely physical world. With regard to the latter, (3) appears to have the consequence that worlds in which there are blockers are worlds where positive non-physical properties of 693:. Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists committed to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, 'a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity', i.e. as experience or consciousness". Because experiential phenomena allegedly 204:): an argument against theory-based understandings of the physical. Very roughly, Hempel's dilemma is that if we define the physical by reference to current physics, then physicalism is very likely to be false, as it is very likely (by pessimistic meta-induction) that much of current physics is false. But if we instead define the physical in terms of a future (ideal) or completed physics, then physicalism is hopelessly vague or indeterminate. 3206: 290:", some additional pure experience that does not interact with the physical components of the world and is not necessitated by them (does not supervene on them). To handle the epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem, (1) can be modified to include a "that's-all" or "totality" clause or be restricted to "positive" properties. Adopting the former suggestion here, we can reformulate (1) as follows: 3217: 520:

emergentism because it does not need that the subject's psychological experience be novel. The strong version of emergentism is incompatible with physicalism. Since there are novel mental states, mental states are not nothing over and above physical states. But the weak version of emergentism is compatible with physicalism.

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There are two versions of emergentism, the strong version and the weak version. Supervenience physicalism has been seen as a strong version of emergentism, in which the subject's psychological experience is considered genuinely novel. Non-reductive physicalism, on the other side, is a weak version of

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The combination of reductionism and physicalism is usually called reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. The opposite view is non-reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalism is the view that mental states are both nothing over and above physical states and reducible to physical states. One

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concepts, the possession of consciousness has the special property that the presence of PTI and the absence of consciousness will be conceivable—even though, according to them, it is knowable a posteriori that PTI and not Q is not metaphysically possible. These a posteriori physicalists endorse some

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David Papineau and Barbara Montero have advanced and subsequently defended a "via negativa" characterization of the physical. The gist of the via negativa strategy is to understand the physical in terms of what it is not: the mental. In other words, the via negativa strategy understands the physical

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I don't define the physical as concrete reality, as concrete-reality-whatever-it-is; obviously I can't rule out the possibility that there could be other non-physical (and indeed non-spatiotemporal) forms of concrete reality. I simply fix the reference of the term 'physical' by pointing at certain

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Additional objections have been raised to the above definitions provided for supervenience physicalism: one could imagine an alternative world that differs only by the presence of a single ammonium molecule (or physical property), and yet based on (1), such a world might be completely different in

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An "a posteriori physicalist", on the other hand, will reject the claim that PTI → N is knowable a priori. Rather, they would hold that the inference from PTI to N is justified by metaphysical considerations that in turn can be derived from experience. So the claim then is that "PTI and not N" is

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defined a physical proposition as one that can at least in theory be denied by observation). A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are physical in the ordinary sense. It is common to express the notion of "metaphysical or logical

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There are multiple versions of reductionism. In the context of physicalism, the reductions referred to are of a "linguistic" nature, allowing discussions of, say, mental phenomena to be translated into discussions of physics. In one formulation, every concept is analysed in terms of a physical

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where it is true. This world differs from our world, where PTIQ is true. But the other world is a minimal physical duplicate of our world, because PT is true there. So there is a possible world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world, but not a full duplicate; this contradicts the

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concept. One counterargument to this supposes there may be an additional class of expressions that is non-physical but increases a theory's expressive power. Another version of reductionism is based on the requirement that one theory (mental or physical) be logically derivable from a second.

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Two common approaches to defining "physicalism" are the theory-based and object-based approaches. The theory-based conception of physicalism proposes that "a property is physical if and only if it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which

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truths such as "I am A" and "now is B", the truth of physicalism is knowable a priori. Let "P" stand for the conjunction of all physical truths and laws, "T" for a that's-all truth, "I" for the indexical "centering" truths, and "N" for any truth at the actual world. We can then, using the

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From the notion of supervenience, it can be seen that, assuming that mental, social, and biological properties supervene on physical properties, two hypothetical worlds cannot be identical in their physical properties but differ in their mental, social or biological properties.

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and supervenience. Emergentism compatible with dualism claims that mental states and physical states are metaphysically distinct while maintaining the supervenience of mental states on physical states. But this contradicts supervenience physicalism, which denies dualism.

657:. Other a posteriori physicalists eschew the phenomenal concept strategy, and argue that even ordinary macroscopic truths such as "water covers 60% of the earth's surface" are not knowable a priori from PTI and a non-deferential grasp of the concepts "water" and "earth" 382:

calls "positive properties". A positive property is one that "if instantiated in a world W, is also instantiated by the corresponding individual in all worlds that contain W as a proper part." Following this suggestion, we can then formulate physicalism as follows:

441:). A necessary being is compatible with all the definitions provided, because it is supervenient on everything; yet it is usually taken to contradict the notion that everything is physical. So any supervenience-based formulation of physicalism will at best state a 471:

Token physicalism is the proposition that "for every actual particular (object, event or process) x, there is some physical particular y such that x = y". It is intended to capture the idea of "physical mechanisms". Token physicalism is compatible with

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Where "metaphysical necessitation" here simply means that if "B" metaphysically necessitates "A" then any world in which B is instantiated is a world in which A is instantiated--a consequence of the metaphysical supervenience of A upon B. See Kripke,

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terms of its distribution of mental properties. Furthermore, there are disputes about the modal status of physicalism: whether it is a necessary truth or is only true in a world that conforms to certain conditions (i.e. those of physicalism).

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is true, then such a non-materialist understanding of the physical gives the counterintuitive result that physicalism is nevertheless also true, since such properties will figure in a complete account of paradigmatic examples of the physical.

594:) PTI and not Q (where "Q" stands for the conjunction of all truths about consciousness, or some "generic" truth about someone being "phenomenally" conscious ) is conceivable (i.e., it is not knowable a priori that PTI and not Q is false). 436:

A further problem for supervenience-based formulations of physicalism is the so-called "necessary beings problem". A necessary being in this context is a non-physical being who exists in all possible worlds (for example, what theists call

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Since a priori physicalists hold that PTI → N is a priori, they are committed to denying P1) of the conceivability argument. The a priori physicalist, then, must argue that PTI and not Q, on ideal rational reflection, is incoherent or

498:, or mind-body identity theory. Type physicalism asserts that "for every actually instantiated property F, there is some physical property G such that F=G". Unlike token physicalism, type physicalism entails supervenience physicalism. 635:

A posteriori physicalists, on the other hand, generally accept P1) but deny P2)--the move from "conceivability to metaphysical possibility". Some a posteriori physicalists think that unlike the possession of most, if not all other

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Physicalists have traditionally opted for a "theory-based" characterization of the physical either in terms of current physics or a future (ideal) physics. These two theory-based conceptions of the physical represent both horns of

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where the relation between the physical and non-physical properties at this world is slightly weaker than metaphysical necessitation, such that a certain kind of non-physical intervener—"a blocker"—could, were it to exist at

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from the nature of the physical world (i.e., the inference is justified independently of experience, even though the nature of the physical world can itself only be determined through experience) or can only be deduced

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in which the physical properties and laws of the actual world are instantiated, the non-physical (in the ordinary sense of the word) properties of the actual world are also instantiated. To borrow a metaphor from

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But while (2) solves the problem of worlds at which there is some extra stuff (sometimes called the "epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem"), it faces a different challenge: the "blockers problem". Imagine a world

271:, the truth of physicalism at the actual world entails that once God has instantiated or "fixed" the physical properties and laws of our world, then God's work is done; the rest comes "automatically". 70:

in explaining observed phenomena. The terms "physicalism" and "materialism" are often used interchangeably, but can be distinguished based on their philosophical implications. Physicalism encompasses

3081: 328:"minimal" physical duplicates of such a world, nor are they minimal physical duplicates of worlds that contain some non-physical properties that are metaphysically necessitated by the physical. 324:

without qualification. This allows a world in which there are only physical properties to be counted as one at which physicalism is true, since worlds in which there is some extra stuff are

661:. If this is correct, then we should (arguably) conclude that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, and P2) of the conceivability argument against physicalism is false. 207:

While the force of Hempel's dilemma against theory-based conceptions of the physical remains contested, alternative "non-theory-based" conceptions of the physical have also been proposed.

3021: 211:, for example, has argued in favour of the aforementioned "object-based" conception of the physical. An objection to this proposal, which Jackson noted, is that if it turns out that 523:

Emergentism is a very broad view. Some forms of it appear either incompatible with physicalism or equivalent to it (e.g. posteriori physicalism); others appear to merge both

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One response to this problem is to abandon (2) in favour of the possibility mentioned earlier in which supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are restricted to what

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also duplicates simpliciter of it: worlds that have the same physical properties as our imagined one, but with some additional property or properties. A world might contain "

102:, among other things, as described by physics and other sciences, as part of the physical in a monistic sense. From a physicalist perspective, even abstract concepts such as 457:

Closely related to supervenience physicalism is realisation physicalism, the thesis that every instantiated property is either physical or realised by a physical property.

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is a direct application of the supervenience of consciousness, and hence of any supervenience-based version of physicalism: If PTI and not Q is possible, there is some

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and also contain non-physical interveners by virtue of the minimality, or that's-all clause, (2) gives the (allegedly) incorrect result that physicalism is true at

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of all physical truths, a totality or that's-all truth (to rule out non-physical epiphenomena, and enforce the closure of the physical world), and some primitive

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as "the non-mental". An objection to the via negativa conception of the physical is that (like the object-based conception) it lacks the resources to distinguish

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in N must be possessed non-deferentially in order for PTI → N to be knowable a priori. The suggestion, then, is that possession of the concepts in the

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The use of "physical" in physicalism is a philosophical concept and can be distinguished from alternative definitions found in the literature (e.g.,

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physical properties; if physicalism is true at any world it is true at this one. But one can conceive physical duplicates of such a world that are

552:(i.e., the justification of the inference itself is dependent upon experience). So-called "a priori physicalists" hold that from knowledge of the 125:

According to a 2020 survey, physicalism is the majority view among philosophers, but there also remains significant opposition to physicalism.

3855: 3051: 2219: 1574: 1246: 920: 645:". Roughly speaking, the phenomenal concept strategy is a label for those a posteriori physicalists who attempt to show that it is only the 3151: 3071: 3582: 2191: 543:

Physicalists hold that physicalism is true. A natural question for physicalists, then, is whether the truth of physicalism is deducible

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aren't instantiated at a world in which there is a blocker, they are not positive properties in Chalmers's sense, and so (3) will count

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Real physicalists must accept that at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving. They must at least embrace

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are considered physical entities, although they may consist of a large ontological object and a causally complex structure.

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Andrew Melnyk should apparently be credited with having introduced this name for Hempel's argument. See Melnyk, 1997, p.624

565:"→", represent a priori physicalism as the thesis that PTI → N is knowable a priori. An important wrinkle here is that the 3885: 3712: 3364: 3271: 2857: 2767: 2742: 2653: 584:

One commonly issued challenge to a priori physicalism and to physicalism in general is the "conceivability argument", or

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Applied to the actual world (our world), (1) is the claim that physicalism is true at the actual world if and only if at

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Judisch, N (2008). "Why 'non-mental won't work: On Hempel's dilemma and the characterization of the 'physical.'".

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For a survey of the different arguments for this conclusion (as well as responses to each), see Chalmers, 2009.

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objects to this response to the blockers problem on the basis that since the non-physical properties of

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For a recent defence of the first horn see Melnyk, 1997. For a defence of the second, see Wilson, 2006.

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Bickle, J. (2006). Multiple realizability. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Available at

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eds. W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 37–48.

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But (1) fails to capture even a necessary condition for physicalism to be true at a world

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Kirk, R. (2013), The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental, Oxford University Press,

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Applied in the same way, (2) is the claim that physicalism is true at a possible world

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should be considered the best and only way to render truth about the world or reality.

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Outside of philosophy, physicalism can also refer to the preference or viewpoint that

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Chalmers, D.; Jackson, F. (2001). "Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation".

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Restrepo, Ricardo (2012-05-22). "Two Myths of Psychophysical Reductionism".

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and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".

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Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?

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Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?

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from being instantiated by the instantiation of the physical properties at

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Chalmers, D. 2009. "The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism." In

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606:) If PTI and not Q is metaphysically possible then physicalism is false. 588:. At a rough approximation, the conceivability argument runs as follows: 107: 36: 1372:"Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)" 3702: 2981: 2687: 2617: 2587: 2552: 2487: 2445: 2430: 2297: 2068: 2011: 1926: 1821: 1387: 1334: 1291: 566: 129: 48: 28: 1371: 140:

The word "physicalism" was introduced into philosophy in the 1930s by

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ed. B. McLaughlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 313–335.

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eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman. Dordrecht: Reidel: 253-355, 763-769.

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Hempel, C. 1969. "Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets." In

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Melnyk, Andrew (1997). "How to Keep the 'Physical' in Physicalism".

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Smart, J.J.C. 1959. "Sensations and Brain Processes." Reprinted in

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from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to

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will not be counted as a world at which physicalism is true.

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Since (2) rules out worlds that are physical duplicates of

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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/

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if and only if any world that is a physical duplicate of

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if and only if any world that is a physical duplicate of

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if and only if any world that is a physical duplicate of

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to physical properties. It is therefore compatible with

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Lycan, W. 2003. "Chomsky on the Mind-body Problem." In

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See Hempel, 1969, pp.180-183; Hempel, 1980, pp.194-195.

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version of what Daniel Stoljar (2005) has called "the

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Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium

433:as a world at which physicalism is true after all. 1596: 1349: 278:. To see this, imagine a world in which there are 1665:"The first-personal argument against physicalism" 896:Physicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 2032:Putnam, H. 1967. "Psychological Predicates." In 1990:Nagel, T (1974). "What is it like to be a bat". 320:(without any further changes) is a duplicate of 1549: 1547: 1545: 1543: 711: 156:combination of properties" using the notion of 2043:ed. D. Rosenthal. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. 232:Supervenience-based definitions of physicalism 3248: 2213: 2124:British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1687:"A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness" 1599:Mind, Brain and the Quantum: The Compound 'I' 624:definition of physicalism that we saw above. 8: 1519:For critical discussion, see Chalmers, 2009. 1365: 1363: 386:(3) Physicalism is true at a possible world 293:(2) Physicalism is true at a possible world 2027:Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations. 1204:Chalmers, 1996; Stoljar, 2009, section 4.3. 855:https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUPOP-3.pdf 3255: 3241: 3233: 2220: 2206: 2198: 1230: 1228: 800: 798: 796: 794: 792: 790: 788: 786: 784: 1951: 1743: 1890:Lewis, D. 1994. "Reduction of Mind." In 1804:Hempel, C (1980). "Comment on Goodman's 573:, plus the empirical information in the 872:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 836:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 771: 348:prevent the non-physical properties in 136:Definition of physicalism in philosophy 2041:Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, 1892:A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 1762:Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, 3856:Philosophy of artificial intelligence 3052:Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics 1177:See e.g., Stoljar, 2009, section 4.3. 7: 3152:Interpretations of quantum mechanics 3072:The World as Will and Representation 2098:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2096:Stoljar, D. 2009. "Physicalism." in 1726:. New York: Oxford University Press. 1713:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1007:See Jackson, 1998, p.7; Lycan, 2003. 494:version of reductive physicalism is 2192:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1563:. Imprint Academic. pp. 4, 7. 953:See e.g., Smart, 1978; Lewis, 1994. 297:if and only if any world that is a 164:is said to supervene on a property 1961:Montero, B.; Papineau, D. (2005). 1840:New York: Oxford University Press. 1137:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1982.tb00084.x 1090:Australasian Journal of Philosophy 653:—that is in some way "special" or 62:Physicalism is closely related to 35:on the physical. It is opposed to 14: 1577:from the original on 2012-01-11. 912:The Logic of Scientific Discovery 3215: 3205: 3204: 2189:entry by Daniel Stoljar in the 2090:10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00296.x 2022:Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2005.00556.x 1798:Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. 1534:Journal of Consciousness Studies 1235:Jaegwon Kim (26 November 1993). 935:See Bennett and McLaughlin, 2011 172:necessarily implies a change in 27:is the view that "everything is 3002:Meditations on First Philosophy 1125:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1885:Semantics of Natural Language, 1447:See Chalmers and Jackson, 2001 1434:(Ph.D.). Princeton University. 1356:. Harcourt, Brace & World. 1241:. Cambridge University Press. 1034:See Montero and Papineau, 2005 1: 3713:Hard problem of consciousness 2020:Thinking About Consciousness. 1689:. The Philosophical Quarterly 870:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), 834:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), 3187:Philosophy of space and time 909:Karl Raimund Popper (2002). 809:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 480:Reductionism and emergentism 443:necessary but not sufficient 3062:The Phenomenology of Spirit 643:phenomenal concept strategy 581:metaphysically impossible. 445:condition for physicalism. 394:is a positive duplicate of 3950: 2118:Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. 1754:10.1215/00318108-110-3-315 1603:. Blackwell Pub. pp. 1213:see Hawthorne, 2002, p.107 736:argues that Benj Hellie's 512: 464: 51:, unlike "two-substance" ( 3876: 3435:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 3425:David Lewis (philosopher) 3200: 2165:10.1007/s11098-006-5984-8 2102:http://plato.stanford.edu 1967:Argument for Physicalism" 1858:10.1007/s11098-007-9142-8 1717:http://plato.stanford.edu 1264:The Journal of Philosophy 1102:10.1080/00048408312341131 649:of consciousness—not the 3177:Philosophy of psychology 3112:Simulacra and Simulation 2034:Art, Mind, and Religion, 1899:Chomsky and His Critics, 1685:List, Christian (2023). 1663:List, Christian (2023). 1307:The Philosophical Review 1222:See Stoljar, 2010, p.138 866:Stoljar, Daniel (2022), 830:Stoljar, Daniel (2022), 805:Stoljar, Daniel (2009). 612:) Physicalism is false. 47:" view of the nature of 3563:Eliminative materialism 3042:Critique of Pure Reason 2049:Philosophical Quarterly 1953:10.1111/0029-4624.00149 1782:10.1023/a:1020200213934 1043:See e.g., Judisch, 2008 755:Metaphysical naturalism 707:eliminative materialism 453:Realisation physicalism 288:epiphenomenal ectoplasm 255:is also a duplicate of 55:) or "many-substance" ( 3815:Propositional attitude 3810:Problem of other minds 3718:Hypostatic abstraction 2633:Type–token distinction 2461:Hypostatic abstraction 2243:Abstract object theory 731: 503:multiple realizability 408:will be absent, hence 301:physical duplicate of 182:multiple realizability 94:, physical processes, 3927:Philosophy of science 3922:Philosophy of physics 3886:Philosophers category 3790:Mental representation 3553:Biological naturalism 3440:Maurice Merleau-Ponty 3415:Frank Cameron Jackson 3222:Philosophy portal 3102:Being and Nothingness 2518:Mental representation 2153:Philosophical Studies 1907:Journal of Philosophy 1881:Naming and Necessity. 1846:Philosophical Studies 1770:Philosophical Studies 1370:Fodor, J. A. (1974). 1348:Ernest Nagel (1961). 1195:Chalmers, 1996, p.40. 679:realistic physicalism 670:Realistic physicalism 3568:Emergent materialism 3147:Feminist metaphysics 2111:New York: Routledge. 1992:Philosophical Review 1806:Ways of Worldmaking. 1732:Philosophical Review 1628:Skrbina, D. (2009). 1186:See Hawthorne, 2002. 915:. Psychology Press. 738:vertiginous question 563:material conditional 264:every possible world 247:at a possible world 3765:Language of thought 3515:Ludwig Wittgenstein 3345:Patricia Churchland 2992:Daneshnameh-ye Alai 2503:Linguistic modality 2136:10.1093/bjps/axq033 2018:Papineau, D. 2002. 1934:Montero, B (1999). 1722:Chalmers, D. 1996. 1456:See Chalmers, 2009. 243:(1) Physicalism is 16:Metaphysical thesis 3593:Neurophenomenology 3264:Philosophy of mind 3182:Philosophy of self 3172:Philosophy of mind 2436:Embodied cognition 2348:Scientific realism 2107:Stoljar, D. 2010. 2029:Oxford: Clarendon. 1963:"A Defence of the 1936:"The Body Problem" 1836:Jackson, F. 1998. 1822:10.1007/bf00413558 1724:The Conscious Mind 1474:See Chalmers, 2009 1388:10.1007/BF00485230 1131:(January): 29–43. 1016:See Papineau, 2002 980:see Vincente, 2011 695:cannot be emergent 305:is a duplicate of 202:Carl Gustav Hempel 3904: 3903: 3800:Mind–body problem 3698:Cognitive closure 3662:Substance dualism 3280:G. E. M. Anscombe 3230: 3229: 2409:Category of being 2378:Truthmaker theory 2078:Mind and Language 2025:Poland, J. 1994. 1879:Kripke, S. 1972. 1593:Lockwood, Michael 1501:cf. Stoljar, 2005 1492:See Stoljar, 2005 1432:The Emergent Mind 1430:Byrne, A (1993). 1248:978-0-521-43996-1 1078:See Jackson, 1998 1025:See Montero, 1999 922:978-0-415-27844-7 699:substance dualism 615:Here proposition 461:Token physicalism 168:if any change in 68:physical sciences 53:mind–body dualism 3939: 3652:Representational 3647:Property dualism 3640:Type physicalism 3605:New mysterianism 3573:Epiphenomenalism 3395:Martin Heidegger 3257: 3250: 3243: 3234: 3220: 3219: 3218: 3208: 3207: 3117: 3107: 3097: 3087: 3077: 3067: 3057: 3047: 3037: 3027: 3017: 3007: 2997: 2987: 2977: 2967: 2957: 2947: 2937: 2613:Substantial form 2425:Cogito, ergo sum 2368:Substance theory 2222: 2215: 2208: 2199: 2176: 2147: 2093: 2072: 2015: 1986: 1977:(287): 233–237. 1957: 1955: 1930: 1869: 1833: 1793: 1757: 1747: 1699: 1698: 1696: 1694: 1682: 1676: 1675: 1673: 1671: 1660: 1654: 1653: 1625: 1619: 1618: 1602: 1589: 1583: 1582: 1551: 1538: 1526: 1520: 1517: 1511: 1508: 1502: 1499: 1493: 1490: 1484: 1481: 1475: 1472: 1466: 1463: 1457: 1454: 1448: 1445: 1436: 1435: 1427: 1421: 1414: 1408: 1407: 1367: 1358: 1357: 1355: 1345: 1339: 1338: 1302: 1296: 1295: 1259: 1253: 1252: 1232: 1223: 1220: 1214: 1211: 1205: 1202: 1196: 1193: 1187: 1184: 1178: 1175: 1169: 1165: 1159: 1156: 1150: 1147: 1141: 1140: 1120: 1114: 1113: 1085: 1079: 1076: 1063: 1062: 1050: 1044: 1041: 1035: 1032: 1026: 1023: 1017: 1014: 1008: 1005: 999: 996: 990: 987: 981: 978: 972: 969: 963: 960: 954: 951: 945: 944:See Putnam, 1967 942: 936: 933: 927: 926: 906: 900: 899: 888: 882: 881: 880: 879: 863: 857: 852: 846: 845: 844: 843: 827: 821: 820: 818: 817: 802: 779: 776: 729: 703:property dualism 683:realistic monism 496:type physicalism 474:property dualism 467:Anomalous monism 217:panprotopsychism 198:Hempel's dilemma 3949: 3948: 3942: 3941: 3940: 3938: 3937: 3936: 3907: 3906: 3905: 3900: 3872: 3839: 3785:Mental property 3678:Abstract object 3666: 3536: 3490:Wilfrid Sellars 3365:Donald Davidson 3350:Paul Churchland 3310:George Berkeley 3266: 3261: 3231: 3226: 3216: 3214: 3196: 3120: 3115: 3105: 3095: 3085: 3075: 3065: 3055: 3045: 3035: 3025: 3015: 3005: 2995: 2985: 2975: 2965: 2962:De rerum natura 2955: 2945: 2935: 2919: 2659: 2563:Physical object 2399:Abstract object 2387: 2373:Theory of forms 2308:Meaning of life 2231: 2226: 2183: 2150: 2121: 2075: 2061:10.2307/2219085 2055:(113): 239–41. 2046: 2004:10.2307/2183914 1989: 1960: 1933: 1919:10.2307/2564597 1913:(12): 622–637. 1904: 1843: 1803: 1767: 1745:10.1.1.143.7688 1729: 1708: 1703: 1702: 1692: 1690: 1684: 1683: 1679: 1669: 1667: 1662: 1661: 1657: 1642: 1627: 1626: 1622: 1615: 1591: 1590: 1586: 1571: 1555:Strawson, Galen 1553: 1552: 1541: 1529:Strawson, Galen 1527: 1523: 1518: 1514: 1510:e.g., Tye, 2009 1509: 1505: 1500: 1496: 1491: 1487: 1482: 1478: 1473: 1469: 1465:See Nagel, 1974 1464: 1460: 1455: 1451: 1446: 1439: 1429: 1428: 1424: 1415: 1411: 1369: 1368: 1361: 1347: 1346: 1342: 1319:10.2307/2182164 1304: 1303: 1299: 1276:10.2307/2564597 1270:(12): 622–637. 1261: 1260: 1256: 1249: 1234: 1233: 1226: 1221: 1217: 1212: 1208: 1203: 1199: 1194: 1190: 1185: 1181: 1176: 1172: 1166: 1162: 1157: 1153: 1148: 1144: 1122: 1121: 1117: 1087: 1086: 1082: 1077: 1066: 1052: 1051: 1047: 1042: 1038: 1033: 1029: 1024: 1020: 1015: 1011: 1006: 1002: 997: 993: 988: 984: 979: 975: 970: 966: 961: 957: 952: 948: 943: 939: 934: 930: 923: 908: 907: 903: 890: 889: 885: 877: 875: 865: 864: 860: 853: 849: 841: 839: 829: 828: 824: 815: 813: 804: 803: 782: 778:See Smart, 1959 777: 773: 768: 746: 730: 721: 672: 667: 586:zombie argument 541: 517: 511: 487: 482: 469: 463: 455: 431: 424: 413: 406: 375: 368: 360: 353: 345: 337: 234: 138: 17: 12: 11: 5: 3947: 3946: 3943: 3935: 3934: 3929: 3924: 3919: 3909: 3908: 3902: 3901: 3899: 3898: 3893: 3888: 3883: 3877: 3874: 3873: 3871: 3870: 3853: 3847: 3845: 3841: 3840: 3838: 3837: 3832: 3827: 3822: 3817: 3812: 3807: 3802: 3797: 3792: 3787: 3782: 3780:Mental process 3777: 3772: 3767: 3762: 3757: 3752: 3750:Intentionality 3747: 3746: 3745: 3740: 3730: 3725: 3720: 3715: 3710: 3705: 3700: 3695: 3690: 3685: 3680: 3674: 3672: 3668: 3667: 3665: 3664: 3659: 3654: 3649: 3644: 3643: 3642: 3632: 3627: 3622: 3617: 3612: 3607: 3602: 3600:Neutral monism 3597: 3596: 3595: 3585: 3583:Interactionism 3580: 3575: 3570: 3565: 3560: 3555: 3550: 3544: 3542: 3538: 3537: 3535: 3534: 3527: 3522: 3517: 3512: 3507: 3502: 3497: 3495:Baruch Spinoza 3492: 3487: 3482: 3477: 3472: 3467: 3462: 3457: 3452: 3447: 3442: 3437: 3432: 3427: 3422: 3417: 3412: 3407: 3405:Edmund Husserl 3402: 3397: 3392: 3387: 3382: 3377: 3375:René Descartes 3372: 3370:Daniel Dennett 3367: 3362: 3357: 3352: 3347: 3342: 3340:David Chalmers 3337: 3332: 3327: 3325:Franz Brentano 3322: 3317: 3312: 3307: 3305:Alexander Bain 3302: 3297: 3295:Thomas Aquinas 3292: 3287: 3282: 3276: 3274: 3268: 3267: 3262: 3260: 3259: 3252: 3245: 3237: 3228: 3227: 3225: 3224: 3212: 3201: 3198: 3197: 3195: 3194: 3189: 3184: 3179: 3174: 3169: 3164: 3159: 3154: 3149: 3144: 3139: 3134: 3128: 3126: 3125:Related topics 3122: 3121: 3119: 3118: 3108: 3098: 3092:Being and Time 3088: 3078: 3068: 3058: 3048: 3038: 3028: 3018: 3008: 2998: 2988: 2978: 2968: 2958: 2948: 2938: 2927: 2925: 2921: 2920: 2918: 2917: 2910: 2905: 2900: 2895: 2890: 2885: 2880: 2875: 2870: 2865: 2860: 2855: 2850: 2845: 2840: 2835: 2830: 2825: 2820: 2815: 2810: 2805: 2800: 2795: 2790: 2785: 2780: 2775: 2770: 2765: 2760: 2755: 2750: 2745: 2740: 2735: 2730: 2725: 2720: 2715: 2710: 2705: 2700: 2695: 2690: 2685: 2680: 2675: 2669: 2667: 2665:Metaphysicians 2661: 2660: 2658: 2657: 2650: 2645: 2640: 2635: 2630: 2625: 2620: 2615: 2610: 2605: 2600: 2595: 2590: 2585: 2580: 2575: 2570: 2565: 2560: 2555: 2550: 2545: 2540: 2535: 2530: 2525: 2520: 2515: 2510: 2505: 2500: 2495: 2490: 2485: 2484: 2483: 2473: 2468: 2463: 2458: 2453: 2448: 2443: 2438: 2433: 2428: 2421: 2419:Causal closure 2416: 2411: 2406: 2401: 2395: 2393: 2389: 2388: 2386: 2385: 2380: 2375: 2370: 2365: 2360: 2355: 2350: 2345: 2340: 2335: 2330: 2325: 2320: 2315: 2310: 2305: 2300: 2295: 2293:Libertarianism 2290: 2285: 2280: 2278:Existentialism 2275: 2270: 2265: 2260: 2255: 2250: 2245: 2239: 2237: 2233: 2232: 2227: 2225: 2224: 2217: 2210: 2202: 2196: 2195: 2182: 2181:External links 2179: 2178: 2177: 2148: 2130:(2): 393–416. 2119: 2114:Tye, M. 2009. 2112: 2105: 2100:ed. E. Zalta. 2094: 2084:(5): 469–494. 2073: 2044: 2037: 2030: 2023: 2016: 1987: 1958: 1946:(2): 183–200. 1931: 1902: 1895: 1888: 1877: 1870: 1852:(3): 299–318. 1841: 1834: 1816:(2): 193–199. 1801: 1794: 1776:(2): 103–113. 1765: 1758: 1738:(3): 315–361. 1727: 1720: 1715:ed. E. Zalta. 1707: 1704: 1701: 1700: 1677: 1655: 1640: 1620: 1614:978-0631180319 1613: 1584: 1570:978-1845400590 1569: 1539: 1521: 1512: 1503: 1494: 1485: 1476: 1467: 1458: 1449: 1437: 1422: 1409: 1359: 1340: 1313:(2): 141–156. 1297: 1254: 1247: 1224: 1215: 1206: 1197: 1188: 1179: 1170: 1160: 1158:Chalmers, 1996 1151: 1142: 1115: 1096:(4): 343–377. 1080: 1064: 1045: 1036: 1027: 1018: 1009: 1000: 991: 982: 973: 964: 955: 946: 937: 928: 921: 901: 883: 858: 847: 822: 780: 770: 769: 767: 764: 763: 762: 757: 752: 745: 742: 734:Christian List 723:Galen Strawson 719: 689:– or at least 675:Galen Strawson 671: 668: 666: 663: 621:possible world 540: 530: 513:Main article: 510: 507: 486: 483: 481: 478: 462: 459: 454: 451: 429: 422: 417:Daniel Stoljar 411: 404: 380:David Chalmers 373: 366: 358: 351: 343: 335: 233: 230: 226:neutral monism 178:type identical 137: 134: 116:intentionality 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 3945: 3944: 3933: 3930: 3928: 3925: 3923: 3920: 3918: 3915: 3914: 3912: 3897: 3894: 3892: 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Broad 2972:Metaphysics 2956:(c. 200 BC) 2946:(c. 350 BC) 2936:(c. 350 BC) 2823:Collingwood 2728:Malebranche 2476:Information 2404:Anima mundi 2383:Type theory 2338:Physicalism 2303:Materialism 2258:Determinism 2229:Metaphysics 1693:3 September 1670:3 September 1061:(2): 75–83. 687:panpsychism 665:Other views 655:sui generis 554:conjunction 539:physicalism 515:Emergentism 509:Emergentism 269:Saul Kripke 236:Adopting a 213:panpsychism 153:Karl Popper 104:mathematics 96:information 74:, but also 64:materialism 25:physicalism 3911:Categories 3896:Task Force 3864:perception 3738:Artificial 3688:Creativity 3610:Nondualism 3510:Vasubandhu 3430:John Locke 3400:David Hume 3355:Andy Clark 3032:Monadology 2966:(c. 80 BC) 2673:Parmenides 2558:Perception 2456:Experience 2343:Relativism 2318:Naturalism 2268:Enactivism 1706:References 1650:2008042603 878:2022-09-20 842:2022-09-20 816:2014-08-07 760:Empiricism 575:antecedent 571:consequent 465:See also: 33:supervenes 21:philosophy 3760:Intuition 3693:Cognition 3657:Solipsism 3320:Ned Block 3290:Armstrong 3285:Aristotle 3192:Teleology 3157:Mereology 3137:Cosmology 2996:(c. 1000) 2893:Plantinga 2883:Armstrong 2833:Heidegger 2808:Whitehead 2793:Nietzsche 2713:Descartes 2683:Aristotle 2638:Universal 2568:Principle 2538:Necessity 2498:Intention 2451:Existence 2414:Causality 2353:Solipsism 2283:Free will 2159:: 69–99. 2144:170690287 1790:170039410 1740:CiteSeerX 1396:0039-7857 1327:0031-8108 1284:0022-362X 1110:0004-8402 659:et cetera 638:empirical 558:indexical 92:structure 57:pluralism 45:substance 3917:Ontology 3881:Category 3728:Identity 3671:Concepts 3541:Theories 3525:Zhuangzi 3455:Alva Noë 3210:Category 3132:Axiology 2986:(c. 270) 2914:more ... 2868:Anscombe 2863:Strawson 2858:Davidson 2753:Berkeley 2693:Plotinus 2654:more ... 2593:Relation 2573:Property 2548:Ontology 2471:Identity 2392:Concepts 2323:Nihilism 2288:Idealism 2236:Theories 1971:Analysis 1830:46953839 1810:Synthese 1595:(1991). 1575:Archived 1557:(2006). 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