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true if the function from meanings to Global Roles is one to one. In this case, in fact, the meanings of "brown", "cow" and "dangerous" all contain the inference "Brown cows are dangerous"!! But this is only true if the relation is one to one. Since it is one to one, "brown" would not have the meaning it has unless it had the global role that it has. If we change the relation so that it is many to one (h*), many global roles can share the same meaning. So suppose that the meaning of "brown "is given by M("brown"). It does not follow from this that L("brown", "brown cow", "dangerous") is true unless all of the global roles that h* assigns to M("brown") contain ("brown cow", "dangerous"). And this is not necessary for holism. In fact, with this many to one relation from Global Roles to meanings, it is possible to change opinions with respect to an inference consistently. Suppose that B and C initially accept all of the same inferences, speak the same language and they both accept that "brown cows imply dangerous." Suddenly, B changes his mind and rejects the inference. If the function from meanings to Global Role is one to one, then many of B's Global Roles have changed and therefore their meanings. But if there is no one to one assignment, then B's change in belief in the inference about brown cows does not necessarily imply a difference in the meanings of the terms he uses. Therefore, it is not intrinsic to holism that communication or change of opinion is impossible.
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was capable of manifesting a strict relationship with empirical experience. Therefore, they believed, the only linguistic expressions (manifestations of knowledge) that had meaning were those that either directly referred to observable entities, or that could be reduced to a vocabulary that directly referred to such entities. A sentence S contained knowledge only if it possessed a meaning, and it possessed a meaning only if it was possible to refer to a set of experiences that could, at least potentially, verify it and to another set that could potentially falsify it. Underlying all this, there is an implicit and powerful connection between
860:. To comprehend a sentence is to comprehend all and only the sentences of less logical complexity than the sentence that one is trying to comprehend. However, there is still a problem with extending this approach to natural languages. If I understand the word "hot" because I have understood the phrase "this stove is hot", it seems that I am defining the term by reference to a set of stereotypical objects with the property of being hot. If I don't know what it means for these objects to be "hot", such a set or listing of objects is not helpful.
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733:. This helps to some extent but there is still a problem in terms of identifying how the different propositions shared by the two speakers are specifically related to each other. Dummett's proposal is based on an analogy from logic. To understand a logically complex sentence it is necessary to understand one that is logically less complex. In this manner, the distinction between logically less complex sentences that are
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the extent that beliefs (or parts of beliefs) are not determined externally. The problem here is that the whole scheme is based on the idea that certain relations are constitutive (i.e. necessary) for the determination of the beliefs and others are not. Thus, we have reintroduced the idea of an analytic/synthetic distinction with all of the problems that that carries with it.
296:, which expresses it and makes it publicly communicable, the tendency in recent discussion is to consider the term "content" to apply indifferently both to linguistic expressions and to mental states, regardless of the extremely controversial question of which category (the mental or the linguistic) has priority over the other and which, instead, possesses only a
899:"brown cow." According to compositionality then, "cow implies dangerous" and "brown implies dangerous" are both true because they are the constituents of the expression "brown cow." But is this really an inevitable consequence of the acceptance of the holism of inferential role semantics? To see why it's not assume the existence of a relation of inference
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by their relations with other beliefs. In this way, it is possible to say that externalism applies only to those beliefs not determined by their relations with other beliefs (or for the part of a belief that is not determined by its relations with other parts of other beliefs), and holism is valid to
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externalism of mental contents. In Burge's experiment, a person named
Jeffray believes that he has arthritis in his thighs and we can correctly attribute to him the (mistaken) belief that he has arthritis in his thighs because he is ignorant of the fact that arthritis is a disease of the articulation
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accepted inference that involves some expression will enter into the meaning of that expression. Suppose, for example, that Fred believes that "Brown cows are dangerous". That is, he accepts the inference from "brown cows" to "dangerous." This entails that this inference is now part of the meaning of
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of the language. Given the limits of our cognitive abilities, we will never be able to master the whole of the
English (or Italian or German) language, even on the assumption that languages are static and immutable entities (which is false). Therefore, if one must understand all of a natural language
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The first approach is to insist that there is no conflict because holists do not mean the phrase "determine beliefs" in the sense of individuation but rather of attribution. But the problem with this is that if one is not a "realist" about mental states, then all we are left with is the attributions
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and semantic holism has also been of interest to many philosophers of language. On the surface it would seem that these two ideas are in complete and irremediable contradiction. Compositionality is the principle that states that the meaning of a complex expression depends on the meaning of its parts
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The key to answering this question lies in going back to Quine and his attack on logical positivism. The logical positivists, who dominated the philosophical scene for almost the entire first half of the twentieth century, maintained that genuine knowledge consisted in all and only such knowledge as
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Quine's holistic argument against the neo-positivists set out to demolish the assumption that every sentence of a language is bound univocally to its own set of potential verifiers and falsifiers and the result was that the epistemological value of every sentence must depend on the entire language.
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meaning. So, it would seem that semantic holism ties the philosopher's hands. By making it impossible to explain language learning and to provide a unique and consistent description of the meanings of linguistic expressions, it blocks off any possibility of formulating a theory of meaning; and, by
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has two different meanings in two different moments during the life of the same person. Consequently, if I accept the truth of a sentence and then reject it later on, the meaning of what I rejected and what I accepted are completely different, and therefore I cannot change my opinions regarding the
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to the effect that a certain part of language, be it a term or a complete sentence, can only be understood through its relations to a (previously understood) larger segment of language. There is substantial controversy, however, as to exactly what the larger segment of language in question consists
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of the joints. In another society, there is an individual named
Goodfrey who also believes that he has arthritis in the thighs. But in the case of Goodfrey the belief is correct because in the counterfactual society in which he lives "arthritis" is defined as a disease that can include the thighs.
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This function is one to one in that it assigns exactly one meaning to every Global Role. According to Fodor and Lepore, holistic inferential role semantics leads to the absurd conclusion that part of the meaning of "brown cow" is constituted by the inference "Brown cow implies dangerous." This is
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The question then arises of the possibility of reconciling externalism with holism. The one seems to be saying that meanings are determined by the external relations (with society or the world), while the other suggests that meaning is determined by the relation of words (or beliefs) to all the
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All of our so-called knowledge or convictions, from questions of geography and history to the most profound laws of atomic physics or even mathematics and logic, are an edifice made by man that touches experience only at the margins. Or, to change images, science in its globality is like a force
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of belief: those determined holistically and those determined externally. Perhaps the external beliefs are those that are determined by their relations with the external world through observation and the holistic ones are the theoretical statements. But this implies the abandonment of a central
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One last proposal is to carefully distinguish between so-called narrow content states and broad content states. The first would be determined in a holistic manner and the second non-holistically and externalistically. But how to distinguish between the two notions of content while providing a
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unless there are other propositions in which one believes. If one accepts the first reading, then one must accept the existence of a set of sentences that are necessarily believed and hence fall into the analytic/synthetic distinction. The second reading is useless (too weak) to serve the
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that of the whole. The second incoherence consists in the fact that a necessity to attribute "strange" meanings to the components of larger expressions would apparently result from any attempt to reconcile compositionality and holism. Pagin takes a specific holistic theory of meaning –
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The Global Role of the complex expression β is the n- tuple of the global roles of its constituent parts. The next problem is to develop a function that assigns meanings to Global Roles. This function is generally called a homomorphism and says that for every syntactic function
133:, according to which it is only within the context of an entire sentence that a word acquires its meaning. In the 1950s, the agreement that seemed to have been reached regarding the primacy of sentences in semantic questions began to unravel with the collapse of the movement of
124:. What is it? Where does it come from? How is it communicated? And, among these questions, what is the smallest unit of meaning, the smallest fragment of language with which it is possible to communicate something? At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century,
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According to Fodor and Lepore, there is a quantificational ambiguity in the molecularist's typical formulation of his thesis: someone can believe P only if she believes a sufficient number of other propositions. They propose to disambiguate this assertion into a
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making it impossible to individuate the exact contents of any propositional attitude—given the necessity of considering a potentially infinite and continuously evolving set of mental states—it blocks off the possibility of formulating a theory of the mind.
288:(thought, desire, belief) acquires its content by virtue of the role that it plays within the web that connects it to all the other propositional attitudes of an individual. Since there is a very tight relationship between the content of a mental state
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and semantic holism are inextricably linked. Since confirmation holism is widely accepted among philosophers, a serious question for them has been to determine whether and how the two holisms can be distinguished or how the undesirable consequences of
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while on E' it stands for some substance macroscopically identical to water but which is actually composed of XYZ. According to Putnam, only Calvin has genuine experiences that involve water, so only his term "water" really refers to water.
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pillar of holism: the idea that there can be no one to one correspondence between behavior and beliefs. There will be cases in which the beliefs that are determined externally correspond one to one with perceptual states of the subject.
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and on its mode of composition. As stated before, holism, on the other hand, is the thesis that the meanings of expressions of a language are determined by their relations with the other expressions of the language as a whole.
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in his sense), takes precisely this approach. But those who would opt for some version of moderate holism need to make the distinction between the parts of a language that are "constitutive" of the meaning of an expression
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Semantic holism, in this sense, also fails to explain how two speakers can mean the same thing when using the same linguistic expression, and therefore how communication is even possible between them. Given a sentence
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and his followers abandoned the view, common at the time, that a word gets its meaning in isolation, independently from all the rest of the words in a language. Frege, as an alternative, formulated his famous
1752:: two individuals, Calvin and Carvin, live, respectively, on the real earth (E) of our everyday experience and on an exact copy (E') with the only difference being that on E "water" stands for the substance
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Since the epistemological value of every sentence, for Quine just as for the positivists, was the meaning of that sentence, then the meaning of every sentence must depend on every other. As Quine states it:
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field whose limit points are experiences...a particular experience is never tied to any proposition inside the field except indirectly, for the needs of equilibrium which affect the field in its globality.
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Since the concept of semantic holism, as explained above, is often used to refer to not just theories of meaning in natural languages but also to theories of mental content such as the hypothesis of a
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and those that are not without falling into the extraordinarily problematic analytic/synthetic distinction. Fodor and Lepore (1992) present several arguments to demonstrate that this is impossible.
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derives its meaning from the relations it entertains with the totality of sentences of a language, as soon as the vocabulary of an individual changes by the addition or elimination of a sentence
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of the meaning of a logical constant and logically more complex sentences that are not takes on the role of the old analytic/synthetic distinction. "The comprehension of a sentence in which the
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does not figure as a principal operator depends on the comprehension of the constant, but does not contribute to its constitution." For example, one can explain the use of the conditional in
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is an element of the set which is an element of the right side of the Global Role of α. This makes Global Roles for simple expressions sensitive to changes in the acceptance of inferences by
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1818:. But if one is a "realist" about mental states, then why not say that we can actually individuate them and therefore that instrumentalist attributions are just a short-term strategy?
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identifies three points of incompatibility between these two hypotheses. The first consists in the simple observation that while, for holism, the meaning of the whole would seem to
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These sorts of counterintuitive consequences of semantic holism also affect another form of holism, often identified with but, in fact, distinct from semantic holism: the holism of
1732:. Externalism is the thesis that the propositional attitudes of an individual are determined, at least in part, by her relations with her environment (both social and natural).
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These are some of the problems and questions that have still to be resolved by those who would adopt a position of "holistic externalism" or "externalist holism".
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that are debated and discussed in contemporary philosophy, has tended to centre on the view that the "whole" in question consists of an entire language.
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Numerous philosophers of language have taken the latter avenue, abandoning the early
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one must already know the meaning of "not" and "or." This is, in turn, explained by giving the rules of introduction for simple schemes such as
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Another approach is to say that externalism is valid only for certain beliefs and that holism only suggests that beliefs are determined only
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justification of the possibility of formulating an idea of narrow content that does not depend on a prior notion of broad content?
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criticizes this argument by pointing out that there is an intermediate reading Fodor and Lepore have left out of count:
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by stating that the whole sentence is false if the part before the arrow is true and c is false. But to understand
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that of its parts in terms of priority, for compositionality, the reverse is true, the meaning of the parts
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that "comprehending a proposition means comprehending a language". About the same time or shortly after,
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molecularist's needs since it only requires that if, say, two people believe the same proposition
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of. In recent years, the debate surrounding semantic holism, which is one among the many forms of
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identifies at least three possible ways to reconcile them and then points out some objections.
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that assigns to simple expressions α1...αn some complex expression β, there exists a function
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of a linguistic expression is only possible if the speaker who uses it understands its
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consists in a pair of sets, each one composed of a pair of sets of expressions. If
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Stjernberg, Fredrik. (2002). "On the
Combination of Holism and Externalism". In
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and others. In the first place, it is impossible to understand how a speaker of
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and semantic questions. This connection carries over into the work of Quine in
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means one thing for Fred and something else for Mary. Moreover, if a sentence
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themselves and, if these are holistic, then we really have a form of hidden
1701:{\displaystyle h(G(\beta ))=h()=F(h(G(\alpha _{1}))...h(G(\alpha _{n}))).\;}
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The many and substantial problems with this position have been described by
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is related to the sentences in each part differently, the result is that
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The first statement asserts that there are other propositions, besides
481:{\displaystyle \forall p\exists q\neq p\Box (B(x,p)\rightarrow B(x,q))}
352:. These philosophers generally deny that the meaning of an expression
195:(as in the cases of Davidson, Quine and, perhaps, Wittgenstein), then
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the totality of relations changes, and therefore also the meaning of
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is related. If, in addition, no limits are placed on the size of
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An Essay
Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language
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1992:
Putnam, Hilary. (2002). "The Mind is Not Only
Computation". In
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applies between α, β, and γ just in case α is a part of γ and
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of which it is part and sustain, instead, that the meaning of
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A third possibility is to insist that there are two distinct
1420:. The Global Role for complex expressions can be defined as:
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his own inferences and communication will remain impossible.
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Dummett, for example, after rejecting
Quinean holism (holism
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applies between α,β and γ just in case α is a part of β and
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depends on the meanings of the words of the entire language
267:. As this is a very common phenomenon, the result is that
159:) has meaning only in the context of a (whole) language".
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Burge, Tyler. (1979). "Individualism and the Mental". In
938:. Two more relations, "Left" and "Right", are required:
171:(a word, a phrase or sentence) of some natural language
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Putnam, Hilary. (1975). "The
Meaning of 'Meaning'", in
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accepts the inference between β and γ. The relation
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1978:Penco, Carlo. (2002). "Olismo e Molecularismo". In
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137:and the powerful influence exercised by the later
222:can acquire knowledge of (learn) the meaning of
43:but its sources remain unclear because it lacks
2010:, Massimo dell'Utri (ed.), Macerata: Quodlibet.
1996:, Massimo dell'Utri (ed.), Macerata: Quodlibet.
1982:, Massimo Dell'Utri (ed.), Macerata: Quodlibet.
1975:, Massimo dell'Utri (ed.), Macerata: Quodlibet.
239:, then language learning is simply impossible.
1132:The Global Role, G(α), of a simple expression
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8:
775:{\displaystyle (a\lor \lnot b)\rightarrow c}
577:, that one must believe in order to believe
235:to understand the single word or expression
911:and that the relation applies just in case
2760:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
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2003:. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
1961:. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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1989:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1952:Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
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1964:Fodor, J. and Lepore, E. (1992).
1744:. In it, he described his famous
1959:The Logical Basis of Metaphysics
1409:{\displaystyle (\beta ,\gamma )}
1270:{\displaystyle G(\alpha )=(,)\;}
930:There is also a second relation
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2700:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
2013:Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1967).
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199:coincides with the "whole" of
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2581:Principle of compositionality
1945:Midwest Studies in Philosophy
1736:formulated the thesis of the
804:{\displaystyle a\lor \lnot b}
2730:Philosophical Investigations
2015:Philosophical Investigations
2001:From a Logical Point of View
1929:From a Logical Point of View
1861:. Vol. 100. p. 32.
1791:Individualism and the Mental
1502:{\displaystyle G(\beta )=\;}
144:Philosophical Investigations
141:. Wittgenstein wrote in the
2571:Modality (natural language)
1931:. Harvard University Press.
1521:from meanings to meanings:
1304:accepts the inference from
915:accepts the inference from
864:Holism and compositionality
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2710:Language, Truth, and Logic
2450:Theological noncognitivism
2335:Contrast theory of meaning
2330:Causal theory of reference
2061:Index of language articles
2017:. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
1987:Mind, Language and Reality
1957:Dummett, Michael. (1978).
1954:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1950:Davidson, Donald. (1984).
1897:"Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
1802:other words (or beliefs).
892:inferential role semantics
364:depends on some subset of
183:one must understand a set
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2795:Philosophy of information
2395:Mediated reference theory
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1966:Holism: A Shopper's Guide
868:The relationship between
2720:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
1902:The Philosophical Review
1895:Quine, W. V. O. (1951).
1742:The Meaning of "Meaning"
1136:can then be defined as:
903:between two expressions
316:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
276:Holism of mental content
187:of expressions to which
29:This article includes a
2906:Willard Van Orman Quine
2521:Use–mention distinction
2365:Direct reference theory
1859:On Sense and Reference
1857:Frege, Gottlob (1892).
1377:{\displaystyle \gamma }
1357:{\displaystyle \alpha }
1337:{\displaystyle \gamma }
1293:{\displaystyle \alpha }
853:{\displaystyle \lnot Q}
830:{\displaystyle P\lor Q}
58:more precise citations.
2455:Theory of descriptions
2390:Linguistic determinism
2052:Philosophy of language
1927:Reprinted in his 1953
1814:rather than a genuine
1776:
1775:{\displaystyle H_{2}O}
1716:Holism and externalism
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1338:
1318:
1317:{\displaystyle \beta }
1294:
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329:
286:propositional attitude
95:philosophy of language
2566:Mental representation
2501:Linguistic relativity
2385:Inquisitive semantics
1999:Quine, W. V. (1953).
1947:, 4. pp. 73–121.
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350:semantic molecularism
324:
226:, for any expression
2891:Theories of language
2750:Naming and Necessity
2660:De Arte Combinatoria
2459:Definite description
2420:Semantic externalism
1968:. Oxford: Blackwell.
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2800:Philosophical logic
2790:Analytic philosophy
2596:Sense and reference
2475:Verification theory
2430:Situation semantics
1812:constitutive holism
1804:Frederik Stjernfelt
1722:language of thought
1280:The global role of
333:confirmation holism
305:Confirmation holism
139:Ludwig Wittgenstein
2650:Port-Royal Grammar
2546:Family resemblance
2465:Theory of language
2440:Supposition theory
1816:attributive holism
1772:
1746:thought experiment
1730:philosophy of mind
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135:logical positivism
31:list of references
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2375:Dynamic semantics
338:unbuttoned holism
292:and the sentence
131:context principle
84:
83:
76:
2913:
2835:Formal semantics
2783:Related articles
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2415:Relevance theory
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2690:On Denoting
2516:Proposition
2167:de Saussure
2132:Ibn Khaldun
1875:|work=
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1750:Twin Earths
1726:externalism
875:Peter Pagin
598:Carlo Penco
212:Jerry Fodor
56:introducing
2886:Metatheory
2880:Categories
2865:Discussion
2860:Task Force
2810:Pragmatics
2601:Speech act
2531:Categories
2445:Symbiosism
2400:Nominalism
2312:Watzlawick
2192:Bloomfield
2112:Chrysippus
1938:References
1748:involving
377:tout court
110:Since the
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64:March 2011
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2842:Semiotics
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2616:Statement
2551:Intension
2491:Ambiguity
2370:Dramatism
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2102:Eubulides
2097:Aristotle
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1877:ignored (
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2257:Anscombe
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2107:Diodorus
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163:Problems
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