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Population monotonicity

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is a principle of consistency in allocation problems. It says that, when the set of agents participating in the allocation changes, the utility of all agents should change in the same direction. For example, if the resource is good, and an agent leaves, then all remaining agents should receive at
86:(a monotonically-increasing function of the utilities) is PM. This holds whether the welfare function operates on the absolute utilities or on the relative utilities. In particular, the Nash-optimal rule, 146:
appropriate for agents with different entitlements. Picking-sequences based on divisor methods are PM too. However, a picking-sequence based on the quota method is not PM.
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Chakraborty, Mithun; Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike; Suksompong, Warut (2021-04-29). "Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division".
126:, if-and-only-if it assigns the houses iteratively, where at each iteration, at most two agents trade houses from their initial endowments. 48:
of seats in the congress among states. There, the property relates to the population of an individual state, which determines the state's
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A population-increase means that a state is entitled to more seats. This different property is described in the page
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are all PM. It is an open question whether concavity of the welfare function is necessary for PM.
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The term "population monotonicity" is used in an unrelated meaning in the context of
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rule and relative-equitable rules are weakly Pareto-optimal and PM.
101:, no Pareto-optimal proportional division rule is PM. The absolute- 509:"Population monotonicity in economies with one indivisible good" 468:
Chen, Xin; Gao, Xiangyu; Hu, Zhenyu; Wang, Qiong (2019-01-17).
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problem, the Nash-optimal rule is no longer PM. In contrast,
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Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina; Pápai, Szilvia (2002-11-01).
247:"Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting" 565: 572:
to it so that it can be listed with similar articles.
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Segal-Halevi, Erel; Sziklai, Balázs R. (2018-09-01).
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Segal-Halevi, Erel; Sziklai, Balázs R. (2019-09-01).
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is PM. Moreover, round-robin can be adapted to yield
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least as much utility as in the original allocation.
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absolute-utilitarian and relative utilitarian rules
74:are not PM. Several rules are known to be PM: 470:"Population Monotonicity in Newsvendor Games" 8: 88:absolute-leximin and relative-leximin rules 170:PM in economies with one indivisible good. 70:problem, classic allocation rules such as 411: 319: 262: 191:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 179: 7: 189:Fair Division and Collective Welfare 557:needs additional or more specific 25: 365:Journal of Mathematical Economics 546: 443:Sonmez, Tayfun O. (2014-09-01). 330:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.07.001 82:, any function that maximizes a 1: 377:10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00059-9 222:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00021-3 55:state-population monotonicity 29:population-ratio monotonicity 525:10.1016/0165-4896(96)00814-1 513:Mathematical Social Sciences 507:Beviá, Carmen (1996-10-01). 422:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103578 308:Mathematical Social Sciences 38:Population monotonicity (PM) 140:round-robin item allocation 615: 26: 273:10.1007/s00199-018-1128-6 212:Thomson, William (2011). 116:house allocation problem 110:In fair house allocation 97:When the pieces must be 84:concave welfare function 27:Not to be confused with 449:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de 400:Artificial Intelligence 167:PM in newsvendor games. 160:PM of the nucleolus in 130:In fair item allocation 78:When the pieces may be 34:Principle of allocation 486:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3053 214:Fair Allocation Rules 187:Herve Moulin (2004). 156:Resource monotonicity 136:fair item allocation 62:In fair cake cutting 18:Population monotonic 118:, a rule is PM and 474:Management Science 599:Fairness criteria 587: 586: 570:adding categories 144:picking sequences 72:divide and choose 68:fair cake-cutting 16:(Redirected from 606: 582: 579: 573: 550: 542: 537: 536: 504: 498: 497: 480:(5): 2142–2160. 465: 459: 458: 456: 455: 440: 434: 433: 415: 395: 389: 388: 356: 350: 349: 323: 299: 293: 292: 266: 242: 236: 235: 209: 203: 202: 184: 124:Pareto-efficient 21: 614: 613: 609: 608: 607: 605: 604: 603: 589: 588: 583: 577: 574: 563: 551: 540: 506: 505: 501: 467: 466: 462: 453: 451: 442: 441: 437: 397: 396: 392: 358: 357: 353: 301: 300: 296: 251:Economic Theory 244: 243: 239: 232: 211: 210: 206: 199: 186: 185: 181: 177: 152: 132: 112: 64: 35: 32: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 612: 610: 602: 601: 591: 590: 585: 584: 554: 552: 545: 539: 538: 519:(2): 125–137. 499: 460: 435: 390: 371:(3): 329–339. 351: 294: 257:(2): 363–401. 237: 230: 204: 197: 178: 176: 173: 172: 171: 168: 165: 158: 151: 148: 131: 128: 111: 108: 107: 106: 95: 63: 60: 33: 24: 14: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 611: 600: 597: 596: 594: 581: 571: 567: 561: 560: 555:This article 553: 549: 544: 543: 534: 530: 526: 522: 518: 514: 510: 503: 500: 495: 491: 487: 483: 479: 475: 471: 464: 461: 450: 446: 439: 436: 431: 427: 423: 419: 414: 409: 405: 401: 394: 391: 386: 382: 378: 374: 370: 366: 362: 355: 352: 347: 343: 339: 335: 331: 327: 322: 317: 313: 309: 305: 298: 295: 290: 286: 282: 278: 274: 270: 265: 260: 256: 252: 248: 241: 238: 233: 231:9780444508942 227: 223: 219: 215: 208: 205: 200: 198:9780262134231 194: 190: 183: 180: 174: 169: 166: 163: 159: 157: 154: 153: 149: 147: 145: 141: 137: 129: 127: 125: 121: 120:strategyproof 117: 109: 104: 100: 96: 93: 89: 85: 81: 77: 76: 75: 73: 69: 61: 59: 57: 56: 51: 47: 46:apportionment 42: 39: 30: 19: 575: 556: 516: 512: 502: 477: 473: 463: 452:. Retrieved 448: 438: 403: 399: 393: 368: 364: 354: 311: 307: 297: 254: 250: 240: 213: 207: 188: 182: 133: 113: 98: 80:disconnected 79: 65: 53: 50:entitlement. 49: 43: 37: 36: 162:public good 559:categories 454:2021-08-05 413:2104.14347 406:: 103578. 321:1703.08928 264:1510.05229 175:References 578:July 2024 533:0165-4896 494:0025-1909 430:233443832 385:0304-4068 338:0165-4896 314:: 19–30. 281:1432-0479 164:problems. 103:equitable 99:connected 593:Category 566:help out 346:16282641 150:See also 564:Please 134:In the 114:In the 66:In the 531:  492:  428:  383:  344:  336:  289:179618 287:  279:  228:  195:  426:S2CID 408:arXiv 342:S2CID 316:arXiv 285:S2CID 259:arXiv 529:ISSN 490:ISSN 381:ISSN 334:ISSN 277:ISSN 226:ISBN 193:ISBN 122:and 568:by 521:doi 482:doi 418:doi 404:301 373:doi 326:doi 269:doi 218:doi 595:: 527:. 517:32 515:. 511:. 488:. 478:65 476:. 472:. 447:. 424:. 416:. 402:. 379:. 369:38 367:. 363:. 340:. 332:. 324:. 312:95 310:. 306:. 283:. 275:. 267:. 255:68 253:. 249:. 224:. 90:, 58:. 580:) 576:( 562:. 535:. 523:: 496:. 484:: 457:. 432:. 420:: 410:: 387:. 375:: 348:. 328:: 318:: 291:. 271:: 261:: 234:. 220:: 201:. 31:. 20:)

Index

Population monotonic
population-ratio monotonicity
apportionment
state-population monotonicity
fair cake-cutting
divide and choose
concave welfare function
absolute-leximin and relative-leximin rules
absolute-utilitarian and relative utilitarian rules
equitable
house allocation problem
strategyproof
Pareto-efficient
fair item allocation
round-robin item allocation
picking sequences
Resource monotonicity
public good
ISBN
9780262134231
doi
10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00021-3
ISBN
9780444508942
"Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting"
arXiv
1510.05229
doi
10.1007/s00199-018-1128-6
ISSN

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