377:. Objects have their properties either essentially or accidentally. The essence of an object involves all the properties it has essentially; it defines the object's nature: what it fundamentally is. On this type of account, the truthmaker for "it is necessary that all cows are animals" is that it belongs to the essence of cows to be animals. The truthmaker for "there could have been purple cows" is that color is not essential to cows. Some essentialist theories focus on object essences, i.e. that certain properties are essential to a specific object. Other essentialist theories focus on kind essences, i.e. that certain properties are essential to the kind or species of the object in question.
489:. For example, a lazy person might justify rejecting a request to help a friend by arguing that, due to her lazy character, she wouldn't have done the work anyway, even if she had accepted the request. By rejecting the offer right away, she managed at least not to waste anyone's time. Actualists might even consider her behavior praiseworthy since she did what, according to actualism, she ought to have done. This seems to be a very easy way to "get off the hook" that is avoided by possibilism. But possibilism has to face the objection that in some cases it sanctions and even recommends what actually leads to the worst outcome.
482:
the whole bag is finished, which would result in a terrible stomach ache and would be the worst alternative. Not eating any cookies at all, on the other hand, would be the second-best alternative. Now the question is: should Gifre eat the first cookie or not? Actualists are only concerned with the actual consequences. According to them, Gifre should not eat any cookies at all since it is better than the alternative leading to a stomach ache. Possibilists contend that the best possible course of action involves eating the first cookie and this is therefore what Gifre should do.
97:
intentional attitude reports. Actualists have often responded to this problem by paraphrasing the expressions with apparently problematic ontological commitments into ones that are free of such commitments. Actualism has been challenged by truthmaker theory to explain how truths about what is possible or necessary depend on actuality, i.e. to point out which actual entities can act as truthmakers for them. Popular candidates for this role within an actualist ontology include possible worlds conceived as abstract objects, essences and dispositions.
390:
all truths. Problematic cases include truths like "it's possible that nothing existed" or "it's possible that the laws of nature had been different". A theistic version of this account has been proposed in order to solve these problems: God's power is the truthmaker for modal truths. "There could have been purple cows" because it was in God's power to create purple cows, while "it is necessary that all cows are animals" because it was not in God's power to create cows that are not animals.
185:, the proposition "◊p" means that p obtains in at least one other, distinct world that is as real as the one we are in. If a state of affairs is possible, then it really obtains, it physically occurs in at least one world. Therefore, as Lewis is happy to admit, there is a world where someone named Sherlock Holmes lived at 221b Baker Street in Victorian times, there is another world where pigs fly, and there is even another world where both Sherlock Holmes exists and pigs fly.
85:. On Lewis's account, the actual world is identified with the physical universe of which we are all a part. Other possible worlds exist in exactly the same sense as the actual world; they are simply spatio-temporally unrelated to our world, and to each other. Hence, for Lewis, "merely possible" entities—entities that exist in other possible worlds—exist in exactly the same sense as do we in the actual world; to be actual, from the perspective of any given individual
274:
impossible objects. Since actualists deny the existence of such objects, it would seem that they are committed to the view that these expressions don't refer to anything and are therefore meaningless. This would be a rather unintuitive consequence of actualism, which is why actualists have proposed different strategies for different types of expressions in order to avoid this conclusion. These strategies usually involve some kind of
493:
cookie and stopping afterward only is an option for Gifre if she has the rational capacity to repress her temptation to continue eating. If the temptation is irrepressible then this course of action is not considered to be an option and is therefore not relevant when assessing what the best alternative is. Portmore suggests that, given this adjustment, we should prefer a view very closely associated with
340:
labeled "ontological cheating". Actualists face the problem of how to account for the truthmakers of modal truths, like "it was possible for the Cuban
Missile Crisis to escalate into a full-scale nuclear war", "there could have been purple cows" or "it is necessary that all cows are animals". Actualists have proposed various solutions, but there is no consensus as to which one is the best solution.
365:
truthmaker of "it is necessary that all cows are animals". This account relies heavily on a logical notion of modality, since possibility and necessity are defined in terms of consistency. This dependency has prompted some philosophers to assert that no truthmakers at all are needed for modal truths, that modal truths are true "by default". This position involves abandoning truthmaker maximalism.
162:. Possible worlds are mere descriptions of ways this world (the actual one) might have been, and nothing else. Thus, as modal constructions, they come in as a handy heuristic device to use with modal logic; as it helps our modal reasoning to imagine ways the world might have been. Thus, the actualist interpretation of "◊p" sees the modality (i.e., "the way" in which it is true) as being
331:
problem involves treating intentional attitudes not as relations between a subject and an object but as properties of the subject. This approach has been termed "adverbialism" since the object of the intentional attitude is seen as a modification of the attitude: "Peter likes superman-ly". This paraphrase succeeds in removing any reference to non-actual entities.
270:. But there is a third and even wider-ranging view, Meinongianism, which holds that being includes impossible entities. So actualists disagree with both possibilists and Meinongians whether there are possible objects, e.g. unicorns, while actualists and possibilists disagree with Meinongians whether there are impossible objects, e.g. round squares.
443:. "Actual" is seen as an indexical term, and its reference depends on its context. Therefore, there is no feature of this world (nor of any other) to be distinguished in order to infer that the world is actual, "the actual world" is actual simply in virtue of the definition of "actual": a world is actual
492:
Douglas W. Portmore has suggested that these and other problems of actualism and possibilism can be avoided by constraining what counts as a genuine alternative for the agent. On his view, it is a requirement that the agent has rational control over the event in question. For example, eating only one
481:
For example, assume that Gifre has the choice between two alternatives, eating a cookie or not eating anything. Having eaten the first cookie, Gifre could stop eating cookies, which is the best alternative. But after having tasted one cookie, Gifre would freely decide to continue eating cookies until
313:
that fail to refer, like "the present king of France". Possibilists and
Meinongians have no problem to account for the meaning of these expressions: they just refer to possible objects. (Possibilists share this problem with the actualists in case of definite descriptions involving impossibility like
389:
or powers of actually existing entities. So, for example, the claim that "it's possible that the teacup breaks" has its truthmaker in the teacup's disposition to break, i.e. in its fragility. While this type of theory can account for various truths, it has been questioned whether it can account for
318:
expressions. For example, the expression "The present king of France is bald" could be paraphrased as "there is exactly one thing that is currently king of France, and all such things are bald". This sentence is false, but it doesn't contain a reference to any non-actual entities anymore, thanks to
100:
Actualism and possibilism in ethics are two different theories about how future choices affect what the agent should presently do. Actualists assert that it is only relevant what the agent would actually do later for assessing the normative status of an alternative. Possibilists, on the other hand,
364:
is a member. Possible worlds act as truthmakers for modal truths. For example, there is a possible world which is inhabited by purple cows. This world is a truthmaker for "there could have been purple cows". Cows are animals in all possible worlds that are inhabited by cows. So all worlds are the
330:
reports about non-actual entities are another type of problematic cases, for example "Peter likes
Superman". Possibilists can interpret the intentional attitude, in this case the liking, as a relation between Peter, an actual person, and Superman, a possible person. One actualist solution to this
339:
Truthmaker theorists hold that truth depends on reality. In the terms of truthmaker theory: a truthbearer (e.g. a proposition) is true because of the existence of its truthmaker (e.g. a fact). Positing a truth without being able to account for its truthmaker violates this principle and has been
177:
So, from this point of view, what distinguishes the actual world from other possible worlds is what distinguishes reality from a description of a simulation of reality, this world from
Sherlock Holmes': the former exists and is not a product of imagination and the latter does not exist and is a
96:
Actualists face the problem of explaining why many expressions commonly used in natural language are meaningful and sometimes even true despite the fact that they contain references to non-actual entities. Problematic expressions include names of fictional characters, definite descriptions and
273:
The disagreements between these three views touch many areas in philosophy, including the semantics of natural language and the problem of intentionality. This is due to the fact that various expressions commonly used in natural language seem to refer to merely possible and in some cases even
129:
Most actualists will be happy to grant the interpretation of "Sherlock Holmes' existence is possible" in terms of possible worlds. But they argue that the possibilist goes wrong in taking this as a sign that there exist other worlds that are just like ours, except for the fact that we are not
470:, the theory that an action is right if and only if its consequences are better than the consequences of any alternative action. These consequences may include other actions of the agent at a later point in time. Actualists assert that it is only relevant what the agent
434:
conception of actuality, favoured by Lewis (1986), actuality is an attribute which our world has relative to itself, but which all the other worlds have relative to themselves too. Actuality is an intrinsic property of each world, so world
121:
in which
Sherlock Holmes exists". The possibilist argues that apparent existential claims such as this (that "there are" possible worlds of various sorts) ought to be taken more or less at face value: as stating the
253:
which might obtain or not obtain. Here, the "possible world" which is said to be actual is actual in virtue of that state of affairs obtaining in the world around us (since it is maximally complete, only
75:: these entities have being but are not actual and, hence, enjoy a "less robust" sort of being than do actually existing things. An important, but significantly different notion of possibilism known as
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of two or more worlds, only one of which (at the most) can be the actual one. Hence, they argue, there are innumerably many possible worlds other than our own, which exist just as much as ours does.
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352:, conceived as actual abstract objects, for example as maximal consistent sets of propositions or of states of affairs. A set of propositions is maximal if, for any statement
266:
Actualism, the view that being is restricted to actual being, is usually contrasted with possibilism, the view that being also includes possible entities, so-called
314:"the round square") A widely known solution to these problems comes from Bertrand Russell. He proposed to analyze both names and definite descriptions in terms of
220:
of a proposition entailed by the conjunction of one or more elements of the set). Here the "possible world" which is said to be actual is actual in virtue of
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actually do later for assessing the value of an alternative. Possibilists, on the other hand, hold that we should also take into account what the agent
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actually in them. The actualist argues, instead, that when we claim "possible worlds" exist we are making claims that things exist
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such state of affairs could actually obtain; all the others would differ from the actual world in various large or small ways).
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301:, are one type of problematic expressions. These expressions are usually considered meaningful despite the fact that neither
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406:. The adherents of these positions disagree on which part of the actual world is the foundation supporting modal truths.
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and Adams do, that "possible worlds" talk can be reduced to logical relations amongst consistent and maximally complete
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One counterintuitive consequence of actualism is that agents can avoid moral obligations simply by having an imperfect
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200:. "Consistent" here means that none of its propositions contradict one another (if they did, it would not be a
58:
545:
279:
171:
691:
Koons, Robert C.; Pickavance, Timothy (9 February 2017). "12 The Non-Existent and the
Vaguely Existent".
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hold that modal truths are grounded in the abstract realm, for example in possible worlds conceived as
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of how the world might be (through a very large set of statements) but rather as a maximally complete
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of an element of the set, or entailed by the conjunction of one or more elements of the set, or the
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theories, is to determine what one ought to do. They are mostly, but not exclusively, relevant for
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An alternative solution to the problem of truthmakers for modal truths is based on the notion of
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192:; and on this question actualists are divided. One of the most popular solutions is to claim, as
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61:
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This leaves open the question, of course, of what an actually existing "way the world could be"
1553:
Wonders, and a World of
Possibility Spaces. A Short Introduction into the Theory of Possibilism
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hold that we should also take into account what the agent could do, even if he wouldn't do it.
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exists." This is a false statement about the world, but is usually accepted as representing a
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feature of the world. (More precisely: a set of propositions is "maximally complete" if, for
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the paraphrase. So the actualist has solved the problem of accounting for its meaning.
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which can serve as possible worlds for the interpretation of modal claims: that many
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1276:, 10 (1). Symposium Papers to be Read at the Meeting of the Western Division of the
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These solutions proposed on behalf of actualism can be divided into two categories:
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description of the world); "maximally complete" means that the set covers
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Portmore, Douglas W. (2019). "3. What's the
Relevant Sort of Control?".
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are, in contrast to the main part of this article, not concerned with
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117:. This contingency is usually described by the statement "there is a
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meaningful proposition P, P is either an element of the set, or the
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For the philosophy of
Giovanni Gentile, often called actualism, see
788:
608:
Woodward, Richard (2011). "The things that aren't actually there".
418:, on the other hand, assert that modal truths are grounded in the
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of the actual world, for example in essences or in dispositions.
231:
Another common actualist account, advanced in different forms by
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in any possible world, is simply to be part of the same world as
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For the geological assumption of processes that exist today, see
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896:
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771:
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875:
1453:
Portmore, Douglas W. (2019). "5. Rationalist Maximalism".
694:
The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics
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in New Orleans, Louisiana, April 29 – May 1, pp. 65–75.
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product of the imagination set in a modal construction.
843:"Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality"
385:
Another account attempts to ground modal truths in the
278:
that transforms a sentence with apparently problematic
16:
Philosophical view that everything there is, is actual
1167:Pruss, Alexander R. "The Actual and the Possible".
71:, the thesis that there are some entities that are
1189:"Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism"
1064:Real Metaphysics: Essays in honour of D. H. Mellor
158:are nothing more than fictions created within the
1323:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
901:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
830:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
776:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
753:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
730:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
1136:"Hardcore Actualism and Possible Non-Existence"
982:"Recent Work: Modality Without Possible Worlds"
568:Actualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
309:have actual existence. Similar cases come from
181:From a modal realist's point of view, such as
1515:. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
1459:. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
639:Adams, R.M. (1974). "Theories of Actuality".
348:A well-known account relies on the notion of
142:exist other than the actual world around us.
53:. Another phrasing of the thesis is that the
8:
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293:of non-existent entities, like the 'planet'
1376:Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility
1370:Timmerman, Travis; Swenson, Philip (2019).
1272:Stalnaker, R.C. (1976). "Possible Worlds".
1182:
1180:
1120:Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality
1061:Mellor, D. H. "Real Metaphysics: Replies".
282:into one that is free of such commitments.
64:ranges over all and only actual existents.
1411:Jackson, Frank; Pargetter, Robert (1986).
1365:
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931:
929:
927:
1372:"How to Be an Actualist and Blame People"
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1334:Cohen, Yishai; Timmerman, Travis (2016).
1311:Timmerman, Travis; Cohen, Yishai (2020).
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975:
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581:(1976). "Actualism and Possible Worlds".
297:, or names of fictional characters, like
150:From an actualist point of view, such as
1472:"Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection"
1232:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
1512:Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options
1456:Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options
1340:Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
686:
684:
682:
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1313:"Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics"
1228:"Can Hardcore Actualism Validate S5?"
914:"Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy"
597:Essays on the Metaphysics of Modality
563:
561:
7:
1541:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1117:Vetter, Barbara. "1. The Project".
1048:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
456:Actualism and possibilism in ethics
138:(actually) exist, but not that any
1532:"The Possibilism-Actualism Debate"
1388:10.1093/oso/9780198845539.003.0009
1278:American Philosophical Association
1170:The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics
1029:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1976.tb00681.x
878:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
593:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1976.tb00681.x
335:Truthmaker theory and modal truths
41:is the view that everything there
14:
239:, views "possible worlds" not as
81:was developed by the philosopher
1413:"Oughts, Options, and Actualism"
1140:Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
859:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x
595:. (Reprinted in his compilation
478:do, even if she wouldn't do it.
462:claims. Instead, their goal, as
1555:, June 2020 PDF (Researchgate)
1013:"Actualism and Possible Worlds"
286:Names and definite descriptions
262:Language and non-actual objects
1336:"Actualism Has Control Issues"
645:, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 211–231.
414:existing in the actual world.
1:
1173:. Blackwell. pp. 317–33.
872:Crane, Tim. "5: Perception".
1226:Kimpton-Nye, Samuel (2019).
1134:Kimpton-Nye, Samuel (2018).
426:Indexical actuality analysis
323:Intentional attitude reports
49:, in the broadest sense) is
1187:Contessa, Gabriele (2010).
936:Cameron, Ross Paul (2008).
599:, Oxford University Press).
140:worlds which are those ways
67:The denial of actualism is
45:(i.e., everything that has
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1470:Goldman, Holly S. (1976).
1123:. Oxford University Press.
1084:Philosophical Perspectives
938:"Truthmakers and Modality"
847:Philosophical Perspectives
787:Russell, Bertrand (1905).
673:On the Plurality of Worlds
536:Many-worlds interpretation
25:
18:
1205:10.1007/s11229-008-9456-x
1011:Plantinga, Alvin (1976).
954:10.1007/s11229-007-9225-2
889:MacBride, Fraser (2020).
697:. John Wiley & Sons.
620:10.1007/s11098-009-9443-1
980:Vetter, Barbara (2011).
764:Nelson, Michael (2020).
439:is actual just at world
228:of the world around us.
109:Consider the statement "
1353:10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104
841:Kriegel, Uriah (2007).
718:Reicher, Maria (2019).
587:42 (1–3): pp. 139–160.
280:ontological commitments
136:ways the world could be
132:in our own actual world
1080:"Essence and Modality"
818:Ludlow, Peter (2018).
805:10.1093/mind/xiv.4.479
741:Marek, Johann (2019).
614:152 (2): pp. 155–166.
546:Extended modal realism
172:ontological commitment
1574:Metaphysical theories
1549:Niemann, Hans-Joachim
1530:Menzel, Christopher.
998:10.1093/analys/anr077
720:"Nonexistent Objects"
611:Philosophical Studies
526:Robert Merrihew Adams
420:concrete constituents
311:definite descriptions
152:Robert Merrihew Adams
1476:Philosophical Review
1417:Philosophical Review
394:Softcore vs hardcore
328:Intentional attitude
198:sets of propositions
1579:Analytic philosophy
1044:"Modal Metaphysics"
676:. Oxford: Blackwell
521:David Kellogg Lewis
416:Hardcore actualists
408:Softcore actualists
224:its elements being
35:analytic philosophy
1244:10.1111/phpr.12656
1078:Fine, Kit (1994).
670:Lewis, D. (1986).
404:hardcore actualism
400:Softcore actualism
249:that covers every
1569:Modal metaphysics
1397:978-0-19-884553-9
918:Truthmaker Theory
743:"Alexius Meinong"
704:978-1-119-11611-0
430:According to the
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1238:(2): 342–358.
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1199:(3): 341–353.
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1146:(2): 122–131.
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992:(4): 742–754.
967:
948:(2): 261–280.
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853:(1): 307–340.
833:
820:"Descriptions"
810:
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119:possible world
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789:"On Denoting"
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1067:. Routledge.
1063:
1056:
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1020:
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989:
985:
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381:Dispositions
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59:unrestricted
46:
42:
38:
32:
1382:: 216–240.
1346:(3): 1–18.
766:"Existence"
516:Modal logic
495:possibilism
445:simpliciter
83:David Lewis
69:possibilism
1563:Categories
552:References
499:maximalism
316:quantified
276:paraphrase
268:possibilia
146:Viewpoints
1260:211936005
1252:1933-1592
432:indexical
356:, either
168:entailing
124:existence
39:actualism
1213:41090856
1193:Synthese
1090:: 1–16.
986:Analysis
962:29061342
942:Synthese
628:41487586
505:See also
369:Essences
218:negation
214:negation
202:possible
166:and not
164:de dicto
1538:(ed.).
1496:2184275
1437:2185591
1294:2214477
1104:2214160
1017:Theoria
659:2214751
584:Theoria
497:called
464:ethical
375:essence
105:Example
1494:
1435:
1394:
1292:
1258:
1250:
1211:
1102:
960:
701:
657:
626:
451:Ethics
303:Vulcan
295:Vulcan
183:Lewis'
55:domain
51:actual
1534:. In
1492:JSTOR
1433:JSTOR
1290:JSTOR
1256:S2CID
1209:S2CID
1100:JSTOR
958:S2CID
655:JSTOR
624:JSTOR
476:could
472:would
362:not-p
291:Names
206:every
47:being
1392:ISBN
1274:Noûs
1248:ISSN
793:Mind
699:ISBN
642:Noûs
402:and
305:nor
235:and
226:true
170:any
1484:doi
1425:doi
1384:doi
1348:doi
1319:SEP
1282:doi
1240:doi
1236:102
1201:doi
1197:174
1148:doi
1092:doi
1025:doi
994:doi
950:doi
946:164
897:SEP
855:doi
826:SEP
801:doi
772:SEP
749:SEP
726:SEP
647:doi
616:doi
589:doi
360:or
256:one
222:all
210:any
154:',
57:of
33:In
1565::
1551:,
1490:.
1480:85
1478:.
1474:.
1445:^
1431:.
1421:95
1419:.
1415:.
1390:.
1378:.
1374:.
1362:^
1344:10
1342:.
1338:.
1315:.
1301:^
1288:.
1254:.
1246:.
1234:.
1230:.
1207:.
1195:.
1191:.
1179:^
1142:.
1138:.
1098:.
1086:.
1082:.
1046:.
1021:42
1019:.
1015:.
990:71
988:.
984:.
970:^
956:.
944:.
940:.
926:^
916:.
893:.
851:21
849:.
845:.
822:.
797:14
795:.
791:.
768:.
745:.
722:.
681:^
653:.
622:.
560:^
501:.
447:.
190:is
174:.
93:.
43:is
37:,
1544:.
1498:.
1486::
1439:.
1427::
1400:.
1386::
1380:6
1356:.
1350::
1296:.
1284::
1262:.
1242::
1215:.
1203::
1156:.
1150::
1144:7
1106:.
1094::
1088:8
1050:.
1031:.
1027::
1000:.
996::
964:.
952::
920:.
861:.
857::
807:.
803::
707:.
661:.
649::
630:.
618::
591::
441:w
437:w
358:p
354:p
91:x
87:x
30:.
23:.
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