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Chainstore paradox

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216:: that "every player knows the payoffs and strategies available to other players," where the word "payoff" is descriptive of behavior—what the player is trying to maximize. If, in the first town, the competitor enters and the monopolist is aggressive, the second competitor has observed that the monopolist is not, from the standpoint of common knowledge of payoffs and strategies, maximizing the assumed payoffs; expecting the monopolist to do so in this town seems dubious. 153:"). If a few do test the chain store early in the game, and see that they are greeted with the aggressive strategy, the rest of the competitors are likely not to test any further. Assuming all 17 are deterred, Player A receives 91 (17×5 + 2×3). Even if as many as 10 competitors enter and test Player A's will, Player A will still receive a payoff of 41 (10×0+ 7×5 + 3×2), which is better than the induction (game theoretically correct) payoff. 1125: 1115: 113:, Player A receives a higher payoff from choosing to cooperate than aggressive, and being the last period of the game, there are no longer any future competitors whom Player A needs to intimidate from the market. Knowing this, the 20th competitor enters the market, and Player A will cooperate (receiving a payoff of 2 instead of 0). 116:
The outcome in the final period is set in stone, so to speak. Now consider period 19, and the potential competitor's decision. He knows that A will cooperate in the next period, regardless of what happens in period 19. Thus, if player 19 enters, an aggressive strategy will not be able to deter player
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Depending on which level is selected, the individual begins the decision procedure. The individual then arrives at a (possibly different) decision for each level available (if we have chosen imagination, we would arrive at a routine decision and possible and imagination decision). Selten argues that
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This theory states that Player A will be able to get payoff of higher than 40. Suppose Player A finds the induction argument convincing. He will decide how many periods at the end to play such a strategy, say 3. In periods 1–17, he will decide to always be aggressive against the choice of IN. If all
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The individual makes a conscious effort to analyze the situation in a rational way, using both past experience and logical thinking. This mode of decision uses simplified models whose assumptions are products of imagination, and is the only method of reasoning permitted and expected by game theory.
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If competitors place even a very small probability on the possibility that the monopolist is spiteful, and places intrinsic value on being (or appearing) aggressive, and the monopolist knows this, then even if the monopolist has payoffs as described above, responding to entry in an early town with
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If Player A follows the game theory payoff matrix to achieve the optimal payoff, they will have a lower payoff than with the "deterrence" strategy. This creates an apparent game theory paradox: game theory states that induction strategy should be optimal, but it looks like "deterrence strategy" is
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individuals can always reach a routine decision, but perhaps not the higher levels. Once the individuals have all their levels of decision, they can decide which answer to use...the Final Decision. The final decision is made on the routine level and governs actual behavior.
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The individual tries to visualize how the selection of different alternatives may influence the probable course of future events. This level employs the routine level within the procedural decisions. This method is similar to a computer simulation.
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The individuals use their past experience of the results of decisions to guide their response to choices in the present. "The underlying criteria of similarity between decision situations are crude and sometimes inadequate". (Selten)
204:, is in fact an acceptable idea by the rationality that individuals actually employ. Selten argues that individuals can make decisions of three levels: Routine, Imagination, and Reasoning. 181:. A rational player will not carry out a non-credible threat, but the paradox is that it nevertheless seems to benefit Player A to carry out the threat. 93:
These outcomes lead to two theories for the game, the induction (game theoretically optimal version) and the deterrence theory (weakly dominated theory):
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One chooses which method (routine, imagination or reasoning) to use for the problem, and this decision itself is made on the routine level.
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aggression will be optimal if it increases the probability that later competitors place on the monopolist's being spiteful.
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of the potential competitors know this, it is unlikely potential competitors 1–17 will bother the
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Consider the decision to be made by the 20th and final competitor, of whether to choose
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Game theory is based on the idea that each matrix is modeled with the assumption of
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holds all the way back to the first competitor. Each potential competitor chooses
862: 201: 146: 32: 24: 197: 51: 403: 338: 149:, thus risking the safe payout of 1 ("A" will not retaliate if they choose " 86:, both player A and the competitor receive a payoff of 2, and if A chooses 66:, he receives a payoff of 1, while A receives a payoff of 5. If he chooses 27:
might make, where a "deterrence strategy" appears optimal instead of the
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Relation of Chain Store Paradox to Constitutional Politics in Canada
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is an apparent game theory paradox describing the decisions a
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Player A chooses to 238:The imagination level 208:Complete information? 31:strategy of standard 1056:Kavka's toxin puzzle 828:Income and fertility 214:complete information 200:by the standards of 46:The chain store game 715:Temperature paradox 638:Free choice paradox 502:Fitch's knowability 383:Theory and Decision 352:Ordeshook, Peter C. 319:Theory and Decision 247:The reasoning level 171:non-credible threat 169:: It relies on the 21:chain store paradox 16:Game theory paradox 1091:Prisoner's dilemma 777:Heat death paradox 765:Unexpected hanging 730:Chicken or the egg 396:10.1007/BF00131770 331:10.1007/BF00131770 289:Traveler's dilemma 269:The final decision 130:backward induction 29:backward induction 1137: 1136: 808:Arrow information 229:The routine level 185:Selten's response 173:of responding to 162:optimal instead. 140:Deterrence theory 1162: 1127: 1126: 1117: 1116: 928:Service recovery 782:Olbers's paradox 482:Buridan's bridge 455: 448: 441: 432: 415: 378:Selten, Reinhard 373: 343: 342: 310: 180: 176: 152: 135: 124: 120: 112: 108: 104: 97:Induction theory 89: 85: 82:. If he chooses 81: 77: 73: 69: 65: 61: 57: 1170: 1169: 1165: 1164: 1163: 1161: 1160: 1159: 1140: 1139: 1138: 1133: 1105: 1016:Decision-making 962:Decision theory 957: 786: 710:Hilbert's Hotel 643:Grelling–Nelson 586: 465: 459: 422: 420:Further reading 376: 370: 350: 347: 346: 312: 311: 307: 302: 280: 271: 263: 261:The predecision 258: 249: 240: 231: 226: 210: 190:Reinhard Selten 187: 178: 174: 159: 150: 142: 133: 122: 118: 110: 106: 102: 99: 87: 83: 79: 75: 71: 67: 63: 59: 55: 48: 40:Reinhard Selten 17: 12: 11: 5: 1168: 1166: 1158: 1157: 1152: 1142: 1141: 1135: 1134: 1132: 1131: 1121: 1110: 1107: 1106: 1104: 1103: 1098: 1093: 1088: 1083: 1078: 1073: 1068: 1063: 1058: 1053: 1048: 1043: 1038: 1033: 1028: 1023: 1018: 1013: 1008: 1003: 998: 993: 992: 991: 986: 981: 971: 965: 963: 959: 958: 956: 955: 950: 945: 940: 935: 933:St. Petersburg 930: 925: 920: 915: 910: 905: 900: 895: 890: 885: 880: 875: 870: 865: 860: 855: 850: 845: 840: 835: 830: 825: 820: 815: 810: 805: 800: 794: 792: 788: 787: 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863:Giffen good 823:Competition 577:White horse 552:Omnipotence 202:Game Theory 147:chain store 84:cooperative 76:cooperative 35:reasoning. 33:game theory 25:chain store 1144:Categories 1086:Prevention 1076:Parrondo's 1066:Navigation 1051:Inventor's 1046:Hedgehog's 1006:Chainstore 989:Population 984:New states 918:Prosperity 898:Mayfield's 740:Entailment 720:Barbershop 633:Epimenides 300:References 198:irrational 179:aggressive 88:aggressive 80:aggressive 52:monopolist 1101:Willpower 1096:Tolerance 1071:Newcomb's 1036:Fredkin's 923:Scitovsky 843:Edgeworth 838:Easterlin 803:Antitrust 700:Russell's 695:Richard's 668:Pinocchio 623:Crocodile 542:Newcomb's 512:Goodman's 507:Free will 492:Epicurean 463:paradoxes 412:143946876 404:0040-5833 339:1573-7187 123:cooperate 42:in 1978. 1129:Category 1026:Ellsberg 878:Leontief 858:Gibson's 853:European 848:Ellsberg 818:Braess's 813:Bertrand 791:Economic 725:Catch-22 705:Socratic 547:Nihilism 517:Hedonism 477:Analysis 461:Notable 354:(1992). 278:See also 1031:Fenno's 996:Arrow's 979:Alabama 969:Abilene 948:Tullock 903:Metzler 745:Lottery 735:Drinker 678:Yablo's 673:Quine's 628:Curry's 591:Logical 567:Sorites 557:Preface 537:Moore's 522:Liberal 497:Fiction 194:paradox 938:Thrift 908:Plenty 883:Lerner 873:Jevons 868:Icarus 798:Allais 760:Ross's 598:Barber 582:Zeno's 527:Meno's 410:  402:  366:  337:  1041:Green 1021:Downs 953:Value 888:Lucas 755:Raven 663:No-no 618:Court 603:Berry 408:S2CID 177:with 1119:List 943:Toil 658:Card 653:Liar 400:ISSN 364:ISBN 335:ISSN 19:The 392:doi 327:doi 151:out 107:out 105:or 78:or 64:out 60:out 58:or 1146:: 406:. 398:. 386:. 358:. 333:. 321:. 317:. 175:in 134:in 125:. 119:in 111:in 103:in 72:in 68:in 56:in 50:A 773:" 769:" 454:e 447:t 440:v 414:. 394:: 388:9 372:. 341:. 329:: 323:9

Index

chain store
backward induction
game theory
Reinhard Selten
monopolist
backward induction
chain store
Subgame perfect equilibrium
non-credible threat
Reinhard Selten
paradox
irrational
Game Theory
complete information
Repeated game
Traveler's dilemma
Unexpected hanging paradox
"The chain store paradox"
doi
10.1007/BF00131770
ISSN
1573-7187
Ordeshook, Peter C.
"Reputation and the Chain-Store Paradox"
ISBN
0-415-90241-X
Selten, Reinhard
Theory and Decision
doi
10.1007/BF00131770

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