Knowledge (XXG)

Population monotonicity

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is a principle of consistency in allocation problems. It says that, when the set of agents participating in the allocation changes, the utility of all agents should change in the same direction. For example, if the resource is good, and an agent leaves, then all remaining agents should receive at
75:(a monotonically-increasing function of the utilities) is PM. This holds whether the welfare function operates on the absolute utilities or on the relative utilities. In particular, the Nash-optimal rule, 135:
appropriate for agents with different entitlements. Picking-sequences based on divisor methods are PM too. However, a picking-sequence based on the quota method is not PM.
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Chakraborty, Mithun; Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike; Suksompong, Warut (2021-04-29). "Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division".
115:, if-and-only-if it assigns the houses iteratively, where at each iteration, at most two agents trade houses from their initial endowments. 37:
of seats in the congress among states. There, the property relates to the population of an individual state, which determines the state's
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A population-increase means that a state is entitled to more seats. This different property is described in the page
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are all PM. It is an open question whether concavity of the welfare function is necessary for PM.
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The term "population monotonicity" is used in an unrelated meaning in the context of
334: 277: 410: 350:"Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems" 261: 521: 482: 434:"Population-Monotonicity of the Nucleolus on a Class of Public Good Problems" 373: 326: 293:"Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting" 269: 235: 536: 474: 433: 205:. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 2. pp. 393–506. 401: 309: 252: 94:
rule and relative-equitable rules are weakly Pareto-optimal and PM.
90:, no Pareto-optimal proportional division rule is PM. The absolute- 498:"Population monotonicity in economies with one indivisible good" 457:
Chen, Xin; Gao, Xiangyu; Hu, Zhenyu; Wang, Qiong (2019-01-17).
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problem, the Nash-optimal rule is no longer PM. In contrast,
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Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina; Pápai, Szilvia (2002-11-01).
236:"Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting" 554: 561:
to it so that it can be listed with similar articles.
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Segal-Halevi, Erel; Sziklai, Balázs R. (2018-09-01).
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Segal-Halevi, Erel; Sziklai, Balázs R. (2019-09-01).
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is PM. Moreover, round-robin can be adapted to yield
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least as much utility as in the original allocation.
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absolute-utilitarian and relative utilitarian rules
63:are not PM. Several rules are known to be PM: 459:"Population Monotonicity in Newsvendor Games" 8: 77:absolute-leximin and relative-leximin rules 159:PM in economies with one indivisible good. 59:problem, classic allocation rules such as 400: 308: 251: 180:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 168: 7: 178:Fair Division and Collective Welfare 546:needs additional or more specific 14: 354:Journal of Mathematical Economics 535: 432:Sonmez, Tayfun O. (2014-09-01). 319:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.07.001 71:, any function that maximizes a 1: 366:10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00059-9 211:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00021-3 44:state-population monotonicity 18:population-ratio monotonicity 514:10.1016/0165-4896(96)00814-1 502:Mathematical Social Sciences 496:Beviá, Carmen (1996-10-01). 411:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103578 297:Mathematical Social Sciences 27:Population monotonicity (PM) 129:round-robin item allocation 604: 15: 262:10.1007/s00199-018-1128-6 201:Thomson, William (2011). 105:house allocation problem 99:In fair house allocation 86:When the pieces must be 73:concave welfare function 16:Not to be confused with 438:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de 389:Artificial Intelligence 156:PM in newsvendor games. 149:PM of the nucleolus in 119:In fair item allocation 67:When the pieces may be 23:Principle of allocation 475:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3053 203:Fair Allocation Rules 176:Herve Moulin (2004). 145:Resource monotonicity 125:fair item allocation 51:In fair cake cutting 107:, a rule is PM and 463:Management Science 588:Fairness criteria 576: 575: 559:adding categories 133:picking sequences 61:divide and choose 57:fair cake-cutting 595: 571: 568: 562: 539: 531: 526: 525: 493: 487: 486: 469:(5): 2142–2160. 454: 448: 447: 445: 444: 429: 423: 422: 404: 384: 378: 377: 345: 339: 338: 312: 288: 282: 281: 255: 231: 225: 224: 198: 192: 191: 173: 113:Pareto-efficient 603: 602: 598: 597: 596: 594: 593: 592: 578: 577: 572: 566: 563: 552: 540: 529: 495: 494: 490: 456: 455: 451: 442: 440: 431: 430: 426: 386: 385: 381: 347: 346: 342: 290: 289: 285: 240:Economic Theory 233: 232: 228: 221: 200: 199: 195: 188: 175: 174: 170: 166: 141: 121: 101: 53: 24: 21: 12: 11: 5: 601: 599: 591: 590: 580: 579: 574: 573: 543: 541: 534: 528: 527: 508:(2): 125–137. 488: 449: 424: 379: 360:(3): 329–339. 340: 283: 246:(2): 363–401. 226: 219: 193: 186: 167: 165: 162: 161: 160: 157: 154: 147: 140: 137: 120: 117: 100: 97: 96: 95: 84: 52: 49: 22: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 600: 589: 586: 585: 583: 570: 560: 556: 550: 549: 544:This article 542: 538: 533: 532: 523: 519: 515: 511: 507: 503: 499: 492: 489: 484: 480: 476: 472: 468: 464: 460: 453: 450: 439: 435: 428: 425: 420: 416: 412: 408: 403: 398: 394: 390: 383: 380: 375: 371: 367: 363: 359: 355: 351: 344: 341: 336: 332: 328: 324: 320: 316: 311: 306: 302: 298: 294: 287: 284: 279: 275: 271: 267: 263: 259: 254: 249: 245: 241: 237: 230: 227: 222: 220:9780444508942 216: 212: 208: 204: 197: 194: 189: 187:9780262134231 183: 179: 172: 169: 163: 158: 155: 152: 148: 146: 143: 142: 138: 136: 134: 130: 126: 118: 116: 114: 110: 109:strategyproof 106: 98: 93: 89: 85: 82: 78: 74: 70: 66: 65: 64: 62: 58: 50: 48: 46: 45: 40: 36: 35:apportionment 31: 28: 19: 564: 545: 505: 501: 491: 466: 462: 452: 441:. Retrieved 437: 427: 392: 388: 382: 357: 353: 343: 300: 296: 286: 243: 239: 229: 202: 196: 177: 171: 122: 102: 87: 69:disconnected 68: 54: 42: 39:entitlement. 38: 32: 26: 25: 151:public good 548:categories 443:2021-08-05 402:2104.14347 395:: 103578. 310:1703.08928 253:1510.05229 164:References 567:July 2024 522:0165-4896 483:0025-1909 419:233443832 374:0304-4068 327:0165-4896 303:: 19–30. 270:1432-0479 153:problems. 92:equitable 88:connected 582:Category 555:help out 335:16282641 139:See also 553:Please 123:In the 103:In the 55:In the 520:  481:  417:  372:  333:  325:  278:179618 276:  268:  217:  184:  415:S2CID 397:arXiv 331:S2CID 305:arXiv 274:S2CID 248:arXiv 518:ISSN 479:ISSN 370:ISSN 323:ISSN 266:ISSN 215:ISBN 182:ISBN 111:and 557:by 510:doi 471:doi 407:doi 393:301 362:doi 315:doi 258:doi 207:doi 584:: 516:. 506:32 504:. 500:. 477:. 467:65 465:. 461:. 436:. 413:. 405:. 391:. 368:. 358:38 356:. 352:. 329:. 321:. 313:. 301:95 299:. 295:. 272:. 264:. 256:. 244:68 242:. 238:. 213:. 79:, 47:. 569:) 565:( 551:. 524:. 512:: 485:. 473:: 446:. 421:. 409:: 399:: 376:. 364:: 337:. 317:: 307:: 280:. 260:: 250:: 223:. 209:: 190:. 20:.

Index

population-ratio monotonicity
apportionment
state-population monotonicity
fair cake-cutting
divide and choose
concave welfare function
absolute-leximin and relative-leximin rules
absolute-utilitarian and relative utilitarian rules
equitable
house allocation problem
strategyproof
Pareto-efficient
fair item allocation
round-robin item allocation
picking sequences
Resource monotonicity
public good
ISBN
9780262134231
doi
10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00021-3
ISBN
9780444508942
"Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting"
arXiv
1510.05229
doi
10.1007/s00199-018-1128-6
ISSN
1432-0479

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