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Pseudocertainty effect

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In the second problem, since individuals have no choice on options in the first stage, individuals tend to discard the first option when evaluating the overall probability of winning money, but just to consider the options in the second stage that individuals have a choice on. This is also known as
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of option B is higher. In problem 2, people preferred option D with a rate of 58% over option C with a rate of 42%. However, the discrepancy between the answers were surprising because the two problems were designed to have identical outcomes. The choices in problem 2 were designed to be compressed
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Kahneman and Tversky referred to this incidence as a result of what they called the "pseudocertainty effect". They concluded that when people make choices at later stages of problems they often do not realize that uncertainty at an earlier stage will affect the final outcome. This was clearly
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is the tendency for people to perceive an outcome as certain while it is actually uncertain in multi-stage decision making. The evaluation of the certainty of the outcome in a previous stage of decisions is disregarded when selecting an option in subsequent stages. Not to be confused with
154:. The studies that they researched used real and hypothetical monetary gambles and were often used in undergraduate classrooms and laboratories. Kahneman and Tversky illustrated the pseudocertainty effect by the following examples. 162:
Consider the following two stage game. In the first stage, there is a 75% chance to end the game without winning anything and a 25% chance to move into the second stage. If you reach the second stage, you have a choice between:
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Each problem was answered by a different group of respondents. In problem 1, people preferred option A with a rate of 74% over option B with 26%, even though the
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observed in the two stage problem shown above in which the problem moved onto the second stage only if the condition of the first stage was met.
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Your choice must be made before the game starts, i.e., before the outcome of the first stage is known. Please indicate the option you prefer.
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cancellation, meaning that possible options are yielding to the same outcome thus ignoring decision process in that stage.
75: 533: 150:, who received the Nobel Prize in economics for his work on decision making and decision theory, in collaboration with 212:(25% chance to move on x 100% = 25%) chance to win $ 30. The same $ 7.50 expected return in option A and option C. 57: 215:(25% chance to move on x 80% = 20%) chance to win $ 45. The same $ 9.00 expected return in option B and option D. 35: 563: 553: 515: 456: 281: 520: 82: 488: 480: 359: 313: 272:
Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1981-01-30). "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice".
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Rizzo, James (2005-07-01). "Newcomb's Problem for Decision Theory and Critical Theory".
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Also, this time the participants had to make their choice before the game starts.
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for the certainty effect by relaxing the cancellation rule.
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forms of the choices from the two stages of problem 1.
49:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. 501:"Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions" 380:Hayes, Brett K.; Newell, Ben R. (2009-09-01). 185:Which of the following options do you prefer? 166:Which of the following options do you prefer? 146:The pseudocertainty effect was illustrated by 8: 519: 397: 109:Learn how and when to remove this message 499:Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel (1986). 259: 7: 375: 373: 329: 327: 267: 265: 263: 47:adding citations to reliable sources 14: 23: 34:needs additional citations for 1: 580: 348:10.1080/08935690500122404 192:D. 20% chance to win $ 45 189:C. 25% chance to win $ 30 173:B. 80% chance to win $ 45 58:"Pseudocertainty effect" 508:The Journal of Business 469:10.1126/science.7455683 294:10.1126/science.7455683 386:Memory & Cognition 127:pseudocertainty effect 170:A. a sure win of $ 30 43:improve this article 461:1981Sci...211..453T 399:10.3758/MC.37.6.730 286:1981Sci...211..453T 336:Rethinking Marxism 455:(4481): 453โ€“458. 280:(4481): 453โ€“458. 119: 118: 111: 93: 571: 564:Cognitive biases 540: 538: 532:. Archived from 523: 505: 495: 493: 487:. Archived from 446: 438:Kahneman, Daniel 420: 419: 401: 377: 368: 367: 331: 322: 321: 269: 238:Certainty effect 132:certainty effect 114: 107: 103: 100: 94: 92: 51: 27: 19: 579: 578: 574: 573: 572: 570: 569: 568: 554:Prospect theory 544: 543: 536: 521:10.1.1.463.1334 503: 498: 491: 444: 432: 429: 424: 423: 379: 378: 371: 333: 332: 325: 271: 270: 261: 256: 243:Loaded question 229: 206:expected return 202: 183: 160: 148:Daniel Kahneman 144: 136:decision theory 123:prospect theory 115: 104: 98: 95: 52: 50: 40: 28: 17: 12: 11: 5: 577: 575: 567: 566: 561: 556: 546: 545: 542: 541: 539:on 2016-06-01. 530:10.1086/296365 496: 494:on 2016-05-07. 428: 425: 422: 421: 392:(6): 730โ€“743. 369: 342:(3): 471โ€“485. 323: 258: 257: 255: 252: 251: 250: 245: 240: 235: 233:Allais paradox 228: 225: 201: 198: 194: 193: 190: 182: 179: 175: 174: 171: 159: 156: 143: 140: 117: 116: 31: 29: 22: 16:Cognitive bias 15: 13: 10: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 576: 565: 562: 560: 557: 555: 552: 551: 549: 535: 531: 527: 522: 517: 513: 509: 502: 497: 490: 486: 482: 478: 474: 470: 466: 462: 458: 454: 450: 443: 439: 435: 434:Tversky, Amos 431: 430: 426: 417: 413: 409: 405: 400: 395: 391: 387: 383: 376: 374: 370: 365: 361: 357: 353: 349: 345: 341: 337: 330: 328: 324: 319: 315: 311: 307: 303: 299: 295: 291: 287: 283: 279: 275: 268: 266: 264: 260: 253: 249: 248:Loss aversion 246: 244: 241: 239: 236: 234: 231: 230: 226: 224: 220: 216: 213: 210: 207: 199: 197: 191: 188: 187: 186: 180: 178: 172: 169: 168: 167: 164: 157: 155: 153: 149: 141: 139: 137: 133: 128: 124: 113: 110: 102: 91: 88: 84: 81: 77: 74: 70: 67: 63: 60: โ€“  59: 55: 54:Find sources: 48: 44: 38: 37: 32:This article 30: 26: 21: 20: 534:the original 514:(S4): S251. 511: 507: 489:the original 452: 448: 427:Bibliography 389: 385: 339: 335: 277: 273: 221: 217: 214: 211: 203: 200:Significance 195: 184: 176: 165: 161: 152:Amos Tversky 145: 126: 120: 105: 96: 86: 79: 72: 65: 53: 41:Please help 36:verification 33: 548:Categories 254:References 142:Background 69:newspapers 516:CiteSeerX 408:0090-502X 364:144494637 356:0893-5696 302:0036-8075 181:Problem 2 158:Problem 1 99:July 2010 440:(1981). 416:19679854 227:See also 485:5643902 477:7455683 457:Bibcode 449:Science 318:5643902 310:7455683 282:Bibcode 274:Science 83:scholar 518:  483:  475:  414:  406:  362:  354:  316:  308:  300:  125:, the 85:  78:  71:  64:  56:  537:(PDF) 504:(PDF) 492:(PDF) 481:S2CID 445:(PDF) 360:S2CID 314:S2CID 90:JSTOR 76:books 559:Risk 473:PMID 412:PMID 404:ISSN 352:ISSN 306:PMID 298:ISSN 62:news 526:doi 465:doi 453:211 394:doi 344:doi 290:doi 278:211 121:In 45:by 550:: 524:. 512:59 510:. 506:. 479:. 471:. 463:. 451:. 447:. 436:; 410:. 402:. 390:37 388:. 384:. 372:^ 358:. 350:. 340:17 338:. 326:^ 312:. 304:. 296:. 288:. 276:. 262:^ 528:: 467:: 459:: 418:. 396:: 366:. 346:: 320:. 292:: 284:: 112:) 106:( 101:) 97:( 87:ยท 80:ยท 73:ยท 66:ยท 39:.

Index


verification
improve this article
adding citations to reliable sources
"Pseudocertainty effect"
news
newspapers
books
scholar
JSTOR
Learn how and when to remove this message
prospect theory
certainty effect
decision theory
Daniel Kahneman
Amos Tversky
expected return
Allais paradox
Certainty effect
Loaded question
Loss aversion



Bibcode
1981Sci...211..453T
doi
10.1126/science.7455683
ISSN
0036-8075

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