850:(empirical, that is, matters of observation interpreted using terms from a framework). The "external" questions were also of two types: those that were confused pseudo-questions ("one disguised in the form of a theoretical question") and those that could be re-interpreted as practical, pragmatic questions about whether a framework under consideration was "more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended". The adjective "synthetic" was not used by Carnap in his 1950 work
93:
565:. However, they did not believe that any complex metaphysics, such as the type Kant supplied, are necessary to explain our knowledge of mathematical truths. Instead, the logical positivists maintained that our knowledge of judgments like "all bachelors are unmarried" and our knowledge of mathematics (and logic) are in the basic sense the same: all proceeded from our knowledge of the meanings of terms or the conventions of language.
4845:
5984:
3312:
1033:, countered the arguments of "Two Dogmas" directly by trying to define analyticity non-circularly on the syntactical features of sentences. Chomsky himself critically discussed Quine's conclusion, arguing that it is possible to identify some analytic truths (truths of meaning, not truths of facts) which are determined by specific relations holding among some innate conceptual features of the mind or brain.
5994:
1023:. While the first four sections of Quine's paper concern analyticity, the last two concern a-priority. Putnam considers the argument in the two last sections as independent of the first four, and at the same time as Putnam criticizes Quine, he also emphasizes his historical importance as the first top-rank philosopher to both reject the notion of a-priority and sketch a methodology without it.
3322:
6009:
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question "What does it mean?" asked of one of them is the true answer to the same question asked of the other. They also draw the conclusion that discussion about correct or incorrect translations would be impossible given Quine's argument. Four years after Grice and
Strawson published their paper, Quine's book
380:
contradiction, the required predicate" (A7/B12). In analytic propositions, the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. Thus, to know an analytic proposition is true, one need merely examine the concept of the subject. If one finds the predicate contained in the subject, the judgment is true.
184:
As with the previous examples classified as analytic propositions, each of these new statements is an affirmative subject–predicate judgment. However, in none of these cases does the subject concept contain the predicate concept. The concept "bachelor" does not contain the concept "alone"; "alone" is
189:
of "bachelor". The same is true for "creatures with hearts" and "have kidneys"; even if every creature with a heart also has kidneys, the concept "creature with a heart" does not contain the concept "has kidneys". So the philosophical issue is: What kind of statement is "Language is used to transmit
921:
It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact. ... Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some
841:
was a strong proponent of the distinction between what he called "internal questions", questions entertained within a "framework" (like a mathematical theory), and "external questions", questions posed outside any framework – posed before the adoption of any framework. The "internal" questions
631:
These definitions applied to all propositions, regardless of whether they were of subject–predicate form. Thus, under these definitions, the proposition "It is raining or it is not raining" was classified as analytic, while for Kant it was analytic by virtue of its logical form. And the proposition
573:
knowledge is based on experience, this assertion had to include knowledge in mathematics. On the other hand, we believed that with respect to this problem the rationalists had been right in rejecting the old empiricist view that the truth of "2+2=4" is contingent on the observation of facts, a view
504:
and so on. He had a strong emphasis on formality, in particular formal definition, and also emphasized the idea of substitution of synonymous terms. "All bachelors are unmarried" can be expanded out with the formal definition of bachelor as "unmarried man" to form "All unmarried men are unmarried",
477:
propositions, and that we know them. That they are synthetic, he thought, is obvious: the concept "equal to 12" is not contained within the concept "7 + 5"; and the concept "straight line" is not contained within the concept "the shortest distance between two points". From this, Kant concluded that
1061:
It is only when these two theses are accepted that Quine's argument holds. It is not a problem that the notion of necessity is presupposed by the notion of analyticity if necessity can be explained without analyticity. According to Soames, both theses were accepted by most philosophers when Quine
987:
argues that from the difficulties encountered in trying to explicate analyticity by appeal to specific criteria, it does not follow that the notion itself is void. Considering the way that we would test any proposed list of criteria, which is by comparing their extension to the set of analytic
937:
To summarize Quine's argument, the notion of an analytic proposition requires a notion of synonymy, but establishing synonymy inevitably leads to matters of fact – synthetic propositions. Thus, there is no non-circular (and so no tenable) way to ground the notion of analytic propositions.
383:
Thus, for example, one need not consult experience to determine whether "All bachelors are unmarried" is true. One need merely examine the subject concept ("bachelors") and see if the predicate concept "unmarried" is contained in it. And in fact, it is: "unmarried" is part of the definition of
965:
about synonyms leads to a skepticism about meaning. If statements can have meanings, then it would make sense to ask "What does it mean?". If it makes sense to ask "What does it mean?", then synonymy can be defined as follows: Two sentences are synonymous if and only if the true answer of the
578:'s conception, consisted in asserting the thesis of empiricism only for factual truth. By contrast, the truths of logic and mathematics are not in need of confirmation by observations, because they do not state anything about the world of facts, they hold for any possible combination of facts.
379:
involves arguing that there is no problem figuring out how knowledge of analytic propositions is possible. To know an analytic proposition, Kant argued, one need not consult experience. Instead, one needs merely to take the subject and "extract from it, in accordance with the principle of
80:) have questioned whether there is even a clear distinction to be made between propositions which are analytically true and propositions which are synthetically true. Debates regarding the nature and usefulness of the distinction continue to this day in contemporary
906:" in which he argued that the analytic–synthetic distinction is untenable. The argument at bottom is that there are no "analytic" truths, but all truths involve an empirical aspect. In the first paragraph, Quine takes the distinction to be the following:
348:
Kant posits the third type as obviously self-contradictory. Ruling it out, he discusses only the remaining three types as components of his epistemological framework—each, for brevity's sake, becoming, respectively, "analytic", "synthetic
1018:
by putting synonyms for synonyms is near Kant's account of analytic truth as a truth whose negation is a contradiction. Analytic truth defined as a truth confirmed no matter what, however, is closer to one of the traditional accounts of
617:(While the logical positivists believed that the only necessarily true propositions were analytic, they did not define "analytic proposition" as "necessarily true proposition" or "proposition that is true in all possible worlds".)
999:
It seems to me there is as gross a distinction between 'All bachelors are unmarried' and 'There is a book on this table' as between any two things in this world, or at any rate, between any two linguistic expressions in the
863:
The notion of a synthetic truth is of something that is true both because of what it means and because of the way the world is, whereas analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning alone. Thus, what Carnap calls internal
161:
within the subject concept. The concept "bachelor" contains the concept "unmarried"; the concept "unmarried" is part of the definition of the concept "bachelor". Likewise, for "triangle" and "has three sides", and so on.
395:
analytic propositions. It follows, second: There is no problem understanding how we can know analytic propositions; we can know them because we only need to consult our concepts in order to determine that they are true.
926:
reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of
5845:
941:
While Quine's rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction is widely known, the precise argument for the rejection and its status is highly debated in contemporary philosophy. However, some (for example,
593:
Thus the logical positivists drew a new distinction, and, inheriting the terms from Kant, named it the "analytic-synthetic distinction". They provided many different definitions, such as the following:
117:(1781/1998, A6–7/B10–11). There, he restricts his attention to statements that are affirmative subject–predicate judgments and defines "analytic proposition" and "synthetic proposition" as follows:
1062:
published "Two Dogmas". Today, however, Soames holds both statements to be antiquated. He says: "Very few philosophers today would accept either , both of which now seem decidedly antique."
876:, but some external statements also could be "synthetic" statements and Carnap would be doubtful about their status. The analytic–synthetic argument therefore is not identical with the
420:
propositions is possible. This question is exceedingly important, Kant maintains, because all scientific knowledge (for him
Newtonian physics and mathematics) is made up of synthetic
69:. Analytic propositions are true or not true solely by virtue of their meaning, whereas synthetic propositions' truth, if any, derives from how their meaning relates to the world.
266:
The justification of these propositions does not depend upon experience: one need not consult experience to determine whether all bachelors are unmarried, nor whether
3963:
4006:
247:: a proposition whose justification does rely upon experience. The proposition is validated by, and grounded in, experience. Therefore, it is logically contingent.
737:. The thing picked out by the primary intension of "water" could have been otherwise. For example, on some other world where the inhabitants take "water" to mean
1486:
The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association
2274:
574:
that would lead to the unacceptable consequence that an arithmetical statement might possibly be refuted tomorrow by new experiences. Our solution, based upon
111:
uses the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" to divide propositions into two types. Kant introduces the analytic–synthetic distinction in the
Introduction to his
76:, it was revised considerably over time, and different philosophers have used the terms in very different ways. Furthermore, some philosophers (starting with
988:
statements, it would follow that any explication of what analyticity means presupposes that we already have at our disposal a working notion of analyticity.
549:'s extended sense of "analytic". Hence logical empiricists are not subject to Kant's criticism of Hume for throwing out mathematics along with metaphysics.
679:? Two-dimensionalism provides an analysis of the semantics of words and sentences that makes sense of this possibility. The theory was first developed by
241:
rely upon experience. Moreover, the proposition can be validated by experience, but is not grounded in experience. Therefore, it is logically necessary.
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384:"bachelor" and so is contained within it. Thus the proposition "All bachelors are unmarried" can be known to be true without consulting experience.
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270:. (Of course, as Kant would grant, experience is required to understand the concepts "bachelor", "unmarried", "7", "+" and so forth. However, the
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Over a hundred years later, a group of philosophers took interest in Kant and his distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions: the
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Reprinted in W.V.O. Quine, From a
Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, 1953; second, revised, edition 1961) On-line versions at
671:. It is intended to resolve a puzzle that has plagued philosophy for some time, namely: How is it possible to discover empirically that a
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The logical positivists agreed with Kant that we have knowledge of mathematical truths, and further that mathematical propositions are
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Thanks to Frege's logical semantics, particularly his concept of analyticity, arithmetic truths like "7+5=12" are no longer synthetic
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521:". Using this particular expanded idea of analyticity, Frege concluded that Kant's examples of arithmetical truths are analytical
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218:, Kant contrasts his distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions with another distinction, the distinction between
733:, i.e., is the idea or method by which we find its referent. The primary intension of "water" might be a description, such as
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860:: a sentence that is true, but not simply because "the semantical rules of the system suffice for establishing its truth".
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946:) argue that Quine's rejection of the distinction is still widely accepted among philosophers, even if for poor reasons.
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pointed out that Quine's circularity argument needs two of the logical positivists' central theses to be effective:
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criticized "Two Dogmas" in their 1956 article "In
Defense of a Dogma". Among other things, they argue that Quine's
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O, but given that it is true, it cannot be false. It would be absurd to claim that something that is water is not H
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which is recognizable as tautologous and therefore analytic from its logical form: any statement of the form "All
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Each of these statements is an affirmative subject–predicate judgment, and, in each, the predicate concept is
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statements the factual component should be null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its
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If two-dimensionalism is workable it solves some very important problems in the philosophy of language.
357:" propositions. This triad accounts for all propositions possible. Examples of analytic and examples of
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propositions are true, he argues, then metaphysics as a discipline is impossible. The remainder of the
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488:'s notion of analyticity included a number of logical properties and relations beyond containment:
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analytic propositions – propositions grounded in meanings, independent of matters of fact.
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This quote is found with a discussion of the differences between Carnap and
Wittgenstein in
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2004:
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/boghossian/papers/AnalyticityReconsidered.html
1498:
Willard v.O. Quine (1951). "Main Trends in Recent
Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism".
2061:
1787:
Donald
Davidson; Gilbert Harman, eds. (1973). "Analytic/Synthetic and Semantic Theory".
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world, whatever that world happens to be. So if we assign "water" the primary intension
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1309:"§51 A first sketch of the pragmatic roots of Carnap's analytic-synthetic distinction"
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Quine's position denying the analytic–synthetic distinction is summarized as follows:
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1950:
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attempting to demonstrate that Kant's epistemology was compatible with
Lutheranism.
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of the propositions. Once we have the concepts, experience is no longer necessary.)
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to distinguish between propositions (in particular, statements that are affirmative
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613:: a proposition that is made true (or false) solely by the conventions of language
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1925:'Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis
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804:
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180:"All bodies are heavy": that is, they experience a gravitational force. (A7/B11)
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Philosophical
Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis
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statements) could be taken as being also synthetic truths because they require
636:" was classified as analytic, while under Kant's definitions it was synthetic.
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Willard Van Orman Quine § Rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction
50:
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1897:
Cipriani, Enrico (2017). "Chomsky on analytic and necessary propositions".
1751:
Leonard Linsky (October 1970). "Analytical/Synthetic and Semantic Theory".
1359:
473:
Kant maintained that mathematical propositions such as these are synthetic
124:: a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept
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propositions. That leaves only the question of how knowledge of synthetic
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propositions, Kant also explains how we can obtain knowledge of synthetic
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2070:"Chapter 14: Ontology, Analyticity and Meaning: The Quine-Carnap Dispute"
1374:
Supplement to Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic
501:
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489:
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knowledge involved the examination of mathematical propositions, such as
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1772:
1622:
H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson (April 1956). "In Defense of a Dogma".
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It follows from this, Kant argued, first: All analytic propositions are
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469:"The shortest distance between two points is a straight line." (B16–17)
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Sloman, Aaron (1965-10-01). "'Necessary', 'a priori' and 'analytic'".
683:, but it has been advocated by numerous philosophers since, including
601:: a proposition whose truth depends solely on the meaning of its terms
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Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Volume 3, Realism and Reason
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propositions, and explaining how we can obtain knowledge of analytic
1833:
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1600:
1511:
1412:
1188:
1175:(1949-01-06). "A Proof That Synthetic A Priori Propositions Exist".
796:
O. When considered according to its secondary intension, "Water is H
776:
in this world. The secondary intension of "water" in our world is H
553:(Here "logical empiricist" is a synonym for "logical positivist".)
165:
Examples of synthetic propositions, on Kant's definition, include:
5175:
4890:
3887:
3533:
2194:
1987:
1857:"Where Things Stand Now with the Analytical/Synthetic Distinction"
1070:
This distinction was imported from philosophy into theology, with
676:
138:
Examples of analytic propositions, on Kant's definition, include:
91:
1820:
Willard v O Quine (February 2, 1967). "On a Suggestion of Katz".
193:
5674:
5306:
5135:
4121:
2053:. Trans. by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood, Cambridge University Press .
660:
5310:
4863:
3988:
3340:
3336:
2256:
2243:
2075:. In David John Chalmers; David Manley; Ryan Wasserman (eds.).
434:
is devoted to examining whether and how knowledge of synthetic
424:
propositions. If it is impossible to determine which synthetic
153:"All bodies are extended": that is, they occupy space. (A7/B11)
2195:"Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
1119:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition)
2056:
Rey, Georges. (2003). "The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction".
1014:
Analytic truth defined as a true statement derivable from a
913:
synthetic propositions – propositions grounded in fact.
756:
of "water" is whatever thing "water" happens to pick out in
308:: any justification of them would require one's experience.
1737:
Putnam, Hilary, "'Two dogmas' revisited." In Gilbert Ryle,
1433:
Meaning and Necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic
894:
Two Dogmas of Empiricism § Analyticity and circularity
458:
Part of Kant's examination of the possibility of synthetic
2077:
Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology
1714:
Philosophical Papers: Volume 2, Mind, Language and Reality
1057:
Analyticity is needed to explain and legitimate necessity.
741:, but, where the chemical make-up of watery stuff is not H
365:
propositions he gives those in mathematics and physics.
4859:
2031:
Glock, Hans-Johann; Gluer, Kathrin; Keil, Geert (2003).
972:
was released. In the book Quine presented his theory of
6022:
5295:
1376:, enlarged edition (University of Chicago Press, 1956).
1284:
Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein
319:
distinction together yield four types of propositions:
278:
distinction as employed here by Kant refers not to the
1998:
Boghossian, Paul. (1996). "Analyticity Reconsidered".
995:
argues that Quine is attacking two different notions:
932:
Willard V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", p. 64
2124:(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). <
607:: a proposition that is true (or false) by definition
583:
Rudolf Carnap, "Autobiography": §10: Semantics, p. 64
2062:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic
854:. Carnap did define a "synthetic truth" in his work
5909:
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5733:
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2297:
2290:
1660:
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language
373:Part of Kant's argument in the Introduction to the
2134:"The return of the analytic-synthetic distinction"
557:The origin of the logical positivist's distinction
361:statements have already been given, for synthetic
2116:Quine, W. V. (1951). "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".
1551:"Chapter 2: W.V. Quine: Two dogmas of empiricism"
230:propositions. He defines these terms as follows:
1939:There are several earlier versions of this work.
997:
919:
567:
535:
1690:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 87–97.
1339:For a fuller explanation see Chalmers, David.
5322:
4875:
4000:
3352:
2268:
2120:, Vol.60, No.1, pp. 20–43. Reprinted in
1248:. Open Court Publishing Company. p. 64.
620:Synthetic propositions were then defined as:
404:After ruling out the possibility of analytic
8:
764:then the secondary intension of "water" is H
694:Any given sentence, for example, the words,
134:contained in its subject concept but related
72:While the distinction was first proposed by
2098:. In John Lachs; Robert B. Talisse (eds.).
1927:. Princeton University Press. p. 360.
1413:"Rudolf Carnap: §3. Analytic and Synthetic"
818:, since we had to discover that water was H
311:The analytic–synthetic distinction and the
130:: a proposition whose predicate concept is
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2253:
2240:
569:Since empiricism had always asserted that
4626:Relationship between religion and science
1966:
1951:"Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?"
1914:
1912:
1663:. Cambridge University Press. p. 5.
1470:Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
1315:. Harvard University Press. pp. 101
655:. It is a theory of how to determine the
369:The ease of knowing analytic propositions
237:: a proposition whose justification does
172:"All creatures with hearts have kidneys."
5846:Fundamental theory of Catholic canon law
2002:, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 360–391. <
1741:Stocksfield: Oriel Press, 1976, 202–213.
1717:. Harvard University Press. p. 36.
1353:
1351:
1349:
1343:. Oxford UP: 1996. Chapter 2, section 4.
1212:"The epistemic challenge to antirealism"
2058:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1992:The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1436:(2nd ed.). University of Chicago.
1105:
2126:http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
1921:"Evaluating the circularity argument"
1583:Paul Artin Boghossian (August 1996).
1360:"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"
1286:. Open Court Publishing. p. 29.
1137:
1135:
846:(or analytic, or logically true) and
745:O, it is not the case that water is H
7:
2181:"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
2102:. Psychology Press. pp. 36–39.
2100:American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia
1986:Baehr, Jason S. (October 18, 2006).
1463:"Does ontology rest upon a mistake?"
1143:"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
1115:"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
627:: a proposition that is not analytic
447:Frege revision of Kantian definition
6008:
5774:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
5057:Analytic and synthetic propositions
4928:Formal semantics (natural language)
2226:Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
2214:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2200:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2186:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2033:Fifty Years of Quine's "Two dogmas"
1739:Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy.
1417:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1364:Revue Internationale de Philosophie
1147:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
868:statements (as opposed to internal
852:Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology
30:For the linguistic categories, see
1990:. In J. Fieser; B. Dowden (eds.).
1791:(2nd ed.). pp. 473–482.
1557:. Hackett Publishing. p. 60.
61:judgments) that are of two types:
27:Semantic distinction in philosophy
25:
4646:Sociology of scientific knowledge
4641:Sociology of scientific ignorance
4594:History and philosophy of science
1573:, Harvard University Press (1953)
706:is taken to express two distinct
145:"All triangles have three sides."
6007:
5992:
5983:
5982:
5269:
4843:
4831:
3320:
3311:
3310:
2209:"Analytic–synthetic distinction"
1388:"Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
1244:. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.).
784:O in every world because unlike
2010:Cory Juhl; Eric Loomis (2009).
1246:The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap
478:we have knowledge of synthetic
304:Both of these propositions are
5804:Natural Law and Natural Rights
4035:Analytic–synthetic distinction
3783:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2523:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2231:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2222:Analytic–synthetic distinction
2096:"Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic"
1980:References and further reading
1411:Mauro Murzi (April 12, 2001).
1386:Gillian Russell (2012-11-21).
589:Logical positivist definitions
400:The possibility of metaphysics
259:"All bachelors are unmarried."
142:"All bachelors are unmarried."
49:distinction used primarily in
43:analytic–synthetic distinction
1:
2049:Kant, Immanuel. (1781/1998).
1789:Semantics of natural language
1449:Google link to Midway reprint
991:In "'Two Dogmas' Revisited",
878:internal–external distinction
826:O, for these are known to be
729:of a word or sentence is its
718:, which together compose its
2122:From a Logical Point of View
1797:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_16
1571:From a Logical Point of View
974:indeterminacy of translation
297:"All bachelors are unhappy."
5881:Libertarian theories of law
4368:Hypothetico-deductive model
4343:Deductive-nomological model
4328:Constructivist epistemology
3828:Internalism and externalism
2079:. Oxford University Press.
2051:The Critique of Pure Reason
1988:"A Priori and A Posteriori"
1949:Palmquist, Stephen (1989).
1272:"Carnap and Wittgenstein's
833:
807:has argued that "Water is H
800:O" is true in every world.
556:
282:of the concepts but to the
212:In the Introduction to the
6101:
5392:International legal theory
2422:Causal theory of reference
2060:, Edward Zalta (ed.). <
1585:"Analyticity Reconsidered"
1553:. In Harold Morick (ed.).
1549:Willard v O Quine (1980).
1535:February 28, 2013, at the
1313:Rule-Following and Realism
1170:(1949)'s ostensive proof:
1084:Holophrastic indeterminacy
1029:, a one-time associate of
887:
883:
438:propositions is possible.
205:
169:"All bachelors are alone."
29:
5978:
5344:
5264:
5141:Necessity and sufficiency
4897:
4822:
4429:Semantic view of theories
4348:Epistemological anarchism
4285:dependent and independent
3954:
3659:Evolutionary epistemology
3306:
2250:
2245:Links to related articles
1822:The Journal of Philosophy
1526:http://www.calculemus.org
1270:Michael Friedman (1997).
1218:. MIT Press. p. 69.
1177:The Journal of Philosophy
710:, often referred to as a
208:A priori and a posteriori
6085:Definitions of knowledge
6065:Concepts in epistemology
5963:Rational-legal authority
5851:German historical school
5836:Analytical jurisprudence
4171:Intertheoretic reduction
4160:Ignoramus et ignorabimus
4137:Functional contextualism
3931:Philosophy of perception
3734:Representational realism
3704:Naturalized epistemology
2482:Scientific structuralism
1968:10.5840/faithphil1989619
1657:Searle, John R. (1969).
1624:The Philosophical Review
1555:Challenges to empiricism
1500:The Philosophical Review
1210:Jerrold J. Katz (2000).
904:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
811:O" is an example of the
245:a posteriori proposition
6055:Conceptual distinctions
5931:Judicial interpretation
4656:Philosophers of science
4434:Scientific essentialism
4383:Model-dependent realism
4318:Constructive empiricism
4211:Evidence-based practice
3911:Outline of epistemology
3744:Transcendental idealism
1855:Jerrold J Katz (1974).
1482:10.1111/1467-8349.00044
1048:All necessary (and all
900:Willard Van Orman Quine
842:could be of two types:
431:Critique of Pure Reason
376:Critique of Pure Reason
353:", and "empirical" or "
215:Critique of Pure Reason
194:Kant's version and the
176:Kant's own example is:
149:Kant's own example is:
114:Critique of Pure Reason
78:Willard Van Orman Quine
6018:WikiProject Philosophy
5372:Critical legal studies
4739:Alfred North Whitehead
4729:Charles Sanders Peirce
3858:Problem of other minds
2538:Reflective equilibrium
2162:10.1093/analys/26.1.12
2068:Soames, Scott (2009).
1899:Phenomenology and Mind
1711:Hilary Putnam (1979).
1684:Hilary Putnam (1983).
1461:Stephen Yablo (1998).
1430:Rudolf Carnap (1947).
1358:Rudolf Carnap (1950).
1278:. In William W. Tait;
1168:Cooper Harold Langford
1052:) truths are analytic.
1012:
935:
788:it is impossible for H
586:
551:
466:"7 + 5 = 12." (B15–16)
293:propositions include:
255:propositions include:
103:Conceptual containment
99:
82:philosophy of language
67:synthetic propositions
5941:Law without the state
5276:Philosophy portal
4838:Philosophy portal
4589:Hard and soft science
4584:Faith and rationality
4453:Scientific skepticism
4233:Scientific Revolution
4016:Philosophy of science
3936:Philosophy of science
3916:Faith and rationality
3798:Descriptive knowledge
3669:Feminist epistemology
3609:Nicholas Wolterstorff
3209:Nicholas Wolterstorff
2664:David Malet Armstrong
2132:Robert Hanna (2012).
2094:Frank X Ryan (2004).
1919:Scott Soames (2009).
1569:Published earlier in
1392:Oxford Bibliographies
1216:Realistic Rationalism
902:published the essay "
857:Meaning and Necessity
625:synthetic proposition
128:synthetic proposition
95:
63:analytic propositions
5901:Virtue jurisprudence
5841:Deontological ethics
4564:Criticism of science
4439:Scientific formalism
4323:Constructive realism
4228:Scientific pluralism
4201:Problem of induction
3868:Procedural knowledge
3853:Problem of induction
2118:Philosophical Review
1955:Faith and Philosophy
1094:Failure to elucidate
1007:Philosophical Papers
834:Carnap's distinction
792:O to be other than H
611:analytic proposition
605:analytic proposition
599:analytic proposition
235:a priori proposition
122:analytic proposition
6075:Philosophy of logic
6060:Analytic philosophy
6050:Philosophical logic
4938:Philosophy of logic
4631:Rhetoric of science
4569:Descriptive science
4313:Confirmation holism
4206:Scientific evidence
4166:Inductive reasoning
4095:Demarcation problem
3946:Virtue epistemology
3941:Social epistemology
3921:Formal epistemology
3808:Epistemic injustice
3803:Exploratory thought
3604:Ludwig Wittgenstein
3031:Patricia Churchland
2962:Christine Korsgaard
2848:Logical positivists
2740:Ludwig Wittgenstein
2517:paradox of analysis
2284:Analytic philosophy
1240:Carnap, R. (1999).
1089:Paradox of analysis
754:secondary intension
716:secondary intension
657:sense and reference
653:analytic philosophy
453:logical positivists
442:Logical positivists
5794:The Concept of Law
5784:Pure Theory of Law
5237:Rules of inference
5206:Mathematical logic
4948:Semantics of logic
4850:Science portal
4779:Carl Gustav Hempel
4734:Wilhelm Windelband
4621:Questionable cause
4444:Scientific realism
4265:Underdetermination
4100:Empirical evidence
4090:Creative synthesis
3599:Timothy Williamson
3389:Augustine of Hippo
3204:William Lane Craig
2922:Friedrich Waismann
2879:Carl Gustav Hempel
2838:Timothy Williamson
2798:Alasdair MacIntyre
2656:Australian realism
2636:Russ Shafer-Landau
2497:Analytical Thomism
2452:Logical positivism
1876:10.1007/BF00877579
1765:10.1007/BF00484810
1341:The Conscious Mind
1307:Gary Ebbs (2009).
884:Quine's criticisms
749:O for that world.
647:is an approach to
645:Two-dimensionalism
640:Two-dimensionalism
185:not a part of the
100:
36:Synthetic language
18:Synthetic a priori
6070:Concepts in logic
6037:
6036:
6031:
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6003:Philosophy portal
5764:The Spirit of Law
5402:Philosophy of law
5382:Economic analysis
5367:Constitutionalism
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5094:Deductive closure
5040:
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4979:Critical thinking
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4468:Uniformitarianism
4223:Scientific method
4117:Explanatory power
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3848:Privileged access
3484:Søren Kierkegaard
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3018:Pittsburgh School
3008:Peter van Inwagen
2942:Roderick Chisholm
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2823:Richard Swinburne
2758:G. E. M. Anscombe
2594:
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2492:Analytic theology
2467:Ordinary language
2405:
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1372:Reprinted in the
712:primary intension
32:Analytic language
16:(Redirected from
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4809:Bas van Fraassen
4764:Hans Reichenbach
4744:Bertrand Russell
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4487:Philosophy of...
4270:Unity of science
4063:Commensurability
4009:
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3926:Metaepistemology
3904:Related articles
3878:Regress argument
3813:Epistemic virtue
3564:Bertrand Russell
3539:Duncan Pritchard
3499:Hilary Kornblith
3414:Laurence BonJour
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3071:Bas van Fraassen
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2884:Hans Reichenbach
2867:
2833:Bernard Williams
2730:Bertrand Russell
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1173:Langford, C. H.
1171:
1165:
1161:
1151:
1149:
1141:
1140:
1133:
1123:
1121:
1112:
1111:
1107:
1102:
1080:
1068:
1066:In other fields
1011:
1005:Hilary Putnam,
1004:
969:Word and Object
952:
944:Paul Boghossian
934:
931:
896:
886:
836:
825:
821:
810:
799:
795:
791:
783:
779:
771:
767:
748:
744:
701:
673:necessary truth
642:
633:
591:
585:
582:
559:
541:but analytical
449:
444:
402:
391:; there are no
371:
300:"Tables exist."
267:
210:
204:
105:
90:
39:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
6098:
6096:
6088:
6087:
6082:
6077:
6072:
6067:
6062:
6057:
6052:
6042:
6041:
6035:
6034:
6029:
6028:
6026:
6025:
6020:
6015:
6005:
6000:
5990:
5979:
5976:
5975:
5973:
5972:
5965:
5960:
5955:
5948:
5943:
5938:
5933:
5928:
5921:
5913:
5911:
5907:
5906:
5904:
5903:
5898:
5896:Utilitarianism
5893:
5888:
5883:
5878:
5873:
5868:
5863:
5861:Legal moralism
5858:
5856:Interpretivism
5853:
5848:
5843:
5838:
5832:
5830:
5824:
5823:
5821:
5820:
5810:
5800:
5790:
5780:
5770:
5760:
5750:
5739:
5737:
5731:
5730:
5728:
5727:
5722:
5717:
5712:
5707:
5702:
5697:
5692:
5687:
5682:
5677:
5672:
5667:
5662:
5657:
5652:
5647:
5642:
5637:
5632:
5627:
5622:
5617:
5612:
5607:
5602:
5597:
5592:
5587:
5582:
5577:
5572:
5567:
5562:
5557:
5552:
5547:
5542:
5537:
5532:
5527:
5522:
5517:
5512:
5507:
5502:
5497:
5492:
5487:
5482:
5477:
5472:
5467:
5462:
5457:
5452:
5447:
5442:
5437:
5432:
5427:
5421:
5419:
5413:
5412:
5410:
5409:
5404:
5399:
5394:
5389:
5384:
5379:
5374:
5369:
5363:
5361:
5355:
5354:
5352:
5351:
5345:
5342:
5341:
5336:
5334:
5333:
5326:
5319:
5311:
5302:
5301:
5299:
5298:
5293:
5283:
5278:
5265:
5262:
5261:
5258:
5257:
5255:
5254:
5249:
5244:
5239:
5234:
5228:
5226:
5222:
5221:
5219:
5218:
5213:
5208:
5202:
5200:
5191:
5187:
5186:
5184:
5183:
5178:
5173:
5168:
5163:
5158:
5153:
5148:
5143:
5138:
5133:
5128:
5123:
5118:
5117:
5116:
5106:
5101:
5096:
5091:
5086:
5085:
5084:
5079:
5069:
5064:
5059:
5054:
5048:
5046:
5042:
5041:
5038:
5037:
5035:
5034:
5029:
5024:
5019:
5013:
5011:
5007:
5006:
5004:
5003:
4998:
4993:
4988:
4987:
4986:
4981:
4971:
4965:
4963:
4956:
4955:
4950:
4945:
4940:
4935:
4930:
4925:
4919:
4917:
4913:
4912:
4910:
4909:
4904:
4898:
4895:
4894:
4889:
4887:
4886:
4879:
4872:
4864:
4855:
4854:
4852:
4840:
4828:
4823:
4820:
4819:
4817:
4816:
4811:
4806:
4801:
4796:
4791:
4786:
4784:W. V. O. Quine
4781:
4776:
4771:
4766:
4761:
4756:
4751:
4746:
4741:
4736:
4731:
4726:
4721:
4719:Rudolf Steiner
4716:
4711:
4709:Henri Poincaré
4706:
4700:
4697:
4696:
4694:
4693:
4688:
4683:
4678:
4673:
4667:
4665:
4658:
4652:
4651:
4649:
4648:
4643:
4638:
4633:
4628:
4623:
4618:
4613:
4608:
4607:
4606:
4596:
4591:
4586:
4581:
4579:Exact sciences
4576:
4571:
4566:
4560:
4558:
4557:Related topics
4554:
4553:
4551:
4550:
4549:
4548:
4543:
4538:
4533:
4528:
4523:
4516:Social science
4513:
4512:
4511:
4509:Space and time
4501:
4496:
4490:
4488:
4484:
4483:
4481:
4480:
4475:
4470:
4465:
4460:
4455:
4450:
4441:
4436:
4431:
4422:
4413:
4408:
4395:
4390:
4385:
4380:
4375:
4370:
4365:
4360:
4355:
4350:
4345:
4340:
4335:
4330:
4325:
4320:
4315:
4310:
4304:
4302:
4298:
4297:
4295:
4294:
4289:
4288:
4287:
4282:
4272:
4267:
4262:
4261:
4260:
4255:
4250:
4240:
4235:
4230:
4225:
4220:
4218:Scientific law
4215:
4214:
4213:
4203:
4198:
4193:
4188:
4183:
4178:
4173:
4168:
4163:
4156:
4155:
4154:
4149:
4139:
4134:
4129:
4127:Falsifiability
4124:
4119:
4114:
4113:
4112:
4102:
4097:
4092:
4087:
4086:
4085:
4075:
4070:
4065:
4060:
4059:
4058:
4056:Mill's Methods
4048:
4037:
4032:
4026:
4024:
4020:
4019:
4014:
4012:
4011:
4004:
3997:
3989:
3980:
3979:
3977:
3976:
3971:
3966:
3961:
3955:
3952:
3951:
3949:
3948:
3943:
3938:
3933:
3928:
3923:
3918:
3913:
3907:
3905:
3901:
3900:
3898:
3897:
3890:
3885:
3880:
3875:
3870:
3865:
3860:
3855:
3850:
3845:
3840:
3835:
3830:
3825:
3820:
3815:
3810:
3805:
3800:
3795:
3790:
3785:
3780:
3775:
3767:
3758:
3756:
3750:
3749:
3747:
3746:
3741:
3736:
3731:
3726:
3721:
3716:
3711:
3706:
3701:
3696:
3691:
3686:
3681:
3676:
3671:
3666:
3661:
3656:
3651:
3646:
3644:Constructivism
3641:
3635:
3633:
3627:
3626:
3624:
3623:
3616:
3611:
3606:
3601:
3596:
3594:Baruch Spinoza
3591:
3589:P. F. Strawson
3586:
3581:
3579:Susanna Siegel
3576:
3571:
3566:
3561:
3556:
3554:W. V. O. Quine
3551:
3546:
3541:
3536:
3531:
3526:
3521:
3516:
3511:
3506:
3501:
3496:
3491:
3486:
3481:
3476:
3471:
3466:
3461:
3456:
3454:Nelson Goodman
3451:
3446:
3444:Edmund Gettier
3441:
3436:
3431:
3429:René Descartes
3426:
3421:
3419:Gilles Deleuze
3416:
3411:
3406:
3401:
3396:
3394:William Alston
3391:
3386:
3384:Thomas Aquinas
3380:
3378:
3372:
3371:
3366:
3364:
3363:
3356:
3349:
3341:
3332:
3331:
3329:
3328:
3318:
3307:
3304:
3303:
3300:
3299:
3297:
3296:
3291:
3285:
3283:
3279:
3278:
3276:
3275:
3273:Patrick Suppes
3270:
3265:
3260:
3255:
3249:
3247:
3241:
3240:
3238:
3237:
3232:
3227:
3221:
3219:
3215:
3214:
3212:
3211:
3206:
3201:
3195:
3193:
3189:
3188:
3186:
3185:
3180:
3175:
3169:
3167:
3161:
3160:
3158:
3157:
3155:Michael Walzer
3152:
3147:
3142:
3137:
3132:
3127:
3122:
3117:
3111:
3109:
3105:
3104:
3102:
3101:
3096:
3091:
3085:
3083:
3077:
3076:
3074:
3073:
3068:
3063:
3058:
3053:
3048:
3043:
3041:Adolf Grünbaum
3038:
3033:
3028:
3026:Robert Brandom
3022:
3020:
3014:
3013:
3011:
3010:
3005:
2999:
2997:
2993:
2992:
2990:
2989:
2984:
2982:W. V. O. Quine
2979:
2974:
2969:
2964:
2959:
2957:Nelson Goodman
2954:
2952:Daniel Dennett
2949:
2944:
2938:
2936:
2932:
2931:
2928:
2927:
2925:
2924:
2919:
2917:Moritz Schlick
2914:
2909:
2904:
2898:
2896:
2890:
2889:
2887:
2886:
2881:
2875:
2873:
2864:
2863:
2858:
2852:
2850:
2844:
2843:
2841:
2840:
2835:
2830:
2828:Charles Taylor
2825:
2820:
2818:P. F. Strawson
2815:
2810:
2805:
2800:
2795:
2790:
2785:
2780:
2775:
2770:
2765:
2760:
2754:
2752:
2746:
2745:
2743:
2742:
2737:
2732:
2727:
2722:
2717:
2715:Norman Malcolm
2712:
2707:
2702:
2696:
2694:
2690:
2689:
2687:
2686:
2684:J. J. C. Smart
2681:
2676:
2671:
2669:David Chalmers
2666:
2660:
2658:
2649:
2648:
2643:
2638:
2633:
2631:Giuseppe Peano
2628:
2623:
2621:Edmund Gettier
2618:
2613:
2608:
2602:
2600:
2596:
2595:
2592:
2591:
2589:
2588:
2583:
2578:
2576:Possible world
2573:
2568:
2563:
2557:
2555:
2546:
2545:
2540:
2535:
2530:
2528:Counterfactual
2525:
2520:
2509:
2507:
2503:
2502:
2500:
2499:
2494:
2489:
2484:
2479:
2474:
2469:
2464:
2459:
2454:
2449:
2444:
2439:
2434:
2429:
2424:
2419:
2413:
2411:
2407:
2406:
2403:
2402:
2400:
2399:
2394:
2389:
2387:Paraconsistent
2384:
2379:
2374:
2369:
2363:
2361:
2357:
2356:
2354:
2353:
2348:
2343:
2337:
2335:
2331:
2330:
2328:
2327:
2322:
2317:
2312:
2307:
2301:
2299:
2298:Areas of focus
2292:
2288:
2287:
2282:
2280:
2279:
2272:
2265:
2257:
2251:
2248:
2247:
2244:
2238:
2237:
2228:
2219:
2205:
2191:
2171:
2170:External links
2168:
2167:
2166:
2145:
2129:
2114:
2109:978-0203492796
2108:
2091:
2086:978-0199546046
2085:
2065:
2054:
2047:
2042:978-9042009486
2041:
2028:
2023:978-0415773331
2022:
2007:
1996:
1981:
1978:
1975:
1974:
1941:
1934:978-1400825790
1933:
1908:
1889:
1847:
1812:
1806:978-9027703040
1805:
1743:
1730:
1724:978-0521295512
1723:
1703:
1696:
1676:
1670:978-0521096263
1669:
1649:
1614:
1595:(3): 360–391.
1575:
1564:978-0915144907
1563:
1541:
1490:
1476:(1): 229–262.
1453:
1443:978-0226093475
1442:
1422:
1403:
1378:
1345:
1332:
1326:978-0674034419
1325:
1299:
1293:978-0812693447
1292:
1280:Leonard Linsky
1261:
1255:978-0812691535
1254:
1238:Reprinted in:
1231:
1225:978-0262263290
1224:
1202:
1159:
1131:
1113:Rey, Georges.
1104:
1103:
1101:
1098:
1097:
1096:
1091:
1086:
1079:
1076:
1067:
1064:
1059:
1058:
1054:
1053:
1002:
959:P. F. Strawson
951:
948:
929:
915:
914:
911:
885:
882:
835:
832:
823:
819:
808:
797:
793:
789:
781:
777:
769:
765:
746:
742:
704:
703:
699:
689:Berit Brogaard
685:David Chalmers
641:
638:
629:
628:
615:
614:
608:
602:
590:
587:
580:
558:
555:
482:propositions.
471:
470:
467:
448:
445:
443:
440:
401:
398:
370:
367:
346:
345:
339:
333:
327:
302:
301:
298:
264:
263:
260:
249:
248:
242:
206:Main article:
203:
192:
182:
181:
174:
173:
170:
155:
154:
147:
146:
143:
136:
135:
125:
104:
101:
89:
86:
26:
24:
14:
13:
10:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
6097:
6086:
6083:
6081:
6078:
6076:
6073:
6071:
6068:
6066:
6063:
6061:
6058:
6056:
6053:
6051:
6048:
6047:
6045:
6024:
6021:
6019:
6016:
6014:
6006:
6004:
6001:
5999:
5995:
5991:
5989:
5981:
5980:
5977:
5971:
5970:
5966:
5964:
5961:
5959:
5956:
5954:
5953:
5949:
5947:
5944:
5942:
5939:
5937:
5934:
5932:
5929:
5927:
5926:
5922:
5920:
5919:
5915:
5914:
5912:
5908:
5902:
5899:
5897:
5894:
5892:
5889:
5887:
5884:
5882:
5879:
5877:
5874:
5872:
5871:Legal realism
5869:
5867:
5864:
5862:
5859:
5857:
5854:
5852:
5849:
5847:
5844:
5842:
5839:
5837:
5834:
5833:
5831:
5829:
5825:
5816:
5815:
5811:
5806:
5805:
5801:
5796:
5795:
5791:
5786:
5785:
5781:
5776:
5775:
5771:
5766:
5765:
5761:
5756:
5755:
5751:
5746:
5745:
5741:
5740:
5738:
5736:
5732:
5726:
5723:
5721:
5718:
5716:
5713:
5711:
5708:
5706:
5703:
5701:
5698:
5696:
5693:
5691:
5688:
5686:
5683:
5681:
5678:
5676:
5673:
5671:
5668:
5666:
5663:
5661:
5658:
5656:
5653:
5651:
5648:
5646:
5643:
5641:
5638:
5636:
5633:
5631:
5628:
5626:
5623:
5621:
5618:
5616:
5613:
5611:
5608:
5606:
5603:
5601:
5598:
5596:
5593:
5591:
5588:
5586:
5583:
5581:
5578:
5576:
5573:
5571:
5568:
5566:
5563:
5561:
5558:
5556:
5553:
5551:
5548:
5546:
5543:
5541:
5538:
5536:
5533:
5531:
5528:
5526:
5523:
5521:
5518:
5516:
5513:
5511:
5508:
5506:
5503:
5501:
5498:
5496:
5493:
5491:
5488:
5486:
5483:
5481:
5478:
5476:
5473:
5471:
5468:
5466:
5463:
5461:
5458:
5456:
5453:
5451:
5448:
5446:
5443:
5441:
5438:
5436:
5433:
5431:
5428:
5426:
5423:
5422:
5420:
5418:
5414:
5408:
5405:
5403:
5400:
5398:
5397:Legal history
5395:
5393:
5390:
5388:
5385:
5383:
5380:
5378:
5375:
5373:
5370:
5368:
5365:
5364:
5362:
5360:
5356:
5350:
5347:
5346:
5343:
5339:
5338:Jurisprudence
5332:
5327:
5325:
5320:
5318:
5313:
5312:
5309:
5297:
5294:
5291:
5287:
5284:
5282:
5279:
5277:
5267:
5266:
5263:
5253:
5252:Logic symbols
5250:
5248:
5245:
5243:
5240:
5238:
5235:
5233:
5230:
5229:
5227:
5223:
5217:
5214:
5212:
5209:
5207:
5204:
5203:
5201:
5199:
5195:
5192:
5188:
5182:
5179:
5177:
5174:
5172:
5169:
5167:
5164:
5162:
5159:
5157:
5154:
5152:
5149:
5147:
5144:
5142:
5139:
5137:
5134:
5132:
5131:Logical truth
5129:
5127:
5124:
5122:
5119:
5115:
5112:
5111:
5110:
5107:
5105:
5102:
5100:
5097:
5095:
5092:
5090:
5087:
5083:
5080:
5078:
5075:
5074:
5073:
5072:Contradiction
5070:
5068:
5065:
5063:
5060:
5058:
5055:
5053:
5050:
5049:
5047:
5043:
5033:
5030:
5028:
5025:
5023:
5020:
5018:
5017:Argumentation
5015:
5014:
5012:
5008:
5002:
5001:Philosophical
4999:
4997:
4996:Non-classical
4994:
4992:
4989:
4985:
4982:
4980:
4977:
4976:
4975:
4972:
4970:
4967:
4966:
4964:
4960:
4954:
4951:
4949:
4946:
4944:
4941:
4939:
4936:
4934:
4931:
4929:
4926:
4924:
4921:
4920:
4918:
4914:
4908:
4905:
4903:
4900:
4899:
4896:
4892:
4885:
4880:
4878:
4873:
4871:
4866:
4865:
4862:
4851:
4846:
4841:
4839:
4829:
4827:
4824:
4821:
4815:
4812:
4810:
4807:
4805:
4802:
4800:
4797:
4795:
4792:
4790:
4787:
4785:
4782:
4780:
4777:
4775:
4772:
4770:
4769:Rudolf Carnap
4767:
4765:
4762:
4760:
4757:
4755:
4752:
4750:
4747:
4745:
4742:
4740:
4737:
4735:
4732:
4730:
4727:
4725:
4722:
4720:
4717:
4715:
4712:
4710:
4707:
4705:
4704:Auguste Comte
4702:
4701:
4692:
4689:
4687:
4684:
4682:
4679:
4677:
4676:Francis Bacon
4674:
4672:
4669:
4668:
4666:
4662:
4659:
4657:
4653:
4647:
4644:
4642:
4639:
4637:
4634:
4632:
4629:
4627:
4624:
4622:
4619:
4617:
4614:
4612:
4609:
4605:
4604:Pseudoscience
4602:
4601:
4600:
4597:
4595:
4592:
4590:
4587:
4585:
4582:
4580:
4577:
4575:
4572:
4570:
4567:
4565:
4562:
4561:
4559:
4555:
4547:
4544:
4542:
4539:
4537:
4534:
4532:
4529:
4527:
4524:
4522:
4519:
4518:
4517:
4514:
4510:
4507:
4506:
4505:
4502:
4500:
4497:
4495:
4492:
4491:
4489:
4485:
4479:
4476:
4474:
4471:
4469:
4466:
4464:
4463:Structuralism
4461:
4459:
4456:
4454:
4451:
4449:
4445:
4442:
4440:
4437:
4435:
4432:
4430:
4426:
4425:Received view
4423:
4421:
4417:
4414:
4412:
4409:
4407:
4403:
4399:
4396:
4394:
4391:
4389:
4386:
4384:
4381:
4379:
4376:
4374:
4371:
4369:
4366:
4364:
4361:
4359:
4356:
4354:
4351:
4349:
4346:
4344:
4341:
4339:
4336:
4334:
4333:Contextualism
4331:
4329:
4326:
4324:
4321:
4319:
4316:
4314:
4311:
4309:
4306:
4305:
4303:
4299:
4293:
4290:
4286:
4283:
4281:
4278:
4277:
4276:
4273:
4271:
4268:
4266:
4263:
4259:
4256:
4254:
4251:
4249:
4246:
4245:
4244:
4241:
4239:
4236:
4234:
4231:
4229:
4226:
4224:
4221:
4219:
4216:
4212:
4209:
4208:
4207:
4204:
4202:
4199:
4197:
4194:
4192:
4189:
4187:
4184:
4182:
4179:
4177:
4174:
4172:
4169:
4167:
4164:
4162:
4161:
4157:
4153:
4150:
4148:
4145:
4144:
4143:
4140:
4138:
4135:
4133:
4130:
4128:
4125:
4123:
4120:
4118:
4115:
4111:
4108:
4107:
4106:
4103:
4101:
4098:
4096:
4093:
4091:
4088:
4084:
4081:
4080:
4079:
4076:
4074:
4071:
4069:
4066:
4064:
4061:
4057:
4054:
4053:
4052:
4049:
4047:
4046:
4042:
4038:
4036:
4033:
4031:
4028:
4027:
4025:
4021:
4017:
4010:
4005:
4003:
3998:
3996:
3991:
3990:
3987:
3975:
3972:
3970:
3967:
3965:
3962:
3960:
3957:
3956:
3953:
3947:
3944:
3942:
3939:
3937:
3934:
3932:
3929:
3927:
3924:
3922:
3919:
3917:
3914:
3912:
3909:
3908:
3906:
3902:
3896:
3895:
3891:
3889:
3886:
3884:
3881:
3879:
3876:
3874:
3871:
3869:
3866:
3864:
3861:
3859:
3856:
3854:
3851:
3849:
3846:
3844:
3841:
3839:
3836:
3834:
3833:Justification
3831:
3829:
3826:
3824:
3821:
3819:
3816:
3814:
3811:
3809:
3806:
3804:
3801:
3799:
3796:
3794:
3791:
3789:
3786:
3784:
3781:
3779:
3776:
3774:
3772:
3768:
3766:
3764:
3760:
3759:
3757:
3755:
3751:
3745:
3742:
3740:
3737:
3735:
3732:
3730:
3727:
3725:
3722:
3720:
3717:
3715:
3712:
3710:
3709:Phenomenalism
3707:
3705:
3702:
3700:
3699:Naïve realism
3697:
3695:
3692:
3690:
3687:
3685:
3682:
3680:
3677:
3675:
3672:
3670:
3667:
3665:
3662:
3660:
3657:
3655:
3652:
3650:
3649:Contextualism
3647:
3645:
3642:
3640:
3637:
3636:
3634:
3632:
3628:
3622:
3621:
3617:
3615:
3614:Vienna Circle
3612:
3610:
3607:
3605:
3602:
3600:
3597:
3595:
3592:
3590:
3587:
3585:
3582:
3580:
3577:
3575:
3572:
3570:
3567:
3565:
3562:
3560:
3557:
3555:
3552:
3550:
3549:Hilary Putnam
3547:
3545:
3542:
3540:
3537:
3535:
3532:
3530:
3527:
3525:
3524:Robert Nozick
3522:
3520:
3519:John McDowell
3517:
3515:
3512:
3510:
3507:
3505:
3502:
3500:
3497:
3495:
3492:
3490:
3487:
3485:
3482:
3480:
3479:Immanuel Kant
3477:
3475:
3472:
3470:
3467:
3465:
3462:
3460:
3457:
3455:
3452:
3450:
3449:Alvin Goldman
3447:
3445:
3442:
3440:
3437:
3435:
3432:
3430:
3427:
3425:
3422:
3420:
3417:
3415:
3412:
3410:
3407:
3405:
3402:
3400:
3397:
3395:
3392:
3390:
3387:
3385:
3382:
3381:
3379:
3377:
3373:
3369:
3362:
3357:
3355:
3350:
3348:
3343:
3342:
3339:
3327:
3319:
3317:
3309:
3308:
3305:
3295:
3294:Alfred Tarski
3292:
3290:
3287:
3286:
3284:
3280:
3274:
3271:
3269:
3266:
3264:
3263:Peter Galison
3261:
3259:
3256:
3254:
3251:
3250:
3248:
3246:
3242:
3236:
3233:
3231:
3228:
3226:
3223:
3222:
3220:
3216:
3210:
3207:
3205:
3202:
3200:
3197:
3196:
3194:
3190:
3184:
3181:
3179:
3176:
3174:
3171:
3170:
3168:
3166:
3162:
3156:
3153:
3151:
3150:Nathan Salmon
3148:
3146:
3145:Richard Rorty
3143:
3141:
3138:
3136:
3133:
3131:
3128:
3126:
3123:
3121:
3118:
3116:
3115:Alonzo Church
3113:
3112:
3110:
3106:
3100:
3097:
3095:
3092:
3090:
3087:
3086:
3084:
3082:
3078:
3072:
3069:
3067:
3064:
3062:
3059:
3057:
3054:
3052:
3051:Ruth Millikan
3049:
3047:
3046:John McDowell
3044:
3042:
3039:
3037:
3034:
3032:
3029:
3027:
3024:
3023:
3021:
3019:
3015:
3009:
3006:
3004:
3001:
3000:
2998:
2994:
2988:
2985:
2983:
2980:
2978:
2977:Hilary Putnam
2975:
2973:
2972:Robert Nozick
2970:
2968:
2965:
2963:
2960:
2958:
2955:
2953:
2950:
2948:
2945:
2943:
2940:
2939:
2937:
2933:
2923:
2920:
2918:
2915:
2913:
2910:
2908:
2905:
2903:
2902:Rudolf Carnap
2900:
2899:
2897:
2895:
2894:Vienna Circle
2891:
2885:
2882:
2880:
2877:
2876:
2874:
2872:
2871:Berlin Circle
2868:
2862:
2859:
2857:
2854:
2853:
2851:
2849:
2845:
2839:
2836:
2834:
2831:
2829:
2826:
2824:
2821:
2819:
2816:
2814:
2811:
2809:
2806:
2804:
2801:
2799:
2796:
2794:
2791:
2789:
2786:
2784:
2781:
2779:
2778:Philippa Foot
2776:
2774:
2771:
2769:
2766:
2764:
2761:
2759:
2756:
2755:
2753:
2751:
2747:
2741:
2738:
2736:
2733:
2731:
2728:
2726:
2725:Graham Priest
2723:
2721:
2718:
2716:
2713:
2711:
2708:
2706:
2705:Charlie Broad
2703:
2701:
2698:
2697:
2695:
2691:
2685:
2682:
2680:
2677:
2675:
2672:
2670:
2667:
2665:
2662:
2661:
2659:
2657:
2653:
2647:
2644:
2642:
2639:
2637:
2634:
2632:
2629:
2627:
2624:
2622:
2619:
2617:
2616:Gottlob Frege
2614:
2612:
2609:
2607:
2604:
2603:
2601:
2597:
2587:
2584:
2582:
2579:
2577:
2574:
2572:
2569:
2567:
2564:
2562:
2559:
2558:
2556:
2554:
2550:
2544:
2543:Supervenience
2541:
2539:
2536:
2534:
2531:
2529:
2526:
2524:
2521:
2518:
2514:
2511:
2510:
2508:
2504:
2498:
2495:
2493:
2490:
2488:
2485:
2483:
2480:
2478:
2475:
2473:
2470:
2468:
2465:
2463:
2460:
2458:
2455:
2453:
2450:
2448:
2445:
2443:
2442:Functionalism
2440:
2438:
2435:
2433:
2430:
2428:
2427:Descriptivism
2425:
2423:
2420:
2418:
2415:
2414:
2412:
2408:
2398:
2395:
2393:
2392:Philosophical
2390:
2388:
2385:
2383:
2382:Non-classical
2380:
2378:
2375:
2373:
2370:
2368:
2365:
2364:
2362:
2358:
2352:
2349:
2347:
2344:
2342:
2339:
2338:
2336:
2332:
2326:
2323:
2321:
2318:
2316:
2313:
2311:
2308:
2306:
2303:
2302:
2300:
2296:
2293:
2289:
2285:
2278:
2273:
2271:
2266:
2264:
2259:
2258:
2255:
2249:
2242:
2236:
2232:
2229:
2227:
2223:
2220:
2216:
2215:
2210:
2206:
2202:
2201:
2196:
2192:
2188:
2187:
2182:
2178:
2174:
2173:
2169:
2163:
2159:
2155:
2151:
2146:
2142:
2135:
2130:
2127:
2123:
2119:
2115:
2111:
2105:
2101:
2097:
2092:
2088:
2082:
2078:
2071:
2066:
2063:
2059:
2055:
2052:
2048:
2044:
2038:
2034:
2029:
2025:
2019:
2016:. Routledge.
2015:
2014:
2008:
2005:
2001:
1997:
1993:
1989:
1984:
1983:
1979:
1969:
1964:
1960:
1956:
1952:
1945:
1942:
1936:
1930:
1926:
1922:
1915:
1913:
1909:
1904:
1900:
1893:
1890:
1885:
1881:
1877:
1873:
1869:
1865:
1858:
1851:
1848:
1843:
1839:
1835:
1831:
1827:
1823:
1816:
1813:
1808:
1802:
1798:
1794:
1790:
1785:Reprinted in
1782:
1778:
1774:
1770:
1766:
1762:
1758:
1754:
1747:
1744:
1740:
1734:
1731:
1726:
1720:
1716:
1715:
1707:
1704:
1699:
1697:9780521246729
1693:
1689:
1688:
1680:
1677:
1672:
1666:
1662:
1661:
1653:
1650:
1645:
1641:
1637:
1633:
1630:(2): 41–158.
1629:
1625:
1618:
1615:
1610:
1606:
1602:
1598:
1594:
1590:
1586:
1579:
1576:
1572:
1566:
1560:
1556:
1552:
1545:
1542:
1538:
1534:
1531:
1527:
1521:
1517:
1513:
1509:
1505:
1501:
1494:
1491:
1487:
1483:
1479:
1475:
1471:
1464:
1457:
1454:
1450:
1445:
1439:
1435:
1434:
1426:
1423:
1418:
1414:
1407:
1404:
1393:
1389:
1382:
1379:
1375:
1369:
1365:
1361:
1354:
1352:
1350:
1346:
1342:
1336:
1333:
1328:
1322:
1318:
1314:
1310:
1303:
1300:
1295:
1289:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1275:
1265:
1262:
1257:
1251:
1247:
1243:
1235:
1232:
1227:
1221:
1217:
1213:
1206:
1203:
1198:
1194:
1190:
1186:
1182:
1178:
1174:
1169:
1163:
1160:
1148:
1144:
1138:
1136:
1132:
1120:
1116:
1109:
1106:
1099:
1095:
1092:
1090:
1087:
1085:
1082:
1081:
1077:
1075:
1073:
1065:
1063:
1056:
1055:
1051:
1047:
1046:
1045:
1043:
1039:
1034:
1032:
1028:
1024:
1022:
1017:
1008:
1001:
996:
994:
993:Hilary Putnam
989:
986:
982:
977:
975:
971:
970:
964:
960:
956:
949:
947:
945:
939:
928:
925:
918:
912:
909:
908:
907:
905:
901:
895:
891:
881:
879:
875:
871:
867:
861:
859:
858:
853:
849:
845:
840:
839:Rudolf Carnap
831:
829:
817:
816:
806:
801:
787:
780:O, which is H
775:
763:
759:
755:
750:
740:
736:
732:
728:
723:
721:
717:
713:
709:
697:
696:
695:
692:
690:
686:
682:
678:
674:
670:
666:
662:
658:
654:
650:
646:
639:
637:
626:
623:
622:
621:
618:
612:
609:
606:
603:
600:
597:
596:
595:
588:
579:
577:
572:
566:
564:
554:
550:
548:
544:
540:
534:
532:
528:
524:
520:
516:
512:
508:
503:
499:
495:
491:
487:
486:Gottlob Frege
483:
481:
476:
468:
465:
464:
463:
461:
456:
454:
446:
441:
439:
437:
433:
432:
427:
423:
419:
415:
411:
407:
399:
397:
394:
390:
385:
381:
378:
377:
368:
366:
364:
360:
356:
352:
344:
340:
338:
334:
332:
328:
326:
322:
321:
320:
318:
314:
309:
307:
299:
296:
295:
294:
292:
287:
285:
284:justification
281:
277:
273:
262:"7 + 5 = 12."
261:
258:
257:
256:
254:
246:
243:
240:
236:
233:
232:
231:
229:
228:
223:
222:
217:
216:
209:
201:
197:
191:
188:
179:
178:
177:
171:
168:
167:
166:
163:
160:
152:
151:
150:
144:
141:
140:
139:
133:
129:
126:
123:
120:
119:
118:
116:
115:
110:
109:Immanuel Kant
102:
98:
97:Immanuel Kant
94:
87:
85:
83:
79:
75:
74:Immanuel Kant
70:
68:
64:
60:
56:
52:
48:
44:
37:
33:
19:
5969:Usul al-Fiqh
5967:
5950:
5946:Legal system
5923:
5916:
5814:Law's Empire
5812:
5802:
5792:
5782:
5772:
5762:
5752:
5742:
5417:Philosophers
5359:Legal theory
5171:Substitution
5056:
4991:Mathematical
4916:Major fields
4814:Larry Laudan
4794:Imre Lakatos
4749:Otto Neurath
4724:Karl Pearson
4714:Pierre Duhem
4686:Isaac Newton
4616:Protoscience
4574:Epistemology
4448:Anti-realism
4446: /
4427: /
4418: /
4404: /
4402:Reductionism
4400: /
4373:Inductionism
4353:Evolutionism
4158:
4045:a posteriori
4044:
4040:
4034:
3892:
3793:Common sense
3782:
3771:A posteriori
3770:
3762:
3724:Reductionism
3618:
3569:Gilbert Ryle
3439:Fred Dretske
3424:Keith DeRose
3368:Epistemology
3183:Cora Diamond
3099:Morton White
2967:Thomas Nagel
2912:Otto Neurath
2861:Ernest Nagel
2808:Gilbert Ryle
2803:Derek Parfit
2763:J. L. Austin
2710:Casimir Lewy
2679:Peter Singer
2674:J. L. Mackie
2646:Barry Stroud
2606:Noam Chomsky
2599:Philosophers
2533:Natural kind
2522:
2417:Anti-realism
2377:Mathematical
2351:Performative
2310:Epistemology
2212:
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814:
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288:
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227:a posteriori
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5886:Natural law
5748:(c. 355 BC)
5595:Montesquieu
5387:Legal norms
5286:WikiProject
5156:Proposition
5151:Probability
5104:Description
5045:Foundations
4804:Ian Hacking
4789:Thomas Kuhn
4774:Karl Popper
4754:C. D. Broad
4671:Roger Bacon
4599:Non-science
4541:Linguistics
4521:Archaeology
4416:Rationalism
4406:Determinism
4393:Physicalism
4358:Fallibilism
4308:Coherentism
4238:Testability
4191:Observation
4186:Objectivity
4147:alternative
4078:Correlation
4068:Consilience
3873:Proposition
3843:Objectivity
3729:Reliabilism
3719:Rationalism
3664:Fallibilism
3639:Coherentism
3584:Ernest Sosa
3559:Thomas Reid
3544:James Pryor
3514:G. E. Moore
3504:David Lewis
3494:Saul Kripke
3489:Peter Klein
3469:Susan Haack
3399:Robert Audi
3282:Lwow-Warsaw
3268:Ian Hacking
3235:Karl Popper
3230:Thomas Kuhn
3178:Alice Crary
3140:Saul Kripke
3135:Jaegwon Kim
3130:David Lewis
3120:Jerry Fodor
3089:Susan Haack
3003:Robert Audi
2813:John Searle
2783:Peter Geach
2773:Antony Flew
2720:G. E. Moore
2641:Ernest Sosa
2571:Possibility
2320:Mathematics
2305:Metaphysics
2013:Analyticity
985:John Searle
981:Speech Acts
805:Saul Kripke
698:"Water is H
665:truth-value
525:truths and
202:distinction
6080:Empiricism
6044:Categories
5998:Law portal
5625:Petrażycki
5615:Pashukanis
5610:Olivecrona
5545:Hägerström
5460:Blackstone
5216:Set theory
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5099:Definition
5067:Consequent
5062:Antecedent
4691:David Hume
4664:Precursors
4546:Psychology
4526:Economics
4420:Empiricism
4411:Pragmatism
4398:Positivism
4388:Naturalism
4258:scientific
4142:Hypothesis
4105:Experiment
3974:Discussion
3964:Task Force
3883:Simplicity
3863:Perception
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3714:Positivism
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3509:John Locke
3474:David Hume
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3459:Paul Grice
3434:John Dewey
3404:A. J. Ayer
3258:John Dupré
3125:Kurt Gödel
3081:Pragmatism
2996:Notre Dame
2987:John Rawls
2856:A. J. Ayer
2793:R. M. Hare
2788:Paul Grice
2700:Arif Ahmed
2487:Sense data
2472:Pragmatism
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2035:. Rodopi.
1530:Woodbridge
1397:2013-05-16
963:skepticism
955:Paul Grice
888:See also:
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634:7 + 5 = 12
545:truths in
529:synthetic
509:that are (
341:synthetic
329:synthetic
268:7 + 5 = 12
190:meaning"?
187:definition
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5758:(c. 1270)
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5575:Llewellyn
5435:Aristotle
5247:Fallacies
5242:Paradoxes
5232:Logicians
5166:Statement
5161:Reference
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5089:Deduction
5052:Abduction
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4969:Classical
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4458:Scientism
4253:ladenness
4073:Construct
4051:Causality
3838:Knowledge
3823:Induction
3773:knowledge
3765:knowledge
3108:Princeton
2907:Hans Hahn
2693:Cambridge
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1274:Tractatus
1100:Footnotes
1016:tautology
950:Responses
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828:identical
727:intension
649:semantics
335:analytic
323:analytic
159:contained
59:predicate
5988:Category
5910:Concepts
5876:Legalism
5828:Theories
5715:Voegelin
5685:Scaevola
5645:Radbruch
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5605:Nussbaum
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4196:Paradigm
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4030:Analysis
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3754:Concepts
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3192:Reformed
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2410:Theories
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5490:Ehrlich
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5475:Cardozo
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5445:Bastiat
5430:Aquinas
5296:changes
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4907:History
4902:Outline
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4504:Physics
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4280:control
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3620:more...
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1842:2023770
1644:2182828
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5565:Kelsen
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5705:Stahl
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5650:Rawls
5635:Pound
5570:Leoni
5535:Hegel
5425:Alexy
5349:Index
5225:other
5190:Lists
5176:Truth
4943:Proof
4891:Logic
3969:Stubs
3888:Truth
3534:Plato
3326:Index
2360:Logic
2334:Turns
2137:(PDF)
2128:>.
2073:(PDF)
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